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SUMMARY OF THESIS
This thesis examines the contribution to social and political theory of the flexible 
specialization research programme (henceforth FSRP). It explores systematically the 
sociological and political underpinnings of this research programme, with a view to 
critically explicating its understanding of industrialisation and industrial transformations in 
the contemporary world. While examining the unity in diversity of the various researchers 
working with the FSRP it also contrasts the FSRP with other cognate research programmes 
(regulatory theory, post-Fordism, flexible accumulation, etc ). The thesis explores further 
the FSRP and its relationship with political transformations, defined in the broadest sense 
to include meta-theoretical reflections on meaning of the political in the FSRP, the 
transformation in industrial relations, the trend toward economic and social dualism, 
polarisation, marginalisation and segmentation and the meaning of locality, industrial 
districts and regionalism in the FSRP. The thesis is sympathetic to the FSRP and views it 
as a progressively developing one (in both a political and epistemological sense) but is 
nevertheless critical of some of its foundational assumptions and policy prescriptions As 
a research programme that is still developing in a cumulative direction this thesis can only 
claim to be provisional in its problématisations.
INTRODUCTION
That there has been a sea-change in the economic, social and political character of the 
advanced industrial capitalist societies is now well established within the literature of the 
social sciences. Just how to theorise, conceptualise and interpret the empirical evidence, 
however, is subject to much debate and controversy. Terms such as post-industrialism', 
neo-Fordism', 'post-Fordism', 'flexible-mass-production', 'flexible-accumulation', 'new- 
production-concepts’, 'diversified-quality-production1, 'lean production', 'information- 
mediated', 'reflexive-accumulation' and 'flexible-specialization' are all different terms used 
pointing to distinct ways of understanding these transformations.
This dissertation explores in detail just one of these paradigms, the social and political 
theory of flexible specialization. I concentrate my analysis and critique on an identifiable 
group of researchers and writers whose core consists of the following: Michael Piore, 
Charles Sabel, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Paul Hirst and Jonathon Zeitlin (this list is, of 
course, not exhaustive). In the following chapters I will critically explore in detail the 
theoretical, social and political presuppositions of what I call the "Flexible Specialization" 
(henceforth, FS) hypothesis. Through an analysis and critique of these writers I 
problematize the status of the FS hypothesis by confronting it with other traditions of 
thought, both sociological and Marxist. This problematization is not, however, a dogmatic 
rejection of the FS thesis from an exogenous or transcendent standpoint outside it - 
Marxist or otherwise - but rather an immanent critique which attempts to tease out and 
locate the logical, empirical and political aporias of the FS hypothesis
I write from a perspective which while sympathetic to the FS research programme and its 
attempt to map out the contours of the new social, economic and political landscape of the 
advanced industrial capitalist societies of the late twentieth century, I nevertheless have 
many questions and criticisms to direct at the core ideas and political implications of the 
FS research programme. The key word which I would use to describe the basis of my 
criticisms is that of, scepticism. A scepticism that is, nonetheless, tempered by some
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admiration for the ideas, questions and solutions put forward by these researchers. In my 
opinion the FS research programme is one of the most rigorous and ambitious attempts to 
develop a social, economic and political alternative to the twin dogmas of neo-liberal free- 
market economics - which has exercised such a disastrous hegemonic influence on the 
world these last fifteen years - and, on the other hand, Soviet style Marxism - whose 
failure and collapse is now all too clear to see. On the other hand, I have a great deal of 
sympathy with some of the more open and critical forms of Marxism that have attempted 
to keep alive a spirit of radical criticism in the wake of these twin dogmas.
It is difficult to summarise the FS thesis in a few sentences without doing violence to its 
complex, multi-layered and developing character. However in synopsis it can be 
characterized in the following manner: As first formulated in Chapter 5 of Charles F. 
Sabel's book, Work and Politics: the division of labour in industry (1982), it refers to a 
form of production regime which follows the 'end of Fordism1. At this stage Chapter 5, 
titled The end of Fordism?’ formulated the question in terms of a question mark, that is, 
in terms of the possibility of the end of Fordism, defined as mass-production and mass- 
consumption organized along the lines of the semi-automatic assembly line, de-skilled 
(Taylorized) workers, dedicated product specific machinery and homogenised large-scale 
mass markets. Sabel argues that "Fordism calls for the separation of conception from 
execution, the substitution of unskilled for skilled labour and special-purpose for universal 
machines." (1982, p.194). Flexible-specialization (or just specialization in Work and 
Politics) on the other hand demand "the reverse": "collaboration between designers and 
skilled producers to make a variety of goods with general-purpose machines" (ibid p.194). 
This set of transformations is exemplified and concretely specified with the example of 
what Sabel calls high-technology cottage industry’ (ibid, p.220) in North-Eastern Italy.
The FS thesis is outlined in more detail with greater theoretical and empirical grounding in 
Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel’s, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for 
Prosperity (1984). Here the FS thesis is situated within a general critique of orthodox 
modernization theory with its theory of necessitarian stages of growth. Instead, the FS 
thesis argues for a history of greater contingency and plasticity, where other possibilities
could have been pursued given the victory of alternative political, social and economic actors 
and systems
These ideas are traced out and developed throughout Piore and Sabel's writings and, 
moreover, amplified in various modalities by Unger, Hirst and Zeitlin and other researchers. 
In Piore's latest book, Beyond Individualism (1995), the FS thesis is reiterated in Chapter 2, 
Politics & Policy':
"In response to the changed environment, new, more flexible production 
systems have emerged These systems have been greatly facilitated by 
information technology, it is now possible to obtain many of the advantages of 
specialized machinery through software programs attached to general-purpose 
equipment But the new flexible approaches are associated with institutional 
innovations as well, and those innovations have begun to coalesce into a new 
organizational model Although somewhat inchoate, that model has already 
begun to replace the classic hierarchical corporation as the goal of managers 
and entrepreneurs " (1995, p 10)
In this thesis 1 do not attempt to contrast the FS thesis with Marxist forms of theorising 
modern industrial capitalism, but rather to use both traditions to interrogate each other and lay 
bare each tradition of thought, identifying contradictions, convergences and divergences The 
first chapter explores the theories of industrialization and capitalism that underlie and shape 
the FS research programme, the second chapter explores some of the alternative ways of 
understanding industrialisation and capitalism that has been developed by modem critical 
Marxism, and in particular, the tradition of thought represented by the French regulation 
school of political economy, the third chapter explores in more detail the genealogy of the FS 
research programme as it has developed so far, focusing in on some of the substantive 
propositions of the FS hypothesis The fourth chapter examines the political theory of FS, 
asking if a radical democratic politics can be located in these writings Chapter Five follows 
these ideas up by exploring the philosophical, sociological and political place of work, labour 
and production in the thought of the FS research programme Finally, the sixth chapter 
explores, tentatively at least, the political implications of FS on the level of its relationship 
with, and espousal of, industrial districts, localities and regionalism
It is impossible to come to any firm, fixed or dogmatic conclusions regarding the FS 
research programme on the following grounds. First, its contemporaneity means that it is 
still the subject of research and revision. Its major researchers are very much alive and 
are still mapping out a route, through their divergent paths, of a theory and practice of FS 
Second, and relatedly, they are continuingly modifying and widening out their 
understanding of current political, social and economic restructurings which makes their 
research programme a developing one. Thirdly, my sympathy with the general spirit of 
inquiry encouraged by the FS research programme disinclines me from a too hostile and 
negative response. Its concern with the relations between political, philosophical and 
social dimensions of economic activity, from a position on the left (defined in broad terms 
as a concern with political, social and economic justice) is exemplary in modem social 
science, which too often in its concern with isolated and easily manageable empirical 
research, is myopically scornful of anything that attempts to examine the big picture. 
Ironically, modem academic Marxism, in its drive for intellectual respectability, also 
criticizes such projects and research programmes for their lack of empirical evidence, or as 
Pollert puts it, their confusion of the levels of "prediction, prescription and description" 
(1988)' Although there is a grain of truth in this critique it is important to emphasize the 
fact that academic Marxism rarely puts forward with any conviction realizable or feasible 
alternatives to modem capitalism.
Therefore, we should be thankful that the FS research programme consistently attempts to 
unite an analysis which looks attentively to the changes that are happening to the advance 
industrial societies under the driving impetus of capitalist relationships of production and, 
moreover, emphasizing the non-necessitarian', non-essentialistic', non-deterministic', 
artifactual possibilities latent in ’ postindustrial' capitalism. In the spirit of the nineteenth 
century utopian socialist writers, unjustifiably marginalized by Marxism (although this is 
not to suggest that none of Marx's criticisms of this tradition never hit their target), the FS 
researchers are bold in their enthusiasm for inventing and imagining new institutional 
arrangements for managing, in democratic and egalitarian ways, advanced 'postindustrial' 
societies. By imagining alternative 'possible worlds' that are latent in the present, the FS 
theories and researchers offer up new 'transitional' programmes for a 'radical democratic' 
alternative to neo-liberal free market' hegemony and dominance.
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Having made these sympathetic remarks it is necessary nonetheless to valorise the
substantive criticisms that I have made in this dissertation regarding the ideas found in the
FS research programme.
Let me state in a number of short theses what these criticisms are:
(1) There is a non-resolved tension in the FS literature between an assertion of the 
importance of countering the mythical history of modernity' (Unger) which is 
evolutionist, determinist and developmentalist with their own foregrounding in non- 
necessitarianism, artifactuality and non-determinism and, on the other hand, their 
tendency to suggest that FS as a theory of neo-industrialization2 and neo- 
modernisation' is a process which is unfolding with inexorability. Is this the return 
of false necessity'? The general impression that I get from their diverse writings is 
that FS is inscribed within a necessitarian logic, but this is circumscribed by the 
artifactual thesis that FS can take many institutional forms and it should be the task 
of the theorist and politicians to try and invent and discover radically democratic 
forms of FS. But still we are left with the theoretical dilemmas mentioned above.
(2) The FS research programme slips between statements at the level of the indicative 
and of the imperative The Third Italy is constructed as "high-technology cottage 
industry: the unity of the abstract and the concrete". But this, by any criteria, must 
be taken as somewhat of a romanticism which ignores or dissimulates the more 
negative social and economic features of the region and its industrial districts. 
However, on the imperative level there is the constant intellectual endeavour to 
avoid the scenario of a form of FS which institutionalizes a form of exclusivist FS 
which marginalizes large numbers of the population who are not artisans or 
polyvalent workers (non-standard employment contracts). This is the thesis of 
polarization and dualization. However, that the FS research programme is centrally 
concerned with the extra-economic institutional forms of inclusion, citizenship 
rights, reinsurance and the Welfare State suggest that Hyman's (1985) criticism that 
FS theorists are not concerned with state/govemance relationships is false. Indeed, 
this subject is one of the most important areas of research for the FS research
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programme and will increase in importance in the future as is shown by Hirst's 
concern with "New Forms of Economic and Social Governance" (1994). Related 
to the above is the criticism that the FS research programme is ignorant of feminist 
criticisms of modern advanced industrial societies. The way in which modern 
societies are structured by private and public patriarchy3 is not tackled by FS 
researchers, although there is always the suggestion implicit in their research that 
women and ethnic minorities may be the chief victims of an exclusionary version 
of FS (Graham, 1993).
The FS research programme needs to address the issue raised by Marxist 
researchers around the totalising nature of late capitalism. That capitalism is a 
globalizing phenomenon is understated, particularly in Hirst and Zeitlin's writings, 
and work should be done around whether FS industrial districts can survive. Could 
it be the case as Amin and Thrift have suggested that there are processes under 
way which are undermining reversing the industrial district phenomenon of 
'vertical disintegration1. Processes of concentration and centralization are 
challenging the existence of the industrial district. How can this be avoided? 
Unger's work is most cognisant of this danger and his theory works towards a 
radical alternative to capitalism (although he would not put it in these terms). 
Relatedly, the failure to consider the phenomenon of "Japanization” and what 
Kenney (1993) and Florida call "innovation-mediated production", is a serious 
failing which needs to be addressed.
The FS research programme is too dependent on the Marxist paradigm of work.
By placing too much faith in a model of the utopia of emancipation through labour, 
the FS theorists do not take on board the thesis that perhaps this is not the best 
political, philosophical and sociological model to follow. Perhaps, indeed, it just 
reinforces the "ultimate ideology of work" that we can find in strategic human 
resource management. The Marxist paradigm of production (Heller) (1992) that we 
can find in Marx's the Grundrisse and in Negt's (1979) recent critical writings are a 
useful warning to those who would romanticise artisanal labour or even the
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polyvalent worker. It is necessary to take seriously, then, Offe's (1988) hypothesis 
that the radiating and integrating power of employment has weakened considerably.
(5) The FS research programme is linked to a politics of regionalism. A Europe of the 
regions. The danger is, however, that this can be articulated with forms of ethno- 
nationalism and racism. The Northern Leagues of Italy often appeal to the 
economics of the industrial district as the basis for the prosperity of the North.
Could this lead to new geographical/spatial forms of exclusion, dualization, 
polarisation and marginalisation that would over-determine the social and economic 
ones mentioned above? There is not any deterministic relationship between FS and 
these forms of reactionary politics, but there could be a sort of 'elective affinity1 
between them. Much more research needs to be done on this subject. There is the 
case, on the other hand, made by Sabel and Storper that the Third World’ would 
be wise to adapt forms of FS so the argument is much more ambivalent than I have 
suggested.
These five points are not exhaustive of the criticisms that can be directed at the FS 
research programme, but they form the major themes of this dissertation which I hope will 
be taken up by other researchers. Despite these criticisms, however, I would suggest that 
the FS research programme is still a progressively developing one, whose theoretical core 
can be integrated with an open and critical Marxism. In turn an open and critical 
Marxism can learn from the host of theoretical and empirical research and writings which 
have called into question the simplification and orthodoxies of neo-classical economics.
The FS research programme, then, is syncretic, drawing upon a wide variety of traditions 
of thought which are opposed to the neo-classical synthesis. It is an encouraging sign that 
books such as Robert Lane's The Market Experience (1991)'' give support and 
encouragement to ideas that can be found in the FS school. Perhaps all these diverse 
efforts will finally help to dismantle the political, economic and social theory of neo­
liberalism and provide the foundation for a more fair and just society in the near future. 
These observations, then, problematize the extreme rejection of the FS hypothesis put 
forward by such researchers as Florida and Kenney who write "Fables based on northern 
Italy or Silicon Valley are enchanting reading, but irrelevant for understanding the future
development of global capitalism" (p.302).5 Problematize because as Florida and Kenney 
admit they are only concerned with describing and theorizing what is and are not 
concerned with what might and could be in the spirit of what Giddens calls a 'Utopian 
Realism’ As Steven Seidman has eloquently argued in his book Contested Knowledge: 
Social Theory in the Postmodern Era (1994), social science must be engaged, critical and 
normative if it is to speak in a morally inspiring way to the public and politicians. It 
seems to me that the FS research programme whatever its faults succeeds in this task.
Finally, it needs to be emphasised that this thesis does not advance any original empirical 
refutation or validation of the FS thesis, rather it is primarily concerned with the political 
and social theorising which undergirds it and supplies the framework for its empirical 
research. However, any further research needs to work iteratively between reflexive 
theorising and reflexive empirical investigation at the macro and micro levels of social 
existence.
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REFERENCES: INTRODUCTION
1 Anna Pollert's phrase.
2 Neo-industrialization is a term used by Kern and Schumann (1987) to refer to high- 
technology industrialization as opposed to reindustrialization of old manufacturing industries.
3 See Sylvia Walby, Theorizing Patriarchy (1989).
4 Robert Lane's The Market Experience (1991) is perhaps the most elaborate treatise on the 
new institutional social economics. Albert O. Hirschman while praising Lane's book points 
out that "... Lane might have also taken comfort from the findings of Michael Piore and 
Charles Sabel on the emergence of a new culture of work in the post-Fordist age, which they 
describe in their important book The Second Industrial Divide" (742). See Symposium on 
Contemporary Sociology (741-765), March 1993. See also, Will Hutton, "New economics 
hits at market orthodoxies", The Guardian. April 19, 1993.
5 M Kenney and R. Florida. Bevond Mass Production. Oxford University Press (1993).

1. INDUSTRIALIZATION. NEO-INDUSTRIALIZATION AND 
FLEXIBLE SPECIALIZATION
This chapter will explore the theory of industrialization and industrial society that provides 
the meta-theoretical 'foundation' for the FS-hypothesis of Piore, Sabel, Hirst and Zeitlin. I 
will argue that there are some fundamental differences between how these researchers 
understand processes of industrialization and technological paradigms, as well as similarities, 
which has much to do with the distinct political and theoretical routes which each set of 
researchers travelled to reach their positions of convergence around the FS hypothesis. 
Accordingly, this chapter will examine first, Piore and Sabel's understanding of 
industrialization and industrial society and second, Hirst and Zeitlin's concentrating 
specifically on Hirst's more self-conscious and explicit role from the espousal of an 
Althusserian understanding of capitalist society, through to his recent espousal of FS as an 
'ideal-type' concept. As this chapter deals with fairly abstract pre-suppositional issues little 
will be said at this stage about the more concrete and empirical issues involved with the FS 
hypothesis as this will be dealt with in another chapter.1'1
Against Convergence
A genealogical starting point for examining Piore and Sabel's theory of industrialization and 
industrial society can start from the publication in 1980 of Piore and Berger's Dualisms and 
Discontinuity in Industrial Societies. This important book outlines some of the key ideas 
about industrialization which Piore and Sabel will develop and modify in their latest work 
together Furthermore it also indicates the meeting of two theoretical paradigms - the 
sociological and radical economic theories of industrialization - which is the hallmark of the
3FS hypothesis. As background to this book it is worth noting that Piore had, by the late 
1970s, already established himself as a radical economist of some note in such works as Birds 
nf Passaire and Promised Lands: Lone Distance Migrants and Industrial Societies (1979) .1:1 
In keeping with many North American academics, however, Piore kept his distance from 
Marxist approaches, which led him to develop a critique of orthodox structural-functionalist 
theories of industrial society, rather than the theory of industrial society per se.
Without wishing to repeat an often told story it is necessary to outline the industrial society 
idea or paradigm, so as to identify the objectives and pre-suppositions of Piore's critique The 
theory of industrialism emerged within the mainstream of liberal sociology and economics 
during the late 1940s and 1950s in a movement dominated by the neo-classical Keynesian 
synthesis within economics, the Harvard University Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, and 
Parsonian structural-functionalist theory within sociology. Kerr et al developed the industrial 
society theory into its most coherent shape in the famous study, Industrialism and Industrial 
Man (1962) which put forward the following theses: (1) the distinction between traditional 
and modern societies; (2) the separation between ownership and control; (3) the bureaucratic 
differentiation of management; (4) the social responsibility of management; (5) the technical 
specialization of management; (6) the end of ideological politics and the modernization theory 
of development; (7) the theory of convergence A vast literature has been devoted to 
examining this theory (see, Kumar, 1974, Goldthorpe, 1971)'3' mainly from a highly critical 
perspective, although there have been attempts to defend the theory (Abrams, 1985),141 and 
since the events of 1989 in Eastern/Central Europe and 1991 in the former Soviet Union, the 
original theory has made something of a comeback in the form of the "End of History" thesis 
associated with Francis Fukayama (1993). The central idea of the industrial society thesis, 
from the point of view of the argument here, is the convergence hypothesis which can be 
stated in Kerr's own words: "[it] posits that the general movement is for industrial societies 
lo become more alike " (also see Ellman, 1980). Thus we have the orthodox evolutionary 
structural-functionalist differentiation theory which explains divergences and differences in 
terms of blocking mechanisms to convergence such as inertias, inefficiencies and resource
4constraints and the holding power of pre-industrial beliefs and values and of irrational ideologies 
The paradoxical significance of this set of ideas will become apparent below
Piore and Berger's critique of the industrial society theory argues that it has it roots in 
neo-classical economics and theory which assumes that the rational behaviour of individual actors 
maximising their self-interest generates the social and economic structures in which distinctions 
among individuals and groups are continuous and governed by a single logic of rationality. In 
contrast to this model they argue that the advanced industrial societies they were studying seemed 
far "lumpier" than could be accommodated by the classical models. They called this pattern of 
social and economic segmentation, dualism since the notion evoked both the "autonomy of each 
sector and the radical discontinuities we were discovering " Such social facts as the division 
between large-scale capital and small-scale capital, the core working-class and the marginal or 
peripheral working-class, the continuing existence and reproduction of the "traditional middle- 
classes" and artisans, racial, ethnic and gender differences, and so forth These dualisms or 
differences were thought by the classical industrial society theory to be remnants of the past, of 
tradition and backwardness, which would sooner or later be dissolved by the onward necessitarian 
march of industrialization and modernization This sort of deterministic theory was therefore 
unacceptable to Piore and Berger as illustrated in the following synoptic statement from Berger
"It is not possible to explain the persistence and importance of the traditional 
sector without altering the central assumptions on which the model of a unitary 
society are built It is not traditional survivals as such that these theories are 
incapable of explaining, but rather the entire range of phenomena that derive from 
the heterogeneity of mature industrial societies Cleavages between traditional and 
modern groups, cleavages based on race, religion and ethnicity, and languages all 
are said to disappear in modern society "
(1980, p.26).
Central to Piore and Berger's critique was the case of Italy which they saw as a paradigmatic 
counter-example to the convergence thesis, in the sense that Italy was developing in a manner 
contrary to orthodox modernisation theory and orthodox Marxist theory would suggest In the
industrial society perspective Italy was represented as a backward country in the process of 
catching up with the rest of Western Europe.
From the perspective of Piore and Berger, the modernisation/convergence thesis was not 
convincing on the following grounds First, it does not explain why after more than one 
hundred and fifty years of industrial development, the class structure of Italy is so strongly 
'unbalanced' in favour of the industrial middle-classes, the peasantry (and worker-peasants), 
artisan family enterprise and the 'peripheric working- class'. Secondly, the phenomenon of 
'dualism' and 'decentralisation' was increasing rather than declining in Italy contrary to 
expectations of the industrial society thesis. As many researchers have asked, the structure of 
Italian manufacturing industry in terms of firm size is bottom heavy with a large number of 
firms with fewer that one hundred workers, a trend accelerated with the famous 
'decentralisation', 'sub-contracting' or 'disembodying' of production by large Italian firms in the 
1980s Thirdly, the Italian economy was paradoxically undergoing a 'miracle' with high rates 
of economic growth and a GNP which has according to some calculations, overtaken the 
United Kingdom's (see Paci, 1985, Trigilla, 1991, Brusco, 1982, Sabel 1982).
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from Po'dism to 'High Technology Cottage Industry"
Thus, for Piore and Berger, the case of Italy served as an empirical falsification of the 
industrial society thesis. While Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies sketched out 
an agenda for a continuing research programme, it was Charles Sabel's Work and Politics 
Ihe division of labour in industry (1982) which drew together the theoretical and empirical 
threads to develop a frontal assault on the convergence theory. He identifies 'three misleading 
ideas’ which are at the core of this theory: (1) technological determinism; (2) essentialisni, 
and (3) reductionism Although these "three misleading ideas" had already been identified by 
other researchers and critics of the industrial society thesis Sabel lucidly pulls them together 
to develop the beginnings of an alternative theory of industrial society. For Sabel, 
technological determinism is:
6"... the familiar idea that regardless of its political preferences, any society that 
wants to produce industrial goods must adopt certain structures of organisation, 
patterns of authority, and ways of doing business.. The objection to 
technological determinism is that these performance standards can usually be 
met in several ways. They fit between what needs to be done and how it can 
be done is seldom as tight as the determinist imagine."
(1982, pp.4-5).
Essentialism can be defined as a species of determinism. It is the claim that what is true for 
society as a whole is true for each of its parts. The more advanced an industrial society, the 
more clearly modern forms of organisation predominate in each of its parts. As the difference 
between industrializing societies disappear, each society becomes internally more 
homogeneous. The objection to essentialism is that radically different forms of organization, 
some apparently archaic, others modern, are often interdependent. The regnant theories either 
neglect this diversity or dismiss whatever seems backward as vestigial, destined to be swept 
aside by future developments. Finally, reductionism: "is the doctrine that experience 
unambiguously determines thought. Here it amounts to the claim that everyday experience of 
modern societies by itself determines what people in those societies want of life." Sabel's 
objection to these three misleading ideas develops the ideas of Piore and Berger and moves 
towards a full-scale critique of all forms of the classical theory of industrial society and, it 
might be added, Marxist theory which Sabel tends to identify, in its deep structure, as 
equivalent to it at the formal if not the substantive level. This equation, between the 
convergence theory and Marxist theory at the level of sharing the "three misleading ideas", is 
common to many other researchers and is of some significance as shall become clearer below 
The fact that Marxism itself has attempted to correct some of these problems is not mentioned 
by Sabel, but it is a problem that has shaped much of twentieth century Western Marxism as 
shall be argued below The section of Sabel's book which is of most relevance for providing 
a corrective to the misleading ideas of the industrial society theory is chapter five "The end of 
fordism?" although chapter two "The structure of the labour market" is also of some 
significance in that it elaborates upon Piore's model of technological dualism with the point of 
attempting to account for the coexistence of large-scale mass- production industries and 
small-scale firms. The key point is that the special-purpose machines needed by Fordist
7industry cannot themselves be produced by Fordist principles, rather these machines can only 
be produced by general-purpose machines in one-off or small-batches; and secondly, in the 
context of the booms and slumps of the industrial capitalist economy, small firms are 
functional for large firms in filling in gaps in the market and balancing supply and demand in 
unstable and volatile economic circumstances However, what these arguments indicated is 
how, at this stage Piore and Sabel were not so far from the arguments of industrial society 
thesis and its functional logic. Indeed, it is hard to see in what manner the theory of dualism 
breaks with technological determinism or essentialism, because all the talk of contingency and 
the importance of politics does nothing to alter the fact that these are rhetorical gestures rather 
than theorized processes.
In Chapter Five "The end of Fordism?" the rhetorical appeal to contingency is again 
dramatically contradicted by functionalist premises of the central argument. Sabel's first 
observation is that there are signs everywhere in the industrial and economic world of 
restructurings and transformations and that factory work is being revolutionised." However, 
the vectors of change are firmly situated at the economic level and, moreover, are defined in 
essentialist terms as a transition from Fordism and neo-Fordism to post-Fordism (a term 
which will later be replaced by FS). Sabel writes:
"Many signs suggest that the Fordist model or organisation is being challenged 
by new forms of the divisions of labour. International competition and 
overlapping domestic conflicts between producers and consumers, and between 
workers and capitalists, are driving many large firms out of mass markets for 
standardised goods To survive this challenge manufacturers often have no 
choice but to produce more specialised, higher-quality products."
(ibid, p. 194)
These new products must be manufactured and marketed in new ways For Sabel, mass 
markets are the pre-condition for the Fordist organisation of production and when they start to 
break-up, through fragmentation and segmentation or even, in a more hyperbolic formulation, 
disintegrate then Fordism as a method and process for organising production begins to lose its 
aPpeal If this argument is accepted, even though there are numerous problems at the
theoretical and empirical level in that what counts as a mass-market and a lack of precision 
and confusion over what market fragmentation and segmentation is and how it might be 
measured it is still, if not a form of technological determinism, a fundamentally economistic 
argument that sees no need for arguments that appeal to politics, ideology or culture and is 
therefore compatible with the neo-classical 'under-socialised' understanding of the market 
economy (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992). That is, Sabel at this stage has not thought 
through the theoretical problems of how to conceptualise the economy and market in 
sociological and institutional terms.151
Nonetheless, Sabel wishes to present his argument as one which has firmly disposed of the 
"three misleading ideas" and present the case for a voluntaristic theory of contingency, 
possibility and conjunctural openness towards the future. For example, Sabel writes that the 
large- scale, multi-divisional, multinational enterprise or corporation is not doomed to die for 
any necessitarian reasons, inscribed within the logic and ecology of economic evolution, but 
rather could possibly meet the challenge of the 'New Times' and preserve their fundamental 
principles of organisation in the form of a "neo-Fordism". Alternatively, argues Sabel, "the 
changes under way could lead to drastic redefinitions of prevailing ideas of organizational and 
technological efficiency", and moreover new types of firm and work organisation could arise 
in a post- Fordist and post-Taylorist system of manufacture. In short, everything is up for 
grabs, that is, contingent In the interstices between one economic era and another:
"What finally happens will depend, on the eventual volatility of demand in the 
industrialized countries and the stability of the international economic order. It 
will depend on the outcome of workplace struggles between work groups and 
managers, but also among work groups themselves, over the costs and benefits 
of reorganisation Because it builds on so many imponderables, the following 
discussion is necessarily speculative Its purpose is to define possibilities, not 
to predict results One thing, though is for sure: Practical experience in 
productive associations is racing far ahead of existing ideas of organizational 
efficiency, all more or less rooted in Fordism "
(Ibid, p. 195)
9However, the idea that the world is one of many possible worlds where action rather than 
structure is in command is vitiated and undercut by the substantive explanation for 
transformation taking place in the world of work and economic activity. For Sabel argues 
that the preconditions for the emergence of a post-Fordist regime of production, distribution 
and consumption lies in the outcome of events at the level of the world-economy. For 
example, the break-up of mass markets (for Fordism produces and is produced by the viability 
of such markets). The preconditions for this to happen are the following: First, the 
internationalisation and globalisation of production which has led to the emergence in the 
'Third World' of new economic players called "newly industrialising countries" (NICs) which 
are challenging the advanced industrial capitalist societies by playing them at their own game 
through initiation of the mass production methods (product life- cycle theory). A challenge 
which Sabel observes could easily succeed as the cases of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong indicate. The second precondition is related to the first in the sense that it 
remains on the level of the market arguing that the emergence of a more discriminating and 
affluent consumer public has arisen which rejects the homogeneity of mass produced 
consumer durables. Sabel gives some examples such as the case of white pan bread, a mass 
consumption good if ever there was one, which experienced a drop in production of 15% in 
the United States between 1972 and 1977, while production of speciality wheat varieties 
increased by 62%. Another example which is given is the growth of mini-mills for the 
production of high-quality speciality steels.
I he third precondition which we can draw out from Sabel's account follows logically from the 
prior two, namely environmental and ecological effects of mass production/consumption:
Within any one society, too, the spread, of mass produced goods slowly undercuts the 
pre-conditions of the Fordist model. Consumers, workers, even nature itself all react to the 
tremendous increase in the production of standardised goods in ways that threaten the stability 
of mass markets" (Ibid, p. 198). Sabel says little about the mechanisms and processes that 
could lead to a more ecologically friendly form of production, but his argument implies a 
particular theory of the State (see below) which departs little from the classical liberal
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industrial society theory of a benign, interventionist state-subject which intervenes in the name 
of a universal technocratic rationality (Poulantzas, 1986; Jessop, 1988):
"Government regulation to protect the environment is a case in point. As 
increasing amounts of goods are produced, the chance that its production, use, 
or simply disposal will make the natural environment less hospitable to human 
life increases Whenever insults to the environment come to attention, there is 
the possibility that the state will regulate the production or use of the offending 
product in ways that will force its re-design or abandonment. As more 
countries set separate standards for the performance of a final product, it 
becomes more difficult to produce a standard, exportable good in mass 
quantity. In 1974, for example, Renault was having to manufacture several 
dozen variants of the R16 for export".
(Ibid, p 198).
A fourth pre-condition identified by Sabel is the developments in new technology itself which 
give rise to the development of universal computer-aided design and manufacturing systems 
On one reading of Sabel it is difficult to see how he avoids the first 'misleading idea' of 
technological-determinism which implies that technological developments automatically 
produce certain uniform effects and new corporate strategies. However, to avoid this Sabel 
argues that there are always alternative lines of development and responses to the emergence 
of these four developments outlined above. He argues that the core countries can meet all 
these transformations or disturbances in one of two ways. On the one hand, they can attempt 
to restore the status quo ante by adopting a protectionist strategy which would freeze the 
economic situation in the old mould. However, this is high risk strategy which involves 
constructing a coalition of interest groups (trade unions, business, political factions) which is 
unlikely given the diversity of interests involved On the other hand, the alternative to this 
strategy is to promote innovation Which in this context means promoting specialised 
production resting on the idea that:
"at the outset, customers' wants are vaguely defined and potentially diverse.
The presumption is that the customer has no precise need for a particular good 
Rather, he has a yearning or problem whose satisfaction or solution will have 
to reflect many singularities of his situation. The job of the innovative firm is
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to find a technically and economically feasible way of satisfying this inchoate 
need, thus creating a new product and defining a customer's wants at the same 
time This strategy is practicable only if Fordist habits of using labour and 
machinery are discarded or substantially modified in favour of more flexible 
forms of organisation. Flexibility, the capacity to produce a range of different 
products at the lowest total cost, will be more important than reducing the cost 
of any one product to the technically attainable minimum. Because an 
economy of this type prospers by producing an unforeseeably large variety of 
products, it needs general-purpose machines and an adaptable work-force that 
adjust quickly to new patterns of organization rather than special-purpose 
machines and unskilled workers."
(Ibid, p.202).
This strategic choice itself can be sub-divided into two possible worlds. The first strategic 
choice would be a 'neo-Fordisf strategy which would modify production and consumption 
without fundamentally altering or abandoning the basic principles of Fordism. The other 
choice would be to follow the Italian road of'high-technology cottage industry'.161
My argument is that Sabel is clearly attempting to steer clear of the fallacies of the industrial 
society theory's "three misleading ideas" but it is still uncertain whether he achieves this 
objective On my reading of Sabel he argues that (1) the implementation of new technologies 
of umversal/general machines is the only real, rational strategic choice, all other choices being 
either impracticable or irrational or both; (2) it suggests further, that all sectors of industry, 
occupations, jobs and the economy can be organised along these lines, that in principle it can 
be generalised so that the part reflects the whole; (3) finally, it suggests that ideologies, 
politics and cultural systems have little autonomy and are just reflections or representations of 
these prior developments. At best they just facilitate the implementation of technological 
paradigms or block their development according to their character These are just interim 
observations which will be developed further later in the conclusion to this section. However, 
before this it is necessary to examine the theory of industrialization and industrial society in 
the key text of Piore and Sabel, namely The Second Industrial Divide : Possibilities for 
Prosperity (1984).
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The second industrial divide
The argument of The Second Industrial Divide is in many ways very similar to Sahel's earlier 
argument, and departs little from it in its conceptualisation of industrialization and industrial 
society, although it is more explicit in its attempt to give a theoretical formulation and 
characterisation of the history of industrial societies and their 'divides'. Nevertheless, new 
conceptual innovations do make an appearance. First, there is the introduction of the term 
'Industrial Divides'; and secondly, the sketch of a history of the alternatives to mass 
production which is developed further in Sabel and Zeitlin's article 'Historical Alternatives to 
Mass Production: politics, markets and technology in nineteenth century industrialization' 
which appeared a year after the publication of The Second Industrial Divide in the journal 
Past & Present (1983). The term 'Industrial Divides' sharpens up their critique of single-track, 
evolutionary, modernisation/convergence theories of industrial society and can be seen as a 
deepening of Sabel's critique of technological determinism, essentialism and reductionism (the 
'three misleading ideas'). Following Williams, Cutler et al (1987) it is necessary to argue that 
Piore and Sabel have three levels of superstructura! argumentation, built upon the binary 
conceptual opposition between the two types of industrial production: mass-production and 
FS As Williams, Cutler et al put it:
"The text builds a large and ambitious superstructure on the basis of this one 
opposition. The superstructure has three interrelated elements: first, a theory 
of types of economy, their characteristics problems and how these problems can 
and have been resolved; second an interpretative meta-history of the 
development of modern manufacturing since 1800; third, and finally, an 
analysis of the current crisis of the advanced economies and its possible 
solutions Seldom in the history of intellectual endeavour, can so much have 
been built on the foundation of one opposition."
(p.406 1987).
I he term 'Industrial Divides' refers to an interpretative meta-history of the development of 
modern manufacturing and is the key to interpreting Piore and Sahel's theory of 
industrialization and its stages o f growth and development. Unlike the classical modernisation
theories of, say, Parsons or Rostow which posited a fixed sequence of unilineal stages, Piore 
and Sabel argue that there are moments in history when fundamental choices can be made 
There are conjunctures when history is more open and contingent where necessitarian and 
deterministic arguments have even less claim to adequacy:
"The brief moments when the path of technological development itself is at 
issue we call industrial divides. At such moments, social conflicts of the most 
apparently unrelated kinds determine the direction of technological 
developments for the following decades. Although industrialists, workers, 
politicians and intellectuals may only be dimly aware that they face 
technological choices, the actions that they take shape economic institutions for 
long into the future. Industrial divides are therefore the backdrop or frame for 
subsequent regulation crises."
(Ibid, p 5)
Industrial divides are the fundamental dividing points within the history of industrial society 
and two such moments are identified the first in the nineteenth century and the second in the 
last third of the twentieth century
At a lower level of abstraction than 'industrial divides', Piore and Sabel identify what they 
term 'regulation crises' which occur without each industrial divide, but which also occur in 
more extreme form in periods of industrial division as well It is important to recognise that 
the origins of many of Piore and Sabel's ideas have their origin in the French Regulation 
School of political economy. Regulation in Piore and Sabel's words is borrowed from
"the French tvgulalion. But - as will become apparent in the text - the 
concepts of historical change and economic crises with which we associate it 
differ from those concepts in the French theory. More precise English 
translations of ivgulalion are 'balancing mechanisms' and 'equilibration' These 
terms too, however, imply something different from our argument: they are 
closely associated with the market mechanism as understood in neo- classical 
economic theory as a whole - is but a specific solution to more general 
economic problems. Our usage, furthermore, should not be confused with the 
everyday of 'regulation' as a shorthand for 'government' intervention in private 
markets.' Rather, we are using the word in the most extended sense:, in some
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economic systems the government might play a critical role in regulating 
markets, yet the system as a whole would be self- regulating."
(Ibid, p.4).
This elucidation is less than enlightening however as it does not specify in precise terms what 
the conceptual specificity of their use of the term is, or refers to, and the nearest we get to a 
definition is the following:
"One kind of criticism easily visible, is marked by the realisation that existing 
institutions no longer secure a workable match between the production and 
consumption of goods; these institutions must be supplemented or replaced. We 
refer to the institutional circuits that connect production and consumption as 
regulatory mechanisms; we call the disruptions of these circuits regulation 
crises."
(Ibid, p 4).
The rise of the multi-divisional corporation and the KeynesianAVelfare State are examples 
given of forms of regulation which have arisen in the twentieth century in response to 
economic crisis. Thus the term 'regulation' as used by Piore and Sabel is never theorized and 
cannot compare with the attempt to specify it with rigour that can be found in the various 
forms of Marx's regulation theory (Aglietta, 1982, Boyer, 1990; Dunford, 1990; Jessop, 1990).
It is unclear how regulation crises and industrial divides in Piore and Sabel's work differ from 
one another at the conceptual level Industrial divides are presented as extreme forms of 
regulation crises. For example, the first industrial divide in the nineteenth century that pitted 
mass-production against craft production was also a regulation crisis in the sense that any 
form of industrial production and economic organisation depends upon its embeddedness in a 
system of rules, norms and values, of consent and coercion. In the nineteenth century forms 
of FS or artisanal production existed in conflict and contrast to the rising mass-production
system:
15
"These less rigid manufacturing technologies were craft systems: in the most 
advanced ones, skilled workers used sophisticated general-purpose machinery to 
turn out a wide and constantly changing assortment of goods for large but 
continuously shifting markets. Moreover - in contrast to mass production - 
economic success in these industries depended as much on cooperation as on 
competition: unless the costs of permanent innovation were shared among 
firms, and between capitalists and workers, those who stood to lose from 
change defended their interests by blocking it. And the sharing of costs 
depended, in turn, on institutions that protected the vulnerable in the name of 
the community as a whole."
(Ibid, p.5).
Although it is unthematized this argument bears a strong resemblance to Polyam's classic 
attack on free-market liberal economic and social theories. In The Great Transformation 
(1957), Polyani attacked the colonisation of the social by economic markets and the turning of 
everything (land, resources, labour, etc) into a commodity to be bought and sold. In 
particular the idea that human beings could be made the equivalent of other factors of 
production without inhuman and detrimental results was also attacked. In turn, of course, 
Polyani was drawing upon, in an eclectic manner, on the multitude of radical attacks in 
nineteenth century liberalism and its particular interpretation of Adam Smith's The Wealth of 
Nations (1776). Again in turn, Piore and Sabel are much influenced by all these critiques and 
it informs much of their analysis, but they unfortunately never move on and give a coherent 
account at the level of the history of ideas or theoretical formulation, of how these critiques 
have been incorporated into the body of their work and the way it informs their theory of the 
industrialization process and industrial/capitalist society. Although Polyani said little about 
the possibilities of craft production as an alternative to the liberal emphasis on the market, 
there is the suggestion that the free market hegemony of the nineteenth century was some sort 
of unnatural mistake that could have been avoided given the right decisions in the key 
historical conjunctures. Piore and Sabel also seem to be saying this when they discuss the 
nineteenth century Marshallian industrial craft districts:
"Silks in Lyon; ribbons , hardware and speciality steel in neighbouring 
Saint-Étienne, edge tools, cutlery, and speciality steel in Solingen, Remsheid, 
and Sheffield; calicoes in Alsace; woollen and cotton textiles in Roubaix;
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cotton goods in Philadelphia and Pawtucket - the history of all these industries 
challenges the classical view of economic progress. Small firms in these 
industrial districts... often developed or exploited new technologies without 
becoming larger. The technological dynamism of both these large and small 
firms defies the notion that craft production must be either a traditional or 
subordinate form of economic activity. It suggests that there is a craft 
alternative to mass production as a model of technological advance."
(Ibid, p.28).
The most important theme that Piore and Sabel deploy in their argument for this specific 
form of FS industrialization is, as suggested above, the character of the economic and 
extra-economic institutional regulatory mechanisms. They identify three variants which are 
functionally compatible at the micro, meso and macro levels of artisanal production, namely: 
Municipalism; Paternalism and Familiarism (on these see below). Piore and Sabel 
conceptualise a world in which technology can develop in various ways. This artifactual 
argument is repeated in a more detailed form by Sabel and Zeitlin:
"On this evidence, the obstacles to the progress of mechanization on craft lines 
lay not in some self-blockage of this model of technological development, but 
in the unfavourable environment - political, institutional, economic - with 
which it had to contend Yet from the perspective of the narrow-track idea of 
historical development, the technological vitality of the industrial districts 
appears to be an incomprehensible violation of the laws of progress. To make 
sense of this vitality, therefore, it is necessary to shift vantage points and 
imagine a theoretical world in which technology can in principle develop in 
different ways, a world that might have turned out differently from the way it 
did, and therefore a world with a history of abandoned but potentially viable 
alternatives to what actually exists."
(Ibid, p.161)
The leitmotif which runs through this argument is that other possibilities of how society and 
the economy could be organised exist not only hypothetically, but also historically. The 
nineteenth century industrial divide was a branching point containing many alternatives and 
similarly so is the late twentieth century industrial divide which again foregrounds the 
importance of politics:
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"Today in London, Bonn, Vienna and Washington D C., political parties 
struggle ever more openly to put new technology in the service of the groups 
they represent. For the first time since the mid-nineteenth century there are 
widespread explicit arguments over the direction technological development 
might take. If our understanding of the origins of mass production and the 
principles of technical change are correct, it is politics and not the immanent 
characteristics of the technologies which will decide how the new machines 
will be designed. And if that is so, then a deeper understanding of the 
historical alternatives to mass production is one way to ensure that current 
possibilities are not unwittingly dismissed as utopian simply because they did 
not win out in the past".
(Ibid, p.l76).m
The argument that politics and thus power determines the trajectory of economic development 
and industrialization is thus the main argument of Piore, Sabel and Zeitlin's research.
However, in later articles some of the more extreme rhetoric about industrial divides and 
paradigm shifts, while still present, is modulated by a more cautious theorization and 
understanding of contemporary forms of industrialization. For example, Sabel's articles which 
are contemporaneous with The Second Industrial Divide in the mid 1980s such as 'Industrial 
Reorganisation and Social Democracy in Austria', [with Katz] industrial Relations and 
Industrial Adjustment in the Car Industry' (1985); 'Changing Models of Economic Efficiency 
and their Implications for Industrialization in the Third World' (1987), seem to be more 
cautious and empirically specified For example, FS which was previously identified with 
artisanal cottage industry is widened to include what was previously termed neo-Fordism in 
Work and Politics. In these writings Sabel identifies three variants of FS (the same points 
can be found in The Second Industrial Divide: (1) The West German; (2) the Japanese; (3) 
the Italian The German form of FS is organised by the large-firm through internal 
organisational decentralisation of the factory; the Japanese example is an intermediate form 
where the large firm or corporation becomes a final assembler and marketer of components 
produced by flexible small firms in relations of dependent relational contracting; with the 
Italian example, the large firm disappears and production is carried out by federations of 
autonomous small firms within industrial districts. Operating with these broadly defined
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ideal-types, Sabel argues that an Austrian form of FS could be developed by taking something
from each:
"Some combination of these three types of flexible-specialization is plausibly 
applicable to Austrian industry: The West German model suits part of the steel 
industry; the Japanese model might be applied to the textile industry or the 
production of diesel motors. And there are obviously pieces of Austrian 
institutional system, such as the Aussenhandelsstellen which fit naturally into 
such a scheme."
(1985, p.351).
However, Sabel believes that there are political and institutional obstacles which could 
prevent this happening This has to do with the entrenched system of social-democratic 
corporatism or "Austro-Keynesiamsm" which has structured the Austrian polity and economy 
since the end of the Second World War and which have given rise to rigidities which prevent 
the transition to a flexible regime of production. Thus repeatedly the importance of politics is 
emphasised as structuring the industrialization process. Moreover, the idea that these 
institutional 'regulatory' institutions are crucial mediating and structure forming factors in 
determining the outcome and form of the industrialization process is emphasised.
Beyond the second industiial divide?
Of even more significance for understanding Sabel's understanding of industrialization is his 
essay 'Changing Models of Economic Efficiency and Their Implication in the Third World' 
(1987) Here he argues that the FS hypothesis is not just of significance for the rich 
advanced industrial societies, but has a universal significance for the ’Third World' as well. 
Sabel recapitulates the classical or mythical view of how best to industrialize a backward 
region or country and to make the break from tradition to modernity. The classical arguments 
of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, David Landes, Alfred Chandler and Alexander Gerschenkron1“1 
are fused to form a single argument about the dynamics of development and modernisation:
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"That the dynamic of efficiency would triumph in the end was for both Smith 
and Marx the principal lesson of the fall of feudalism. Despite their 
differences, they agreed that history acted through the self-interest of 
individuals to call forth movements which broadened markets and allowed 
producers to profit from their efforts. Once there was an efficiency 
breakthrough anywhere competition spread it anywhere competition spread it 
everywhere. Those who could not emulate the new success would be crushed 
by those who could."
(1987, p.29).
Sabel traces the economic history of how development economics has attempted to impose on 
'Third World' (a term which Sabel curiously takes as given) countries its policy prescriptions 
of imitating the West and mass-production and how the theory and practice of import- 
substitution, the product-cycle theory and export-promotion have all failed the Third World in 
various ways In opposition to these approaches Sabel puts forward his own solution, or as 
he calls it, "two possibilities for FS in the Third World". He repeats his argument about the 
historical viability of small-scale artisanal production as one 'possible world' among many 
which has been abandoned and condemned as obsolete by the classical theorists.
Nevertheless, to emphasise the surprising and contingent combination of circumstances that 
can favour the introduction of FS Sabel argues that the first possibility for its introduction and 
diffusion lies paradoxically in the manner in which mass-production has been introduced into 
the 'Third World'. A classical instance of perverse effects.
Taking as his example Latin America Sabel argues the following case:
"The central conclusion of case studies conducted by the Programa Je 
investigaciones sobre Jesanvla scienli/ico y  technologic en America Latina is 
that even the most modern Latin American plants function according to 
different principles than their first-world models.. Because their design was 
inspired by factories operating in the large advanced countries, the Latin 
American plants are typically too big for their own markets...Under these 
conditions firms making machine tools, injection moulding equipment, farm 
machinery, castings and automobile engines used their slack resources to adapt 
the original product design to local conditions or develop new products in 
related lines Given frequently idle machines, skilled workers used to repairing 
them, and, as an additional facilitating factor, an abundance of cheap
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engineering talent, many large Latin American firms are surprisingly well 
positioned to absorb foreign technology - including programmable equipment - 
and put it to independent use."
(Ibid, p.46).
Sabel recognises that there is no automatic or necessitarian reason why these possibilities 
should be turned into actuality, and that a whole set of transformations and restructurings 
would need to be developed and implemented - in marketing, distribution, suppliers, etc. - but 
he believes that it is not impossible either The examples he uses of a successful strategy that 
Latin America should follow is the newly industrializing countries such as Taiwan and 
Singapore The second setting in which FS might emerge is the "immeasurably vast and 
poorly understood informal sector of Latin American economies".
Sabel argues further that it is possible, under the right conditions, for these to develop into a 
tlexible-specialised economy on the model of the Italian (Third Italy). However, Sabel says 
little about how this could be achieved and concludes on a more general methodological note, 
which repeats his argument about 'possible worlds'. As can be expected from an article in a 
collection dedicated to Albert O Hirschman, Sabel appeals to Hirschman's insistence in his 
article 'The Rise and Decline of Development Economics' that no system of economic laws 
are universal and apply to all times and places and argues that: "There may be one physical 
universe, but there is not one economy" (1987, p.50).191
The latest writing and research by Piore and Sabel while adding substantially to their 
conceptualisation of FS and the institutional/political preconditions for its implementation, 
diffusion and development, again, do not at the theoretical level, confront the question of 
industrial divides and branching point in the history of industrialization. For example, Piore's 
article The decline of mass production and the challenge of union survival' (1986) has as I 
shall show interesting things to say about the role of labour and trade unions in the context of 
new production systems, but little to add to his theoretical arguments on the process of 
industrialization Other articles by Piore such as 'Technological Trajectories and The 
( lassical Revival in Economics' and 'Work, Labour and Action: Work Experience in a System
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of Flexible Production' (1992) can claim more to inquiring into the themes discussed above, 
but can hardly be thought as advancing the original conceptualisation. 'Technological 
Trajectories' helps to clarify the arguments put forward in The Second Industrial Divide, by 
linking them more Firmly to some of the problems in economic growth theory, but it is hardly 
a conclusive argument and is more an illustration of the inadequacy of orthodox economic 
theory than anything else as illustrated by his conclusion: "... The market organisation of the 
kind which the Chicago School envisages would seem to be more likely when the conceptual 
structure of production maps directly onto the conceptual structure of consumption. Why this 
should ever be the case, however, is unclear." (p.170)
Sabel's major articles 'Flexible Specialization and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies' 
(1988), 'Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open Labour Markets : Some Consequences of the 
Reintegration of Conception and Execution in a Volatile Economy' (1991) and [with Horst 
Kern] 'Trade Union and Decentralized Production: A Sketch of Strategic Problems in the 
West German Labour Movement' add significantly to the debate, but little to the positions 
already sketched out, although as shall be argued, some of the more voluntaristic rhetoric 
about 'possible worlds' and 'industrial divides' disappears or is modulated by concern with 
continuities rather than absolute breaks
As a provisional conclusion at this stage in the argument it is necessary to argue that Piore 
and Sabel's ambitious attempt to theorise and develop a social and economic theory of the 
industrialization process, is in need of further development and is under-theorised 
Nevertheless, it is possible to find a more explicit sociological foundation and theorisation of 
the nature, characteristics and trajectory of the industrialization process in the research and 
writing of Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Paul Hirst whose theoretical positions are close to 
Piore and Sabel, and provide a more thorough and rigorous account of non-deterministic 
theory of industrialization and the move towards a flexible-specialised economy. It is through 
a confrontation and dialogue with these researchers that it is possible to provide a more 
adequate and explicitly sociological theory of the economy and society as understood by Piore 
and Sabel
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I’iinl lliist's road to flexible specialization
Hirst's espousal of Piore and Sabel's the FS thesis is the latest manifestation of Hirst's 
theoretical/political trajectory. This is not the place to fully explicate this trajectory (see 
Elliot, 1986, Benton, 1987) but it is important to situate it within the radical sociological 
climate of the 1960s and, in particular, the Althusserian moment in British social theory 
which enjoyed a brief moment of influence in the 1970s. The importation of Althusserian 
themes via journals such as New Left Review and the translation of Althusser's For Marx 
(1965) and (with Balibar) Reading Capital (1968) greatly influenced many radical sociologists 
in this period and Hirst was, with Brewster, Hindness, Cutler and Hussain in the vanguard of 
this "import agency" via the short lived journal Theoretical Practice. Dissatisfied with the 
eclecticism of New Left Review. Theoretical Practice was intent on producing a more 
rigorous theoretical account of the British social formation and the conditions for its 
transformation via the application of a Marxism mediated through a ’symptomatic reading' of 
Marx originated by Althusser
The key essays of Althusserianism that initially influenced Theoretical Practice were 
'Contradiction and Over-determination' and 'Marxism and Humanism' from For Marx (1965) 
Eclecticism would be avoided by tarnishing all other Marxisms and radical sociologies, from 
Lukács, the Frankfurt School, Gouldner, Anderson and Gramsci, with the brush of the 
deviations' and 'errors' of 'historicism' , 'humanism', 'economisin', 'essentialism' and so forth 
Later Reading Capital (1968) would be the most important text for this group and Hirst and 
Hindness in particular. Specifically, the essay by Balibar 'The Basic Concepts of Historical 
Materialism' would be the focal point for discussion and theoretical elaboration and critique, 
concerned as it is with concepts of mode of production, productive forces and relationships of 
production and the possibility of developing a general theory of modes of production. The 
exploration of these concepts led Hirst with Hindness to write Pre-Capitalist Modes of 
Eiaduction (1975) which apart from its high Althusserian scholasticm concluded that a general 
theory of modes of production is an impossibility.
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Then, after a brief self-critique, Hirst and Hindness (with Cutler and Hussain) published their 
two volume Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977) which was a full-scale attack on 
Marx and Marxism's conception of modem industrial capitalism and the form of 
epistemological concept formation deployed by Marxists. The details of the Hirst et al 
critique is not of great concern here although it entails a rejection of rationalist 
epistemological arguments and its substitution by an extreme philosophical conventionalism. 
Substantively it meant the rejection of the idea that the 'mode of production' could be 
represented topographically as a complex structured whole determined in the last instance by 
the economy, a la Althusser. As summarised in Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977) 
their critique has four arguments:
(I) It challenges the conception of a mode of production as a totality which has inscribed in 
its structure certain necessary effects, these effects being assimilable in a general concept; (2) 
It challenges the 'law of value' and the theory of exploitation and accumulation; (3) The 
concept of 'tendencies' as necessary and progressively developing effects of the totality or 
structure is challenged; (4) Rejection of the classic concept of classes as categories of 
economic agents/human individuals ultimately impelled to political unity and action by the 
effects of the economic structure of the totality and crystallising as political forces around 
'interests' which are imposed and given to the agents by the structure.1101
Interpreting Marx as a discourse which conceives modes of production as totalities, with 
certain effects inscribed in their structures and the "specification of those effects in certain 
necessary economic processes" as creating a "homogeneous field of realisation of those 
effects" led to Hirst et al to develop an either/or alternative. The alternative being what most 
commentators at the time interpreted as the blind alley of an eclective pluralism and 
empiricism devoid of content For example, Elliot in an unsympathetic critique of Hirst 
writes
the unmistakeable reflex throughout the book is to inveigh in general 
against general theory and then explain all over again why the particular
subjects under discussion are resistant to such theory. Perhaps this should 
come as no surprise After all, the 'economy-as- totality' was shown the front 
door together with its illustrious companions; any general theory of it from 
Marx to Marshall, from Smith to Sraffa - was dismissed as 'Essentialism'. 
Hence there was inevitably something of a discrepancy between the 
theoretically-saturated nature of the (negative) critiques of all and sundry, and 
the modestly descriptive character of the (positive) alternatives offered "
(1986, p.99).
However, this critique goes too far, and it is necessary to recognise that although Hirst rejects 
the conception of a social formation as having "a definite and necessary structure with 
definite and necessary relations of affectivity between its parts", he still argues that "we are 
left with the concepts of definite social relations and practices, relations and forces of 
production, law, and so on, but there is no necessary form in which these concepts must be 
articulated into the concept of the essential structure of a social formation". However, the 
essentially arbitrary and circular nature of the whole enterprise remains, as recognised, for 
example, by Bail, Massey and Taylor (1979).
Of all the Marxist critiques of Hindness and Hirst, Jessop's (1990) seems to be one of the 
judicious and relevant Jessop recognised the problems with reductionist versions of Marxism 
that Hindness and Hirst attempt to criticise, but argues from a realist position that Hirst's 
concept of "necessary non-correspondence" denies different levels of abstraction and that a 
"method of articulation" would be a better position to develop.
"It is clear that such an argument need not re-introduce the thesis of economic 
determination in the final instance, but it does raise the question of economic 
determination in a pertinent manner. It is in these terms that we can introduce 
the issue of articulation of heterogeneous elements to constitute a relatively 
unified social formation capable of reproduction, the limits of covariation 
involved in the mutual presupposition and/or codetermination of these elements, 
and the relative importance of various elements in the overall determination of 
social cohesion. Such an approach need not involve any rejection of Hindness 
and Hirst's commitment to the heterogeneity of social relations, the multiplicity 
of theoretically possible points of reference for establishing conditions of 
existence, and the variability of causal relations. Indeed it would seem to offer
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a more complete account of what the method of articulation actually involves "
(Jessop, 1988, p 207).
Having said that it is possible to take the theoretical logic of Hindness and Hirst in a different 
direction, towards the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985).1111 The anti-reductionist 
principle that Hirst and Hindness establish of the "necessary non-correspondence" (although 
this is not the term they would use) of social relations is opposed by Laclau and Mouffe on 
the grounds that it excludes "any theoretical possibility of investigating the relative unity of a 
social formation" (Jessop, 1988) With the principle of articulation and contingency, Laclau 
and Mouffe argue that they have a theoretical alternative to Hirst and Hindness which avoids 
a mere pluralism of social elements without any necessary relationship with each other and 
which introduces "a certain notion of totality... with the difference that it would no longer 
involve an underlying principle that would unify 'society', but an ensemble of totalising effects 
m an open relational complex" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.103). What this abstract 
discussion highlights is a more general question which will link up with the later discussion 
of Unger Like Hirst, Laclau and Mouffe, Unger's object of critique is the way social theory 
and, m particular Marxism, has conceptualised the nature of social relations as forming 
functionalist totalities within a 'deep structure' and 'necessitarian' paradigm Moreover, these 
criticisms dovetail into Piore and Sabel's critique of the "three misleading ideas": 
hssentialism. determinism and reductionism.
Elam Discouise to Flexible Specialization
However, there are more parallels between Hirst and Piore and Sabel than just these 
methodological and epistemological issues of social theory. They spill over, further, into the 
substantive conceptions of social and economic organisations, namely, FS. Laclau and 
Mouffe s concept of substantive social and economic organisation is nebulous to say the least, 
with little concrete discussion over the organisation of industrial capitalist societies at all 
beyond a perfunctory discussion of the political constitution of the economy inspired by their
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reading of Bologna, Panzieri, Tronti, and Negri and French theorists of Fordism such a 
Palloix and Aglietta Hirst, on the other hand explicitly attempts to develop a political and 
economic theory of modern society drawing upon the research of Piore, Sabel and Zeitlin 
Surprisingly, however, Hirst does not refer at any point to Unger's project of integrating a 
conception of social theory, industrial society and FS. Hirst's reflections on FS and the 
relationship to his evolving theoretical discourse will now be examined
On first reflection there seems to be a theoretical hiatus between the discourse of Marx's 
Capital and Capitalism Today (see also Hirst, 1979, 1985, 1993) and Hirst's more recent 
writings The abstract and highly theoretical reflections have been modulated by a more 
empirical turn and the wish to express himself as a more 'public' intellectual, communicating 
in the public sphere to a wider common readership. In fact one can discern a certain 
disillusionment with high theory and its esotericism as reflected in Hirst's After Thatcher 
(1988) which is written in a plain, clear style unconcerned with general social theory. 
Nevertheless, a clear theoretico-political line can be discerned, namely scepticism towards the 
neo-Gramscian analysis of 'New Times' associated with Stuart Hall which postulated a 
hegemonic 'Thatcherite' political project with totalising effects of ideological, social and 
economic transformation/restructuring of the British social formation (see Hall, 1988b). For 
Hirst, no such hegemonic project can be identified and conservative dominance is viewed as 
an accident of the electoral system. Nevertheless, Hirst agrees with Hall's analysis that 
Thatcherite policies have been catastrophic for Britain's economic, social and political fabric. 
Indeed, Hirst is more negative about Thatcher and her policies than the 'New Times' analysis 
which locates some positive aspects to the Thatcherite and Conservative governmental project. 
On the other hand, Hirst has also continued to develop a political and social theory which 
keeps to the spirit if not the letter of his original critique of Marxism. In particular, the 
critique of the concept of capitalist mode of production as a totality with necessary and 
homogeneous effects inscribed within its structure, continues to play a crucial role in Hirst's 
political and social theory. In its place has emerged a political theory which draws its 
resources not from any of the versions of post-structuralism and discourse theory, but rather 
from the traditional resources of British Guild Socialism, Cole, Laski and North American
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pluralist political theory. Hirst calls his political theory, Associational Socialism/ Democracy 
which as I shall argue later has important implications for the political theory of FS.|I2)
Hirst further develops an analysis which integrates his political analysis with an economic 
analysis of FS At first approximation Hirst's analysis is heavily dependent on Ptore's and 
Sahel's research, which is not surprising since his work on FS was done in cooperation with 
Zeitlin However, Hirst does explicitly theorize FS within the context and logic of his earlier 
theoretical critique in Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977). Importantly, Hirst's 
article, jointly authored with Zeitlin, 'flexible-specialization versus post- Fordism: theory, 
evidence and policy implications' (1991) is an interesting theoretical analysis which makes a 
series of useful distinctions between the various typologies that have been put forward to 
theorise the contemporary restructuring of economic, social, political and cultural life.
While Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977) said nothing about FS and post-Fordism 
(it would be five or so years before the first intimations of these ideas would be published) 
Hirst et al were cognisant of the fact that changes were in the process of developing. The 
critique of the theorization of the capitalist mode of production led, 1 have argued, to the 
deconstruction of the Marxist theoretical and discursive totality, and hence to the general 
nominalist conclusion that: "If capitalism has no evolutionary tendencies in general and takes 
the form of specific national economies subject to differing problems and constraints, then 
socialisms must differ" (p.265)(A conclusion followed up and concretized in other works by 
Hindness's, Parliamentary Democracy and Socialist Politics (1983), Hirst's Marxism and 
Historical Writing (1985) and Tomlinson’s The Unequal Struggle? British Socialism and the 
Capitalist Enterprise! (1982). Having said this, Hirst and his associates were not to take up 
the themes of economic re-structuring until the debate itself was in general momentum 
throughout the social sciences And in fact the critical reaction from the post-Althusserian 
camp was hostility to the ideas of Piore and Sabel as exemplified by Williams and Cutler et 
al’s (1987) review article in the journal Economy and Society.1'31
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Kmni Capital lu Flexible Specialization
However, from the point of view of this chapter the most significant aspect of Hirst's espousal 
of the Piore, Sabel and Zeitlin FS hypothesis is that it interprets their text symptomatically 
through the problematic of Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977) and criticises other 
approaches, such as the New Times perspective of Hall and Lash and Urry and the Regulation 
approach as further illustrations of the inadequacy of Marxist theorizations. Hirst and Zeitlin 
write
"Many people habitually conflate three approaches to industrial change under 
these headings The resulting problem is that significant differences of 
approach are concealed by a superficial similarity between the proponents of 
flexible specialization and a set of apparently similar but underlyingly divergent 
ideas The purpose of this paper is to examine systematically the differences 
between flexible-specialization, regulation theory, and other variants of 
'post-Fordism' with respect to their fundamental assumptions and theoretical 
architecture, their methodological approach and the use of evidence and their 
policy implications."
(1991, p.l.)
The fact that Hirst should accept the arguments of Piore and Sabel's text is at first surprising. 
However, 'three misleading ideas' that Sabel identified in Work and Politics are basically the 
same type of ideas Hirst is attempting to combat. While Sabel was first and foremost 
criticising the liberal industrial society/convergence theory, Hirst was criticising and 
problematising Marxism. Technological determinism for Hirst became economism, 
essentialism became, expressive-causality and the field of homogeneous effects, and 
reductionism became the classic theory of representation of class interests in politics and 
ideology. On the other hand, though, some surprise must be expressed, for Piore and Sabel's 
Die Second Industrial Divide (1984) is a classical case of an 'exagger-book'. While not in the 
same exagger-league as, say, Daniel Bell's The Comma of the Postindustrial Society (1972) or 
Alvin Toffler's The Third Wave (1983) there are definite exagger-book themes in Piore and 
Sabel’s work Not that this is necessarily a bad thing, but in terms of an immanent critique
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based on Hirst's own methodological and theoretical assumptions, it is certainly problematic
and questionable.’141
In point of fact, the Williams, Cutler et al critique of Piore and Sabel made exactly this sort 
of charge against The Second Industrial Divide, namely that:
"The text builds a large and ambitious superstructure on the basis of this one 
opposition [mass production and flexible-specialization]. The superstructure 
has three interrelated elements; first, a theory of types of economy, their 
characteristic problems and how these problems can and have been resolved; 
second an interpretative meta-history of the development of modern 
manufacturing since 1800, third and finally, an analysis of the current crisis of 
the advanced economies and its possible solutions. Seldom in the history of 
intellectual endeavour, can so much have been built on the foundation of one 
opposition."
(1987, p.406).
Obviously, the reception of The Second Industrial Divide (1984) in the post-Althusserian 
camp caused a considerable split (although this was prefigured in the refusal of Cutler to 
endorse the political conclusions of Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977), with Hirst 
lining up in defence of it against the Williams, Cutler et al's critique, although it is significant 
that Hirst and Zeitlin do not reply and mention this critique.
Hirst and Zeitlin's espousal and defence of The Second Industrial Divide (1984) underplays 
the totalising and generalising aspects of the text and interprets it through very different 
theoretical optics, one which translated it into a careful, empirical, non-totalising 
exemplification of the deconstructionist and neo-Weberian principles of Marx's Capital and 
Capitalism Today (1977). In making this move Hirst and Zeitlin have to underplay the 
totalising aspects of the text, such as the rhetoric of 'industrial divides' and 'paradigm shifts' 
which Piore and Sabel fall into throughout the book. In their article Hirst and Zeitlin, then, 
paradoxically, espouse the FS hypothesis against what they view as the totalising assumptions 
of the post-Fordist and Regulation School approaches to industrial change. It is the post- 
Fordists and the Regulationists that are beaten with the brush of being "exagger-books":
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"Despite their apparent similarities, flexible-specialization and post-Fordism 
represent sharply different theoretical approaches to the analysis of industrial 
change. Where post-Fordism sees productive systems as integrated and 
coherent totalities, flexible specialization identifies complex and variable 
connections between technology, institutions and politics; where post- Fordism 
sees industrial change as a mechanical outcome of impersonal processes, 
flexible-specialization emphasises contingency and the scope for strategic 
choice "
(Ibid, p.2).
Finally, FS is distinctive because as a style of analysis it is unique because its theoretical 
architecture builds "upwards from simple ideal- types to a complex and multi-levelled system 
of concepts applicable to a diverse range of empirical cases" (p.2). So in place of the 
Williams, Cutler et al interpretation of Piore and Sabel we have the completely contrary Hirst 
and Zeitlin interpretation. How do Hirst and Zeitlin justify and make the case for such an 
interpretation and how do they criticise the post-Fordist and Regulationist approaches? First 
they argue that the binary opposition between mass-production and FS should be taken as 
lechnological paradigms or ideal-typical models of visions of industrial efficiency. Second, 
the structural properties of these two paradigms define a set of micro and macro-regulatory 
problems which must always be resolved However, there is not just one way to resolve these 
problems but a potentially infinite number of combinations that could manage them:
"For mass production, the crucial micro-regulatory problem is that of balancing 
supply with demand in individual markets: coordinating the flow of specialised 
inputs through the independent phases of production and distribution, and 
matching the output of productive resources that cannot easily be turned to 
other uses with the normal level of demand for each good. But as Piore and 
Sabel argue these common goals may be pursued through a range of individual 
strategies, such as market segmentation, inventory variation and superficial 
product differentiation, while the institutional framework provided by the large, 
hierarchical corporation likewise vanes considerably both within and across 
national economies. Thus the organisation of mass-production firms in the 
United States, West Germany and Japan, to choose some notable examples, 
differ significantly along key dimensions such as levels of administrative 
centralisation and vertical integration, relationships with financial institutions, 
and systems of shop-floor control."
(Ibid, p.3)
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Likewise for FS the crucial micro-regulatory problem is that of sustaining an innovative 
recombination of resources by reconciling competition and cooperation among firms. They 
identify at least two ideal-typical institutional frameworks that could do this: (1) The 
Marshallian industrial district on the one hand, and on the other (2) the large newly 
decentralised corporation As regards the question of macro-regulatory institutions the same 
sort of analysis is pursued Namely, general and abstract categories are deployed and then are 
complexified to deal with specific, empirical, instances For example, the dominant 
macro-regulatory institution of the mass production era was the Keynesian welfare state:
"here too the differences among national economies remained striking: 
differences for example, in the methods of managing budgetary aggregates, in 
the commitment to counter-cyclical deficit finance and public welfare 
provision, and in the role of collective bargaining agreements and other 'private' 
means for relating purchasing power to productivity growth "
(Ibid, p 4).
Regarding the macro-regulation of FS regimes, Hirst and Zeitlin argue that the model is as yet 
not well developed. More recently in his work on regional economies Sabel has developed 
these ideas by treating macro-economic regulation as a problem of reinsurance: whereas for 
mass production, the key problem is that of reinsuring firms against unpredictable fluctuations 
m the level of demand through macro- economic management On the other hand, the 
problem for FS is that if reinsuring firms against the risk of unpredictable fluctuations in the 
level of demand through macro-economic management and reinsuring regional economies 
against large-scale shifts in its composition by establishing inter-regional mechanisms to 
facilitate adjustment. Again Hirst and Zeitlin follow Sabel in postulating a number of 
variants of this macro-regulator»’ regime which will be examined further in Chapter 3 with 
reterence to the political implications of the FS model, and the implications for industrial 
relations, work and employment With reference to the theory or model of industrialization 
and industrial society it can be argued again, that Hirst and Zeitlin are following the position 
of Fiore and Sabel on the "three misleading ideas" of the industrial society theoretical
arguments
"From this account it should be clear that FS is at once a general theoretical 
approach to the analysis of industrial change, and a specific model of 
productive organisation whose micro and macro regulatory requirements may 
also be satisfied through a variety of institutional forms. But in no sense can 
this general approach be understood as an evolutionary teleology in which the 
triumph o f flexible specialization as a specific model is a necessary 
consequence o f some immanent logic o f economic or technological 
development [my emphasis] Much of the debate over flexible specialization 
has in fact missed the mark by construing the latter as a similar type of theory 
to post-Fordism in its way its many variants."
(Ibid, p 6)
Hirst and Zeitlin contrast their position (and Piore and Sabel) with the various cognate 
theories of post-Fordism (and Regulationist theories of Fordism and neo-Fordism) which 
reproduce all the "sins" of orthodox fundamentalist logics of theorizing which have been 
denounced and criticised since Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977). Hirst and 
Zeitlin, however, do recognise that one cannot simply homogenize the various post-Fordist 
and Regulationist schools and traditions into one singular position. For example, they take 
what they see as representative examples of the post-Fordist argument such as the approach 
of: (1) The argument of the now defunct political journal Marxism Today and its 'New Times' 
argument The most representative figures here are, to take the best example, (1) Stuart Hall, 
(2) The sociological writings of Scott Lash and John Urry as exemplified in their book The 
Fnd of Oriramzed Capitalism (1987); and (3) the Schumpeterian research of Christopher 
Freeman and Carlota Perez."51
Hirst and Zeitlin argue that these positions represent a continuum of sophistication in the 
post-Fordist argument with the "New Times" argument representing the more crude version 
and Freeman and Perez, the most sophisticated with Lash and Urry in-between. Other 
research is mentioned such as David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernitv (1989), which 
according to Hirst and Zeitlin, is not worth considering since it adds nothing to Lash and 
Urry's argument The major objection that Hirst and Zeitlin direct at the post-Fordist 
argument that it is over-totalising (and, at the same time, under-totalising) is captured in their 
remarks objecting to the use of the Gramscian term Fordism in the post-Fordist argument:
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"What is wrong with the Fordist stereotype? Firstly, that it ascribes the dominance of 
Fordism to economies of scale, to a narrowly economic explanation without reference to 
actual markets, plant sizes or specific forms of production organisation. Taylorism is taken 
for granted, without reference to the actual complexities of work organisation or the role of 
labour The division of labour has never been a management prerogative" (p.9). And in 
defence of The Second Industrial Divide (1984) they write: "far from conforming to the 
Fordist stereotype [it] has the great merit of carefully considering these different national 
routes to economic organisation" (p.9).
At the first approximation it would seem that Hirst and Zeitlin make a strong case for arguing 
that the post-Fordist research is too general and totalising and as they write "Post-Fordist 
analysis of 'New Times' is little more that pop-sociology combined with a tendency derived 
from classical Marxism to think of societies as coherent types. The Post- Fordist concept is 
linked to that of postmodernism to produce a view of modern society as fluid and changing, 
dominated by a shift from collectivism to individualism, from production towards 
consumption and the service sector, from substance to style..." (p.l 1). For example, Stuart 
Hall gives a good example of such theorising about 'New Times' in an article in Marxism 
Today, "Brave New World":
"So far as description is concerned, there are several terms which have been 
employed to characterise these transitional times Potential candidates would 
include 'post-industrial, 'post-Fordisf, 'revolution of the subject', 
post-modernism'. None of these is wholly satisfactory. Each expresses a 
clearer sense of what we are leaving behind ('post') than where we are heading. 
Post-industrial' writers, like Alain Touraine and Andre Gorz, start from shifts 
in the technical organization of industrial capitalist production... They see a 
shift to new productive regimes Post-Fordist is a broader term, suggesting a 
whole new epoch distinct from the regime of mass production."
(1988, p.24).
Hall goes on to characterise this shift by referring to terms such as the use of 'information 
technologies', flexibility', 'decentralisation', and so forth. But even here we must express 
caution with Hirst and Zeitlin's verdict for two reasons First, Hall is writing in a political
journal not for a sociological journal. The type of discourse deployed has a different form 
and purpose and one can be hyperbolic and make "exagger-statements". Secondly, Hall is 
more cautious than Hirst and Zeitlin admit as the types of argument are very similar in both 
sets of writers for as Hall writes:
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"An issue that must perplex us is how total or complete this transition to 
post-Fordism is. But this may be a too all-or-nothing way of, posing the 
question In a perm- anently transitional age we must expect unevenness, 
contradictory outcomes, disjunctures, delays, contin- gencies, uncompleted 
projects overlapping emergent ones We have to make assessments, not from 
the complete base, but from the 'leading edge of change. The question should 
always be, where is the 'leading edge' and in what direction is it pointing."
(Ibid, p.24.)
The fact that Hall also asserts that post-Fordism is associated with broader social and cultural 
changes can also be defended in that it does not necessarily mean that there is a direct causal 
relation between the economic sphere and the cultural and political sphere. Indeed, Hall's 
earlier work at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies on the "base-superstructure 
metaphor, social classes, politics, the State and cultural change proves this, even if they would 
disagree with the particular manner in which Hall theorizes these relations. The second 
example of post-Fordist argumentation that Hirst and Zeitlin examine is that of Lash and Urry 
which is a more difficult target to criticise than Hall in so far as it attempts to specify in far 
more detail the theoretical presuppositions of post-Fordism as 'disorganized capitalism' (1987) 
or more recently 'reflexive accumulation' (1994). They specify fourteen points which 
characterize the transition from organized to disorganized capitalism. However, these fourteen 
points can be quite easily collapsed into a larger grouping of six basic points: (1) 
globalisation. (2) the end of mass-production; (3) spatial re-organisation; (4) end of national 
collective-bargaining; (5) end of social class; (6) cultural trans- formations called 
postmodern Although Lash and Urry examine these processes from a cross-national 
perspective, taking as examples the United Kingdom, United States of America, (West) 
Germany, France and Sweden, the logic of their discussion alludes to a more universal
significance
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Lash and Urry do seem to have an explicit totalising explanation which posits successive 
phases of functional integration (organization) and disintegration (disorganisation). Hirst and 
Zeitlin comments are then, very pertinent:
"Their fourteen points of specification of disorganised capitalism is likewise a 
list of features consisting in empirical generalizations, of different phenomena 
grouped to form a whole Even if most of the features thus identified do 
indeed occur we cannot trace organized or disorganized capitalism as social 
types of the same order of those of classical social theory, since they lack a 
rigorous specification of the necessary causal connections which make types an 
operative social whole."
(1991, p 13).
Finally, Hirst and Zeitlin assert that Lash and Urry are essentially technological determinists, 
essentialists and reductionists:
"All in all, the main thrust of the FS argument has passed Lash and Urry by, 
in that they see it predominantly as a generalization about forms of industrial 
technology rather than as a distinctive approach to the analysis of modern 
economies and their form of governance. Lash and Urry are trapped into using 
the model of Fordist-Keynesian national economic regulation as the model of 
organized capitalism and seeing all divergence from this as evidence of 
'disorganization'."
(Ibid, p. 13)
However, Hirst and Zeitlin's critique of Lash and Urry is too general, unspecific and 
undeveloped to be taken as a serious critique. And Lash and Urry's later work has gone 
beyond their original arguments in terms of theoretical sophistication and empirical 
specification (see, Lash and Urry, 1994).
Hie final post-Fordist model they examine is the work of Freeman and Perez which they 
think have a far more sophisticated model of the transition, based on the work of Kondratiev 
and Schumpeter's work on long-waves of economic/technological expansion and contraction,
and so forth:
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"They are careful to try and specify the technologies underpinning the major 
waves, and to look for evidence for their periodization and diffusion. Unlike 
other 'post- Fordists' they are careful to remain at the level of techno-economic 
evolution and not to generalise from this into social types, which are ensembles 
of economic, social and cultural relations. However, they still subscribe to the 
'Fordist'/'post-Fordist' dichotomy and to roughly the periodization as the other 
two bodies of work considered here."
(Ibid, pp 15-16)
The final variant of the post-Fordist argument is the regulationist school which they conflate 
into a single position. The regulation school is understood by Hirst and Zeitlin as a more 
sophisticated version of the post-Fordist hypothesis, but the same criticisms are directed at it 
as at the post-Fordist theories:
"Like post-Fordism, but unlike FS , the regulation school takes as its point of 
departure the concept of capitalism as a mode of production. Capitalism, in 
this view, is a contradictory and crisis- ridden economic system which requires 
some form of institutional regulation for its continued reproduction; but in 
contrast to orthodox Marxism, the operation of these crisis tendencies and their 
resolution is 'underdetermined' by the abstract properties of the mode of 
production itself. Social and political struggles therefore play a crucial role in 
the creation of the regulatory institutions which sustain each new phase of 
capital accumulation; and like post-Fordism, but unlike FS , the central actors 
involved in these struggles are conceived essentially in class terms."
(Ibid, p.18).
This is not the place to examine in detail the regulation approach (see below), but it is worth 
observing that Hirst and Zeitlin's critique of the regulation school is the weakest part of their 
argument and their conclusion that regulation theory is little different from the other 
post-Fordist arguments is a travesty:
"The regulation school set out to discover a middle way between general theory 
and empirical analysis, but their approach has run into the blind alley in which 
its conceptual holism must alternatively override or be undermined by the 
diversity of particular cases. Despite its apparent methodological 
sophistication, therefore, the theoretical architecture of the regulation approach
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is ultimately little different from the more simplistic versions of post-Fordism, 
while contrasting quite sharply with that of FS."
(Ibid, p.22)
Thus, as has been argued, Hindness and Zeitlin read Piore and Sabel's The Second Industrial 
Divide (1984) through the theoretical lens of Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977). 
Moreover, Hirst and Zeitlin's conclusion that the FS approach takes its lead from a criticism 
of social theories which assume that society is a 'totality', a set of relationships "governed by 
a single general principle and consistent in their character with such a principle" and that this 
further entails and presumes a process of "necessary social development or evolution based on 
certain fundamental 'tendencies' operative in such a totality” (p.24), is a critique that adds 
little to Hirst's first 'epistemological' critique. Nor does his conclusion that FS emphasises the 
'contingency' and 'complexity' of the connections between social relations and of the 
distinctiveness of national and regional routes to the establishment of such connections 
between social relations. Whatever the value of Hirst's reflections they lead logically to a 
causal agnosticism and empiricism which undercuts its own foundations and which 
considerably misinterprets Piore and Sabel's work on key points of theoretical articulation and 
concept formation.
The objections to this approach are many and will be referred to in the next section, but it is 
worth observing at this point with Terry Eagleton (1989), the following:
"There are perhaps, two major reasons for this theoretical move, one rather 
more creditable than the other. The more credible reason is that many of the 
concepts of totality traditionally to hand are indeed objectionally homo­
genizing and essentialistic, superiorally excluding a range of crucial political 
struggles which they have decided, for one reason or another, can hardly be 
regarded as 'central'. The undermining of this version of totality is thus an 
urgent political task."
(1981, p.381).
I he less credible reason which Eagleton identifies is the disillusionment that some radicals 
have experienced with Marxism who now believe, in postmodern style, in a 'disarticulated',
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'pluralised', 'anti-totality' and it is sometimes, comforting and convenient to imagine that there 
is not, after all, as Foucault might have said, anything 'total', to be broken. "It as though, 
having temporarily mislaid the breadknife, one declares the loaf to be already sliced" (p.381). 
Whether Gagleton's critique is also a case of wanting it both ways is not a question that can 
be answered here, but, nevertheless, his critique has some force and will be taken up in the 
next section on Unger.
lingers 'False Necessity’ and 'Industrial Divides’
Roberto Mangabeira Unger still needs some introduction to British social scientists, although 
his research and writings in the United States has caused some controversy and debate, 
specifically in the domain of legal studies where his leadership and championing of 'Critical 
Legal Studies' has shaken up the traditionally conservative and liberal legal academic 
establishment. More recently Unger has published a three volume book of social theory 
titled, Politics, a Work in Constructive Social Theory (1987, which is an ambitious attempt to 
provide a full-scale alternative to all the types of social theory presently on offer. This is not 
the place to review his work in its totality and it is only those parts that have direct relevance 
to the work of Piore and Sabel on types of industrialization which will concern me here
Unger's work has developed in close symbiosis and synergy with Piore and Sabel's research 
and writing For example, in the acknowledgement to The Second Industrial Divide 
(1984)(p ix), Piore and Sabel mention Unger who is also cited in the same context in Sabel 
and Zeitlin's 'Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in 
Nineteenth Century Industrialization' (p. 133). In turn, Unger refers to Piore, Sabel and Zeitlin 
in the Biographical Notes to the first volume of his book, Social Theory: Its Situation and
_A Critical Introduction (p.221) and in the second volume False Necessity:
Ajitj-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy (p.617) which 
suggests quite a close intellectual and political collaboration between them with influences 
travelling both ways. Unger explicitly announces his dependence, at the level of historical
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evidence, on Sabel and Zeitlin’s Historical Alternatives' article and writes: "Whether 
despondent or hopeful, this literature supplies an alternative to the traditions of conservative 
or radical necessitarianism that have dominated thinking about the history of the institutional 
forms of production and exchange" (p, 222).
Unger outlines his ideas concisely in the introduction to his three volumes, Social Theory: Its 
Situation and its Task (1987), but they are developed and extended throughout the further two 
volumes. Suffice it to say that Unger is hostile to all forms of social theory (in the most 
extended sense of the term to include economics, political science, sociology) which are 
iiatuialistic'. 'deterministic', 'neccessitarian' and 'positivistic'. Although one of his main targets 
is positivistic social theory, he is equally intent on criticising what he terms 'deep-structure 
social theory', which he identifies paradigmatically with Marxism Unger is intent on 
developing a social theory which steers a course between a view of history which is random 
and denies the existence of historical or structured totalities and a type of theory which 
depends on the existence and reproduction of 'deep-structures' which determine and 
necessitate historical outcomes. The fundamental conceptual division which underlies Unger's 
own theory is the distinction between 'formative contexts' and the 'formative routines' of social 
life Unger objects to the manner in which Marxists convert the 'formative contexts' into a 
deep-structure or essence of the social. One immediate problem with Unger's discussion is 
his lack of references to the particular Marxists or sociologists he is criticising, for Marxism 
is such a diverse and conflicting tradition of thought that his monolithic version is a 
caricature Admittedly, Unger does not dismiss Marxism in toto and writes that it is still a 
powerful theoretical heuristic tool:
''Much of this book represents a polemic against what the text labels 
deep-structure social analysis. The writings of Marx and followers provide the 
most powerful and detailed illustrations of the deep-structure moves. Yet 
Marx's own writings contain many elements that assist the effort to free 
ambitious theorizing from the deep- structure with which to build a view of 
social life more faithful to the anti-naturalistic intentions of Marx and other 
classic social theorists than Marx's original science of history."
(1987, p.216)
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Indeed, Unger identifies a group of Marxists as 'political Marxists' - such as Antonio Gramsci 
and E P Thompson - who make a partial but significant break from 'deep-structure' 
theorizing: "At times the political Marxists have sacrificed the development of their insights 
to the desire to retain a connection with the central thesis of historical materialism" (p.219).
Unger makes other distinctions which have bearing on the discussion which will be taken up 
below, namely the distinction between what he terms 'super-theory' and 'ultra theory' which is 
summarised by Cornell West:
"Unger believes it necessary to go beyond Gramsci not because Gramsci is a 
paradigmatic Marxist 'super-theorist' who generates theoretical generlisations 
and schemas that fail to grasp the complexity of social realities. Rather, the 
move beyond Gramsci is necessary because Gramsci is an exemplary 
'ultra-theorist' who attempts to avoid broad explanations and theoretical systems 
in order to keep track with the multifarious features and aspects of a fluid 
social reality. As an unequivocal super theorist who tries to avoid the traps of 
positivism, naive historicism, and deep-structure logics, Unger criticizes 
ultra-theorists like Gramsci and Foucault for rejecting explanatory or 
prescriptive theories In Unger's view, this rejection ultimately disables 
effective emancipatory thought and practice. According to Unger, the 'ultra­
theorist' sees a deep-structure logic inside every theoretical system, confuses 
explanatory generalization with epistemic foundationalism, and runs the risk of 
degenerating into a nominalistic form of conventional social science."
(1990, p 92).
Returning to Unger's substantive objections to the 'deep-structure' logic of Marxism it is 
necessary to outline his criticisms in more detail. Unger objects most particularly to two 
moves within 'deep- structure' analysis First, the effort to represent the framework identified 
ln a particular circumstance as an example of a repeatable and indivisible type of social 
organisation such as capitalism; the second false move is the appeal to the deep-seated 
constraints and the developmental laws that can generate a closed list of compulsive sequence 
of repeatable and indivisible frameworks. For Unger history and society are more contingent 
•lian the deep-structure argument would suggest, and argues the following:
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"The most serious dangers that deep structure analysis poses to the endeavour 
of the modernist visionary are precisely the dangers that arise from its 
truncation of our insight into structural diversity: the closure imposed on the 
sense of historical possibility, the reliance on an explanatory script and, most 
importantly, the inability to grasp how and why the relations between the 
formative and the formed, between social structure and human agency, may 
change. Deep structure social theory disorients political strategy and 
impoverishes programmatic thought by making both of them subsidiary to a 
ready made list or sequence of social orders."
(1987, p.93).1161
Unger's critique has points of comparison with other contemporary critiques concerned with 
similar problems. For, example, Giddens (1987) who also criticized the concept of mode of 
production and is concerned with attacking functionalist system theory and 'saving the actor' 
in his 'structuration' theory. Pierre Bourdieu's (1989) theory of practice and habitus falls into 
this category as does, in a different way, Touraine's (1987) critique of evolutionism, 
functionalism and structuralism. It is Unger's concern with developing and criticising social 
theory that lends his analysis a more detailed analysis of how society and industrialization 
should be conceptualised in a non-deterministic and non-necessitarian, that is, artifactual 
manner, than the work of Piore and Sabel. Unger, unlike Piore and Sabel, examines in detail 
the theoretical foundations, assumptions, presuppositions, epistemology and ontology behind 
these ideas and critiques. For example, his critique of the concept of mode of production is a 
necessary starting point for grounding his theory of many 'possible worlds'. Perry Anderson 
front a position, sympathetic to yet critical of Unger's theory summarises Unger's concept of 
'formative contexts':
"(Unger's] key conceptual instrument is the notion of formative context This 
is presented expressly as an alternative to the mode of production ... rejected as 
too rigid and replicable. A formative context is something looser and more 
singular - an accidental institutional and ideological cluster that regulates both 
normal expectations and routine conflicts over the distribution of key resources. 
The contemporary North Atlantic example thus includes, for Unger: 
constitutional division of governmental powers, partisan rivalry incongruously 
related to class, market economies based on absolute property rights, 
bureaucratic supervision of business activity, differential unionization,
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Taylorised work organization, vocabularies of private community, civic equality 
and voluntary contracts."
(1992, p 135)
For Anderson this is, of course, an approach that a Marxist cannot condone for it is too loose 
a configuration which is 'vague' and 'indiscriminate', lacking in a 'hierarchy of determinations' 
or 'law of motion'. However, Anderson's critique is too summary to be completely convincing 
for whatever the last twenty-five years of debate over Marx's theory and concepts has 
revealed it is the difficulty of defining the specificity and theoretical architecture of Marx's 
social theory, the concept of mode of production, classes, base and superstructure, and so 
forth Indeed, Anderson's work itself has been fairly heterodox. Unger's own critique of the 
concept of capitalism and the capitalist mode of production has to be examined then more 
closely than Anderson's critique attempts.
For Unger, the concept of capitalism has to be dispensed with because "we often infer the 
shortcomings of an explanatory theory from the difficulties we encounter in the use of its key 
concepts" (p 101). Unger argues that for Marx the concept of capitalism or the capitalist 
mode of production is both too universal and too particular:
"Whenever the concept was defined in a loose and general way, it proved to 
apply to a large range of historical situations. Many of the societies to which 
an inclusive concept of capitalism seemed to apply were not industrialized To 
deal with these embarrassments of overinclusion, you were driven to make your 
concept of capitalism more concrete: to read it into a more particular set of 
institutional arrangements.. As the concept of capitalism is made more concrete 
in the effort to escape overconclusion it runs into a characteristic dilemma."
(1987, pp 101-2)
I he conclusion that Unger draws from this analysis is to dispense with the concept of 
capitalism and substitute in its place the concept of 'formative contexts' and 'context-revising 
practices' in a much looser configuration of practices which allows for a greater diversity of 
societal types This opens his analysis up into the realm of non- determinism which allows 
ihe possibility for the intervention of new possibilities of plausible 'other worlds'. It is worth
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noting that Unger also includes almost all classical social theory in his attack on 'deep- 
structure' explanations and arguments. Durkheim in The Division of Labour in Society (1889, 
1933) "accepts all the key deep-structure tenets. It even embraces the particular combination 
of deep-structure and functionalist ideas described in the test" (p.229). Max Weber is also 
taken to task for the same crime albeit his case proves more ambiguous in that large parts of 
his work are committed to a causally agnostic "though immensely suggestive typology that 
occupies much of Economy and Society (1978)" (p.230).
Post-classical social theory also does nor escape his criticisms. For instance, Talcott Parsons 
and contemporary neo-functionalism represented by Jeffrey Alexander (1982) is taken to task 
and Unger writes in an important, albeit abstruse passage, the following significant comments:
"By presenting every social world as the product of complex individual and 
collective, material and ideal factors, the Parsonian view lends itself easily to 
the belief that each such world is what it is. Though not inevitably 
conservative, the approach inspires respect for the actual. .. By contrast, the 
view foreshadowed in this book suggests disrespect for what happens to exist 
on what happens to have taken place. It throws our cognitive interest in 
explanation on the side of our transformative interest in recognising the 
trumped-up, révisable character or our social contexts. It follows up by 
connecting up our prospects for individual and collective empowerment with 
our ability to change in particular ways both the content of the institutional and 
imaginative frameworks of social life and their relation to our framework 
revising capabilities."
(Ibid, p 229).
from the viewpoint of the argument here these are important criticisms, for they are directed, 
precisely at the 'founding fathers' of the liberal industrial society theory that is the object of 
Piore and Sabel's (and Hirst's) critique Indeed this critique replicates the attack that Sabel 
makes on the 'three misleading ideas' of technological determinism, essentialism, and 
reductiomsm However, Unger carries out his critique more thoroughly and with greater 
precision, with a view to not only displace the classical theories but also to build an 
alternative to them. Not only a deconstruction but also a reconstruction of social theory is
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called for Unger is much more explicit and self-conscious than Piore and Sabel (but has 
parallels with Hirst, see below) about the kind of social theory that is needed to critique the 
classical theory and it is useful at this point in the argument to summarize some of these main 
points Unger returns to the classical tradition of social theory or philosophy. That is to the 
tradition of social philosophy which existed before Hobbes displaced and revolutionised or, as 
Habermas would have it, 'scientized' social and political thought along the lines initiated by 
Galileo and the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century and the birth of natural 
philosophy After Hobbes much social and political theory, with some noteworthy exceptions, 
attempted to imitate the success of the natural sciences by attempting to discover causal 
principles along the lines of 'laws of nature' within the social, economic and political world 
itself The ensuing Kantian separation of 'is' from 'ought', 'facts' from 'values', 'freedom' from 
'necessity', 'theory' from 'practice', 'description' from 'prescription', 'mechanical' from 
teleological' causality affected deeply the rise of sociology, economics and political science, 
which in their wish to appear 'scientific' took on board much of the positivistic principles that 
became dominant in the post- Enlightenment period of the nineteenth century. From Comte 
through to Marx, Durkheim and Weber the predominant wish of the social researcher was to 
make a strict separation between judgements of fact and judgements of value even if, in the 
substantive work, there is often in fact less of a separation than their methodological 
pronouncements indicate.
Suffice it to say, Unger rejects this turn intellectual history and in common with the 
post-positivist paradigm shift, wishes to reclaim in modified form the approach of the 
classical tradition of social and political theorizing which does make such a rigid distinction 
between the various dichotomies mentioned above. Only in this context is it possible to 
understand Unger's comments on Talcott Parsons mentioned above and his arguments on other 
topics throughout his writings. The classical tradition, however, is modified by Unger most 
significantly by his rejection of the idea of a 'fixed human nature' which would serve as an 
Arclnniedian point or 'foundational' 'meta-social principle' for the construction of a 'just' social 
order Instead, Unger argues that contingency is the basic principle of social life. That is to 
say, what characterises human beings is the fact that their nature is to be contingent Although
there are many problems with this analysis, it foregrounds the importance of conceptualising 
human society as artifaclual
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llnper anil Flexible Specialization
The relationship between this rather abstract discussion and the discourse of Piore and Sabel 
should by now be clear. Nevertheless, a more extended discussion is needed so as to draw 
together the threads of the argument so far. It has already been noted that Unger draws upon 
the work of Piore, Sabel and Zeitlin and that Unger's social theory is an extended critique of 
the 'three misleading ideas' of technological determinism, essentialism and reductionism 
identified by Sabel. That is to say, single-track views of history such as modernization and 
convergence theory, evolutionist Marxism and proto-industrialization theories have to be 
rejected and so forth. Moreover, a more direct parallel can be identified between these groups 
of researchers and writers which will now be examined and which links up with the previous 
discussion That is to say, the relationship between Unger's social theory of 
work-organization and industry and Piore, Sabel, Hirst and Zeitlin's discussion Like Piore, 
Sabel and Hirst, Unger's viewpoint regarding industrialized societies is that the predominant 
form of work-organization in the twentieth century has been Fordism (or mass production) 
and the domination of mass-production, product-specific machines utilizing un- skilled and 
semi-skilled workers. Similarly, Unger describes a spectrum of 'rationalized' forms of labour 
organization:
"At one pole of this spectrum lies a rigid form of rationalized labor A clear 
distinction is made between the work of defining the more or less abstract 
projects that are carried out by the group and the actual work of execution.
The definition of the tasks includes decisions about the structure of jobs, 
hierarchies, and perhaps even material rewards within the organizations as well 
as the decisions about how to reassess both the layout of work and the 
understanding of the collective tasks in the light of the group's concrete 
experience.... Each element in planning has a counterpart in execution... This
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rigid classification of operational acts, tied in with a independently defined plan, is the 
core meaning of the routinization of work."
(Ibid, pp. 154-5).
Unger argues that this rigid style of work organization can be realised in any number of 
alternative institutional arrangements, and emphasises that the general scheme should not be 
mistaken for any of its concrete instances. The familiar examples are, of course, the 
Fordist/Taylorist assembly-line and the multi-divisional enterprise, but Unger also recognises, 
like Fiore and Sabel, national specificities which partially modify and alter these ideal-type 
arrangements.
However, Unger's major point is that forms of industrial organization are given the 
presuppositions of his general social theory and view of industrial societies, open to 
context-revising' activities and practices, and that theses practices involve the 'disembedding' 
or 'disentrenchment' of the social organisation of work and employment. The alternative form 
that is put forward as a prescriptive alternative is nothing but Piore and Sabel's FS:
"Take now the flexible form of labour. It relativizes the different formulating 
tasks and executing them. The project becomes simply the provisional and 
sketchy anticipation of a collective effort. Each operational act represents the 
project on the march: an adaptation of the plan to circumstances that is also 
both a step towards greater detail in the understanding of what the project is 
and a proposal for its redefinition Because the moments of formulation and 
execution tend towards merger and simultaneity rather than separation and 
sequence, the boundaries among operations are themselves elastic. Each 
operative step, gains meaning and guidance from its direct relation to other 
steps as well as from its link with the provisional and progressively enriched 
plan The foremost difficulty of organization becomes the need to maintain 
direction and unity without abandoning the impetus towards flexibility."
(Ibid, p 154).
In Unger's work we have the familiar litany of themes that are common in the FS literature - 
multi-skilled workers, universal/general-purpose machines, fluid processes, industrial districts -
and so forth.
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Like Piore, Sabel and Hirst, Unger fits these in to his general meta-theoretical view of the 
character of industrialization and its essential openness to alternative possibilities, routes and 
trajectories The critique of 'deep-structure' social theory, 'necessitarianism' and 'determinism' 
finds itself arguing, inevitably, within its prescription for 'context revision', 'plasticity' and 
negative capability', for a type of economy and society which can give expression to these 
metaphysical and ontological notions. Relying to a great extent on Sabel and Zeitlin's 
"Historical Alternatives to Mass Production" (1983) article, Unger writes:
''I argue that this view of industrial development drastically underestimates the 
degree of deviation from the mainstream that occurred even in such prize 
exhibits of the mythical history as the economic and social transformation of 
England. In fact, the deviant forms reveal more of what was distinctive to the 
West and what made it incomparably revolutionary than do the dominant ones. 
I also claim that the traditional view gives a mistaken sense of the degree of 
prevalence that the more rigid type of work organization in fact achieved. 
According to the mythical history the deviations appeared as a special response 
- the idiosyncracies of the regions where they arose - but failed for general 
ones - the inherent imperatives of industrial development."
(Ibid, pp. 180-1).
For Unger 'mythical history' of the rise of the industrial West found in such works as David 
Lande's Unbound Prometheus (1960), Walt Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth: A 
non-Communist Manifesto (1960) and Kerr et al's Industrialism and Industrial Man (1960) has 
been deconstructed by the mounting evidence for alternative avenues of development and, 
specifically, a 'craft alternative' of industrial transformation and development. Furthermore, 
this is a critique of Marxism as well and, in particular, Marx's Capital which exemplifies for 
Unger the single track view with its logic of historical determinism and tendencies of 
historical necessity. Like Gramsci, Unger is calling for a 'Revolution against Capital'.
Other targets of Unger's attack include theories of 'proto-industrialization' which produce 
elegant and logical models, connecting up economics and demography, to produce historically 
thin causes for industrialization which overlook the diversity and viability of the craft 
alternative as an ongoing and reproducible alternative. "Most of the anomalous experiments
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and trajectories that the proto-industrialization argument fails to accommodate illustrate the 
career of the petty commodity variant of industrialization whose condescending dismissal by 
mainstream theory and historiography I earlier recalled." However, Unger recognizes that the 
craft alternative did lose out to another form of industrialization: "in no instance was the 
consolidation of the alternative style in one sector of the economy followed by changes in the 
defining institutional form of markets and polities that might have permitted a more drastic 
shift in the character of Western industrialism". This conclusion and recognition leads to the 
assessment that the promise of the deviant cases must be an indirect one:
"The approach is to study the dependence of the dominant industrial style upon 
a variety of extra-economic institutional arrangements that were themselves 
subject to constant struggle. The study of this dependence could then be 
complemented by an attempt to imagine the institutional conditions under 
which the alternative industrialism could have flourished more widely. This is 
the theme pursued throughout this interpretative history of contemporary 
formative contexts as well as later parts of False Necessity. Another, much 
narrower approach is to consider how the rivalry between the dominant and 
deviant models relates to early modern struggles over agriculture and to 
contemporary conflicts about economic organization. In this way what has 
usually been seen as a highly localized and long-term quarrel can be shown to 
be part of a general and continuing dispute."
(Ibid, p 187).
Thus Unger's conceptualization of distinct path-ways and forms of industrialization can be 
seen to be dependent on his view of 'formative contexts' consisting of an articulation of an 
ensemble of elements (institutional, economic, political, cultural) that are articulated together 
in specific moments of historical time, which in turn, depends on his critique of 
'deep-structure' theories of society and history and, finally his notion 'negative capability'. 
Although the work of Piore, Sabel and Zeitlin are an important influence on Unger's 
conceptualisation and theory, the politics, which in turn have influenced Piore, Sabel and 
Zeitlin, can be traced back to the nineteenth century Anarchist and Utopian Socialist thinkers. 
To conclude this section it is necessary to point out that the position Unger develops on 
industrialization is more self-consciously reflexive than Piore and Sabel in that it recognises 
the importance of inventing and imagining a social theory which criticises positivism,
determinism and 'false necessity' But it is still not clear how successful he has been in this 
task The argument which I will now present in conclusion to this chapter will be that 
although Unger's social theory states an eloquent critique of determinism, essentialism and 
reductionism it is not, however, without its own difficulties.
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Conclusion
While it is not possible to map onto each the research of Piore and Sabel, Hirst and Zeitlin 
and Unger, it is possible to put forward the view that there are 'family resemblances' between 
these sets of ideas. All attack various forms of technological determinism, essentialism and 
reductionism. Also they put forward similar political programmes based around FS. Piore 
and Sabel are the most careful to empirically ground their ideas in concrete research and are 
not at all concerned with developing a rigorous social theory which would ground or form the 
foundation for the FS hypothesis.
Hirst, on the other hand, came to the FS hypothesis through a more theoretically, circuitous 
route Hirst was concerned with the critique of orthodox forms of Marxist theorising, 
principally Althusser's Marxism. Hirst's project involved a 'logic of disintegration' where 
social relationships of production and their ideological and political conditions of existence 
could no longer be theorized as a totality. This theoretical project, of course, had directly 
political effects That is, the recognition that Marxist political programmes and forms of 
calculation were ill-equipped to deal with the complex reality of modern societies. In this 
context, against the background of the local industrial strategies of Labour councils in the 
mid-1980s, the ideas of Piore and Sabel proved attractive and influenced policy-makers and 
researchers at the GLC.“ 7'
Unger's theoretical project, as argued above, is more ambitious, but can be situated in the 
same paradigm Unger's critique of 'false necessity' is his way of articulating a critique of the 
Ihree misleading' ideas of determinism, essentialism and reductionism. His critique of
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deep-structure' social theories of which he considers Marxism a paradigmatic example traces 
a similar trajectory as Hirst's, albeit within a very different vocabulary and metaphysics. His 
concept of 'formative contexts' is similar to the 'no necessary correspondence' we find in 
Hirst's critique of Capital. Obviously, the metaphysics of 'negative capability' that Unger 
deploys to ground his romantic vision of human restlessness and 'context revision' cannot be 
found in Hirst's more nominalist view of society and humanity. In this sense then, Unger's 
'super-theory' which claims explanatory significance stands in contrast to Hirst's 'ultra-theory' 
which is more deconstructive and non-foundational.
Despite these differences, however, these three groups of researchers share a similar 
conception of what they are criticizing, which is, as argued above, the mythical history and 
theory of modernity and industrialization However, while orthodox modernisation theory is 
successively criticized by the FS theorists on the grounds of its 'necessitarianism' there is a 
ambiguity surrounding the alternative to modernisation theory which they put forward, which 
oscilates uneasily between an argument for contingency' and, alternatively, an argument that 
FS represents the latest surge of a neo-modemization (Tiryakian 1991, 1994, Alexander 1995) 
or reflexive modernization (Beck 1992, 1995). It is the argument of this conclusion that the 
FS thesis has not adequately confronted and thought through the debate over modernization 
theory and its aporias. The argument of Tiryakian 1991, 1994) and Alexander (1995) that 
modernization theory needs to be renewed and rethought in a more multidimensional manner 
would seem to leave open the possibility that the FS thesis can be rethought within the 
framework of a neo-modernization theory of social development. This would draw the FS 
thesis close to the arguments of Beck (1992) who makes much use of Piore and Sabel in his 
discussion of the changing nature of work and employment. Also it would draw close to the 
arguments of Lash and Urry (1994) who argue that there is a transition under way towards a 
form of reflexive accumulation', based around informational and communicative structures
These observations are validated by Unger's article (with Zhiyuan), China in the Russian 
Mirror', where Unger argues that it is only institutional fetishism which makes us believe that 
only the neo-liberal market solution can solve Russia's problem. Unger argues that "in fact,
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there are different ways of organizing market economies and representative democracies" 
(1994, p 78). However, this point does not validate a anti-necessitarian' position, but rather 
the argument that with a neo-modernising logic of re-convergence there are various ways to 
manage and organise a modern market society. The hegemonic signifiers of determinism, 
essentialism and reductionism are their common foe. What needs to be considered now is the 
crucial question of how adequate is their critique and the model of the possible future they 
put forward?
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REFERENCES: CHAPTER ONE
1 This is not to argue that the issues addressed here do not touch or relate to empirical 
issues, but only to argue that there is a movement from the abstract to the concrete as argued by 
Marx in his 1857 Preface (1977).
2 The theory of industrial society or industrialism will be explicated below. But see Kerr 
et al, Industrialism and Industrial Man (1960) for two paradigmatic statements of the theory.
3. While the theory of industrial society is composite, these researchers cited provide some 
of the most adequate statements and criticisms.
4. Abrams provides by far the best defence of the theory arguing against the thesis that it 
is inevitably necessitarian and functionalist. Abrams interprets Kerr's classical statement as 
offering up an historical sociology of industrial society which accepts contingency.
5. Sabel's research has close connections with the new institutional sociology of industrial 
life. It has increasingly turned towards a more socialized view of economic life, although as yet 
he offers up no explicit theoretical statement.
6 High technology cottage industry' is the term Sabel uses for flexible specialization in his 
Work and Politics (1982). It conjures up a romantic vision which has close associations with 
classical anarchist and socialist thinking - Proudhon, Kropotkin, Morris, etc. Sabel only uses the 
term in his book suggesting an acceptance of these criticisms. It is useful to point out that the 
term is a classic example of what Charles Jencks in another context calls 'double-coding'. That 
is to say, a combination of the modern (high technology) with the traditional (cottage-industry). 
The question of whether Sabel can be called post-modern will be taken up below.
7 This passage is a fundamental statement of the close dependence that Sabel and Zeitlin 
establish between their conception of industrialisation and their political beliefs. However, it is 
impossible to read off their conception of industrialisation any imperative politics. But see Unger 
for a more rigorous statement.
8 This tradition forms part of what Unger calls the mythical history of modernity', the 
theory of industrial society, modernisation theory and orthodox Marxist accounts of capitalist 
industrialisation. 9
9 An argument for contingency and many possible worlds'.
53
10 For Hirst and Hindness all 'interests' are artifactual. That is to say, created by human 
practice and institutions. Sabel also challenges the idea of given "interests' in his critiques of
reductionism'.
11 Hirst, Hindness et al, in Marx's capital and Capitalism Today (1977 were criticised for 
offering up a purely negative or deconstructive criticism of the Marxist tradition offering up no 
practical proposals for socio-economic transformation. The theory of FS is an answer to this
criticism.
12 Associated Socialism will be explained below, but it has some points of comparison with 
Piore and Sabel's notion of "Yeoman Democracy".
13. Williams Cutler, et al have in a series of papers offered up some of the most serious 
criticisms of the FS hypothesis and of the concept of Post-Fordism and Lean Production. For 
them there is nothing new under the sun.
14 David Downs used the term ’ exagger-book' to refer to theories that extrapolate generalised 
trends and connections from limited empirical evidence. Obviously, however, whether a piece 
of research is an example of an ' exagger-book' is essentially contestable (Downs is cited in R.E. 
Pqhl's Division of Labour (1986).
15 Unfortunately, 1 have not the space to consider in detail the ideas of Lash and Urry or 
Freeman and Perez. See Jessop (1990) for a critique.
16. It could be argued that Hirst, Hindness et al's Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (1977) 
is an example of ultra-theory. Its nominalistic dissolution of the concept of capitalism stands in 
contrast with Unger's (super) theory of "formative contexts'. Whether Hirst's latest work is ultra 
or super theory is an interesting question that cannot be answered here. 17
17 Best, Murray and Zeitlin were closely linked with the Greater London Council's (GLC) 
policy of economic restructuring pioneered by Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB).
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2 r APITALISM. m a r x is m , a n d  f l e x ib l e  spe c ia l iz a t io n
This chapter will explore some of the issues raised in chapter one. However, while the first 
chapter was mainly an exposition of the key ideas of Piore, Sabel, Zeitlin, Unger and Hirst 
relating to general social theory and the critique of the 'three misleading ideas' of 
technological determinism, essentialism and reductionism, chapter two will develop a more 
critical analysis of the adequacy of their analysis and critique and will draw out the ideas 
that can be rescued and recast into the form of a more adequate account. A more adequate 
account would mean taking more seriously the possibility that modernisation theory in the 
form of a neo-modemisation theory could avoid the two extremes of non-foundational 
contingency on the one hand and the functionalism of orthodox modernisation theory and 
objectivist, functionalist Marxist forms of analysis on the other. As argued in Chapter 1, the 
FS thesis oscillates uneasily between the argument against false necessity' and for 
contingency' on the one hand and, on the other, an argument which postulates FS as being 
the result of a new surge of neo-modemisation (Tiryakian, 1991) or reflexive modernisation 
(Beck, 1992). As Alexander (1995) has argued the development of neo-modemisation theory 
is a response to the collapse of the two prior narrative forms of orthodox modernisation 
theory and Marxist dependency and world-system theories. As 1 have argued the FS theorists 
were at the vanguard of the critique o f these two theories, but were unable to rescue any real 
positive moments of aspects of these two theories or paradigms which left their own 
alternative somewhat untheorised and bereft of a social scientific tradition Therefore, this 
chapter will argue that some forms of Marxist analysis need to be reclaimed because of its 
ability to bring together diverse phenomena into a mediated totality, without necessarily 
postulating the end of market-based relationships.
The first observation that needs to be made is that the general thrust of the Piore and Sabel 
critique needs to be upheld. That is, the need to reject, in principle, technological
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determinism, essentialism and reductionism. The fact that these ideas are now almost 
universally condemned as problematic by most social scientific schools means, however, that 
the rejection and critique of these errors begs the question: How should these errors be 
specified theoretically and therefore avoided? Like all debates within the social sciences 
these questions are essentially contested ones subject to a conflict of interpretation In this 
context, then, the procedure which will be pursued here is to examine some Marxist 
attempts to avoid these errors and to play off their interpretations against the FS hypothesis. 
Before this, however, a few words need to be said on the conception of Marxism upheld in 
this dissertation.
That Marxism is a complex, contested and diverse tradition of thought is a well-known and 
established fact of interpretation (Anderson, 1976, Jay, 1984. Jessop, 1991).111 Nevertheless, 
despite this it is fair to argue that most modern Marxist theory would insist on the fact that 
they share none of the three 'misleading ideas' identified by Sabel. Thus it is a difficult task to 
locate the precise points of disagreement between the researchers dealt with in the Chapter 
One and modem Marxist theory Therefore the Marxists which will be examined will be 
limited (for the most part) to the ones explicitly criticised by Piore, Sabel, Zeitlin, Unger and 
Hirst themselves. For it is the contention of this chapter that they have considerably 
misrepresented and misinterpreted the arguments of Marxism and need to be redeemed, 
albeit in dialogue rather than, necessarily, opposition and conflict, for as Hirst himself has 
written aptly in another context:
"It is an urgent necessity that socialists find means to differ which do not 
destroy the wider possibilities of communication. What is absurd is to differ in 
such a way that neither side learns anything, and least of all about the other."
(1985, p.59)
The first and brief task however, is to establish that a case needs to be answered by Marxist 
theory against the charges laid against it by Sabel et al. There will always be those who 
completely reject that there is anything wrong with Marxism and that it is a complete and 
self-sufficient system of thought that should not be criticised, supplemented or transformed.
However, as most modern Marxist scholarship recognise there are considerable difficulties 
with the classical forms of Marxist analysis.
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Ifflinoloeical determinism?
However, a case can be made that some of these objections and problematizations of 
Marxist analysis have their source or 'foundation' at a higher level of abstraction (Jessop 
1991, Laclau 1990). Marxism, for example, has long been subject to the critique of being a 
'technological determinism' first misleading idea), ever since Marx made the remark that - a 
"society with the hand-mill gives you feudalism, while a society with the steam-engine gives 
you capitalism" - and the various forms of Marxism from Lenin, Lukács, Gramsci, Althusser 
and beyond have, attempted in various ways to reject this view and interpretation of Marx, 
insisting on the 'primacy' of the relationships of production over the 'productive forces'.
Even the argument of G.A. Cohen in Karl Marx's Theory of History (1978) which defends a 
traditional version (updated by analytical philosophy) of historical materialism where the 
'productive forces' are dominant rejects a too simplistic 'technological determinism'. As the 
non- Marxist Alain Touraine has written against another form of technological determinism 
prevalent in the (post) industrial society thesis:
"Thus a postindustrial society cannot be defined, any more than an industrial 
one, by a given technology. It is just as superficial to speak of computer 
society or of plutonium society as it is of steam-engine society or an electric 
motor society. Nothing justifies the granting of such a privilege to a particular 
technology, whatever its economic importance."
(1989, p. 104).
However, explicit statements opposing technological determinism in principle are no 
guarantee that technological deterministic assumptions will not reappear by the back door. 
After all, even Alvin Toffler (1983) refuses the appellation of being a technological 
determinist And this observation leads to the equally pertinent argument that Sabel et al.
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despite their methodological and theoretical opposition to technological determinism can and 
have been criticized for the error of technological determinism themselves (a criticism which 
is taken up below).
From the point of view of the argument here it is necessary to observe that it is useless to 
consider whether it has ever been argued that technology, technique or technics is a 
prime-mover' in history, unmediated by social relations, culture and politics. Rather the 
argument will examine the question from the point of view put forward by Sabel et al, that 
technological determinism in their understanding refers to the idea that: "regardless of its 
political preferences, any society that wants to produce industrial goods must adopt certain 
structures or organization, patterns of authority, and ways of doing business" (p.4). By this 
definition it is easy to see that perhaps the term 'technological determinism' is not the best 
one to use as it implies a much narrower set of ideas than Sabel seems to be writing about 
It is the idea that, rather than technology (and technology is a contestable term itself per se, 
determining distinct forms of organizational structure, an industrial economy producing 
commodities is fairly restricted in the parameters of organizational, political and cultural 
structures that it can adapt. To be more specific, industrialization and industrial society is 
never just conceptualised solely as technology.
As Giddens (198S) interprets it industrialism always presumes the following traits: (1) The 
use of inanimate sources of raw material in either production or in processes affecting the 
circulation of commodities, (2)The mechanization of production and other economic process. 
What a 'machine, is cannot be defined as easily as might at first appear, but can be said to 
involve an artifact that accomplishes certain set tasks through the regularised application of 
inanimate power sources; (3)lndustrialism means the prevalence of manufacturing production, 
but we have to be more careful about how 'manufacture' is to be understood It is very 
frequently used to designate the production of non- agricultural goods but it should refer to 
the manner of production, rather than simply the creation of such goods Manufacture should 
be regarded as connecting (1) and (2) in a regularised fashion, such that there are routimzed 
processes creating a 'flow' of produced goods And crucially Giddens argues that:
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"Industrialism cannot be a wholly 'technological' phenomenon because the three 
elements mentioned above presume an organization of human social 
relationships. I do not mean to imply some sort of technological reductionism 
[read determinism] here The process of industrialization in its original 
(mythical?) form, in Britain, demonstrates various dislocations between 
elements that later came together as a more homogeneous productive order 
Several of the more advanced sectors of production in respect of traits (1), (2) 
and (3) were organized largely through the putting-out system rather than in 
terms of centralized work-place Some of the early factories, by contrast, were 
established in sectors of production not distinguished by a particular high level 
of mechanized manufacture. But once these factors had come together, they 
formed something of a unitary 'productive package' that generated economic 
opportunities and was perceived as such within the framework of expanding 
capitalist enterprise."
(1985, pp 138-9)
Moreover, Giddens links up industrialism with the emergence of another analytical dimension 
of ’modernity', namely, capitalism itself. The most important argument that needs to be 
addressed then is the absence of the concept or theory of capitalism in Sabel, et al
Theories a£ Modem Capitalism
This line of enquiry makes it necessary to examine and put forward an understanding of 
capitalism and its relationship with industrialism which is compatible with the proposition 
that there are variations and divergences within the processes of industrialism, but that they 
take place within the structure-forming effects of capitalism as argued by Marxist theory and 
critics of the FS hypothesis. Thus before the FS hypothesis is compared and contrasted with 
some Marxist positions on industrialization it is necessary to develop an adequate theory of 
modern capitalism itself as a dimension of modernity as argued for by non-Marxist radical 
writers such as Giddens and Marxist writers such as the Regulation School(s) and others 121
As I have argued Sabel et al reject the concept of capitalism as too totalising and 
under-totalising (it is too general, but also not specific enough). Piore and Sabel are silent
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on the issue but symptomatically rarely use the term capitalism in their writings. While the 
term capitalism (or the capitalist mode of production) is by no means an uncontentious term 
and is in certain ways, some of which are identified by Unger and Hirst, problematic, it is 
nonetheless necessary to defend the use of the term in the study of modern societies for 
foregrounds - institutional features of modernity which are passed over and occluded by the 
term industrial society or industrialism. One of the major problems in using the term is its 
ambiguity.
Importantly, the concept of capitalism has entered everyday and intellectual circulation in 
such a manner that it is foolish to think it can just be dispensed with because some social 
scientists have theorised its epistemological inadequacy. Moreover, capitalism is not purely 
an academic concept, but is actually constitutive o f  social reality as well, in what Giddens 
has called a 'double hermeneutic' of social reflexivity.
In The Consequences of Modernity Giddens links this idea with that of reflexivity and
writes:
"All the social sciences participate in the reflexive relation, although sociology 
has an especially central place. Take as an example the discourse of 
economics. Concepts like 'capital', 'investments', ’markets', 'industry', and many 
others, in their modern senses, were elaborated as part of the early development 
of economics as a distinct discipline in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. These concepts, and empirical conclusions linked to them, were 
formulated in order to analyze changes involved in the emergence of modern 
institutions. But they could not, and did not, remain separated from the 
activities and events to which they related. They have become integral to what 
'modem economic life' actually is and inseparable from it. Modern economic 
activity would not be as it is were it not for the fact that all members of the 
population have mastered these concepts and an indefinite variety of others."
(1989, p.41).
On this level, then, of the 'lifeworld', it would seem that we are stuck with terms such as 
capitalism and capitalists.
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Moreover, there is a strong case to be made that everything should be done to preserve their 
usage and circulation, for they are constantly being challenged by other terms which are of 
even less use, acting not only as 'epistemological obstacles' and therefore as ideologies, but 
also as political obstacles Terms such as 'free enterprise', 'free- market', 'affluent society', 
'postindustrial society' and 'post - Fordist society' are such terms which can be contested from 
the standpoint of the continuing adequacy of capitalism as a descriptor of social reality.
That the intellectual debate over the correct terms to use is also, primarily, a political 
contestation No doubt the term capitalism is not the monopoly of Marxists there are many 
examples of other terms being used For example, the later Frankfurt School's substitution 
of administered society' and 'one dimensional society' for the concept of capitalism. Or the 
use of the term 'postindustriaT or 'programmed society' by Touraine. On the other hand, 
mainly on the right are perfectly happy to use the term capitalism And as observed earlier in 
the context of the discussion about Unger and Hirst's rejection and problematization of the 
term capitalism there is a case to be made that it is too totalising, thus excluding a whole 
range of struggles that are made invisible or are marginalised by the term, capitalism.
The critique of 'capitalist genealogies' can be found in cognate critiques which have been 
developed and elaborated upon in the last twenty years, such as the return of 'civil society' as 
an object of analysis, political critique and defence. All these discourses decentre capital as 
an object of critique, viewing its privileging as an illicit totalisation 131
Although these critiques cannot be ignored for the case they make are important, it is 
nonetheless necessary not to throw the baby out with the bath water. For however much the 
traditional Marxist analysis of capitalism and its contradictions has ignored, marginalised and 
penpheralised other struggles, conflicts and antagonisms, it remains the case that the use of a 
central term to describe and analyze society can still be defended It is, surely, not a 
question of either/or, but rather of reformulating and recasting the traditional Marxist concept 
of capitalism to make it accommodate these criticisms. Some figures who developed 
alternative concepts of capitalism have slipped out of view such as Sombart, but others such 
as Max Weber, Schumpeter and Polyani, are of vital significance, as is Marx. This is not the
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place to provide a detailed assessment or critique of the relative merits and demerits of these 
views of capitalism, but it is fair to say that they provide the underpinning for such diverse 
social theories of capitalism and modernity as Wallerstein, (1983) who uses the preferred 
term of 'Historical Capitalism'. To foreground the importance of examining the term in the 
context of the modern world-system and its origins and emergence since at least the sixteenth 
century With Wallerstein both Marx and Braudel are important for understanding the term 
capitalism. Another important use and elaboration of the term is Giddens, who as usual 
writes good sense in his observation that the term capitalism has some advantages over 
industrialism (although both should be seen as analytical dimensions of modernity): "The 
relation of capitalism to industrialism needs to be directly discussed, but first it is worth 
briefly asking why the concept of 'capitalist society' is acceptable while that of 'industrial 
society'is not" (1985, p 14) The reason Giddens gives for this is that the concept of 
capitalism has within it an explanation for the dynamic aspect of modernity, or to use 
Schumpeter's phase 'creative destruction' in a way that the term 'industrial society' does not. 
The dynamic impetus is clear
"Namely, capitalistic enterprise involves the pursuit of profit throughout the 
production of commodities for sale on a market; the perceived need to achieve 
profits sufficient to guarantee an adequate return on investment generates a 
chronic impetus towards economic transformation and expansion. But in the 
instance of industrialism considered alone, such a source of dynamism - one of 
the main features of the discontinuities of modernity - is lacking. Industrialism 
is a highly effective form of productive activity but it carries no inner dynamic 
of the sort associated with capitalist enterprise".
(Ibid, 1985, p. 140).
Like Giddens the tendency to interpret the differences between Weber and Marx's theory of 
capitalism is followed by Lazonick's (1992) recent work on 'The theory and history of 
capitalist development' argues for the comparability of Marx and Schumpeter's account of 
modern capitalist development and that although they said far from the last word on 
economic matters it is still the case that they provide an essential point for analysis:
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"The role of economic theory is to provide a simplified framework with which 
to analyze complex economic phenomena Even though a particular analysis, 
such as Marx and Schumpeter, may arrive at untenable conclusions, the 
underlying conceptual framework may yet serve as a solid foundation on which 
to build a more adequate theoretical structure. As in the case of Marx and 
Schumpeter, when an economic theorist asks relevant questions and creates a 
coherent conceptual framework designed to answer those questions, it is 
possible to learn as much from shortcomings of his or her work as from its 
strengths."
(1992, p 130).
Lazonick's analysis is of great relevance, further, because it recognizes the variability and 
diversity of particular forms of capitalist development, albeit within the parameters of 
capitalism, thus avoiding empiricism and nominalism. No doubt it is important to integrate 
the analysis of other significant thinkers into an adequate account of modern capitalism,
Poly am for instance (Glasman, 1994, Catophores, 1994).
Following on from this overview of the possibility that some sort of theoretical synthesis can 
emerge from the various social scientific theories of modem capitalism, it is very easy to 
concur with Johannes Berger's conclusion that the theory of capitalism cannot be rejected 
because it is, as Weber observed, 'the most fateful power of modern life'. But
"... insofar as capitalism and modernity become synonymous, it is necessary to 
enrich the theory of capitalism by a corresponding theory of modernity. I do 
not mean to fall into any kind of economic reductionism by asserting that 
capitalism played a central role in the 'great transformation' (Polyani 1957); I 
simply assert that the modernity of the economy is the model for the 
modernization of other institutional spheres."
(1992, p.238).
from this insistence that modernity and capitalism are inseparable Berger identifies three 
basic questions that need to be answered: (1) What does capitalism mean? (2) What is 
capitalism's central problem? and; (3) Is there a solution for capitalism's central problem or 
will it finally collapse? For Berger what unites the various theorists of capitalism is the 
belief that its evolution involves a process of Freiselzung (prozess). That is to say, a process
of setting free of the elements of society in a differentiating process (Luhmann). First, the 
separation of society into an economic and political sphere, second, a process of expanded 
reproduction or accumulation of capital, and third, the dissolving or dissolution or 
'communities' and 'world views'. To quote Berger:
"In the economic realm Marx's concept of the 'self- valorization of value' as a 
'ceaseless movement' had already formulated the fundamental process by which 
the economy was being freed from traditional life-orders. 'All that is solid 
melts into air.' This short sentence from the Communist Manifesto captures the 
essence of modernization (Berman 1982). But it would be misleading to regard 
this process exclusively as a negative one; on the level of society as a whole, 
modernization means not only disintegration but also the development of 
productive forces, the increase of adaptive capacity, and the like. Moreover, on 
the level of the individual it means emancipation and self-development."
(Ibid, p.246).
For Berger, the central problems of capital is the fact that this process of freiselzung destroys 
its own conditions of existence. As Schumpeter and Polyani argued it leads to the depleting 
of the moral and normative' foundation or legacy of capitalism. Moreover, it is 
inter-temporarily irrational, for the ceaseless need to accumulate destroys the 
natural/ecological foundation of life Berger seems to reject the idea of traditional Marxism 
that there are economic crisis tendencies within capitalism such as the tendency for the over 
accumulation of capital, which will lead to its collapse. Although this idea classically 
associated in its extreme form with Grossman and Luxemberg it is still in a modified form a 
hypothesis which has not been invalidated or falsified, although scepticism is always called 
for
This viewpoint has the advantage over the Piore, Sabel, Unger, Zeitlin and Hirst position in 
that it keeps with some of the most important Marxist insights, but allows a fair degree of 
variation in the form that capitalism takes between periods, countries, regions, localities etc.
It is in keeping with Jameson's (1993) insight that capitalism produces difference but within 
the process of expansion of the value form and commodification (see also Lash and Urry 
1994)
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The foregoing remarks do not add up into a theory but they do highlight some of the 
problems that need to be faced in theorising modem capitalism. And moreover, facing the 
problems raised by social theory, the process of industrialization and its relation with 
capitalism To make these remarks more concrete and relevant the next section will 
examine some of the Marxist theorisation of the industrial restructurings which the FS theory 
has raised That is to say, I will confront the concept of social theory and industrialization 
which Sabel et al have put forward with that of the Marxist equivalents The examples 
which will be examined are the Regulation School(s) and, from a more sceptical position, 
that of Hyman (1992), Pollert (1988) and Clarke (1990). This is a necessary stage before 
examining in later chapters the concept of work organization, employment and industrial 
relations in the FS theory and, finally, the political implications of the FS theory
Marxism, regulation theorvts) and Industrialization
The FS theory of industrialization now needs to enter into dialogue with the Marxist 
alternatives. As has already been argued the concept of capitalism needs to be re-introduced 
in any analysis of the new production regimes that are arising, for without such a 
specification any variation in the manner in which the economic system and industrialization 
is organised and developed can be mistaken for epochal changes of, great 'divides', 'waves', 
and post' epochs. In this context it is necessary, then, to examine in more detail the Marxist 
theorisation of industrialization within the capitalist mode of production and social 
relationships of production Within modem Marxism, as in the FS debate, the terms mass 
production and Fordism are used to describe the post-1945 wave of industrialization. While 
the FS thesis insists that the terms have complex variants and, on one level of specification, 
should be treated as ideal-type concepts and not as real, substantial relations, this disclaimer 
(see Hirst and Zeitlin) should be treated with caution and suspicion. Moreover, it is 
necessary to question what the theoretical status of the assertion made by Hirst and Zeitlin 
that the Marxist approach and the Regulation approach are too general:
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"Despite the many empirical caveats scattered through their work ... 
systematically overstate the dominance of Fordist modes of regulation during 
the post-war period, whether in terms of the pervasiveness of Taylorist work 
organization, institutionalized collective, Keynesian demand management or the 
welfare. Conversely, the application of a regulation approach to national case 
studies, typically involves not only a severe 'stylization of the facts' to fit its 
theoretical, but also ad hoc modifications of the categories themselves to 
accommodate observed variations. The result is the multiplication of hybrid 
formulations poised uneasily between theory and empirical description, such as 
'flex- Fordism' (West Germany), 'blocked Fordism (UK), 'state Fordism' 
(France), 'delayed Fordism' (Spain, Italy), 'peripheral Fordism’ (Mexico, South 
Korea, Brazil)."
(1991, p 21 ).
This critique which, as has been argued, represents an extreme nominalistic empiricism 
without any theoretical purchase on the world has to be rejected for misrepresenting the 
process and levels of abstraction operative within Marxist theorization This is not of course 
to say that there are no problems with the formulations criticized by Hirst and Zeitlin and, as 
shall be shown, many researchers who would regard themselves as Marxists have raised them 
also and, paradoxically, within the terms of a more orthodox Marxism than the 
Regulations(s) school itself.141
Marxism before Fordism
While the concept of Fordism is now well established in the English language literature of 
critical social theory and political economy, it is only since the publication of Michel 
Aglietta's A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The United States Experience in 1979 that the 
term has been used with such frequency and in an explicitly theoretical manner. While the 
term 'Fordism' has, of course, been in use since the 1920s, within Marxism in the post-war 
period it was little used and certainly was not the central concept for understanding and 
explaining the dynamics of modem capitalism. For example, in the post-war years perhaps 
the most important study in Marxist political economy which was published was Baran and 
Sweezy's Monopoly Capital. An essay on the American Economic and Social Order (1966).
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While this book departs from some of the fundamental Marxist concepts such as value theory 
it still utilises orthodox periodizing concepts such as competitive and monopoly capitalism, 
building on the well established work of Bukharin, Luxemberg and Hilferding as well as 
some of the themes of the Frankfurt School and, in particular Pollock's work. The name of 
Henry Ford appears nowhere in the index, let alone Fordism. This might not appear so 
surprising in the context of the major criticism which was directed at the book by more 
orthodox Marxists, that it neglected the sphere of production and the labour process.
However, since Fordism is an articulated concept that, links production with consumption, it 
is strange for a book so concerned with consumption or the 'absorption of the surplus' as 
Monopoly Capital, that is should not use the term.
To take another example from the same period, Cornelius Castoriadis and the political group 
Socialisme ou Barbarie. perhaps one of the most creative critical tendencies of the 1960s, 
also do not use the term In Castoriadis's article 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution' (1960) 
there is much discussion of the contemporary transformations and restructurings of 'modem 
capitalism' since 1945 The growth of the interventionist state, the bureaucratization of 
capitalist organization and of the labour movement, the reorganization of the labour process 
and of the capitalist corporation and enterprise. There are observations on the growth of 
'privatisin', 'consumption' and 'consumerism', 'the spectacle'. Clearly influenced by Lefebrvre's 
'Critique of Everyday Life' (1992) and Debord's situationist critique of the 'Society of the 
Spectacle' (1987) it is a critique which does without any reference to Ford and Fordism. 
Nevertheless, although many criticisms can be directed at Castoriadis's understanding of 
modern capitalism, such as the belief that the economic contradictions of capitalism had been 
smoothed out permanently by the long-boom and the Keynesian interventionist state. 
Castoriadis' had an astute understanding and analysis of the nature of production and the 
labour process in modern capitalism which, in some ways, anticipates Braverman's work on 
laylorism, (perhaps due to the influence of Pierre Navilie, Georges Friedman and the 
sociologie du travail' in France) Fifteen years before the publication of Braverman's Labour 
and Monopoly Capitalism: the degradation of work in the twentieth century. (1974) 
Castoriadis wrote:
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"... on the level of production, capitalism's large-scale introduction of 
machinery in the first half of the nineteenth century was rightly perceived by 
the workers as a frontal attack... Taylorism was capitalism's response to this 
struggle: From then on norms were to be established 'scientifically' and 
'objectively'. Further resistance on the workers' part made it clear that 
'scientific objectivity' in this field was a joke. Industrial psychology and then 
industrial sociology appeared on the scene in order to help 'integrate' the 
workers into the workforce."
(1988, originally published 1960, p.265).
Thus Castoriadis (and especially within Socialisme ou Barbarie. Mothe) were writing and 
theorizing about mass production, Taylorism and mass consumption, but without using the 
concept of Fordism. The analysis of the effects on the working class of mass production 
were especially astute and foreshadow contemporary post-Fordist discussions of 
consumerism and shopping-niall culture. Castoriadis writes in Bakhtinian terms about the 
repression of popular festivals and the carnival and their substitution by supermarkets and 
consumer culture:
". .. popular festivals, a creation of humanity, tends to disappear as a social 
phenomenon in modern societies. They now survive only as spectacle, a 
physical conglomeration of individuals no longer positively communicating 
with each other, but merely coexisting through their anonymous and passive, 
juxtaposed relations. In such events only one pole of people is active 
nowadays. Its function is to make the event 'live' for the others, who are just 
onlookers. The show, a performance, by a specialised individual or group 
before an impersonal and transitory public, thus becomes the model for 
contemporary socialization."
(Ibid, p.294).
Although, as mentioned above, this critique was taken from Lefebrvre and Debord (other 
influences to note is, surely, the Sartrian critique of "seriality") it emphasises the second-hand 
nature of today's postmodern analysis of consumerism (see Plant, 1992 Gane, 1991 as well as 
Piore and Sabel's which offers little in the way of critique whatsoever.
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The third example is Ernest Mandel's analysis in Late Capitalism (1972), which is by general 
agreement one of the most important works of post-war political economy. Despite certain 
crudities of analysis, for example, the analysis of the role of ideology and the form and 
functions of the state, it is still one of the most successful studies of the evolution and 
development of capital and its modalities of transformation in the post-war era. Its influence 
is particularly revealed in the writings of Frederic Jameson's theorizing of postmodernism 
and the cultural logic of capitalism. Working within the three broad epochal changes in the 
history of capitalism identified by Mandel, competitive capitalism, monopoly capitalism and 
multi-national capitalism, Jameson argues tin his book Postmodernism (1992) that the 
current phase of multinational capital has produced fundamental transformation in our 
culture, which now encompasses everything, including the transition to a post-Fordist regime 
of accumulation. Nevertheless, Mandel's Late Capitalism does not use or refer to the term 
Fordism, although it could be argued that the term is implicit in the sense that Mandel puts 
great emphasis on the importance in the post- war era of the consumer-durable industries such 
as the motor industry as being one of the key propulsive sectors in the 'third technological 
revolution'.
Finally, in this brief analysis of key works in post-war Marxism it is useful to examine the 
example of the Italian operaista school The key thinkers of this school were Panzieri 
(1976), Bologna (1972, 1973), Tronti (1973) and Negri (1988, 1991) who developed a 
sophisticated political analysis of the dynamics of the post-war capitalist expansion, 
accumulation and valorisation, within the context of the Keynesian revolution and the 
American New Deal. Here Fordism begins to appear as a concept, especially within the 
writings of Negri in the later 1970s, but never as the central organizing concept for analysis.
Lmmsci and
The question to ask then in this context is how did the concept of Fordism make its way into 
the Marxist (and general social scientific) theoretical vocabulary? This justifies a short
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history of the origins of the term and when it was introduced and deployed within particular 
critical discourses. As is well-known the first Marxist to use and develop an account of 
Fordism as a particular form of capitalist industrialization was Antonio Gramsci. Indeed 
every discussion of Fordism within contemporary Marxism ritualistically refers to and cites 
Gramsci's famous writings on the subject in his Prison Notebooks ('Americanism and 
Fordism'). However, this invocation is very infrequently followed up with more than a brief 
summation and synopsis of Gramsci's thoughts on the matter and therefore it is necessary to 
summarize in more detail Gramsci's ideas on Fordism. While there should not be reason to 
remind the reader that Gramsci introduced into Marxism a more sophisticated analysis of 
society than hitherto, it is relevant to observe that within his post-Hegelian and post-Crocean 
intellectual formation, Gramsci was able to go beyond the orthodox base-superstructure 
theories which marred the work of Kautsky and Bukharin, while as the same time avoiding 
the sort of idealist expressionist model that Lukács developed in History and Class 
Consciousness (1923). Although Gramsci examined what Anderson has called the 'higher 
realms of the superstructures', namely art, literature, drama, poetry and music (and the middle 
realms of popular or folk culture), he also examined the lower realms and, in the process 
deconstructed the opposition between base and superstructure. The lower realms, for 
Gramsci, were the matrix of ideologies and economic relations (historic bloc) which 
articulated the relationship between 'infrastructure' and 'superstructure'. From the early 
1920s Gramsci had believed that the superstructures existed deep within the infrastructure of 
so-called economic relations in a manner that he was later to express in the formula 
hegemony is bom in the factory'.
In this context, then, it is not surprising that Gramsci became deeply concerned with the 
cultural, ideological, political and economic transformations of capitalism in the United 
States Just as Marx in the nineteenth century saw Britain as a general exemplification of 
capital in its pure form, so Gramsci in the twentieth century saw the United States of 
America For Gramsci, the United States (and the USSR) showed the image of the future for 
l-urope and Italy. This interest was generated by his existential situation as being a militant 
and activist intellectual in Turin, then in the vanguard of capitalist restructuring and
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reorganisation in Italy. Giovanni Agnelli's Fiat car plant, the Lingotto factory was in the 
modernist vanguard of manufacturing, inspired as it was by Henry Ford's organisational and 
production methods The Lingotto factory, which became operational between 1919 and 
1921, covered over two kilometres, and the entire production process flowed uninterruptedly 
through the five reinforced concrete floors, up spiral ramps to a rooftop race- track It was 
an interesting avant-garde attempt to transfer the methods of Ford to the specific spatial 
conditions of Europe The Lingotto plant was designed by the architect Giacommo 
Motte-Trucco, and was to be immortalised by the paradigmatic modern architect Le 
Corbusier in his significantly titled book Towards A New Architecture (1927)(in which he 
expounded his concept of mass-produced housing using ferro-concrete modular skeletons).'51
Also Turin was the centre of militant opposition by workers to the development by Agnelli 
of Taylorism, and the factory occupations of the early 1920s have been interpreted by many 
as in part a reaction against these new managerial and production methods. However, 
although the experience of Turin and the 'Red Years' deeply influenced Gramsci's thinking, 
it was not until the 1930s, when Gramsci was suffering the agony of his incarceration that 
his thought turned in a systematic manner to theorizing these historical transformations of 
capitalism in detail.
For Gramsci, the new regime of accumulation which he christened Fordism (or more 
generally, Americanism) represented a deep restructuring, if not mutation, in the productive 
forces and social relationships of production in modem capitalism. However, as Robert W. 
Cox (1987) recognises, Fordism, for Gramsci, did not represent an epochal transformation of 
society into a completely new form beyond (or post) capitalism, but rather: "a rationalization 
and extension of these relations shorn of all extraneous and procapitalist baggage " In other 
words, it was capitalism in its purer form, the moment when the social formation is colonised 
by the capitalist mode of production, as envisaged by Marx in Capital and the Grundrisse. In 
the historical context of the fascist domination of Italian society, Gramsci speculated on 
whether the corporative state that Mussolini was engineering would lead towards the further
adaption of North American methods of production and organisation throughout Italian 
industry and civil society.
As 'reactionary modernists', the fascists with their nostalgia for Imperial Rome and 'genuine 
community' modulated reaction with a faith in modernity. This was manifested in the Italian 
Futurists praise of war, machine-guns, tanks, cars and death. Moreover, the Fascist 
fascination with Taylorism and Fordism was also part of their programme for change 
However, as Cox explains:
"The fascist corporative state was caught in the horns of a dilemma. There 
were some elements in fascism that envisaged the corporative state as a means 
of making a gradual transition towards the adoption of American methods 
throughout Italian industry. Gramsci, was, however, sceptical that this 
tendency within fascism could triumph, because of fascism's dependence on the 
entrenched, dominant, plutocratic landlord and traditional intellectual elements 
of society. This made a breakthrough by the technical- managerial cadres of 
industry improbable. Fascism would remain a passive revolution, stabilising 
through coercion an impasse in social development, verbally espousing certain 
aims of industrial concentration, but stopping short of the agrarian and 
industrial reform a thorough-going Fordism would imply."
(1987, p.310).
For Gramsci, then, Fordism could only be successively implemented within the context of a 
society where the capitalist class was firmly in the saddle of economic, political and social 
power in short, was hegemonic. Such a society like the USA which had known no 
feudalism or prior social relations of a pre-capitalist nature.
Gramsci's reflections have some points of convergence with other contemporary reflections 
on North America and Americanism, namely the Frankfurt School's. Gramsci's suggestion 
that Americanism and Fordism "derive from an inherent necessity to achieve the organisation 
of a planned economy, and that the various problems examined here should be the links of 
>he chain marking the passage from the old economic individualism to the planned 
economy", could have been written by Pollock or even Adorno and Horkheimer. And, of
72
73
course, following on from this observation the same criticism that could be made of Pollock's 
theory of 'state capitalism' could also be directed at Gramsci. That is, both are too 
deterministic and necessitarian in their respective understandings of the trajectory of 
development of modern capitalism Gramsci, for example, wrote that: "prohibition, which in 
the United States was a necessary condition for developing a new type of worker suitable to 
'Fordist' industry has failed as a result of the opposition of marginal and still backward forces 
and certainly not because of the opposition of either the industrialists or the workers." Suffice 
to say, however, Gramsci's reflections on Fordism cannot really be said to be a theory of 
Fordism in the strong sense, but rather a series of suggestive albeit problematic observations, 
which retrospectively call for criticism Gramsci offers up what he terms a 'catalogue' of 
some of the most important problems pertaining to the phenomenon of Americanism and 
Fordism Which are the following: (1) the "replacement of the present plutocratic stratum by 
a new mechanism of accumulation and distribution of finance capital based on industrial 
production"; (2) "the question of sex"; (3) "the question of whether Americanism can 
constitute an historical 'epoch', that is whether it can determine a gradual evolution of the 
same type as the 'passive revolution' examined elsewhere and typical of the last century, or 
whether on the other hand it does not simply represent the molecular accumulation of 
elements destined to produce an 'explosion', that is an upheaval on the French pattern"; (4) 
"the question of the 'rationalisation' of the demographic composition of Europe"; (5) "the 
question of whether this evolution must have its starting point within the industrial and 
productive world, or whether it can come from the outside, through the cautious but massive 
construction of a formal juridical arm which can guide from the outside the necessary 
evolution of the productive apparatus”: (6) "the question of the so-called 'high wages' paid 
by Fordized and rationalised industry"; (7) "Fordism as the ultimate stage in the process of 
progressive attempts by industry to overcome the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to 
fall”; (g) "psychoanalysis and its enormous diffusion since the war, as the increased moral 
coercion exercised by the apparatus of the State and society on single individuals, and of the 
pathological crisis determined by this coercion"; (9) "Rotary Clubs and Free Masonry". The 
above list gives some idea of the exhaustiveness of Gramsci's reflection on 'Americanism and 
Fordism' That is, his understanding of the new forms of hegemony being created in the
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'New Times'of the 1920s and 1930s In short, the'modernist'restructuring of capitalism It 
would take up too much space to go into all the aspects of the problems raised by Gramsci, but it 
is necessary to examine Gramsci's central problem, which was the transformation of work, which 
emptied work of creative or intellectual challenge and content, aiming to turn the worker into a 
'trained gorilla, however, this was not a pessimistic picture of the alienation of the worker in 
capitalism but, rather, for Gramsci would mean that 'the workers who had no longer to think 
about the conceptual content of their work would have other things to absorb their mental 
capacities, including projects that would become quite threatening to the ruling class Thus, 
(iramsci views Fordism with some optimism, and in line with Lenin's defence of the technical 
logic of Taylorism, argues for its progressiveness and modernity when released from its capitalist 
integument and shell
As Gramsci wrote
"Taylor is in fact expressing with brutal cynicism the purpose of American society 
- developing in the worker to the highest degree automatic and mechanical 
attitudes, breaking up the old psycho-physical nexus of qualified professional 
work, which demands a certain active participation of intelligence, fantasy and 
initiative on the part of the worker, and reducing productive operations exclusively 
to the mechanical physical aspect But these things, in reality, are not original or 
novel they represent simply the most recent phase of a long process which began 
with industrialism itself A forced selection will ineluctably take place, a part of 
the old working class will be pitilessly eliminated from the world of labour perhaps 
from the world tout court"
(1972, pp 302-3)
There is no hint of nostalgia in this passage lamenting the passing of traditional society Rather, 
there is the belief that in whatever one- sided manner modernity is being introduced it has, 
nonetheless, positive and progressive aspects which must be defended against reactionary forces 
and as Clarke (1990) observes quoting Gramsci, "the petit bourgeois and Bohemian layabout". 
Thus Gramsci's Marxism while going a long way in its attempt to invent a non-deterministic and 
anti- necessitarian form of Marxism did not completely realise his intentions. For it is certainly the 
case that Gramsci's Marxism remains imprisoned within the
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objectivist view that the productive forces have a sort of technical/instrumental logic 
inscribed within them, unaffected by social relationships of production. On this argument 
there is something in the view put forward by Laclau and Mouffe that although Gramsci 
begins the invention and creation of a non-deterministic analysis, he still does not carry the 
deconstructive logic he initiated all the way through: "One cannot avoid the feeling that the 
transition from a morphological and essentialist conception a la Labriola, to a radical 
historicist one, has not been coherently accomplished" (p.70). Thus this first Marxist analysis 
of Fordist industrialisation does not fully escape the 'three misleading ideas' of technological 
determinism, essentialism and reductionism identified by Sabel
A ( ntiuue of Cramsci's Analysis of Fordism
It is necessary, then, to analyze briefly, what Henry Ford's new forms of work organisation 
entailed if we are to avoid some of the errors of Gramsci. One of the mistakes often made 
when examining or attempting to understand Fordism is the error of a retrospective analysis 
which starts from the assumption that Henry Ford had a totalising grand master-plan which 
he then proceeded to implement. As historians of technology and Fordism have made clear, 
Ford's assembly-line principle of production and social-economic organisation was a 
contingent and unplanned result of piece-meal experimentation. As Charles Sorensen wrote 
in his Mv Forty Years with Ford (1956):
"Henry Ford had no ideas on mass production. He wanted to build a lot of 
autos. He was determined but, like everyone else at that time, he didn't know 
how In later years he was glorified as the originator of the mass production 
idea. Far from it, he just grew into it, like the rest of us. The essential tools 
and final assembly line ... resulted from an organisation which was continually 
experimenting and improvising to get better production."
(cited in Hounshell, 1984).
The elementary points have been reiterated by historians such as Siegfried Giedion and 
David A. Hounshell. Both writers have shown that there is a long pre-history to Ford's
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innovation Both writers recognise the pre-history of Fordist production methods in the earlier 
'American system of manufacture', of small-arms (Colt), sewing machines (Singer) and in the 
Chicago stockyards and slaughter houses However, Hounshell does modify the picture 
somewhat in his observation that
"From Giedion's perspective, Ford comes at the end of a long historical process 
which, in a Hegelian sense, becomes recognizable only at the end, when unfolding 
historical reason makes itself known Although this interpretation of Ford 
deserves careful attention, it underestimates the singular importance of the changes 
made at the Ford factory in 1913 and 1914 and the way these changes were 
rapidly diffused throughout the Western world."
(1984, p 218)
However, both writers agree that Ford's assembly-line principle was not the result of a grand 
plan, but rather responses to engineering and production problems that needed to be overcome 
Hounshell's conclusion is thus conclusive
"Through unprecedented experimentation, bold moves, and widespread publicity, 
Ford had given the world the first system, in the fullest sense of the expression, of 
mass production: single purpose manufacture combined with the smooth flow of 
materials, the assembly line, large volume production, high waves initiated by the 
five-dollar day, and low prices Ford effected not simply a technological turning 
point but, as Peter Drucker pointed out long age, an economic revolution "
(Ibid, p 263)
The 'economic revolution' which Drucker alludes to is of course the whole social, economic, 
political and cultural effects of Fordism which, to a certain extent, Hounshell ignores However, 
he does foreground the failures of Ford's initial innovation to dovetail into the completion and 
creation of a new 'economic revolution' based on consumerism Ford was still stuck in the 
utilitarian and functionalist paradigm of early twentieth century modernity, reflected in the 
uniformity and standardisation of the Model T. Style, ornament and fashion were foreign to 
Ford's beliefs and he would have agreed with Adolf Loos, that ornament equals crime. And it 
was only in response to the innovations introduced by Alffed Sloan Jr
at General Motors, o f the annual model change that mass production and mass consumption 
would assume their classical form.
In this sense, high Fordism really originated at General Motors rather than by Ford itself 
High Fordism was anything but modernist in the classical functionalist sense and its aesthetic 
was rather one of extreme fantasy, dressed up in technocratic guise ('stream-lining', 
'space-age'), which leads not to the Weberian view of modernity as being 'disenchanted' and 
'de-mythologised', but rather to the Benjaminian view that modernity produces its own 
phantasmagoria and mythication. As the poet Robert Lowell wrote in his poem "For the 
Union Dead": 'Everywhere, giant finned cars nose forward like fish; a savage servility slides 
by on grease". The fantastic cars of the 1950s, immortalised in countless Hollywood films in 
technicolour, and now cult objects for those nostalgic for the retro-innocence of the 1950s, 
were far from the modernist ideal of 'form following function'. In this context it would be an 
interesting exercise to investigate the ways in which Fordism came to be represented in 
popular culture Certainly Chaplin's film Modern Times (1936) is paradigmatic of the sense 
of alienation evoked by mass production in popular consciousness.
In fact, the religious and mythical connotations of Fordism is best summed up by Alexandre 
Koj eve's epigram "Marx est Die it, Ford est son pmphete". From these insights it would be 
hard to follow the line of inquiry which defines Fordism in the narrow production technology 
manner or even narrow economic sense put forward by its own historians or biographers 
such as the definition which Ford put across in his first autobiography of 1922 Mv Life and 
Work (ghost written by Samuel Crowther): "The Ford prosperity recipe is high wages, low 
prices, and mass production" A definition which was canonised in the famous Encyclopedia 
firitanmca article on "Mass Production" which was written on Ford's behalf by William J.
( ameron where the following definition is put forward:
"Mass production is not merely quantity production, for this may be had with 
none of the requisites of mass production. Nor is it merely machine 
production, which may also exist without any resemblance to mass production.
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Mass production is the focusing upon a manufacturing project of the principles
of power, accuracy, economy, system, continuity, and speed."
According to Hounshell, the term "to Fordize" makes its appearance in 1925 with the 
appearance of The Wav Out by Edward A. Filene.
These observations are necessary if we are to understand the origins of the term which 
Gramsci (and Henri de Man) took up and viewed as the latest attempt by the capitalist class 
to recreate their hegemony in society. However, as argued above, the concept of Fordism is 
absent in much of Western Marxism between Gramsci and the reformulation of the term by 
the Regulation School(s) in the 1970s onwards It is necessary to observe that the Marxist 
theorizations of Fordism using the Regulation theory(s) is one of the first attempts to give a 
more precise definition of the specificity of Fordism after Gramsci and goes beyond Piore 
and Sabel's undertheorized use of the term in their writings. However, it is necessary to 
separate out Regulation theory from Fordism, because 'regulation' refers to an abstract 
concept of how particular socio-economic regimes are reproduced and articulated at the 
micro, meso, and macro levels, while Fordism refers to one particular manifestation or form 
of regulation
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Ihe Regulation School and Fordism
Robert Boyer (1990) in his overview of Regulation theories and definitions of regulation 
examines such researchers as Aglietta, Gerard Destanne De Bernis, Lipietz, Fortuna Di 
Ruzza Boyer's selection is fairly representative and foregrounds the family resemblances 
that characterise the regulation approaches The first researcher said to have introduced the 
term regulation into Marxist theory was De Bemis who drew upon the work of the 
philosopher Georges Canguilhem who gave this definition: "Regulation is the adjustment, in 
conformity with certain rules or norms, of several movements or acts, and their effects or 
products, which are initially distinct due to their diversity or succession" (cited in Boyer)
The fact that Canguilhem was important for the development of the Althusserian School is 
to be noticed For although Althusser nor Balibar used the concept of regulation in their 
writings it was to be taken up by Aglietta who was much influenced by Althusserianism, 
particularly at the time he wrote The Theory of Capitalist Regulation (1979) where we find 
this famous definition of the term:
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"To speak of regulation of a mode of production is to try to formulate in 
general laws the way in which the determinate structure of a society is 
reproduced ... [A] theory of social regulation is a complete alternative to the 
theory of general equilibrium ... The study of capitalist regulation, therefore, 
cannot be the investigation of abstract economic laws. It is the study of the 
transformation of social relations as it creates new forms that are both 
economic and noneconomic, that are organized in structures and themselves 
reproduce a determinant structure, the mode of production."
(P 15)
A number of points can be drawn from this terse summary. First, regulation theory is a 
theory of the social totality and therefore rejects separation of the economic from the social 
or political It returns to the political economy tradition. Second, and relatedly, it criticises 
neo-classical economics and reintroduces the temporal and spatial dimensions of the 
reproduction and expansion of modes of production. These points are reinforced by Boyer's 
own definition of regulation: "We will use the term 'regulation' to designate the set of 
mechanisms involved in the overall reproduction of the system, given the state of the 
economic structures and social forms". Lipietz's definition is probably one of the most 
influential, but it is not cited by Boyer:
"A regime of accumulation describes the fairly long-term stabilisation of the 
allocation of social production between consumption and accumulation. This 
implies a certain correspondence between the transformation of the conditions 
of production and the transformation of the conditions of the reproduction of 
wage-labour ... The set of internalized rules and social procedures which 
incorporate social elements into individual behaviour ... is referred to as a mode 
of regulation"
(1987, pp.14-15).
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This definition, despite suggestions that Lipietz is a vulgariser of the regulation approach, has 
all the merit of making clear the analytical distinction between the 'regime of accumulation' 
and its accompanying 'regime of regulation'. A distinction everywhere present in the 
regulation approach. For example, Aglietta writes of 'structural forms', which are 'complex 
social relations, organised in institutions, that are historical products.
At the level of abstract generality it could be said that the regulation approach is a 
'middle-range theory'. In other words, it deals with mediate or intervening variables situated 
in-between the abstract concept of mode of production and the more concrete level of the 
social formation. This is not to say, however, that this leaves the concepts of mode of 
production, value, surplus value, exploitation, and so forth, untouched Indeed some 
regulation theorists have drawn the conclusion that the value categories of Marx have to be 
abandoned The latest work of Aglietta, for example, draws this conclusion. It is obvious 
that other social scientific traditions have been drawn upon by the various regulation school 
approaches to supplement Marx. For example, Lipietz explicitly refers to the importance of 
Bourdieu's concept of habitus in developing the regulation approach. And behind Bourdieu 
there is the influence of Marcel Mauss and, ultimately, the figure of Durkheim The 
Durkheinuan (and Maussian-Bourdieuian) dimension of regulation theory refers to the 
economy or 'regime of accumulation'. Just as Durkheim is famous for writing in The 
Division of Labour in Society that there is always a 'non-contractual' element or dimension to 
every 'contract', so the regulation school point to the importance of structural forms which 
regulate the mode of production or to be more specific the 'regime of accumulation'. Beyond 
Durkheim the influence of Polyani can be detected and, more importantly still, Schumpeter.161
While some Marxists would view this incorporation of non-Marxist concepts into Marxism as 
a transgressive and illegitimate eclecticism there is a strong case to be made for this 
enrichment The transcoding of non-Marxist themes into Marxism is always a difficult 
exercise, but as Frederick Jameson has argued in his The Political Unconscious: Narrative as 
-^Symbolic Act (1983), the Durkheimian emphasis on social forms can contribute to an 
enriched Marxism.
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Returning to the concept of 'regime of accumulation' which is at the centre of the Regulation 
School(s) notion of Fordism it has to be said that it has a more rigorous formulation than 
anywhere in Piore and Sabel et al. While in Piore and Sabel there are, as has been observed, 
allusions to regulation theory, they do not provide a rigorous specification of its components 
and in Unger, Hirst and Zeitlin there is even less of a definition and becomes somewhat 
ambiguously defined in ideal-type terms (as mass production). The most formalised 
definition of Fordism which is close to Piore and Sabel et al's definition is that offered up in 
a commentary on their writings by Arthur Stinchcombe in his book Information and 
Organizations (1990) (chapter 2) "Individuals' Skills as Information Processing: Charles 
Sabel and the Division of Labour". In his conclusion he writes that Fordism consists in 
making complex products cheaper by routinizing not only the decisions but also the 
production process:
"The key here is that the more a fordist factory can routinize the whole 
process, the fewer decisions have to be made anew for each unit produced. So 
the real dependent variable here, the thing we are trying to explain, is How 
many new decisions, non-routinized decisions made by human intelligence and 
discretion, are there per decision that has to be made to make the product? 
Thus a formal measure of fordism would take the following form:
routimzed decisions
fordism (routinization of production)
total decisions
tT
"This is the level of routinization or degree of fordism of production. The 
more complex the product, in the sense of the more total decisions required to 
produce it, the more time and expense will be saved by routinizing. Mass 
production in the fordist sense saves more on a complex product like an 
automobile or refrigerator than it does on a simpler one like a towel or sheet."
(1990, p.71).
Stinchcombe's formula elegantly highlights the manner in which Sabel and Piore conceive 
fordism Aglietta's definition of Fordism does not necessarily contradict this viewpoint and 
understanding, but it goes considerably beyond it. Although it is conceptualised as a labour 
process much in the manner of Sabel it has a richer understanding, based as it is on the
82
Marxist tradition, but also some drawbacks which will be identified. "Fordism ... is the 
principle of articulation between the process o f production and a mode of consumption, 
which constitutes the mass production that is the specific content of the universalisation of 
wage labour". That is, industrialisation, its patterns, modalities and trajectory must be 
understood in the wider sense than just a work process or labour process, and must connect 
up with the reproduction of the economy in the entirety of its cycle (see Lash and Urry, 
1994)
Moreover, Aglietta gives a considerably more detailed understanding of the production side 
of Fordism than Sabel or Stinchcombe:
"The characteristic labour process of Fordism is semi- automatic assembly-line 
production. This particular type of labour process was established in the 
United States from the 1920s onwards, especially for mass consumer goods 
produced in long production runs, and was subsequently extended upstream to 
the production of standardized intermediate components for the manufacture of 
these means of consumption. The establishment of one and the same type of 
labour process was a powerful force for the vertical integration of production 
processes and a material support for the transmission of local mutations in the 
productive forces between the two departments of production."
(1979, p. 117)
Aglietta links up the organisation of the labour process with the establishment of the 
consumer goods industries and its extension to other sectors of the economy such as 
intermediate components. Furthermore, he argues that the vertical integration o f industry and 
the development of the multi-divisional corporation and was the logical effect of these senes 
of transformations. These themes link up with Chandler's research on strategy and structure 
and, crucially the displacement of the market principle by the 'visible' hand of the 
corporation and management. It also has comparisons with the 'transaction costs' school 
Aglietta further argues that at the level of the labour process, Fordism takes up and improves 
upon the principles of Taylorism and puts them more effectively into practice, to obtain an 
ever greater intensification of labour:
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"Fordism further developed the mechanization of labour, increased the intensity 
of work, radicalized the separation between manual and mental labour, 
rigorously subjected workers to the law of accumulation and turned scientific 
progress against them as a power serving the uniform expansion of value."
(Ibid, p 118).
Following Marx's comments on the stage or phase of capitalist development called in Capital 
'machinofacture', Aglietta shows that Fordism is an intensive regime of accumulation based 
on the same principles, that is, the extraction of relative surplus value and the real 
subordination of the producer to the production process. However, Aglietta argues that the 
conditions to be met for the expanded reproduction of an 'autocentric' Fordism, was not 
achieved overnight, but was an uneven and staggered process beginning in the 1920s and 
only fully crystallising in the 1950s and early 1960s. As Driver writes:
"Aglietta argues that the increase in salaried unproductive works associated 
with Department 1 was the historical basis for the social demand for 
commodities previously consumed as luxuries. The expansion of the 
automobile, consumer durables and standardised housing units in the period 
following the First World War marked a watershed, but the initial process of 
expansion faltered in the twenties. 'The working class market could not yet be 
reached under the social conditions of production of the time'."
(1983, p.87).
As early reviews of The Theory of Capitalist Regulation observed, Aglietta went beyond the 
analysis of such radicals as Galbraith, Marcus and Baran and Sweezy who identified the 
specificity of 'American Capitalism', the 'One-Dimensional' society and 'Monopoly 
Capitalism' as lying in the sphere of the organisation of consumption. For Aglietta, as
Davis observed:
"Fordism ... presupposes the emergence of a distinctively capitalist mode of 
organized consumption based upon the 'dominance of commodity relations over 
non-commodity relations'. In Aglietta's terms the 'wage-relation only assumes 
its complete, mature form when the proletariat, through the mediation of new 
structural forms, is able to buy all of its conditions of existence within the 
general circulation of commodities'. Under Fordism a 'social norm of
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consumption' - i e ,  a regulated average level of mass consumption higher than 
mere substance - is brought into being as a crucial determinant of the 
accumulation process."
(1978, pp.216-7).
Aglietta understands these developments as taking place against the background of the class 
conflicts and struggles of the inter-war years and the new conditions which made possible 
new forms of institution- building, or, in Aglietta's term, structural forms of regulation. The 
key chapter in his book where he analyses this transformation is chapter three "The 
Transformation of the Wage Earners' Conditions of Life" and particularly section one "The 
Capitalist Production of the Mode of Consumption". In this section he develops the 
beginnings of a Marxist Regulationist theory of consumption and, in particular, a theory of 
working class consumption under high Fordism. Aglietta rejects the standard neo-classical 
theory of consumption. That, as a series of expenditure functions and as a theory of the 
individual consumer as the source of an axiomatic set of well organised and stable choices, 
given certain resources and market conditions. Rather, Aglietta calls for:
"... a theory of those practices that make consumption a socially conditioned 
activity, subject to contrary forces of homogenization and differentiation that 
modify it in a manner favourable to the generalization of wage-labour ... Our 
point of departure will be the definition of consumption as an activity or, more 
accurately a process that is, organized set of activities which - while 
predominantly private - are subject to a general logic of the reconstitution of 
energies expended in social practices."
(1979, p. 156).
Eondisni and the Consumption Norm
Consumption is viewed first as a material process, located in time and space, linked with the 
cycle o f social labour power. Furthermore, consumption (as opposed to productive 
consumption) is predominantly private activity or process, "its concrete practices take place 
principally within the household, a site where individuality is protected. They are not
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directly under the sway of the relations of production". This is why consumption can give 
rise to a diversity of ideologies of consumption which Aglietta does not specify or 
characterise in an adequate manner (gender, sexuality and patriarchal ideologies of the 
household are not mentioned) the form and content of particular consumerist ideologies, but 
his work is quite fundamentally dependent on the work of French critical theory. For 
example, the early writings of Jean Baudrillard are drawn upon in a direct and unmediated 
manner and in particular Le Svsteme des obiets (1968), La Societe de consommation (1970) 
and For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sien (1976). In turn, there is the 
influence of Lefebrvre, the Arguments group, Socialisme ou Barbarie and Guy Debord (1987) 
and the Situationists. These cross- cutting influences, incidentally, point to the fact that 
Althusserianism in France was less dogmatic than the British version which viewed any sort 
of syncretic approach as an epistemological obstacle. Drawing upon this work Aglietta 
argues that the Fordist consumption norm involves the universalisation of the commodity 
form and the generalised 'reification' of social life: "With Fordism ... the generalisation of 
commodity relations extended to their domination of practices of consumption".1,1
But although Aglietta's theory of consumption draws upon the above traditions of thought he 
goes beyond them by making a linkage in a more direct manner between production and
consumption:
"We have seen how Taylorism and later Fordism, adapted to the restriction of 
the working day by sharply increasing the intensity of labour and systematically 
compressing wasted time. The result was the disappearance of any time for 
recuperation at the workplace itself. The increased exhaustion of labour power 
in the labour process had to be entirely repaired outside the workplace, 
respecting the new time constraint of a strict separation between working and 
non-working hours. Since this was overlaid by a further constraint of 
separation and increased distance between workplace and residence, transport 
time was considerably prolonged, with the result that the time constraint 
imposed by labour did not fall despite the limitations of working hours. 
Individual commodity consumption in the form of consumption that permits the 
most effective recuperation from physical and nervous fatigue in a compact 
space of time, within the day, and at a single place, the home."
(1979, pp. 158-9).
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Thus Aglietta concludes that the structure of the 'consumption norm' coincides with its 
conditioning by capitalist relationships of production, governed by two basic commodities or 
consumer durables: standardised housing and the automobile. The formation of the working 
class consumption norm is, in turn, presupposed by the development of regulatory institutions 
which socialised finance and increased the possibilities for consumer credit, within the 
framework of the Keynesian macro-economic policy instituted by the State.
For Aglietta, heavily dependent on Barthes and Baudrillard (but also, Althusser), the working 
class consumption norm can be characterised as a 'functional aesthetic':
"... this functional aesthetic duplicated the real relationship between individuals 
and objects with an imaginary relationship. Not content to create a space of 
objects of daily life, as supports of a capitalist commodity universe, it provided 
an image of this space by advertising techniques. The image was presented as 
an objectification of consumption status which individuals could perceive 
outside themselves. The process of social recognition was externalised and 
fetishised. Individuals were not initially interpellated as subjects by one 
another, in accordance with their social position: they were interpellated by an 
external power, diffusing a robot portrait of the 'consumer' ... Yet it cannot be 
stressed too greatly that the role of the image in consumption, which many 
sociologists have made into a fundamental explanatory principle of capitalist 
development, is strictly subordinate to the material and social conditions that 
we have discussed."
(Ibid, p.161).
To show the dependence of this argument on Baudrillard's view of consumption it is enough 
to quote Baudrillard:
"In the phenomenology of consumption, the general acclimatization of the life, 
goods, services, behaviours, and social relations represents the perfected 
'consummated' stage of evolution which, through articulated networks of 
objects, ascends from pure and simple abundance to a complete reconditioning 
of action and time, and finally in the systematic organization of ambience, 
which is characteristic of drugstores, shopping malls, or the modem airport - 
our cities of the future."
(1988, pp.23-4).
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Baudrillard's comments, then, provide the background for the analysis put forward by 
Aglietta on the 'functionalization' of existence in the 'consumer society' where of all things 
credit plays a determining role, even though it has only a marginal impact on the spending 
budget. The ideas are exemplary.
"Presented under the guise of gratification, of a facilitated access to affluence, 
of a hedonistic mentality, and of 'freedom from the old idea of thrift', etc., 
credit is in fact the systematic indoctrination of forced economising and an 
economic calculus for generations of consumers who, in a life of subsistence, 
would have otherwise escaped manipulation of demands and would have been 
unexploitable as a force of consumption."
(Ibid, p 49)
Although these arguments can be subject to criticism, they at least have the merit of 
extending the concept of the industrialisation process into the realm beyond the process of 
production Sabel et al seem to neglect this process of 'educating' the working class into the 
'consumer lifestyle', which would go some way into explaining why the various craft forms 
of production existent in the nineteenth century were defeated by mass production 
techniques However, the major criticisms that would need to be directed at the 
Baudrillard/Aglietta (and by extension Frankfurt School) critique is that it reproduces a 
much too one dimensional picture of the consumer (for a more nuanced argument see 
Lipovetsky, 1994).
In fact this argument meshes in within the larger claim that the Baudrillardian and Marxist 
Regulationist schools are both functionalist in the manner they conceptualise society and 
social relationships However, this observation should not be interpreted too liberally as it is 
still the case that there is a logic of capital involved which is more powerful and hegemonic 
While writers like Giddens are correct to observe that there is always a 'dialectic of control' 
ln society between asymmetrically located actors, and that some actors, and their decisions 
and strategies, carry more weight and win out, or set the parameters for, the room for 
manoeuvre of subordinates.19'
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Kn>ni Fordism to Neo-Fordism?
As Aglietta makes clear, the concept of neo-Fordism was originally proposed by Christian 
Palloix (1974), to refer to a modification of Fordism caused by the contradictions engendered 
by it, manifested in such effects as high rates of absenteeism, labour turn-over, wastage, 
poor product quality, high inventory costs, line balancing problems, strikes, sabotage, and so 
forth. For Palloix (and Aglietta) neo- Fordism is not an 'Industrial Divide' or the beginnings 
of a transition to a post-industrial society, rather it is an "adaptation of Taylorism and 
Fordism to new conditions of struggle in production, with the aid of preserving the 
profitability of capital, rather than a radical revolution of the labour process". According to 
Palloix neo-Fordism must be understood as a purely formal attempt to abolish the collective 
worker,
"taking into consideration the social tensions which necessitate the setting-up of 
an absolute despotism in the coordination of the labour processes based on 
automation, of several groups of workers, autonomous in appearance, but which 
are in reality forced to submit to the logic of the collective worker."
(1974, p.65).
This line of analysis must also be seen as part of a joint or collective line of analysis which 
had contributions from many other researchers. On the French side it is useful to mention 
Coriat, Lipietz, Guillarme, Gaudemar, Boyer, Brender and, on the Italian side Bologna,
Ironti, Panzieri and Negri. However, it was Aglietta who gave the term its most precise and 
forceful definition and meaning in The Theory of Capitalist Regulation:
"Neo-Fordism, like Fordism itself, is based on an organizing principle of the 
forces of production dictated by the needs of capitalist management of the work 
collective. The new complex of productive forces is automatic production 
control or automation; the principle of work organization now in embryo is 
known as the recomposition of tasks. The combination of these two lines of 
development has unleashed the most shameless propaganda about the liberation 
of man in work. It is certainly possible that automation does contain
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possibilities which will eventually, in the very long run, lead mere operative 
work in production to disappear. But one thing is clear. These possibilities 
will have no chance of being realized unless capitalist relationships of 
production are abolished."
(1979, p. 123).
So for Aglietta the capitalist mode of production can only escape from its contemporary 
problems or 'impasse' by developing and inventing a 'new cohesion' based on a modification, 
but not a transition from, Fordism. This line of reasoning is reinforced by referring to the 
arguments of other researchers already mentioned. For example, Coriot (1980) argues that 
the new assembly lines that are being created and applied are similar in many ways to the 
old Fordist ones. In basic principles of organisation they are much the same based on 
continuous flow production and the fragmentation of the labour process, but implemented on 
another basis and in a different modality. Accordingly, there are three constant characteristics 
of the new assembly line: (1) the continuous flow of work on the line is maintained, but it 
is segmented into distinct work-spaces or stations, each supplied with its own stock of 
components and tools; (2) team- work is introduced on the principle of each team being 
semi-autonomous and self-determining - albeit within a space still determined by 
management; (3) the use of the central conveyor-belt and parallel conveyor belts.
Moreover, his argument that many companies and managements have started to experiment 
with new ways of organising the classic assembly-line (and organisational structure) has been 
substantiated by many researchers and explains the frantic experimentalism of the type of 
thinking we find in Peters, Waterman, Moss-Kanter and the California Management Review. 
However, a wider frame is needed if we are to understand the current transformation which 
go beyond the labour process, which is but one moment of Fordism, to account for the whole 
regime of accumulation and its modes of regulation. Jean-Paul Gaudemar provides the 
beginnings of an analysis of the rise of the 'Mobile Factory'. Gaudemar argues that there are 
two tendencies in modem capitalism which are at first sight contradictory, but which are in 
reality complementary. First, the movement towards spatial concentration (the model of 
Toyota City) might be apposite here and the kanban or just-in-time system. Second, the
revival of what seems to be a traditional form of production space, albeit in a more 
sophisticated electronic form:
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"In one case, the industrial site is a super-factory In the other, the factory is 
spread out, diffused, at times an anti-factory. In one case the vertigo of size. 
In the other: small is beautiful ... Are these tendencies really contradictory? 
The thesis ... is that they are not, since both announce the end of a paradigm - 
that of the factory- fortress - and the birth of a new figure, a production space 
characterizable as a space of fluidity and mobility. This mobility of objects 
and means of labour, of products and people, as well as social relationships, 
appears both a systematization of previous tendencies and as a fundamental 
element in efforts to resolve the contemporary crisis of the factory."
(cited in Zone 1/2, p.285).
Gaudemar's observations unite a number of ideas. First, the idea that there is a crisis of 
Fordism and the emergence of a neo-Fordism. Second, the Italian Autonomists, and in 
particular, the point of view developed by Toni Negri (1988), where the thesis that the 'social 
factory' is replacing the 'massified' factory of Fordism and that the social figure of the 
Fordized worker is being replaced by that of the new 'socialised worker' which is diffused 
throughout social space, locatable in all the institutional spheres of capitalist society. Another 
influence is the post-structuralist writings of Deleuze and Guattari (1972, 1980) and their 
concept of 'deterritorialization' or 'decoding' of capitalism by the hyper-inflation of the market 
principle as society's 'steering mechanism'.
This argument finds support in the cognate arguments of Feher and Alliez where from a 
regulationist perspective they argue the following:
"What metamorphoses is capital capable of, and from what point of view can 
they be apprehended? ... [the] current articulation of both a new regulatory 
mode of economic activity and of a new regime of capital accumulation - a 
combination linked to the rise of a 'neo-puritan' ethics - tends to turn this 
so-called 'crisis' into an ordinary, if not permanent, state of affairs. During the 
last IS years a certain type of social order has undoubtedly waned."
(cited in Zone 1/2, p.31S).
For Feher and Alliez, in a postindustrial/postmodern inflection of the Regulation School, 
assert that these changes are due to the information revolution, where the establishment of a 
vast network for the productive circulation of information has led to the collapse of the 
distinction between productive and reproductive spaces and the transformation of people and 
'intelligent machines' as:
"functionally interchangeable terminals - relays in the capitalist social machine.
But it also leads to the dereliction of the people and space that cannot be 
'plugged' in to the network either because they are insufficiently 'informed' or 
because the information they produce is irreducible to merchandise form. The 
distinction for each worker between his or her spatially defined work time and 
free time - and their articulation regulated by the welfare state - gives way to a 
division into two groups of workers: those who are integrated into the new 
valorization circuits and those who, because they are excluded, see their 
conditions of existence seriously jeopardised."
(Ibid, p.317).
Adopting the most dystopian Huxleyian schema they argue that: "The regime in which the 
worker is subjected to capital is fading, gradually being replaced by a regime in which 
individuals are enslaved by, or rather, incorporated into, capital". For Alliez and Feher the 
worker, literally, becomes a 'cog' in the social machine. The new capitalism is 
characterised, then, by the following transformations: (1) the globalisation of capital; (2) 
flexible accumulation; (3) automation of production; (4) the re-segmentation of the labour 
market and labour force into (a) responsible in-house workers; (b) less costly marginal 
workers, (c) protected workers or 'micro-entrepreneurs'.
These formulations are common ways of comprehending the current transformation of work 
and employment and it is useful just to focus for the moment on the use of the term 
information is their argument, for it finds points of resonance with other researchers 
conclusions on the nature of neo-Fordism. For example, Castells, from a 'super- modem' 
perspective, argues that two features are characteristic of the stream of technological 
innovation under way:
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"First, the object of technological discoveries, as well as their applications, is 
information. What micro- electronics does is to process, and eventually 
generate, information. What telecommunications do is to transmit information, 
with a growing complexity of interactive loops and feedbacks, at increasingly 
greater speed and at lower cost. What the new media do is to disseminate 
information in a way potentially more and more decentralized and 
individualized. .. And what genetic engineering does is to decode the 
information system of the living matter and try to program it."
(1989, p 13)
Castells, then, places great emphasis on the role of 'information' and 'informationalization' of 
late capitalism, where telecommunications, office automation, improved data transmission 
and telecommuting are revolutionising the social relations of production and communication, 
substituting for the 'space of places' the 'space of flows' within the 'information city'.1101
The conclusions that Castells draws are similar to the various Regulation School conclusions, 
namely, that (1) new technologies in both offices and factories which allow for labour-saving 
innovations that increase productivity, while simultaneously leading to job losses on a 
massive scale, particularly within the manufacturing and unionised sectors of industry; (2) the 
automation of information-processing functions which allow capital to supersede one of the 
major barriers to the growth of economic productivity. The possibility of office automation 
allows corporations to grow in size without losing flexibility and efficiency, thus overcoming 
the obstacles to labour productivity in the service sector. However, as services were the 
"refuge for the growing labour surplus from other sectors as well as a response to the 
political pressures on the public sector to provide jobs and services, automation of services 
will be uneven and will provoke bitter social conflicts"; (3) the impact of automation on the 
occupational structure will result in a bifurcated labour market, with an 'upgrading' of a 
minority of workers and a rapid growth of professional sectors, while, on the other hand, 
there will be a majority of workers who are deskilled and reduced to low paying jobs, either 
in labour intensive services or in 'down-graded' manufacturing. Castells position is shared, in 
modified form, by many other writers. For example, Daniel Bell, whose book The Coming of 
¡he. Postindustrial Society (1973) has established itself as the canonical (albeit contested) text
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on the subject, gives central importance to the role of information and the position of 
'theoretical knowledge' in 'post- industrial society'. In his most recent writings on the subject, 
however, Bell while keeping close to his earlier claims and position, now recognises the 
continuing importance of manufacturing in 'post- industrial' society and, significantly, he 
backs up his comments by utilising the 'flexible specialization1 hypothesis of Piore and 
Sahel's The Second Industrial Divide.
Nevertheless, Bell's argument, like Castells', gives central importance to the new role of 
'information', across sectors and inter-sectoral transformation/shifts:
"In the case of telecommunications - to be brief - the breakdown of the old 
distinction between telephone, computer, television, and facsimile (Xerox) 
means that new, highly differentiated systems - private branch exchanges, local 
area networks, 'internal' communications networks between firms, international 
satellite communication - all emphasise diversity rather than uniformity, with 
many specialized systems rather than a single product such as the telephone."
(1973, p 175)
The social, cultural and political implications of these developments, according to Bell, are 
that the revolution in communications are transforming the scale of human activities and that 
the management of scale is the key problem of a globalized world hooked up by rhizomic 
information systems and networks:
"Given the nature of 'real time' communication, we are for the first time forging 
an interdependent international economy with more and more characteristics of 
an unstable system in which changes in the magnitudes of some variables, or 
shocks and disturbances in some of the units have immediate repercussions in 
all others."
(Ibid, p. 176).
With its fashionable allusions to chaos theory Bell's remarks joins other social theorists such 
as Giddens (time-space distanciation), Harvey (time-space compression) and Castells (space 
of flows) in his concern with the relationship between scale, space, place and information.
Regardless, however, of these similarities, Bell's argument still neglects the most central 
question and problem that the new information technologies raise, namely, that they serve the 
purpose of increasing relative surplus value in manufacturing and services (Lokjine). Or to 
put it more strongly in the words of Negri:
94
"... Automation can no longer be analyzed as the perfection of the process of 
exploitation of productive labour, but rather must be viewed as a modification 
of the totality of social relationships. The problem is to ascertain to what 
extent information technology is the means by which capital undertakes the real 
subsumption of all the social forces of production and reproduction. Through 
automation, the relationship between production and circulation o f commodities 
is found to be totally integrated within capital. The socialization of production 
means that society is exploited by capital as such."
(1990, p.209).
For Negri this means, first and foremost, that automation and 'computerization' are 
instruments used by the capitalist class which concentrate scientific knowledge in symbols 
and transmission belts which manifests itself in the following: the substitution of labour and 
thus the 'streamlining of its turnover'; checking the precise times involved "in every condition 
and phase of the production cycle and thus the subordination to it of all activities and needs 
of the socialized labour force. And finally, success in establishing new hierarchies and new 
legitimacy for socialised control ... To this and the process of automation, and above all 
those of computerization, allow social actors to be homologized and classified with regard to 
the aim of control" (pp. 106-7).
Neo-Fordism as Panoptic Control
For Negri (and Guattari) informational capitalism is a new and, by implication, more 
repressive form of control (tendentiously totalitarian) which through its mobilisation of 
science and technology creates something akin to Foucault's model of panoptic power, a 
society of surveillance and spectacle. However, there are similarities with other traditions of
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thought such as the later work of Habermas. Thus Negri's comments that capital 
appropriates communication, depriving communication of its spontaneous and 'constructive 
substance' and reducing it to a schematic interpretation of reality with the result of 
producing forms of subjectivity which are adequate for a 'computerised mode of working' 
mirrors Habermas' own discussion, albeit in a more conventional Marxist manner, of the 
distortion of communication by colonisation of the lifeworld by abstract systems of money 
and bureaucratic power As Negri and Guattari (1990) write, the global integration and 
restructuring of modern capitalism aims at utilising 'computerisation' [informatization] that:
"Exploitation could thus be articulated scientifically over the entire arena of the 
social, extending the control of profit creation mechanism. Under these 
conditions, the assembly line of commercial and industrial production spreads 
its fabric over the social, not its symbolic sense but materially. Society is no 
longer merely subsumed by capitalist command; it is absorbed entirely by the 
integrated mode of production. Differences in productivity and in levels of 
exploitation can then be articulated in a smoother, more diffuse way within 
each geo-political segment."
(p.49).
Thus Negri's understanding of the contemporary form that industrialisation is taking is 
completely opposed to the liberal-reformist understanding and thematisation which believes 
that new technologies will lead to a more decentralised society, where workers are 're- 
skilled' or 'informated'. A view that can be found in various modulations in such a diverse 
group of writers and researchers as Bell (1972), and Toffier (1983). Furthermore, he is 
opposed to the viewpoint expressed by Piore, Sabel, Hirst and Zeitlin which argues that 
although there are no 'necessitarian', 'deterministic', 'objectivist' or evolutionary reasons why 
industrialisation should assume a particular form, specific forms of politics in the 
industrialised world are driving society for contingent reasons to a potentially more 
democratic form. Indeed, Negri's totalising viewpoint that 'everything connects' is as 
opposed to Sabel et al's point of view as you can get and especially the viewpoint of Hirst 
and Zeitlin.
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For example, Negri (but also see Castells (1992), Soja (1990), Harvey (1989), Lash and UVry 
(1994), Mingione (1991) ) argues that the new informated capitalism is characterised by the 
re-emergence of forms of production and labour control that are usually associated with 
pre-capitalist or 'backward' forms of capital accumulation. For example, the usual cases that 
are cited include such well publicised phenomena as the rise of 'homeworking', 'sweated 
work', 'informal work' and 'downgraded manufacturing'. Rather than to theorise these as 
separate sectors with their own logic and effectivity Negri would argue that they have to be 
theorised within a totalising logic of connections, a manner of theorising which has already 
been declared invalid by Hirst and Zeitlin (and to a lesser extent by Unger). But this caveat 
has no real logic to it in principle, as long as the chain of mediations are traced in a subtle 
and empirical manner. Whether Negri achieves this, however, can be subject to doubt, 
although an effort is attempted.
Negri argues that the Italian 'Third Italy', which is understood by Sabel et al as forming part 
of a more progressive industrial region or series of districts, is understood by Negri in a 
completely different manner as an aspect of the most 'modern' sector of Italian capitalist 
industry: the 'submerged' or 'diffused' economy:
"For example, the light engineering firm Bassani-Ticino, situated between 
Varese and Milan, employs 3,000 workers on the premises and 15,000, each 
with a computer and lorry, on the outside. Each week, work sheets are 
distributed and the previous week's work produced using computerized 
machines, is collected. This is a traditional form of capitalism - but at a higher 
level ... The same phenomenon is to be found more or less throughout the 
whole of Northern Italy. Examining the situation closely, it is possible to see, 
for example, that child labour using sewing machines is in fact regulated by a 
highly organized industrial process, one which is organised according to the 
regulations of the savings banks and of the Viscentini law which gives fiscal 
benefits to large industry. Between Venice and Padua in Marches and to the 
North of Milan etc., thousands of workers are employed in the 'dispersed' 
factory which, moreover, is tied to the needs o f the international economy. In 
the footwear sector, for example, German firms provide the shoe designs, the 
machines and everything necessary for the 'great Italian territorial factory'
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which, in its turn, organizes extremely flexible working on the basis of centralized, 
information based management"
(Ibid, p 212).
Post-Mode in Fordism1" 1
This interpretation is a far cry from the flexible specialization hypothesis of 'high-technology 
artisanal cottage industry'. It is necessary to emphasise that this articulation and mediation of 
the 'high-tech' with the 'low-tech' (a typical postmodern double-coding) does not mean a 
stalled modernisation, but rather an advanced moment of informational (postmodern) 
capitalism with a totalising logic to it. Such a logic demands the use of the term capitalism, 
or in Mandel's expression (which has its origin in the Frankfurt School), late capitalism 
which is consistent with Marx's usage and evocation in The Grundrisse where as Jameson 
writes:
"[the] 'world market' as the ultimate horizon of capitalism turn on this matter of 
internationalization and how it is to be described ... Besides the forms of 
transnational business ... its features include the new international division of 
labour, a vertiginous new dynamic in international banking and stock 
exchanges, new forms of media interrelationship, computers and automation, 
the flight of production to advanced Third World areas, along with all the more 
familiar social consequences.”
(1992, pp.xviii-xix).
Suffice it to say, as Jameson further explains the term 'late capitalism' should not be 
interpreted to mean that capitalism is near its end or on the point of collapse a la 
Luxemburg, but rather it is the moment when capital has colonized and expanded on a global 
and planetary scale and nothing else is outside it or other than it. The same position is 
taken with more economic detail in Harvey's The Condition of Postmodemitv (1989) which 
while problematic in its interpretation of postmodern theory, art and cultural practices is astute 
on the level of the economic analysis of 'flexible accumulation'. Like Jameson, Harvey 
interprets the present in the following manner:
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"There has been a sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic 
practices since around 1972. The sea- change is bound up with the emergence 
of new dominant ways in which we experience time and space. While 
simultaneity in the shifting dimensions of time and space is no proof of 
necessary or causal connection, strong apriori grounds can be adduced for the 
proposition that there is some kind of necessary relation between the rise of 
postmodernist cultural forms, the emergence of more flexible modes of capital 
accumulation, and a new round of 'time-space compression' in the organization 
of capitalism. But these changes, when set against the basic rules of 
capitalistic accumulation, appear more as shifts in surface appearance rather 
than signs of the emergence of some entirely new post-capitalist or even 
postindustrial society."
(Precis to The Condition of Postmodernitv. 1989).
Adopting the language of regulation theory, Harvey argues that these changes must be 
understood as a transition in the regime of accumulation and its associated mode of social 
and political regulation. Harvey argues that the long-boom, from 194S to 1973, was built 
upon a certain set of labour control practices, technological mixes, consumption habits, and 
configurations of political-economic power which he calls, in a fairly orthodox expression, 
the Fordist- Keynesian system This system, according to Harvey following other regulation 
theorists, began to break up from around 1973, and since then we have had a period of 
"rapid change, flux, and uncertainty", characterised by the development of "new systems of 
production and marketing, characterised by more flexible labour processes and markets, of 
geographical mobility and rapid shift in consumption practices [which] warrant the title of a 
new regime of accumulation, and whether the revival of entrepreneurialism and of 
neo-conservatism, coupled with the cultural turn to postmodernism, warrant the title of a new 
mode of regulation, is by no means clear" (p. 124).
Harvey's theorisation of post-Fordism or what he calls 'flexible accumulation' is more 
sustained and thought through than his fairly general and abstract concept of Fordism.
Harvey identifies three positions on post-Fordism which can be criticised. These are: (1) 
flexible specialization, as espoused by Piore and Sabel; (2) the position which rejects the idea 
that 'flexibility' as a unique and recent stage of accumulation; (3) the argument of Harvey 
himself which he calls 'flexible accumulation'. Harvey makes use of a number of
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'ideal-type' schemas and tables which purport to sum up in broad, often binary, terms the 
nature of the postulated transition. The work of Lash and Urry (1987, 1994) are taken as 
paradigmatic examples. However, Harvey never quite explains the relationship between these 
ideal-typical schemas and social reality and in the end his argument offers no precise 
specification of the relationship the transformations he is attempting to trace. Like many of 
the Marxist writers examined in this chapter, the argument that a 'totalising' argument is 
necessary, which traces all empirical changes as the effect or result of the capitalist mode of 
production and accumulation is convincing. What is less convincing is the lack of recognition, 
except in principle, that what is most important is to recognise the diversity of 
organisational forms that exist within the world-system of capitalism which do make a 
difference. That is to say, it is important to see how national, regional and local specificities 
must be taken into account. The regulation theory with its recognition of the need to theorise 
an intermediate level of abstraction between the abstract mode of production and empirical 
results, goes some way along this road (Lipietz 1992, Boyer 1990, Aglietta 1979, etc.), but it 
does not go far enough in tracing out the links in enough detail. And, moreover, does not 
give enough space for politics and culture in having a causal influence or effect on concrete 
outcomes. In effect, it gives little space for politics and we return to a rather functionalist, 
deterministic and necessitarian theory of capitalist industrialisation.
Conclusion
Therefore the critique developed by Sabel, Piore et al does have some efficacy as an 
alternative theorisation of contemporary social and economic changes, avoiding the 
abstraction of Marxist critiques. However, their critique still needs to be cautioned by the 
inherent scepticism of Marxism, regarding the possibilities of escaping in this world from 
the inherent logic of capital accumulation. It might be that any amount of empirical data or 
evidence will not settle the issue of the manner in which the transformations in the character 
of production, work and employment should be assessed. Each theory has different 
'language games' or 'phrase regimes' (Lyotard, 1979, which interpret the evidence
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according to different criteria. That is to say, theory is always underdetermined by the 
evidence and by the forms of politics one envisages as possible and desirable. The Marxist 
critique because of its totalising reach leaves one feeling, paradoxically, that little can be 
done to change the world, for the sublime power and reach of the 'total system' is 
untransformable. It is, in short, a form of 'false necessity' where it is difficult to imagine 
anything beyond the constraint of the system. The FS research programme, however, helps 
us to visualise another form of society which is perhaps still capitalism, but fundamentally 
reformed.
In this the FS thesis again connects with the neo-modernisation thesis referred earlier in 
Chapter One and in the introduction to Chapter Two. Neo-modemisation theory provides an 
explanation for the revival of market-based thinking, but also provides a more subtle 
argument which reveals the possibility of different forms of socially constructed and 
embedded' market forms, beyond individualism' (Piore, 1995). For Alexander in his recent 
sophisticated discussion of the phases of post-war social theory neo-modemisation theory, 
dependency theory and postmodernism, which attempts to revalorise the possibility of market 
alternatives to neo-liberal market capitalism. Alexander argues persuasively that the fall of 
Communism and the rise of market-based thinking has produced the climate for a new form 
of social theory which avoids postmodern forms of fragmented thinking
"Because the recent revivals of market and democracy have occurred on a 
world-wide scale, and because they are categorically abstract and generalizing 
ideas, universalism has once again become a viable source for social theory.
Notions of commonalty and institutional convergence have re-emerged, and 
with them the possibilities for intellectuals to provide meaning in a utopian 
way."
(1995, p.86).
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3. FLEXIBLE SPECIALIZATION: A PROGRESSIVE RESEARCH PROGRAMME
The FS hypothesis has, as I have argued above, developed against the background of Sahel's 
critique of various forms of 'deterministic', 'necessitarian', 'reductionist' and 'essentialist' 
theorizations of the process of industrialization. While there is a great deal to be said for 
this critique it has the tendency to 'bend the stick too far' in the opposite direction and to 
become too 'voluntaristic' and 'plastic' in its conception of the industrialization process and 
the available social, economic and political alternatives. As I have argued, the Marxist 
emphasis on the 'totality' and 'totalisation' should not be jettisoned because a plausible case 
can be made for the view that capitalism is a system which produces certain 
non-homogeneous and heterogeneous effects on a world-scale. In other words, while the 
idea that there are 'other' 'possible worlds' is plausible, it needs to be emphasised that the 
strength of capital as a stabilised social order fixes the parameters of difference. But, of 
course, everything depends on how this fixity is understood.1' 1 As argued previously the 
development of a neo-modernisation theory would help to avoid total contingency on the one 
hand and, on the other, a rigid objectivist functionalism, whether of an orthodox 
modernisation type or of objectivist, structuralist-functionalist Marxism.
hollowing Jameson (1992), it is important to understand that differences of organization are 
produced in a non-functional manner by capitalism itself. Political responses and cultural 
struggles of all kinds necessarily mediate this in various ways. As Stuart Hall has written, 
admittedly in a different context, it is too simplistic to identify a homogeneous logic of 
capital, that would gradually reduce the world to sameness, where all particularity and 
specificity would disappear. Rather, as Hall argues, the
"more we understand about the development of capital itself, the more we 
understand that that is only part of the story. That alongside the drive to 
commodify everything, which is certainly one part of its logic, is another 
critical part of the logic which works in and through specificity ... It is the
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contradictions which it has to overcome that produce its own forms of 
expansion. And that until once can see the nature of that contradictory terrain 
and precisely how particularity is engaged and how it is woven in, and how it 
presents its resistances, and how it is partly overcome, and how those 
overcomings then appear again, we will not understand it. That is much closer 
to how we ought to think about the so-called 'logic of capital' in the advance of 
globalization itself.”
(1988b, p.29).
Hall's remarks are sensible and avoid the either/or position of Hirst, which offers either a 
homogeneous totalising logic of capital or the capsizal of all structure into nominalistic 
ideal-types with no essential connections with each other. Hall's argument connects up with 
the 'realist' position in the philosophy of the social sciences (see Bhasker, 1978; Sayer,
1992), which argues that there are generative mechanisms behind real world empirical events, 
of a complex and structured nature, and that distinct levels of abstraction are needed to 
uncover them in their interrelationships. Finally, it connects up with the debate around the 
relationship between structure and subject, system and actor, determinism and voluntarism 
which writers such as Giddens (1992) and Bourdieu (1987) have grappled with. 'Structuration 
theory' and the 'theory of practice' being the two most important attempts within the social 
sciences to deal with these antinomies in a satisfactory manner. Of course, Unger in his 
Social Theory (1987) also attempts to deal with these problems, but in a one-sided manner 
which gives primacy to the 'negative capability' of the acting subject or actor over more 
objective and embedded institutions and practices. Therefore it is necessary to examine the 
structural and institutional level of Piore and Sabel's work and, in particular, their views on 
the transformation of production, work, employment, organization and industrial relations. 
The examination of their broad views on social theory and the nature, process and trajectory 
of industrialization has set the scene, as has some of the criticisms that can be directed 
against them by critical researchers and writers. The following substantive questions will 
therefore be taken up and examined regarding FS: (1) the institutional environment and 
support for flexible specialization; (2) the conditions necessary for the reproduction of the 
system of flexible specialization.
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From Foidism to Flexible Specialization
The term 'flexible specialization' is the hinge around which Piore and Sabel et al pivot their 
main arguments and it is necessary to examine in more detail their understanding of the term 
and how they have used it and developed it in their successive writings. As Hirst has 
emphasised it is important to separate it off from other cognate terms such as 'flexibility' or 
'post-Fordism' or 'flexible-accumulation', and by extension terms such as 'lean production', 
'new production concepts', and so forth FS has its own specificity and meaning which must 
be understood in its own right. The key to understanding the genealogy of the term is 
Sabel's Work and Politics (1982), particularly chapter five "The end of Fordism?", which 
announces that there are signs everywhere in the industrial and political world, of change 
and transformation and crisis and experiment. Or, in Sabel's own words: "There are new 
things under the sun ... factory work is being revolutionised". Moreover, the Fordist model 
of organization is being challenged by new forms of the division of labour: "International 
competition and overlapping domestic conflicts between producers and consumers, and 
between workers and capitalists, are driving many large firms out of mass markets for 
standardised goods. To survive this challenge manufacturers often have no choice but to 
produce more specialized, higher quality products" (1982, p.194).
Contrary to Hirst and Zeitlin's argument that Piore and Sabel have no need for large 
abstractions such as Fordism it is obvious that in Work and Politics (1982) at least he does, 
recognizing that there are variant forms of Fordism, and that within its parameters workers 
can protect their skills and attain forms of job-control, thus avoiding the Bravermanesque 
over-totalising deskilling thesis. A second observation to make is that a species of 
determinism enters the picture in Sabel's remark that manufacturers 'have no choice but' to 
dispense with Fordism. For Sabel, mass markets are a precondition for the Fordist 
organization of production and when they start to break up, fragment, segment, or as Sabel 
boldly suggests, 'disintegrate', then Fordism as a method, technology and process for
organizing production begins to lose its appeal. What is replacing Fordism will be, at the 
leading edge the opposite or inversion of Fordism:
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"Where Fordism calls for the separation of conception from execution, the 
substitution of unskilled for skilled labour and special-purpose machines for 
universal machines. I will argue that specialization often demands the reverse: 
collaboration between designers and skilled producers to make a variety of 
goods with general-purpose machines."
(1982, p 194)
However, Sabel avoids the mistake he fell into earlier, of suggesting that what is historically 
in train is necessarily inevitable. He avoids confusing the dimensions of 'description, 
prediction and prescription' (Pollert, 1988), by exploring various possible institutional 
possibilities by which FS could be realized. And, moreover, he recognizes in much the same 
spirit as the Regulation School(s) that one 'possible world' could be the development of a 
neo-Fordism On the other hand though, it is conceivable argues Sabel, that the changes 
under way could lead to drastic redefinitions of prevailing ideas of organizational and 
technological efficiency. In short, in line with the idea that the industrialization process is 
contingent and non- necessitarian, Sabel argues that:
"What finally happens will depend on the eventual volatility of demand in the 
industrialized countries and the stability of the international economic order. It 
will depend too, as we shall see, on the outcome of workplace struggles - some 
already underway - between work groups and managers, but also among the 
work groups themselves, over the costs and benefits of reorganization. Because 
it builds on so many imponderables, the following discussion is necessarily 
speculative. Its purpose is to define possibilities, not to predict results. One 
thing, though, is sure: Practical experience in productive associations is racing 
ahead of existing ideas of organizational efficiency, all the more or less rooted 
in Fordism."
(1982, p.195).
Sabel goes on to explain some of the conditions that need to be met for a FS productive 
regime to be implemented and reproduce itself. The break-up of mass-markets is a 
necessary, though not sufficient condition for the creation of such a productive regime.
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Sabel never specifies what a mass-market is, and this is a big problem in assessing his 
definition of mass production and mass markets. The globalization of production into a 
planetary industrialization means that other producers are entering the market and 
manufacturing commodities and consumer durables which can compete with the old 
industrial heartlands, not only on the level of quality, but also cost. The rise of the 
newly-industrializing countries, then, is a crucial part of his argument as is his rejection of 
the evolutionary assumptions of the 'product-lifecycle' theory.121 However, although Sabel's 
comments are convincing on the intuitive level his argument that this will lead to the 
break-up of mass markets is not proved
Another precondition that Sabel identifies is an environmental or ecological one. Although 
the argument is fairly undeveloped and seems to disappear entirely in later work it is of some 
importance and should be emphasised, especially in the light of recent heightened ecological 
consciousness and the shortage of realistic and practical theories of what an ecological 
economics would look like. Sabel writes:
"Within any one society, too, the spread of mass produced goods slowly 
undercuts the preconditions of the Fordist model. Consumers, workers, even 
nature itself all react to the tremendous increase in the production of 
standardized goods in ways that threaten the stability of mass markets."
(1982, p. 198).
Sabel argues that dominant Fordist models of economic development and industrialization are 
un-ecological and involve an instrumental and conquistadorial domination and exploitation of 
nature The logic which would involve a move towards an ecological economics is located 
at the political institutional level:
"Government regulation to protect the environment is a case in point. As 
increasing amounts of a good are produced, the chance that its production, use, 
or simply disposal will make the natural environment less hospitable to human 
life also increases. Whenever insults to the environment come to attention, 
there is the possibility that the state will regulate the production or use of the 
offending product in ways that will force its redesign or abandonment. As
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more countries set separate standards for the performance of a final product, it 
becomes more difficult to produce a standard, exportable good in mass 
quantity: In 1974, for example, Renault was having to manufacture several 
dozen variants of the R16 for export."
(1982, p 198).
However, by any criterion Sabel's argument is a very 'shallow' (Naess, 1989, Gray, 1993) 
environmental argument (certainly not ecological) and is an argument for a 'green capitalism', 
responsive to public opinion and public regulation, that is to say, consumer demand. On the 
political level it hardly seems a truly ecological form of production as this would involve 
the progressive harmonisation of standards across countries through bodies like the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and other international agencies The fragmentation of 
standards is something to be regretted and rectified rather than viewed as progressive In this 
instance, mass production is possibly more ecological than fragmented and segmented 
markets. Another argument that Sabel throws in as an afterthought is that Fordism leads to 
health risks for workers and so work has to be redesigned. This argument is useful but 
unoriginal, going back as it does to the 1920s and the human relations school. The current 
ideology of human resource management reproduces these ideas in 'postmodemized' form and 
has points of parallel with Sabel's ideas, as will be shown in another chapter.131
Customised and niche markets
The third, related, condition for the dissolution of Fordism concerns the consumer and 
consumer behaviour. Sabel builds upon the work of sociological theories of consumption in 
arguing that consumer choices are not just 'rational-choices', but rather are based on forms of 
'distinction' (Bourdieu, 1979). As I have shown, the regulation school, and especially 
Aglietta in A Theory of Capitalist Regulation (1982), argues that Fordism as an articulation 
of a principle of production with a principle of consumption gave rise to the ideology of the 
'consumer society'. Sabel says little about this in his analysis of Fordism and seems to
suggest that the development of 'taste cultures' and 'games of distinction' are a recent 
phenomenon to do with the break-up of mass markets.
Sabel's argument that the growth of 'market niches' and 'customised' production, where the 
consumer is more prepared to pay a 'premium' for a specialized product is a problematic 
interpretation of the history of Fordism He gives the example of white-pan bread, a mass 
production commodity if ever there was one, which experienced a drop in production of 
fifteen percent in the United States between 1972 and 1977, "while production of speciality 
wheat varieties increased by sixty-two percent". Again we are given only anecdotal figures 
documenting these transformations, rather than broad aggregates and time-series data.
Certainly under certain institutional conditions artisanal production can beat off the challenge 
of mass production and this supports the conclusion that Sabel draws that mass production is 
not an inevitable destiny. To suggest, however, that the transition to 'niche' and 'customised' 
production is a generalized phenomenon needs more evidential support and argument. As for 
its progressiveness as a social phenomenon one must have doubts. As Davis (1991) has 
argued, one of the developments of the twelve years of Reaganism and Thatcherism has 
been the hyper-development of an over-consumptionist life-style by sections of the 
middle-class, particularly in the United States of America. Expensively produced artisanal 
articles are not for the poor and disadvantaged, but, to use an already historically dated 
term, for 'yuppies'. Similarly Harvey (1989) and others have pointed out that the working 
conditions and the terms of employment and representation of the 'artisanal' workers are not 
necessarily very good. A more adequate theory of consumption would have to trace the 
continuities rather than the discontinuities with Fordism.14'
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Neo-Fordism or 'High Technology Cottage Industry'
Sabel concludes that the capitalist 'core' countries can meet these transformations in one of 
two ways On the one hand, they could attempt to restore the status quo ante by adopting a 
protectionist strategy which freezes the economy in the old mould. Or, alternatively, as
I l l
argued in The Second Industrial Divide, they could pursue a strategy of institution-building 
on a global scale which involves a world-wide Keynesian consensus along the lines, say, of 
the Brandt Report strategy which, under present conditions, is unlikely. The alternative to 
these strategies is to seize the bull by the horns and promote 'innovation', which in the 
context of Sabel's work means promoting FS and rests on the idea that:
"... at the outset the customers' wants are vaguely defined and potentially 
diverse. The presumption is that the customer has no precise need for a 
particular good Rather, he has a yearning or problem whose satisfaction or 
solution will have to reflect many singularities of his situation. The job of the 
innovative firm is to find a technically and economically feasible way of 
satisfying this inchoate need, thus creating a new product and defining the 
customers' wants at the same time ... This strategy is practicable only if Fordist 
habits of using labour and machinery are discarded or substantially modified in 
favor of more flexible forms of organization. Flexibility, the capacity to 
produce a range of different products at the lowest total cost, will be more 
important than reducing the cost of any one product to the technic- ally 
attainable minimum. Because an economy of this type prospers by producing 
an unforeseeably large variety of products, each in comparatively small 
numbers, it needs general-purpose machines and an adaptable work force that 
adjusts quickly to new patterns of organization, rather than special machines 
and unskilled workers."
(1982, p.202).
Sabel qualifies this argument by recognising how difficult it will be to realize this strategy, 
and he recognises that mistakes will be made and blind alleys gone down before it succeeds. 
As already mentioned above, Sabel does posit a hybrid between Fordism and FS which he 
calls neo-Fordism. In this strategy, in response to the volatility of markets and the 
inflexibility of technology and labour, capital attempts to develop a production system or 
regime which attempts to overcome the accumulated structural rigidities of conventional 
Fordism, through the devices and processes of decentralisation, subcontracting, labour 
flexibility, strategic human resource management and so forth. The fact that Sabel recognises 
neo-Fordism as one possible world that could stabilise capitalism is however never elaborated 
■n any detail. He thinks it is important to recognise the open-ended fashion in which Sabel 
addresses this possibility, thus he writes: "Now the fateful question: will it work? Will some
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combinations of flexible automation and redesigned assembly procedure make it possible to 
pursue an innovative production strategy while holding tight to the principle of low trust, 
Fordist organization" (p.214). At this point he expresses agnosticism as to whether it will 
succeed or not, but suggests that it may succeed in Germany where the high-trust corporatist 
state system (plus co-determination) would prove an institutional stabiliser for a 
neo-Fordism, flexi-Fordism or, to use Streeck's term, diversified quality production.
Institutionalism, Romanticism and Flexible Specialization151
In the light of Sabel's later writings this argument is quite a significant caveat to his general 
formula expressed in Work and Politics, that the only real radical alternative which is on the 
horizon is that of the 'Third Italy' of 'high-technology cottage industry'. However he insists 
that the Third Italy' trajectory is the most likely:
"In yet other cases, attempts to restore flexibility to the factories may get out of 
hand, leading to the emergence of forms of work association unanticipated by 
the managers who set them in motion, it has happened once already in Italy, 
producing a form of high technology, decentralized production that suggests 
radically new ways of organizing industrial society even as it recalls the earlier 
variant of small-scale industrialization that gave way in the nineteenth century 
before the triumph of Fordism."
(1982, p.219).
For Sabel, the Italian example is, at this stage of his research and writing at least, the 
prescriptive and normative model of how FS should be institutionalized. Much like the 
'fellow-travellers' of the 1930s who travelled to the Soviet Union to see the 'workers' 
paradise' in the flesh, to see the 'future that worked' as the Webb's famously declared, or as 
in the 1960s those that travelled to Mao's China and wrote paeans of praise to the 'Cultural 
Revolution' and the practice of putting 'politics in command' in the factories, so similarly in 
our postmodern 'post- ideological' and 'post-historical' times Sabel likewise goes travelling in 
search of a concrete utopia.161
113
He travels to the 'Third Italy' which is in the north-central and north-eastern part of Italy, 
distinguishable from the rural south and the traditional industrial north-west. It comprises of 
the regions of Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Umbria, Marche, Veneto, Fruili-Venezia-Guilia 
and Trentino-Alto Adige. In Sabel's evocative invocation the area is described in lyrical 
terms akin to the style of journalism one finds in the travel section o f the Sunday 
Supplements of the 'quality' papers:
"There are small towns near Bologna, along the Adriatic coast near Ancona and 
Venice, where the number of officially registered factories or artisan workshops 
almost equals the number of inhabitants ... The regions in central and 
north-eastern Italy where these shops cluster have come to be called the Third 
Italy, defined in contrast to the Industrial Triangle formed by Turin, Milan and 
Genoa on the one hand and the South on the other. Within this area each 
district specializes in the production of a range of related goods. In Tuscany, 
for instance, cloth is made at Prato, ceramics at Sesto and Montelupo; in 
Emilia-Romagna, knitwear is made at Capri, ceramic tiles at Sassuolo, 
motorcycles and automatic machines at Bologna ..."
Sabel's discussion is an exemplary case of 'bending the stick too far' to make a point. 
However, his romanticisation of the Third Italy as a new arcadia has entered the discourse of 
the avant-garde, postmodern theoretical academic left and has assumed mythological 
proportions. For example, George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer in their manifesto of 
postmodern anthropology, Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in
"... Charles Sabel's Work and Politics (1983), uses an ethnographic perspective 
strategically, first to situate its argument, as a conventional way of 
understanding the labour process in industrial societies, and then to present case 
material from Italy as an illustration of a much more ambitious thesis. At the 
most general level, Sabel observes the breakdown of the global hegemony of 
neo- Fordism as both the central ideology and the practice of industrialization. 
He argues for the revitalization of de-centralized, flexible production modes 
that rely on a kind of artisanal model of production which most scholars have 
assumed is no longer practical in a high technology world. As evidence, Sabel 
presents a detailed real-life case in which neo-Fordism was in fact replaced by
(1982, p.220).
(1986), write:
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modern version of the artisanal model in northern Italy's 'third zone' during the late 
1960s. Large factories were successfully reorganised into decentralized, high 
technology workshops Sabel was a shrewd, de facto ethnographic observer of the 
political manoeuvrings that led to this shift, and he records these on both the level 
of elite policy making and that of the shop-floor In particular he exhibits intimate 
ethnographic knowledge of the latter: the lifestyles and outlooks of various 
categories of workers and how they interacted in the formation of small-scale, 
high-technology production units The power of his book is that it 
ethnographically documents a case that in its general terms suggests a clear and 
attractive alternative to the model of mass production in many other places with 
histories and local situations that both compare and contrast with Italy "
(1986, p 83)
The argument of the 'experimental moment' in ethnography is that all research is actually, in 
post-structural vein, 'writing culture', where it is difficult to gain access to 'true reality' and that 
the position and inscription of the researcher affects the research This sits uneasily with Marcus 
and Fischer's contrary argument that Sabel is superior to other writers on industrial sociology in 
that he "exposes the insensitivity to conditions 'on the ground' that most theoretical discussions 
of industrial process have displayed, and thus their limited ability to explain or affect real 
conditions" (1986, p 83). Regardless of the contradictions and confusions in their theoretical 
position their interpretation of Sabel's work shows both a misreading of the argument presented 
(e g they argue, incorrectly, that large firms have become high-technology workshops: this is not 
quite Sabel's argument) and a naive faith in its accuracy. This casts doubt on the critical 
dimension of their project and invites scepticism as to the accuracy of their other examples of the 
'experimental moment'. Nevertheless, it is a paradigmatic example of how broad sections of the 
post-Marxist, post-modern theoretical left have interpreted the FS hypothesis 7
Sabel's (with Piore) research and writing on the 'Third Italy' did, however, depend on 'other texts' 
which Marcus and Fischer fail to refer the reader to in any detail and, moreover, if we follow 
their other assertion that the ethnographer must listen to the 'natives point of view'. They should 
refer to the indigenous Italian researchers which Sabel depends on for his ideas. It was, for 
example, Bagnasco's Tre ltalie: la problematica territoriale dello sviluppo (1977)
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which introduced the term the 'Third Italy' to the social scientific community. The work of 
Sebastino Brusco popularised the idea in his article, "The Emilian model: productive 
decentralisation and social integration", which has translated by Zeitlin and published in The 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. Other Italian researchers include Brusco (1982, 1989), 
Triglia (1991) and Bellandi (1983), and since this original research there has been a mutual 
collaboration and exchange of ideas between the Italians and North Americans (and now 
extending to the rest of Europe including Britain), manifested in jointly-authored articles 
such as Brusco and Sabel's "Artisan Production and Economic Growth" (1982).
Contrary to Marcus and Fischer's gloss there is a background to Sabel's work and, moreover, 
it is considerably more ambiguous in its argument than Marcus and Fischer suggest. For 
example, Sabel recognizes that within the 'Third Italy' there are distinct and variable political, 
institutional and employment conditions:
"Most of the shops and factories in these areas employ from 5 to 50 workers ...
Some would recall turn-of-the- century sweatshops. The three or four workers 
are children scarcely fifteen years old ... the tools are simple, the product crude, 
the hours long, the air full of dust and fumes."
(1982, p.220)
Sabel does not give any statistics on how many small-enterprises recall 'sweated shops' and 
the reader is led to believe that it must be a declining proportion or minority of the total 
number of enterprises in the 'Third Italy'. For as he argues: "many others are spotless; the 
workers extremely skilled and the distinction between them and their supervisors almost 
imperceptible; the tools the most advanced numerically controlled equipment" (1982, p.220). 
In the article with Brusco these are characteristic of the third ideal-type model, or 'high-tech 
cottage industry', the other two being the traditional (sweated?) firm and the dependent firm. 
They all coexist and there is no reason to believe that subsequent development will lead to 
the extinction of any one of them. The three models, in other words, are not to be 
understood as three necessary evolutionary steps.
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However, this conclusion sits uneasily with the view that the 'high- tech cottage artisanal' 
(independent) form is at the leading edge or part of the avant-garde of industrial 
development. As argued, Sabel does not put forward a crude logic endogenous, evolutionary 
development where firms go through a process of transformation of one into the other. Nor 
does he argue for a quasi-Darwinian mechanism of selection or logic of industrialism, but 
rather for a contingent, non- necessitarian and non-deterministic form of industrialization 
driven by political, cultural, social, economic struggles and conflict, cooperation and 
consensus.
For Sabel (and Sabel and Piore in The Second Industrial Divide. (1984) the emergence of 
'high-technology cottage industry' in Italy was the result of two developments, both 
necessary, if the system was to emerge and grow. The first was the industrial struggles of 
the 1960s and the 1970s, and the second, the general change in market conditions. Sabel 
argues that these Italian events are circumstantial but compelling proof that local conflicts 
over the application of dominant models of organization can combine with global changes in 
economic conditions to produce novel forms of the division of labour.
Sabel presents the by now familiar argument about the 'decentralisation of production' in 
Italy since the industrial struggles of the 1960s and 1970s:
"As the unions’ power over wages, hours, work conditions, and employment 
levels in the large factories increased, managers tried to regain control by 
subcontracting work to small producers. Craftsmen, unsettled by the 
compression of wage and skill hierarchies, began to look for work in small 
shops. Sometimes the new orders and disaffected craftsmen came together in 
small factories founded especially to evade union control. Often, however, 
they met in older shops that had been established during earlier periods of 
economic and political turmoil. For example, near Modena, in 
Emilia-Romagna, many beneficiaries of the decentramento produttivo were 
socialist and communist artisans who had gone into business for themselves in 
the early 1950s after a series of bitter strikes ... The upshot was that by the 
mid-1970s there were in Italy innumerable small firms specializing in virtually
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every phase of the production of textiles, automatic machines, machine tools, 
automobiles."
(1982, p.221).
In Sahel's reconstruction of this process the emphasis is put on the rational-choices of 
craftsmen to leave the large factories and set up on their own (or for sacked craftsmen to set 
up on their own or with others). These micro-enterprises appear to be unionized and 
prosperous, rather than dependent on the large firms. Moreover, the regions of the 'Third 
Italy', so Sabel argues, have shown remarkable growth rates in the last twenty years; dramatic 
proof of the area's riches is the ascent of Modena, regarded as the capital of the small- firm 
economy, in the league tables of provincial wealth. Ranked by per capita income, it was the 
seventeenth richest province in 1970, the second richest in 1979. Furthermore, it is useful to 
add that by the 1980s, Italy was the fastest growing economy in Europe and that in 1986 
Italy's GDP at $673 was higher than that of the United Kingdom. However, what this reveals 
is unclear, growth rates can be high in a capitalist economy, but this need not mean 
economic transformation or affluence for the many.
The second observation that Sabel makes is that from the 1970s enough small firms became 
relatively independent of large firms. This happened for a number of reasons such as the 
'ambition', 'joy of invention' or 'fear [of] economic devastation by an economic downturn' 
made the artisans into entrepreneurs who, by using high technology computer numerically 
controlled machines, were able to introduce and implement process and product innovations. 
As a result they could make an increasingly diverse range of products that can be marketed 
and sold, rather than being dependent on a few big clients:
"The result is a system of high-technology cottage industry that does in a 
decentralized way what large innovative companies like Thyssen speciality steel 
division do within the framework of huge organizations: create new demand by 
filling needs that potential customers may have only begun to suspect were 
there."
(1982, p.223).
At this point Sahel's argument shifts focus, for now he is ready to propose that FS can be 
institutionalized in other circumstances, namely, in the large firm This is a line of argument 
that Sabel increasingly follows in his later work, where the rhetoric of 'high technology 
cottage industry' disappears from the discussion. In intimation of this direction he argues:
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"The innovative capacity of this type of firm depends on its flexible use of 
technology; its close relations with other, similarly innovative firms in the same 
and adjacent sectors, and above all on the close collaboration of workers with 
different kinds of expertise. These firms practice boldly and spontaneously the 
fusion of conception and execution, abstract and practical knowledge, that only 
a few exceptional giant firms such as Thyssen have so far been able to achieve 
on a grand scale, and then ... only by disregarding the rules of Fordism"
(1982, p.224).1,1
Turning now to the conditions necessary for the expanded reproduction and 
institutionalization of this system and the creation of new institutions of industrial 
restructuring, to shape the required form of labour market, product market and capital market 
in which such a sector can operate, Sabel argues:
"A closer look at the preconditions for the emergence and perpetuation of the 
innovative small firms will underscore the relation between Italian 
developments and my over- arching theme: the role of ideas about the world, 
political conceptions in the broadest sense, in shaping economic activity."
(1982, pp.225-6).
This theme joins up with the earlier discussion about the non-deterministic and contingent 
nature of industrialization and industrial trajectories and will be taken up more fully in my 
later discussion in chapter 4. But Sabel's general position is summarized thus:
"In Emilia-Romagna ... the innovative proprietors, the unions, and the regional 
government are already so intertwined by common political ideas that the 
creation of such collective services seems possible ... The success of 
agricultural and industrial producers' cooperatives, owing in some measure to 
the governments willingness to place orders with local artisans determined to 
defend their independence against large firms, has popularized the idea of
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collectively owned enterprise while drawing the state and the labour movement 
still closer together."
(1982, p.229).
Sahel's Work and Politics (1982) is a stimulating book which sets up the research programme 
on FS At this stage, however, in this initial conception, he focuses on the Italian experience 
as prototypical of the new progressive, non-Marxist production space he sees as emerging, 
given the correct practice of political calculation. The insistence on using the term, 
'high-technology cottage industry’, gives a remarkably romantic tinge to his argument which 
carries over into The Second Industrial Divide (1984), but this latter book deepens the 
analysis considerably and the moments of high romanticism start to disappear as a factor 
reflected in the disappearance of the term ’high-technology cottage industry’.
Ihe Second Industrial Divide
Michael Piore’s and Charles Sahel's jointly authored book, The Second Industrial Divide: 
Possibilities for Progress (1984) continues many of the themes developed in Sabel's Work 
and Politics (1982). Rather than summarising the argument of the book it is better to 
examine some of the key theses that it develops about FS. The first part takes off from the 
theses developed in Work and Politics (1982). The introduction and the first chapter rehearse 
some of the previous arguments about the crisis of mass production and Fordism, the 
contingency of history, and so forth. However, new innovations do appear which give the 
book a sharper profile and historical depth. The first innovation is the introduction of the 
term 'industrial divides'; the second is a sketch of a history of the 'alternatives to mass 
production', drawing on the Past & Present (1983) article by Sabel and Zeitlin.
The introduction of the term 'industrial divides' introduces a meta-historical dimension to 
Piore and Sabel's conceptualization of the industrialization process which has already been 
outlined In summary the term embodies a critique of single-track visions of industrial
evolution and, in its place puts forward a branching-plant vision of alternative possibilities, 
some realized, some delayed, others stalled. They are 'brief moments' when history becomes 
unstuck and possibilities make themselves available.
The next argument which Piore and Sabel put forward is that the alternative possibilities that 
are available are a stagnant orthodoxy (neo-liberalism), an international Keynesianism or 
more 'realistically', FS. The most important concept introduced in The Second Industrial 
Divide (1984) is that of 'industrial districts' which was developed by Italian researchers, 
drawing upon the research and writing of the economist, Alfred Marshall. For Piore and 
Sabel these districts were defined by
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"three mutually dependent characteristics. The first, most obvious characteristic 
was the district's relation to the market. The districts produced a wide range of 
products for the highly differentiated regional markets at home and abroad; but 
- more important - they also constantly altered the goods, partly in response to 
changing tastes, partly to change tastes, in order to open new markets ... This 
relation to the market encouraged and depended upon the second and third 
characteristics of the industrial districts: their flexible use of increasingly 
productive, widely applicable technology and their creation of regional 
institutions that balanced cooperation and competition among firms, so as to 
encourage permanent innovation."
(1984, p.29).
This development of the concept of 'industrial districts' needs some elaboration if we are to 
see the significance of the term for Piore and Sabel's argument. As already mentioned, the 
term has its origin in Alfred Marshall's writings In Industry and Trade (1892) he argued 
that efficiency is not only found in large firms, but can be realized in small firms interacting 
in spatially agglomerated localities which he discovered in England, Germany and other 
countries. As Cooke explains:
"Nineteenth century industrial districts, as described by Alfred Marshall, were 
systems of small, craft-based companies specialized in the production of a 
particular set of products, interlinked by tight networks of sub-contractors, often 
organized around family relationships, dependent on starting finance raised
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within the community and capable of producing customised products, often for 
luxury markets. Such districts would be localised in particular regions or even 
within towns or specialized areas of cities. The best examples of industrial 
districts were the Sheffield cutlery, tools and special steels district, the 
Birmingham armaments and jewellery quarters, the Lyons silk manufacturing 
district, the New York garment district and the Roubaix and Kortrijk textile 
towns of France and Belgium."
(1987, p.164).'9'
Industrial Localities and Vertical Disintegration'
Against this background The Second Industrial Divide (1984) Piore and Sabel identify at 
three distinct institutional forms of'industrial district': (1) municipalism; (2) welfare 
capitalism or paternalism; (3) familialism. By Municipalism Piore and Sabel mean a 
territorially dispersed production centre, coordinated by an urban seat. Productive units are 
small and capital requirements modest. Citing the nineteenth century social scientist,
Frederic Le Play, Piore and Sabel borrow his term fabriques collective to name this form of 
industrial, political, social and geographic phenomenon. The most famous example which 
Piore, Sabel and Zeitlin continue to cite throughout their work is the nineteenth century 
Lyonese silk industry. Lyons was regulated by a dense web of institutions, governed by 
'trust', 'regulated competition', 'cooperation'. There were mechanisms to cushion workers and 
artisans from economic downturns such as the system of caisse de prets (loan banks) which 
provided credit to weavers during downturns of the economic cycle, and in Saint-Étienne 
municipal taxes were introduced to finance unemployment insurance.
Welfare capitalism or Paternalism: This refers to the manufacturing system that occurred in 
large factories where what would now be called 'functional flexibility' and high levels of skill 
were required. Piore and Sabel argue that these firms were really 'groupings of artisans' 
shops under one roof, rather than assembly-line factories. The entrepreneur or industrialist 
provided more or less the same kind of mutual services that small firm municipalism 
provided. Obviously, the term 'welfare capitalism' has little to do with the social democratic
meaning of the term. The third institutional means of securing the flexible use of resources 
was based on the family and kin group network (Familialism):
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"The idea of using family ties to create an alliance was conceived by a 
prominent cotton-textile manufacturer in Roubaix, France: Alfred Motte. In the 
1850s, after a failure to gain ground against established and better-situated 
mass producers, Motte switched his strategy; he began to construct a 
confederation of firms owned by different members of his family."
(1984, p.34).
The main problem for Piore, Sabel and their co-workers is to explain why these industrial 
districts got replaced by other systems of economic organization. If they were dynamic, 
flexible, efficient and innovative is it not logical to presume that they would survive and 
replicate themselves in the economic struggle for the survival of the fittest? The historical 
interpretation which they present is one that avoids an expressive or homogeneous, 
evolutionary logic as we might expect. They argue that some of the industrial districts 
survived until after the Second World War - Lyon and the silk industry is an example.
Much of their argument turns around the assertion that it was the specific economic policies 
of the state which forced industry onto the single-track of mass production and Fordism.
Other factors, of course, played a part, such as, in the case of Sheffield, the role played by 
the numerous "craft unions, each organizing a narrow trade and powerful enough to defend 
successfully the existing division of labour". This account, which relies on an interpretation 
of labour history which emphasises the sectionalism and craft-consciousness of the British 
labour movement, is something of an orthodoxy amongst labour historians of which Zeitlin is 
an important figure.
Sabel and Zeitlin conclude their account o f industrial districts by arguing that:
"On this evidence, the obstacles to the progress of mechanization on craft lines 
lay not in some self-blockage of this model of technological development, but 
in the unfavourable environment - political, institutional, economic • with 
which it had to contend. Yet from the perspective of the narrow track-idea of 
historical development, the technological vitality of the industrial districts
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appears to be an incomprehensible violation of the laws of progress. To make 
sense of this vitality, therefore, it is necessary to shift vantage point and 
imagine a theoretical world in which technology can in principle develop in 
different ways: a world that might have turned out differently from the way it 
did, and therefore with a history of abandoned but potentially viable 
alternatives to what actually exists."
(1983, p. 161).
This conclusion can be said to be the overall message of The Second Industrial Divide 
(1984) itself What is contestable is how to interpret the overall argument. For some, as I 
have argued, the book is an example of the exagger-book genre, high on generalization, weak 
on specifics. For others it is a carefully constructed argument which avoids facile 
generalizations and sweeping assertions.
Industrial relations, work/eniploviiient and the labour market
Apart from The Second Industrial Divide (1984) and various articles on artisanal production 
in the 'Third Italy' Piore and Sabel wrote more or less contemporaneously a number of 
articles (sometimes jointly with other authors) on alternative forms of FS regimes to that of 
the 'Third Italy'. It is to these I shall now turn so as to explain more fully their claims 
about alternative futures.
Sabel's "Industrial Reorganization and Social Democracy in Austria" appeared in 1984 and is 
interesting because it combines an analysis of what is wrong with European social 
democracy, especially in its Austrian form, with an analysis of how FS could evolve in the 
peculiar circumstances of Austria. The article begins with the by now standard opposition 
between Fordism (or mass production) and FS. Sabel focuses in on three variants, the West 
German, the Japanese and the Italian. For Sabel the German form of FS (which is emerging) 
is organised through the large firm through the internal 'decentralisation' of the factory; the 
Japanese example is an intermediate form, where the large firm or corporation becomes a 
final assembler and marketer of components produced by flexible small firms; in the Italian
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example, by now the most familiar, the large firm disappears and production is carried out 
by federations of autonomous small firms within industrial districts. It seems the Sabel is 
using the term FS as an ideal type concept which then gets modified by other institutional 
practices according to the context. But this seems to lead to the same problem that Hirst 
and Zeitlin criticize regulation theory for. Namely, the proliferation of sub-types, hybrids 
and variants which are poised "uneasily between theory and empirical description" and which 
involves not only "severe 'stylization of the facts' to fits its theoretical categories, but also ad 
hoc modifications of the categories themselves to accommodate observed variations" (1991, 
p.21). How Piore and Sabel avoid this criticism for Hirst and Zeitlin is not clear.
For Sabel the Austrian form of FS could be developed by hybridization, borrowing from the 
lessons of Germany, Italy and Japan:
"Some combination of these three types of flexible specialization is plausibly 
applicable to Austrian industry. The West German model, for instance, suits 
part of the steel industry; the Japanese model might be applied to the 
production of turn-key factories ...; and the Italian model might be applied to 
the textile industry or the production of diesel motors. And there are obviously 
pieces of the Austrian institutional system such as the Aussenhandelsstellen, 
which fit naturally into such a scheme."
(1984b, p.351).
However, Sabel believes that there are obstacles in the way of inventing a flexible 
specialization social economy in Austria. These are to do with the entrenched system of 
social democracy and corporativism (Austro-Keynesianism) which has organized the Austrian 
polity and economy since the late 1940s These institutional arrangements were perfect for 
mass production, but the unintended or perverse consequence of these arrangements resulted 
in structural rigidities, which now prevent the transition to a FS in Austria:
"Thus the triumphs of Austro-Keynesianism, like the triumphs of any other 
bold plan of institutional innovation, threaten to imprison the innovators in the 
past, in two related ways. First, the operation of the current system distracts 
attention from analysis of problems associated with the breakup of the mass
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markets on which Keynesianism depended and the construction of the new 
infrastructure needed to address them. Second, and worse, from the perspective 
of the old system, many of the spontaneous and yet fragile attempts to create 
the kind of infrastructure required by the new situation appear to one (or even 
both) of the social partners as potential threats to the discipline and social 
equilibrium on which prior success has been grounded. The institutions are not 
just (partially) blind to the needs and possibilities of reform, but (partially) 
hostile to the society's efforts at self-help."
(1984b, p.354).
In interpreting these arguments it is important to observe while there are echoes of the 
orthodox neo-liberal arguments about the need to remove 'rigidities' and 'blockages' and the 
need to make 'structural adjustments', Sabel is far removed from these points of view and is 
confident that the tripartite corporativism of Austria can survive in the context of institutional 
transformation and rebuilding. Thus he goes on to argue:
"The systems of social partnership was bom out of the Austrians' recognition 
that they for a vulnerable Astgemeinschaft. Under specific historical 
conditions, that Gemeinschaft took on a particular and corresponding 
institutional form. As those conditions change, Austria's leaders sense that they 
face a crucial choice. They can hold fast to interpreting Astgemeinschaft 
narrowly as the set of practices and institutions which are its current 
expressions; or they can return to the idea of a community of the vulnerable as 
a general commitment to share equitably the burdens of adapting social 
institutions to a continuously changing world. In the latter case, social 
partnership means not a commitment to the defence of spheres of influence, but 
rather a willingness to create a system of risk spreading that makes possible the 
transition from one form of economic organization to another by assuring that 
no party will take advantage of change to impose burdens on the other."
(1984b, p.359).
Against false necessity: »he flexible social maitet
It could be argued, however, this form of politics is not so distinct from the 'social market 
economy* political philosophy. As Ralf Dahrendorf has written in his Reflections on the 
Revolution in Europe (1990), "Alfred Muller-Armack had invented the term 'social market
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economy', sociale Marklwirstschafl. His 1949 paper, 'Proposals for the Implementation of 
the Social Market Economy' is almost the Federalist Paper for economic reform" (p.88). 
Dahrendorf lists the modest plans for social intervention into the market and observed that it 
was the practitioner of the 'social market economy', the German Chancellor Erhard who 
extended the idea of 'the social' and the need for its intervention into the market economy. 
Dahrendorf also recognizes that the 'social market economy' does not really add up to a 
theory or system, but is inherently pragmatic in its orientation and implementation, drawing 
upon diverse sources such as the various Papal encyclicals on social reform, such as. Rerum 
Novarum (1891) and Ouadrauesimo Anno (1931). A more rigorous formulation of these 
ideas was developed by Alexander von Rustow, in the post-war policy journal Ordo which 
forms the focus for Foucault's lectures and seminars on neo-liberalism and 'governmentality'. 
The important idea here was that the 'market' is not a natural relation, but something that 
has to be consciously developed, nurtured and, moreover, regulated. As Gordon (1991) has 
written the major problem, as the Ordoliberen saw it was to promote, in the spirit of Max 
Weber, entrepreneurial attitudes and relationships within an ongoing social order of 
solidarity:
"As Foucault points out, Rustow's thinking here seems almost to make an 
admission that the principle of enterprise bears its own seeds of contradiction, 
since the idea of Vitalpolitik ... seems in large part designed to palliate the 
desegregating effects of market competition on the social body."
(1978, 1991, p.42).
Gordon contrasts this with orthodox neo-liberalism of the Chicago school variety such as 
Gary Becker where the social gets reinscribed and swallowed by the economic in a reversal 
of terms by which the social is formed into a special case of the economic.'101
This gives credence to Clarke's argument that Piore and Sabel's politics are a
"essentially Christian-Democratic critique of both social democracy and 
neo-liberalism. Their main economic argument is that neo-liberal strategies 
make no allowance for externalities, so that some collective framework is
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required to make appropriate investments in training, research and 
infrastructure. But social democratic statism politicizes such investment 
decisions, instead of subordinating them to the competitive needs of local or 
national capitalists. The most appropriate basis on which to build an economic 
strategy is therefore neither competitive economic relations nor statist political 
forms but a set of common solidaristic values, which Hirst recognizes to be as 
Clarke argues (1990) the 'small town virtues, old style familialism and deeply 
conservative social attitudes, characteristic of Christian Democracy ."
(1990, p.79).
However, Clarke misrepresents Piore and Sabel's (and Hirst's) position somewhat by refusing 
to see that there might be some radical potential in these ideas, something which will be 
examined below
A new trade unionism?
Michael Piore's article "The decline of mass of production and the challenge to union 
survival" (1986) is another interesting reflection on the institutional and political conditions 
necessary for the implementation of FS, this time focusing on the decline and failure of the 
United States trade union movement. It was written mid-point in the Reagan years and starts 
by observing the decline of the labour movement in the United States manifested in falling 
union membership, density, concession bargaining and inter-sectoral shifts from 
manufacturing to services Piore argues that there is an absence of political vision in the 
contemporary labour movement which finds some points of comparison with the arguments 
of Hobsbawm regarding the 'forward march of labour halted' in the United Kingdom In the 
1930s, Piore argues, "labour place in American society secured by a social vision which 
made trade unions fundamental to the way in which society was supposed to, and did in fact, 
operate That social vision has now been abandoned" (1986).
Piore views the Rooseveltian New Deal as crucially important for giving shape to this vision 
which has now decayed. The conditions for this settlement were: First, the emergence of
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collective bargaining (the Wagner Act and the National Labour Relations Board), which 
created consumer purchasing power and matched it with productivity increases. Second, the 
trade union movement was part of a broad progressive coalition in electoral politics which 
lobbied for welfare rights on behalf of the poor and the working class. This widened the 
coalition of previously disenfranchised groups such as blacks. Third, the commitment to 
mass production as a technological form which was seen as the key to prosperity, and the 
establishment of trade unions as 'countervailing' powers to the giant multi-divisional 
corporation. The upshot of this was:
"Unions moved to stop managerial actions which violated union rules, but they 
were not involved in proposing substantive alternatives. In this sense, 
industrial unions never entered actively into the operation of the business and 
they were legitimized by a social vision which excluded them from doing so.
One could almost say that they had a place in the broad social structure but no 
place in the conduct of the business itself. In this they contrasted radically 
with craft unions whose social vision gave them an organic role in the business 
but no place in the larger society."
(1986, p.209).
Moreover, Piore goes on to argue that in the 1970s the institutional, political, economic and 
cultural assumptions which had helped to maintain and reproduce this institutional settlement 
had all but collapsed The proliferation of 'new social movements' resulted in the labour 
movement coming to be perceived as a narrow, special interest group. And paradoxically the 
'shifting involvements' of political culture had seen a swing away from collective and public 
involvements towards a narcissistic culture of private involvements. Furthermore, the labour 
movement's economic role was undermined by the changing international division of labour 
and the need for United States companies and multinationals to be internationally 
competitive. Moreover, technological changes - "ranging from the computer in design and 
manufacture to the laser for cutting, the photocopying machine in printing, and biotechnology 
for organic products • enhance economies of smaller batch production and give an advantage 
to flexible firms in parts of the economy where unions are not well represented". Finally, 
these new technological forms favour new modes of labour-management relations involving
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cooperation and the development of social technologies such as quality circles, profit-sharing 
and 'human resource management'.
These new developments have, then, undermined the New Deal settlement and the 'Great 
Society' vision and, unfortunately, neo-liberal Reaganism and replaced it with its espousal of 
the 'spirit of enterprise'. Piore concludes:
"Neither the exuberant individualism of Reagan nor the disciplined 
individualism of neo-classical economics has a place for trade unions. In the 
former, they stifle creativity; in the latter they are a monopoly element, driving 
up wages at the expense of efficiency."
(1988, p 221).
Piore argues that in the economic climate of the 1980s and 1990s we have entered into a 
new competitive environment which foregrounds enterprise and entrepreneurialism as the 
well-spring of economic prosperity. But he writes that this only gives half the picture:
"The focus upon individual initiative captures one aspect of the new reality, but 
it leaves out of account a second aspect of that reality, and the public policy 
lessons it teaches denies that aspect completely. Individual activity and 
initiative do not take place in isolation: they grow out of, and are heavily 
dependent upon, the broader social setting in which productive activity is 
embedded. The social dependence is multifaceted. It depends upon an 
intellectual community for the exchange and development of ideas. It depends 
on complex networks of sub-contracting and inter-firm cooperation to translate 
the continual flow of ideas into operational, commercially feasible goods and 
services. It depends heavily upon a pool of skilled workers to get these goods 
and services into production ... it depends on a web of trust and cooperation ... 
and restraints upon competitive activities to insure that competitive pressures 
are channelled into innovative activities ... Above all, wages and inter-firm 
exchanges must be removed from competition, otherwise sweating or, in the 
case of inter-firm contracting, a kind of cheating and exploitation, will destroy 
the trust required for creative interchange."
(1986, p.211).
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This analysis is characteristic of other left-liberal writers on the problems of the United 
States economy. For example, Robert Reich (Clinton's economic adviser), Paul Kennedy, 
Lester Thurrow and John Kenneth Galbraith in various ways foreground the Durkheimian 
'pre- contractual1 element in the 'contract' which neo-liberalism occludes. Like the 'social 
market economy' theorists, emphasis is given to the social conditions that help produce and 
promote an 'entrepreneurial' climate. Moreover, the themes of 'trust', 'consensus' and 
'normative order' is a continuous refrain throughout the literature on the new production 
spaces or localities in Silicon Valley, Southern California and Boston and so forth 
However, this interpretation is problematic in its oscillation between description and 
prescription. Other researchers, such as Florida and Kenney (1992) for example have called 
into question the idea of trust and cooperation in Silicon Valley arguing that the unfortunate 
reality of Silicon Valley and Route 128 is one of severe, at times devastating competition 
that drastically limits the ability of small entrepreneurial firms to cooperate with one another 
and to generate follow-through on cutting-edge technological innovations Rather than 
harmony of interests, the reality is one of each protecting his own - a trait clearly reflected in 
the recent rash of lawsuits charging companies with stealing employees or copying 
technology. Cypress Semiconductor, for example, currently faces at least twenty intellectual 
property lawsuits. Larger firms like DEC and Intel have developed in-house staffs of ten or 
more lawyers to deal with intellectual property litigation
Fiore's argument must be understood against the background of his marked nostalgia for the 
craft and artisanal communities which preexisted mass production and Fordism Some of 
these principles, argues Piore, have survived into the present in industries where small 
enterprises are still predominant. He gives some examples, such as the garment and 
construction industries, where communal institutions have been embedded in ethnic 
communities - of Jews and Italians. The existence of political parties, local government 
institutions, employer associations and trade unions were all critical of wage stability, 
standards of workmanship and the training of workers. As a model it can be extended in a 
new form into a programme for the future:
m"The new model unionism is developing none too soon. The social pieces 
missing from Reagan's vision of reality can be provided by other institutional 
forms ... In newer industries like the high-tech communities around Boston, 
Massachusetts and Stanford, California, the communal structure is embedded in 
the culture of local universities like MIT and Stanford, populated by university 
alumni, and led by employer organizations and lobbies who are restructuring 
the state and local government institutions to provide the requisite communal 
services."
(1986, p 212)
The same argument is taken up by Sabel and Katz in their article "Industrial Relations & 
Industrial Adjustment in the Car Industry" (1985) where they observe the current 
transformation in U S. and German industrial relations such as the introduction of quality 
circles and quality of working-life programmes In a manner similar to, but more 
ambivalent than Piore, they write:
"In our view, current economic developments imperil national unions, but do 
not condemn them to extinction. The craft models no less than the automobile 
experiments suggest that increasingly flexible local units could be compatible 
with a new type of national union ... First, unions will have to exchange the 
rights to impose uniform conditions for rights in decision making Second, the 
unions will have to find ways of tying the interests of particular companies to 
the interests of their industry, and even of the company as a whole. By linking 
the day-to-day operation of individual companies through, for example, joint 
training programmes, contracts facilitating labour mobility between kanban 
suppliers and their customers; and industry-wide health and safety programs, 
the unions may be able to offset the divisive tendencies of local autonomy " 
(P-314).
Whether this will be the outcome is another question. It remains a possibility of prescription 
rather than description and they conclude by observing that the future of the national union is 
nothing if not open A more extended statement of this position may be found in Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie's book The Transformation of American Industrial Relations (1986), 
which presents a case for trade union involvement in the human resource management 
strategies of the U S. corporation. But, as their research shows, the more likely outcome of 
the development and implementation of these packages will be the further marginalization
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and eventual displacement of trade unions in the United States.,n| This argument is further 
elaborated upon in Piore's Bevond Individualism (1995).
A Europe of industrial districts?
Although the picture in the United States looks bleak for the proponents of the FS 
programme the situation in Europe is perhaps more hopeful, and Sabel has increasingly 
turned his attention to the possibilities of this continent rather than on the North American.
A key essay in Sabel's expanding oeuvre was his contribution to Hirst and Zeitlin's 
Reversing Industrial Decline? Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and her Competitors 
(1989). The essay, "Flexible Specialization and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies", 
takes off from his previous research and writing and, in particular, his work on industrial 
districts and alternatives to mass production.
In Sabel's reconstruction of economic history these regions were more or less devastated by 
inter-war and post-war economic policy which foregrounded the Fordist and State-regulated 
policies of mass production, led by the giant multi-divisional Chandlerian corporation. This 
dovetailed with the Welfare state social policies which insured against risks, personal 
disasters and stabilised demand by guaranteeing minimum levels of purchasing power for 
persons with no income. The crisis of the 1970s is introduced briefly by Sabel at a high 
level of generality which would shame even the most crude of New Times post- Fordists:
"But in the early 1970s, as international competition increased and world 
markets fragmented, firms became more and more wary of long-term 
investments in product-specific machinery. The product's market often 
disappeared before the machinery's costs were recovered. The more volatile 
markets became, the more firms experimented with flexible forms of 
organization which permitted rapid shifts in output. As they did, they 
encouraged the reconsolidation of the region as an integrated unit of 
production."
(1989, p. 18).
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Sabel identifies five developments, each reinforcing the others which are contributing to this 
result: (1) the emergence of twentieth century variants of industrial districts in Italy, West 
Germany, Japan, Denmark, Austria, France and the United States; (2) the reorganisation of 
large, multi-national firms; (3) "the double convergence of large- and small-firm structure". 
Large firms in reorganising attempt to establish the collaboration characteristic of relations 
among firms in the flexible-specialization economies; (4) the transformation of local 
governments from welfare dispensation to job-creation and labour-market shaping agencies;
(S) plant and regional level officials of trade unions are cooperating in the industrial 
reorganisation.
To show how these five factors are interacting with each other to produce the transformations 
he believes are taking place Sabel examines more closely the various industrial districts that 
are springing up in Europe and which have been identified by various researchers The 
'Third Italy' is the first case which is mentioned but others are identified such as the 'Second 
Denmark’, Baden-Wurttemburg, Silicon Valley, Route 128, Oyonnax in France, Valles near 
Barcelona, and so forth. Sabel recognizes that there are objections to his way of 
formulating and interpreting these phenomena. First and foremost he recognizes that many 
researchers make the strong case that these regions involve forms of work which resemble 
turn-of-the-century sweatshop conditions:
"Many of the new firms in the Third Italy were founded in the 1970s expressly 
to avoid the unions' growing control of the large factories. Many of the new 
firms evaded taxes, refused to pay social welfare benefits, imposed long hours, 
used toxic materials hazardously, and paid sub-standard wages."
(1989, p.24).
However, Sabel argues that, in the last decade, this view has been substantially modified by 
a new understanding of what is really taking place. Thus he writes: "In Italy, for instance, 
much of what first seemed child labour proved to be carefully monitored initiations of 
children in their parents' work-day world" (1989, p.24). It is interesting that he makes no 
attempt to substantiate this conclusion, nor does he cite any of the numerous studies which
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argue more circumscriptly or the opposite (see Amin, 1992). More importantly Sabel argues 
that during this period the new regional economies began to elaborate or revitalise systems 
for regulating cooperation between firms and workers that recalled the earlier controls on 
competition in the nineteenth century industrial districts. This did not mean that labour 
relations in the industrial districts became harmonious, let alone joyously communal But it 
did mean that conflicts were conducted and concluded with respect for the preconditions for 
continuous redisposition of resources. Strikes in the Third Italy thus tend to be shorter than 
in other areas of Italy, and to eventuate in agreements in principle rather than detailed rules 
For Sabel, then, the new industrial districts are in the process of continued institution 
building which are elaborating a system of rules, norms, regulations and institutions which 
are forming a communal system of cooperation, of trust and cooperation between firms, firms 
and workers and local government:
"In the region of Emilia-Romagna, for instance, provinces such as Modena 
substantially expanded the technical consulting services provided to the small 
and medium-sized firms. In Baden-Württemberg, the already excellent public 
technical consulting services and vocational and technical education system 
have been substantially improved. Vocational high schools (Berufsschulen) 
once gave elementary instruction to apprentices. Now they are teaching the 
skills formerly taught to technicians and engineering students in community 
colleges or polytechnics (Fachhochsculen)."
(1989, p.26).
Theorising industrial districts
Sabel concludes though that it is still unclear how best to theorise, explain and characterise 
the new industrial districts. While his arguments have depended on ethnographic case 
studies and anecdote others have attempted to develop more formalised models:
"Sociologists studying organisational behaviour and economists studying 
industrial structures as instruments for minimising the costs of transaction 
among production units or as solutions to the related problems faced by
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principals in controlling their agents have also detected something novel in the new 
arrangements associated with industrial districts."
(1989, p 29).
However, he argues that these abstract theoretical models are no more proof or adequate than 
the ethnographic evidence. In this context he refers to Williamson's 'transaction costs' (1975) 
school and Ouchi's (1980) theory of networks and clan culture, and relatedly, the models 
being put forward by organisational theorists who draw upon population biology metaphors 
about the competitive advantages of generalist organisations over specialist ones in less 
stable market conditions of economic turbulence. Sabel finds none of the theories he reviews 
totally adequate and suggests that perhaps something can be learned from the analysis of the 
contemporary reorganisation of multinational companies.
Sabel's observations on the current strategies and structures of the multi-national large 
corporation start from the idea that they are repudiating mass-production and that they have 
begun to organise production along the lines of FS Sabel outlines, yet again, the text-book 
version of how mass production and Fordism emerges and replicates itself through the logic 
of the separation of conception from execution and the fall in unit costs according to scale. 
However, this only made sense if the massive costs of building such organisations and forms 
of production could be amortised:
"But the more markets fragmented in the 1970s, the more difficult this became 
Here too, the failure of the world car strategy is emblematic. Firms learned to 
expect the unexpected from the market. Once they assumed that they could not 
foresee which products would succeed, they introduced more new items to 
increase the chances of finding a winner. To speed up the development of new 
products and assure that winners selected by the market could be manufactured 
in time to meet the demand, the firms then had to learn to cut the costs of 
reorganising production. In a word - their word - they had to become more 
flexible. To do that, they had to reintegrate conception and execution, thereby 
blurring the distinction between planning and production at all but the highest 
levels of the corporation and reducing costs and time required for both."
(1989, p.32).
Sabel realizes that this abstract theory needs some modification as reality is always more 
complex and so it is therefore
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"necessary to assess the correspondence between the text- book picture of 
corporate reorganisation and a composite picture of actual practice. In the 
absence of comprehensive evidence it is helpful to establish two polar reference 
points - cases where corporate reorganisation matches the foregoing description, 
and cases where the goal is a clear alternative - and then scrutinise intermediate 
development for clues about the viability and potential diffusion of the 
extremes."
(Ibid, p.35-6).
Sabel draws up a number of ideal-type models on this continuum. First, there is the Italian 
example of the chemical firm, Montedison at Ferrara, where the firm has reconstituted itself 
as a holding company made up of smaller units. Companies such as Xerox come close to 
this model as well. Second, other companies have adopted elements of the vertically 
disintegrated model, but without breaking fully with the organisational principles of the mass 
production firm:
"Many American firms, for example, appear to be pursuing what might be 
called a Japanese (as opposed to world-car) variant of the strategy of flexible 
specialization. The aim is to increase the variants of production without 
abandoning the distinction between conception and execution."
(Ibid, p.37).
However, despite these divergences Sabel concludes that: "If the experience of these 
Japanese and West German companies indicates a trend, then the shift towards the text-book 
will be self-reinforcing".
The next argument that Sabel introduces is that of the rediscovery of the region as the 
context for the creation of industrial districts with egalitarian potential. Regions are no 
longer blank spaces on the map of industry, but rather are now viewed as economic, social 
and political entities
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"full or under- or unused resources that range from traditional artisanal skills to 
petty commerce Prosperity depends, according to the new doctrine of 
endogenous growth, on developing these resources rather than importing the 
equipment and skills of a mass-production economy from the rich exterior."
(Ibid, p 41).
Sabel lists many examples of regional initiatives and concludes that there are signs 
everywhere of regional consolidation at the economic, social, cultural and political levels. 
This argument which is not developed in detail is one of the most important of Sabel's 
observations and will be examined in the next chapter. But it has importance also in the 
context of Sabel's reflections on the relationship between production regimes based on FS 
and politics. And in particular, the politics of the welfare state which in recent years has 
been more at the centre of Sabel's theorising and research:
"The very nature of flexible specialization suggests that it will require 
complementary macro-economic institutions, different in kind but not in 
ultimate purpose from the Keynesian reinsurance (against risks) systems. And 
because of the conditions which favour its diffusion, furthermore, it is likely 
that even abstracting from the additional problems of creating an appropriate 
international trade regime, national economies will have no easier time, and 
perhaps a harder one, discovering why and how to construct such an 
institution."
(1989, p 53).
Here Sabel recognize that the flexible specialization economy/region has to find ways to stop 
the polarization of work and income into the secure and protected multi-skilled workers on 
the one hand, and on the other, the excluded and marginalized 'underclass' The danger that 
a new feudalism could emerge has been recognised by many writers both on the left and by 
other researchers close to Sabel's position.
In one form the welfare state would look
"like a more ramshackle version of its current self. The industrial districts 
would half surreptitiously reshape their services locally to meet their needs;
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wherever possible they would try to reduce their contributions to public 
revenues with the plausible argument that through their job guarantees and 
training programmes they already bear many of the risks and responsibilities 
once bom by the state. At the same time, the national state would support the 
excluded - primarily unskilled workers, many of them women - through some 
combination of unemployment insurance and poor relief. In northern European 
countries with strong Social Democratic traditions some alliance of 
progressiveness urging the attractive possibilities of leisure in a post-material 
society and conservatives anxious to keep the poor of the streets might press 
for a legal right to a minimum income, thus removing poverty from the 
national political agenda and legitimating the silent coexistence of those inside 
and outside the new economies. In classically liberal societies such as the 
USA, much of the new under- class would scrape by serving the privileged. 
The rest would be grudgingly provided for, and constantly tested to determine 
its propensity to respond to various incentives to join the active labour force". 
(1989, p.56).
The second line of development would be more progressive and would involve the extension 
and institutionalisation of FS throughout the whole of the economy and society. The pooling 
of resources, cooperation between trade unions, management, local authorities, education and 
training authorities would lead to the emergence of a 'virtuous circle' of expansion and 
solidarity between elements of the system:
"If the pooling of knowledge succeeds, it can become the political metaphor 
and matrix for the pooling of other resources as well. The more knowledge 
available to each industrial district, the less likely that each can draw on the 
resources of the others in its moments of distress. If firms, workers, trade 
associations and trade unions come to define their interests in this way, then 
they will press for those policies - modelled perhaps on cooperation in 
education - which encourages the diffusion of regional economies. The result 
would be to draw currently marginal groups into the flexible economy while 
strengthening the armature of supra-local institutions which would eventually 
have to construct the macro-regulatory system of flexible specialization."
(1989, p.59).
But Sabel does not expand on how this system will work in any detail. Rather he ends on an 
inconclusive note that either the circle of prosperity will remain closed to many, resulting in 
conflict and antagonism, or else the circle of prosperity will be enlarged as new forms of
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institutionalised confederation are imagined, invented and implemented. Then the "capitalist 
democracies will face the problem of reconciling the new mechanisms of redistribution with 
their traditions of parliamentarism and equal treatment under law. Better the problems of 
prosperity" (1989, p.59).
What becomes clear in this conclusion is that Sahel's ideas should not be interpreted as 
simply describing an existent situation, but rather represent a social theory with a clear 
normative reference. The logical direction for Sabel to travel is towards a more explicitly 
formulated political theory which would attempt to articulate his socio-economic themes, in a 
more satisfying intellectual and political manner with a political theory of democracy, 
community and justice.
Kem and Schumann and the "new production concepts”
Sahel's work is not just a research programme in the sociology of work, employment and 
industry but a social and political theory with practical intent. This becomes clearer in two 
further papers which he has published which will now be considered. Both papers follow on 
logically from his regional economies paper. The first, titled "Trade Unions and 
Decentralized Production: A sketch of Strategic Problems in the West German Labour 
Movement" (1988 and 1991), written jointly with Horst Kem, points out a convergence with 
the German research programme on new production concepts.
It is significant then that Sabel's work, which has always been in close dialogue with Kem 
and Schumann, should now converge into joint research and writing. In an early article 
summarising their research on new production concepts and the 'end of the division of 
labour', Kern and Schumann wrote:
"On the basis of these analyses we can state as a principal position that a 
fundamental change is taking place in the use of labour. New production
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concepts are being formulated and put into practice, whose common 
denominator is the avoidance of technical automation of the production process 
if the price is too high and a growing regard for qualifications and independent 
skills. The trend of capitalist rationalization is changing: the rationalization 
logic remains the same but fundamentally new forms are emerging."
(1987, p 156).
For Kern and Schumann the forms that are emergent and transitional form a spectrum of 
possibilities and there is no necessitarian logic to the implementation of one particular 
formative context, which at first sight is similar to the statements of Piore, Sabei et al. As 
Kern and Schumann write:
"The term 'spectrum' therefore emphasizes the openness and malleability of the 
situation, the multiple possibilities for intervention. The thesis of the new 
production concepts outlines a new constellation, a possibility which will 
presumably grow in importance but not a definite process or results which can 
be determined in detail in advance. Rather it should develop into a policy of 
industrial modernization which opens the path to the development of the 
opportunities inherent in the constellation: modernization as a social project. It 
is mainly the problem constellations, the direction of development and the 
possibilities for action which are foreseeable not the concrete results."
(1987, p. 158).
Like Piore and Sabei, Kern and Schumann reject the Bravermanesque conclusion that 
'de-skilling' is the inevitable logic of capitalist development and forms of industrialisation. 
Rather, they argue that in some 'central' sectors of industry such as engineering, chemicals 
and car manufacture, there is a restructuring and a reorganisation of production and 
production planning underway based on the réintroduction and recognition of production 
skills which augurs the possibility of the 'end of the division of labour', a 'de-differentiation' 
of work (Clegg, 1990). Thus:
"Capital investment itself demands a radical change in the utilization of 
working capacity. The more the product conception tends towards the 
manufacture of highly sophisticated quality articles and the production concept 
aims at a wide application of the new technologies, the more an increased 
allocation of tasks and a wider application of qualifications appears to be the
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optimal concept for the assignment of work ... Higher productivity cannot be 
attained under the present conditions without a more considerate, 'enlightened' 
treatment of human labour - that is something that capital too must learn."
(1987, p. 162).
The main concerns of Kern and Schumann are not, however, with these rather narrow 
productivist issues, but others come close to Sabel's political and social interests. Kem and 
Schumann recognise that the logic of these developments is not necessarily towards increased 
egalitarianism, but rather could open up and reproduce more entrenched divisions between 
workers in different sectors, industries and occupations and, moreover, between workers and 
non-workers. They identify four groups who appear to them to be of particular importance 
for the 'inner dynamics' of the emerging social structure. First are those who personally bear 
the new production concepts: modern skilled production workers, maintenance specialists 
and those who could gradually move into such positions. These are the winners in 
rationalisation. In the rationalisation process their behaviour is that of associates, 
protagonists in the reorganisation o f the firm; they have a high status within the firm and can 
claim bonuses. They could even emerge from this development with increased power. 
Secondly, there are workers in traditional jobs in the central sectors who, because of personal 
characteristics - advancing age, lack of qualifications - are not apparently attractive for 
employment by the firms according to the new production concept. Their behaviour in the 
rationalisation process is most likely that of lolemiors o f nationalisation. They are, of course, 
largely protected from the worst effects by wage agreements and conditions of employment 
set out in the firm's contracts. Yet their interests are rather less securely protected with 
obvious risks of becoming redundant in the process. And thirdly, there are workers in 
branches affected by the recession. They are already losers. When they are collectively 
affected (i.e. plant closures), there exists a very high potential for action. Finally, there are 
the risk-bearers on the labour market and in particular the long-term unemployed These are 
driven still further into the ghetto o f long-term unemployment, since with the new 
production concepts the external insulation of the firms grows as does the demand for 
specific qualifications. They are effectively marginalised. The end of the division of labour 
at the core of the major areas of industrial production thus coincides with a tendency
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towards intensification of insulation against the outside. Since the immediate post-war years, 
the inequalities within the labour force have never been as great as at present. Never have 
the risks and opportunities connected with industrial work been as differentially distributed 
among workers as they are now While there are differences, then, between Piore and Sabel 
and Kern and Schumann, particularly in the greater emphasis that Kern and Schumann put on 
the distinctiveness of the 're-professionalised worker' over against the artisanal and craft 
worker, there are many common points of convergence between their points of view.
Kent and Sabel: flexible production concepts
This comes into focus in Kern and Sabel's jointly written article referred to above which will 
now be discussed. In this article the focus is on the specificity of the German system of 
emergent FS. Outlining the uniqueness of the German system of industrial organisation and, 
moreover, industrial relations, Kern and Sabel comment on the power, influence and 
authority of the trade union movement and worker representation in the co-determination or 
Nitbestimmung system, which has important consequences for the form, and modalities of 
implementation, of the new production concepts. They observe that the framework for trade 
union action is being redefined by these changes and restructurings. The growing 
diversification of product markets means the trend towards vertical disintegration and the 
increasing concern with product and process innovations to keep competitive advantages and 
to stay ahead in the competitive race. This leads to fundamental changes in the strategies 
and organisational structures of companies, manifested in increased sub-contracting and 
just-in-time delivery systems to mention the most important. Furthermore, there is the 
accompanying trend towards the growth of industrial districts and regional economies. In 
this complex context of economic and organisational confusion Kem and Sabel argue that:
"In the Federal Republic, the current reorganisation of industry creates new 
possibilities for the extension of trade-union authority simply because German 
codetermination laws allow labour to block or delay many of the changes 
management wants. Whether it is a question of more flexible use of labour,
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including corresponding changes in the regulation of the legal work-week and 
overtime; lengthening the permissible periods of production, including 
relaxation of restrictions on shift and weekend work; greater freedom to 
rejuvenate the work force, including increased use of early pensions to remove 
older workers and more aggressive hiring of younger persons with up-to-date 
technical skills; extensive retraining and continuing education programmes - the 
factory council's approval is required for the execution of any of these 
measures."
(1991, p.383).
However, the logic of industrial reorganisation of work and employment which goes under 
the name of the new production concepts or flexible specialization is to undermine these Je 
facto and de jure powers that the workers have at their disposal. Kern and Sabel argue that 
at least three problems stand out and "unless the unions discover a way to use their 
bargaining power to address them in a concerted way, they may cumulatively transform the 
Je facto rules of collective bargaining in Germany". The first problem is that with the new 
production concepts there is a increased demand for more technically skilled employees 
whom the unions find difficulty in organising. For example, there has been an increase in 
the recruitment o f university trained engineering graduates which have no real allegiance to 
the trade union movement. Second, there has been a weakening of the allegiance to the trade 
union movement of the traditional evening class engineers who now spend more time in 
education Following from these transformations are the recruitment problems that the trade 
unions face due to the change in the "typology and geographic distribution of production 
units". Put in simple terms, with the decline of centralised and concentrated production sites 
and their molecular dissolution through vertical disintegration into a plurality of 
micro-organisations, the unions find it difficult to forge a unitary collective identity. Third, 
the trade union or, more importantly, the factory council often responds to these 
developments in a defensive manner. However, this strategy at the most produces only 
'pyrrhic victories' which do nothing to manage change in the interests of the employees.
In this context Kern and Sabel argue that what needs to be thought about and strengthened is 
the reorientation of trade-union policy. As I have argued Piore and Sabel had already been
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moving their research interests in this direction but with inconclusive results. Other 
researchers and writers have been attempting to find solutions, answers and alternative 
strategies as well, most notably, Alain Touraine in The Workers' Movement (1988) and 
Andre Gorz in his various writings, but particularly The Critique of Economic Reason 
(1989). Kern and Sabel rarely refer to cognate discussions but, nevertheless, their argument 
finds points of comparison and difference with these researchers findings and argument.
Their first observation is that as the situation in the United States has shown it is futile to 
believe that conflicts provoked by industrial reorganisation will inevitably bring recruits into 
the labour movement. Their starting point is, rather:
"... the effect of industrial reorganisation on the very constitution of the labour 
market An understanding of the complex, apparently contradictory 
consequences of corporate decentralization and regional agglomeration is, we 
believe, indispensable to the formulation of any trade-union strategy whose aim 
is to turn the new competitive conditions to labour advantage We begin by 
sketching responses which address the needs of highly skilled workers - the 
traditional core of the unions' constituency in the Federal Republic, and the 
reservoir from which most of its leaders at all levels have been drawn. Then 
we will try to show that the same strategy which appeals to them can be further 
developed to meet the concerns of the un- and semi- skilled."
(1988, p 387)
Kern and Sabel argue that in the more open labour market situation trade unions need to 
extend their bargaining areas towards the organisation of leisure, job counselling, placement, 
training and education. To do this, they argue, the trade unions need not only to adapt their 
current strategies, but also to create new organisational structures:
"Here the unions might take a page from the corporations' book on the 
decentralization of responsibility and the opening of institutional borders. In 
order to provide the new labour market services and influence the strategies of 
both firms and public authorities, they must move beyond their jurisdictional 
limits to create local, grass-roots alliances among themselves and with many 
actors they have ignored or battled in the past: municipalities, no-profit groups, 
social movements, political parties, churches, and educational institutions. The 
result would be 'networking of trade union capacities'. To do this they will
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need the authorization of national unions whose authority will also be necessary to 
institutionalize successful regional experiments "
(1988, p 394)
The model here is the current transformation of corporate organisational structure itself along the 
lines of the networking structure or decentralisation Just as these new corporate structures and 
networks blur the distinction between the inside and the outside and in the process produce an 
open labour market, so trade unions should follow suit
"Corporations are experimenting with new governance structures while 
decentralizing substantial, potentially self-reinforcing autonomy to operating units 
At the same time, these new governance structures create open labour markets 
that blur the distinction between paid work and social life By organizing the open 
labour market and shaping regional economies, the unions can influence the new 
governance structure - not least by encouraging those aspects of decentralization 
which augment their own capacity to gain further influence On this view, they 
ought not to aim to exemplify labour collective power by changing the extent 
and goals of local action Thus understood, localization of union strategy goes 
hand in hand with its universalisation, and is a precondition for that 'broadening of 
the trade union mandate' so often mentioned in the German labour movement's 
current strategic discussions "
(1988, p 395).
Kern and Sabel also posit that the labour movement must take up and articulate the demands of 
the un-skilled, semi-skilled and unemployed by creating a thick institutional exoskeleton which 
protects all workers The conclusion of their article is that the new divisions of labour that are 
emerging must be accompanied by a revitalised labour movement That is to say, the new 
production concept, flexibly specialised regionalized economy must be based on a new solidarism 
forged by the labour movement in cooperation with private capital and the central and local state 
(within the context of the wider structures of the European Economic Community):
"Just as important, only the national labour movement can, through its legislative 
influence, help create a system of incentives which encourages the formation and 
expansion of flexible, high-skill, and hence robust regional
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economies. So too is national legislation required to shape the development of 
the local welfare systems which these regional economies require."
(1988, p 399).
Thus Kern and Sabel argue for a form of FS regional economies which refuse the neo-liberal 
agenda of wild capitalism unhindered by social and political controls
Flexible specialization as a nioebius strip
The second important article which adds concreteness and empirical detail to these reflections 
is Charles Sabel's "Moebius Strip Organizations and Open Labour Markets: Some 
Consequences of the Reintegration of Conception and Execution in a Volatile Economy" 
(1991) This article does not depart from Sabel's prior formulations, although new evidence 
and new concepts are introduced to give form to his argument. The term 'moebius strip' 
organisations is a new term which is a useful metaphor for some of the organisational 
transformations which have been identified by organisation theorists (see Clegg, 1987,
Cooke, P ). For example, Cooke (1987) has argued that:
"The model of organization of the Fordist corporation, hierarchized, 
bureaucratized, divisional, task-divisional, task specified, spatially decomposed 
has come under attack in the contemporary management literature. What is 
being rejected is the 'mechanical picture' of the organization, as Michael Piore 
and Charles Sabel term it, in favour of something called an 'anti-organization'. 
The similarity between this conceptual overturning and that of Richard Rorty 
concerning the 'mirror of nature' approach to philosophy is striking. This is 
because the anti- organization is also a ferment of critical discourse in which 
the rules that have governed past corporate practices are there to be challenged, 
contradicted and placed in doubt "
(1987, p. 144).
The concept of the Moebius Strip, of course, is another term that finds resonance in 
post-structuralist philosophy and is the figure that Sabel refers to, but without much 
discussion of its function in what must be the most abstruse theoretical discourse - Lacan's.
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Mentioning Lacan's use of the moebius strip idea is not to suggest there is any connection 
between Sabel's use and Lacan's. However, there is a parallel in so far as both formulations 
suggest that stable forms of identity .boundaries and boundary maintenance are being re­
negotiated in the 'postmodern' period. And perhaps this is a better metaphor than Cooke's 
even more unlikely homology between Rorty's anti- foundational pragmatism and the 
'anti-organization' (Clegg, 1987, Harvey, 1988).
However, the manner in which these discourses are appropriated by sociological discussion 
leads very often not to enlightenment, but rather to pretentious obfuscation and, as Poulantzas 
remarked with relation to the 'New Philosophers', to the use of a fashionable language of 
'analogy and metaphor'.
Sabel's article with its arresting title is in the grand style of combining bold theoretical 
conjectures and empirical reference with speculative reflections on the 'possible world's' of 
fin-de-siecle and fin-de-millennium capitalism. Although Sabel nowhere in any of his 
writings refers to poststructuralist or postmodernist theory, in this article one gets the strong 
impression that Sabel has been influenced by some of the tropes and motifs of those theories, 
at least in an implicit way.
Thus it seems to be the case that the influence of theorists like Foucault, Derrida and 
Rorty1121 throughout the humanities and social sciences in the United States appears to have 
affected Sabel's manner of thinking and formulating questions of social theory and social 
transformation. For example, we find at the beginning of his article a statement which could 
have been written by the 'deconstructionist' pen of a Derrida:
"Corporations, buffeted by markets that have become more volatile in part 
because technology is proving so malleable, are desperately trying to reduce 
their risks by transforming dedicated or special-purpose resources into 
general-purpose ones - whenever, that is, they cannot simply transform fixed 
into variable costs. In the process they are inventing organizational forms 
whose complexity and mutability often threaten to overwhelm those who design 
and execute them as well as the sociologists and economists who struggle to
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understand their own constitutional principles. Work now refers to such 
disparate and rapidly changing experiences that it is at least as reasonable to 
treat the word as a popular shorthand for survival as to regard it as a category 
of activity that gives similar contours to our different understandings of life."
(1991, p.24).
Sabel identifies two responses to this situation. The first is in response to the 'breakdown of 
the linguistic whole' and is to articulate separate languages to understand some of the pieces 
These examinations of the plural and diverse trajectories of 'patterns of work, and forms of 
corporate governance' often
"produce a vertiginous experience of diversity as the constitutive fact of social 
life Caricatured, the view is that societies consist of contradictory institutions 
whose historically specific heterogeneity is a precondition for survival in a 
changing environment. Context and contingency - national, local, or corporate - 
suddenly explain most things in a world with no grand rhythm or reason "
(1991, p.24).
Sabel identifies the work of Storper (1989) as exemplifying this position. He has some 
sympathy with it but as I shall show does not wish to follow all the way. The second 
response is to "search for new generalities amidst the apparent ruins of the old". The task is 
to formulate the general laws and tendencies which are replacing the old world, a "response 
[which can] end in the intoxicating vision of a world not gone to pieces but, rather, stood on 
its head. In this view, universal materialising machines replace product-specific capital 
goods; small and effortlessly recombinable units of production replace the hierarchies of the 
mass-production corporation; and the exercise of autonomy required by both the machines 
and the new organisations produces a new model producer whose view of life confounds the 
distinction between the entrepreneurial manager and the socialist worker-owner. Contingency 
and context determine only whether and in what precise way particular nations, regions, or 
firms manage the necessary handstands" (1991, p.24). Interestingly, Sabel cites himself and 
Piore as being the victims of this fantasy as mediated through the interpretations of others 
who are not named: "Although many people hold some part of the views caricatured in the 
text, no one - ourselves included - comes close to holding them all".
1 4 9
a uifiologv of postmodemitv?
Sabel rejects both alternatives and hopes to develop an analysis which does justice to the 
rational kernel of both points of view "The aim of this chapter is to adumbrate a sociology 
of work or production that does justice to the prudent version of these caricatures: to 
account, that is, for the diversity and similarity of efforts to adjust to the new competitive 
environment" (1991, pp 24-25). Thus Sabel rejects what might be called the extreme 
postmodern capsisal into the vortex of disintegration and dissolution on the one hand, and on 
the other, the rationalist exagger-statement. Perhaps like Zygmunt Bauman (1989) he is 
arguing for a sociology of postmodemity, rather than a postmodern sociology. As Bauman 
explains:
"1 suggest that a sociology bent on the continuation of modem concerns under 
postmodern conditions would be distinguished not by new procedures and 
purposes of sociological work, as other postmodern strategies suggest, but by a 
new object of investigation."
(1989, p.lll).
Against this background, then, Sabel argues that his position advances two principal 
arguments. These arguments introduce some new twists to his well established ideas First, 
that the strategy of responding to turbulent markets by deploying general-purpose machines, 
must be "hedged and complemented by the deployment of less flexible" (1991, p.25). In 
concrete terms this means the emergence and development of forms of organisation and 
production that tend to dissolve or blur the hierarchical distinctions within firms and 
enterprises, the boundaries between them, and the boundaries between firms in particular 
industrial districts and regions, and, moreover the boundaries between the public and the 
private. As Sabel argues:
"1 will call such production structures meta-corporations or Moebius strip 
organizations: meta-corporations because they are designed to be easily 
redesigned and Moebius-strip organizations because, as with a looped ribbon
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twisted once, it is impossible to distinguish their inside from their outsides. 
Another consequence is a constant re- ordering of versatile and rigid 
technologies that reflects among other things, guesses about the longevity of 
the parts of a product in relation to the whole as well as uncertainty about
those guesses."
(1991, p 25).
What is of importance here is the acknowledgement that flexibility is not an absolute 
principal and that it depends on certain 'rigidities' as well, in an articulated ensemble In 
Adornoian language the flexible and the rigid form a 'constellation' of forms, relations, 
institutions and practices which are in a shifting and mobile relationship with each other. 
This converges with Dore's description of the Japanese system of socio-economic 
organisation as characterised by 'flexible- rigidities' or what Kenney and Florida (1993) call 
'structured- flexibility'.1'31
Postmodern labour market?
Nevertheless, Sabel does not mean the kind of labour market (or, internal labour-market) 
rigidity found in the Japanese model of so-called 'life-term employment' for core employees, 
for the second part of his argument is that the changes charted above will and are leading to 
heightened demand for skilled labour while undermining the fixity of any particular job:
"Workers under these circumstance must acquire skills, including the ability to 
cooperate in particular settings in order to be employable, yet cannot rely on 
long-term relations with any single employer. To learn what they need to learn 
in order to move from job to job in an economy in which boundaries between 
firms and between firms and society are blurring, they must join various 
networks that cross company lines and reach from the economy into social and 
family life. I will call this situation an open labour market. ... Because of 
Groucho Marx's notorious fascination with ambivalent attractions, I will refer to 
the employees' experiences of open labour markets as the creation of Groucho 
Marx identities."
(1991, p 25).
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In this passage Sabel moves away from the romanticism of artisanal/craft-worker identities 
which mars his earlier work, with its evocation of the crafts-man doing nothing other than 
his metier which we find in nineteenth century social thinkers such as Frederic Le Play and 
Denis Poulot' Le Sublime, ou le traivailleur comme il est 1870, et ce qu'il peut etre (1870) 
(see Touraine, 1988). The move away from the romantic model towards a position closer to 
Kern and Schumann has, as I have shown, already been announced in the article Sabel 
authored with Kern. In its place we have a skilled or 'polyvalent' worker who has no 
relationship with the individualistic and autonomous (but solidaristic with his trade and 
comrades) craftsmen of the nineteenth century with his tool-kit in his hand. Nor that of his 
sublime attitude of defiance against the employer which Poulet evokes in his unconsciously 
amusing way in his classic work.
Sabel makes his argument more precise by examining in greater detail the character of the 
new meta-corporation He rehearses again his argument about how mass 
production/consumption-markets are breaking up, without unfortunately giving any real 
substantiation that this is indeed taking place. Nevertheless this market-based argument is at 
the core of his theory and forms the causal mechanism which leads to the administrative 
decentralisation of the corporation. For example, the drive to reduce development costs will 
lead to the blurring of the boundaries between, and the hierarchical distinctions within, firms. 
The first step is the administrative decentralisation of the corporation. Responsibility for 
design, manufacture, and sale of a narrowly defined range of products
"... is assigned to quasi-independent operating units. The corporation often 
becomes, in effect, a holding company that makes strategic decisions, raises 
capital, allocates it among the operating units, and periodically monitors general 
performance. By rotating promising managers through different kinds of jobs 
in different operating units, headquarters also forms a corporate elite that 
understands the needs of the concern as a whole. The corporate planning, 
accounting, research, and technical staffs are cut to the bone, if not disbanded 
or reorganized as wholly owned subsidiaries that must sell their services to 
other operating units or outside firms. Thus, the corporation becomes more a 
federation of companies than a single organizational entity."
(1991, p.28).
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These themes which Sabel recounts are now the staple of management literature and whether 
we call it corporate 'downsizing', 're-engineering' or 'managing chaos' the upshot is the same.
Thus Sabel puts more stress on the need for a strong 'exoskeleton' or infrastructural support 
for firms based on the region:
"A final consequence of the reintegration of conception and execution, one that 
further blurs the boundary between firms and between the economy and 
society, is the formation of regional economies: clusters of firms with different 
specialities working in various combinations to serve common markets. First, 
the more volatile markets become, the riskier it becomes to hold inventory - 
hence, the need for just-in-time logistics, which require that suppliers put 
production units, warehouse facilities, or transportation hubs close to their 
major customer's plants. Second, the more volatile the markets and technology, 
the more likely it is that timely knowledge is embodied in everyday experience 
- the more likely it is, in other words, that knowledge becomes local 
knowledge. Living together in the sense of learning to speak a common 
technical or commercial language becomes the precondition for working 
together. Once firms value such conviviality, they may be present where this 
expertise is grounded. Call this the localization effect of firms - or of members 
of a community of producers - on each other. Third, the more specialized a 
firm becomes the more it depends on the collective provision of training, 
research, hazardous-waste disposal, supplemental unemployment of medical 
protection, environmental monitoring, market information, or warehousing that 
it cannot provide itself."
(1991, pp.29-30).
Postmodern industrial relations?
The third difference is that Sabel is aware of the continuing importance of conflict, mistrust 
and trust in social relationships in the meta-corporation. This is not meant in the Marxist 
sense of class conflict to be sure, but he disavows the idea of 'normative consensus' (or 
unitary industrial relations paradigm) or the assumption of a conflict-free organisation of 
social relations. Indeed, Sabel's concept of conflict is more akin to Durkheim than Marx in
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its emphasis on building institutions of conflict resolution and bargaining Moreover, there 
are some similarities between his concept of 'trust', which is theoretically explicated in his 
recent paper 'Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy" 
(1993) and social theorists such as Luhmann and Giddens. For example, Giddens (1988) in 
his various reflections on high modernity has put 'trust' at the centre of his understanding of 
the uniqueness o f modernity. Giddens has a much more rigorous formulation of the concept of 
trust' than Sabel and recognises that it is too simplistic to counterpose 'trust' to 'mistrust' in 
the manner Sabel does Nevertheless, when Giddens discusses 'trust' with relation to what he 
calls 'abstract systems' (systems of knowledge, expertise and professionalism, management) 
his formulation could be better made with more discussion of conflict and negotiation within 
these systems than he in fact does.
Sahel's recognition of the conflict between groups of workers, between groups of workers 
and groups of managers, the conflict between groups within management and between 
enterprises and other organisations is a healthy dose of realism. Sabel further recognises that 
the key problem in securing a high-trust system would be to institutionalise mechanisms for 
conflict resolution and arbitration, especially at the local and regional levels. In the 'Third 
Italy', for example, he argues that the vitality of the districts depends on arbitration boards 
and joint councils which can resolve dispute between all the parties concerned. These 
formulations are given a more concrete form in the conclusion to his paper where Sabel 
outlines a further set of vital distinctions regarding trust, power and conflict. First, within 
the restructured economy itself based on the meta-corporation and, second, between the 
meta-corporation and those it excludes. Sabel argues that in the traditional sociology of 
work there was a clear connection between these two kinds of power and conflict.
Sabel argues that there are two possible outcomes or responses. The first is an exclusionary 
one where
"the ins stay in and the outs stay out, maintained by welfare systems and casual
employment that guarantee their physical survival while sapping their capacity
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to change their situation. In the meta-corporations, small groups of workers 
use their market power to extract privileges at the expense of the excluded or 
their co-workers, further decreasing the chance of any redistribution of rights in 
favor of the outsiders. The suggestion is that if there is any justice ... the 
social tensions these divisions produce will eventually lead to chaos or to the 
effort to construct a more inclusive alternative."
(1991, pp.44-45).
Here Sabel evokes the scenario put forward by such thinkers as Andre Gorz (see also 
Castells, 1988, Kern and Schumann, 1987) in his various works such as Farewell to the 
Working Class (1987), Pathways to Paradise (1983) and The Critique of Economic Reason 
(1989). In Gorz's vision there emerges a social structure of the included and the excluded, 
driven by the expansion of an economy which, through automation, robotisation and new 
technologies, displaces ever more people. At the best they are turned into a new servant 
class who minister to the 'needs' of the people in the inside of the system. In effect it 
involves what Gorz calls a new form of apartheid or Brazilian type of society'14'. Within the 
post-Fordist school(s) we also get a similar theory of the development of a type of social 
structure of extreme inequalities. For example, Mike Davis's research and writing on Los 
Angeles as 'the bad side of postmodemity' (1992), and Soja's research on Los Angeles 
"Capital of the 20th Century" (1990) outline in paradigmatic terms the evolution of these 
developments. Soja writes that Los Angeles regional job machine has churned most actively 
at two levels Employment and production in high technology industries have expanded to 
make Greater Los Angeles perhaps the world's largest 'technopolis' with more engineers, 
scientists, mathematicians, technical specialists - and more high security cleared workers - 
than any other urban region. Meanwhile an even greater expansion in low- paying service 
and manufacturing jobs (with a booming garment industry leading the way) and an explosion 
in part-time and 'contingent' work (flexibly organised to meet changing labour demands) has 
ballooned the bottom of the labour market to absorb most of the nearly two million new 
job-seekers (mainly immigrants and women) entering the market over the past twenty years).
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Similar conclusions have been reached by Manuel Castells (1992) in his discussion of the 
rise of the 'dual city' in Los Angeles, New York and London. Saskia-Sassen (1991) has 
reinforced these conclusions in her work on 'world cities'. David Harvey in his key book on 
The Condition of Postmodemitv (1989) also reaches the conclusion in his discussion of 
flexible accumulation', that the transformation in labour market structure has been paralleled 
by equally important shifts in industrial organisation:
"Organized sub-contracting, for example, opens up opportunities for small 
business formation, and in some instances permits older systems of domestic, 
artisanal, familial (patriarchal), and paternalistic labour systems to revive and 
flourish as centrepieces rather than appendages of the production system. The 
revival of the 'sweatshop* forms of production in cities such as New York and 
Los Angeles, Paris and London ... has proliferated rather than shrunk during the 
1980s The growth of 'black', 'informal', or 'underground' economies has also 
been documented throughout the advanced capitalist world."
(1989, p.152).
A culture of contentment and anxiety
The arguments resorted to above are supported by numerous other studies which come to 
similar conclusions (see, for example, Storper, 1992, Scott, 1990, Pahl, 1986). Other writers 
such as Zygmunt Bauman argue in similar terms about postmodern economic and social 
conditions. Much in the manner of Gramsci's discussion of Naples, Bauman (1989) draws his 
example from literature in this case, Rabelais:
"There is, in other words, a possibility that the phenomenon of postmodernity 
can be only sociologically interpreted as a Thelemic phenomenon (in Francois 
Rabelais' Gargantua, the imaginary Abbey of Theleme offers its inmates all the 
amenities of the 'good life' - strikingly similar to those offered today by the 
postmodern culture, this is achieved by locking out the impoverished providers 
of the insiders' luxury, outside thick and tall monastery walls. The inside and 
the outside determine and condition each other's existence)."
(1989, p.59)
However, as interpreted by Gorz, Piore and Sahel's (and Kern and Schumann) argument 
about the polarization and emargination (or the collapsing-middle) of the social structure 
depends too much on, to quote Gorz:
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"the Marxist utopia of work ... They believe in the possibility of workers 
becoming 'masters over machines' and achieving autonomy through their work; 
and in the possibility of restructuring tasks to such a degree that the division of 
labour (and not just its fragmentation) can be overcome. In their view, workers 
should be able to identify with their work and derive from that identification an 
awareness of their strength and their role as liberators ... It would then be 
possible ... to see this new elite as a new chivalric order, a hypothesis (or 
thesis) outlined by Oskar Negt. Just like an order of knights, in fact, this new 
elite would hold the instruments of power - the entire economy, or better still, 
the whole of collective life - in its hands. Everything would function through 
this elite."
(1989, p.74).
Here we have the very postmodern dystopian view of a new feudalism that can be found in 
writers as diverse as Umberto Eco through to William Gibson, and in other texts of popular 
culture such as sci-fi films such as Blade Runner. Mad Max.
Although, as argued above, Sabel has tempered his romantic picture of the craft-worker 
(artisan) in his later work with a more up-dated version of the polyvalent skilled worker or 
employee, Gorz and Negt's criticisms still carry some weight, especially in the context of 
Sabel's second alternative to the polarisation scenario just outlined. He writes:
"This second, inclusive outcome corresponds to the classic idea of the 
socialization of the means of production. In this alternative, the struggles for 
power in both senses were linked in a way that weakens the grip of the owners 
of capital on the meta-corporation while widening the circle of the flexible 
economy to include more and more of the unskilled."
(1991, p.45).
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Sabel believes that everyone can become part of the new chivalric order The mechanism to 
achieve this had already been sketched out in his article with Kern, namely, a reinvigorated and 
restructured strategic trade unionism:
"The key to this solution is the formation o f a new kind of labour movement, born 
of existing trade unions or other organizational experiences Instead of directly 
regulating conditions of work in firms or industries, this labour movement would 
help employees acquire the skills and knowledge of the labour market they need to 
move from job to job, while also enabling them to manage the changing 
relationship between work and the rest of life By providing these services, this 
movement would become as indispensable to the meta-corporation as other 
systems suppliers, while encouraging older firms - daunted by skill shortages - to 
reorganize as meta-corporations To succeed nationally, the new labour 
movement would seek allies by pressing for legislation facilitating the 
redistribution of resources from prosperous regions to those that needed to 
restructure Here is a new bloodless version of the revolutionary victory of reason 
and solidarity."
(1991, p 45)
It should be noted that the new trade union movement is visualised in very different terms from 
the old trade unions It bears some likeness to the idea mooted by some radical writers and 
activists that the trade union movement should move towards an 'extended' form of collective 
bargaining as in the Nordic countries and, in particular, Sweden There are also similarities to the 
policies of the so-called French 'Second Left' of the 1980s, particularly around the Confederation 
française du travail (C F D T ), which had an influence on the policies of the French Socialist 
Minister of Labour, Jean Auroux who argued in 1982 the following: "The low rate of trade-union 
membership cannot simply be explained by anti-union repression, even where that exists The 
same stale empty rhetoric with its manichean ideology, the absence of a more inclusive viewpoint, 
the refusal to allow trade-union participation in national politics thus preventing the exercise of 
solidarity are all contributory elements in the disaffection of wage-earners who are much better 
informed that is often thought" (cited in Touraine, p xi, 1988).
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Npw social movements
The above argument bears some similarity with Alain Touraine's observations in his book, 
The Workers' Movement (1988), where he argues that the labour movement is in decline and 
must be reinvigorated by other (new) social movements which can invent and provide new 
and original forms of organisation, strategies and policies:
"The workers' movement was the first modem social movement. In all 
probability others will follow, but they will not reproduce either the same 
issues or the same mode of organization. On the contrary, by shifting away 
from the workplace into the broad cultural domain, they will be able to fight 
against a kind of domination which extends far beyond production to the whole 
of life in society, including consumption, information and education. Perhaps 
they will create new, non-subordinate relations with intellectuals and political 
parties: the workers movement undoubtedly had its own limitation on this and 
other points. But it still remains the most imposing so far of all the figures in 
the huge family of social movements. And the best way to honour its function 
as heart and soul of the workers' struggle by which industrial society was built 
is to look towards the future. The workers' movement can provide the nascent 
social campaigns with the image of a social movement, and in so doing can 
help them develop and discover their own identities."
(1988, pp.293-4).
The theme of the decline of the workers' movement is now a sociological commonplace, 
which Touraine is careful to dissociate himself with in its crude form, but the idea that new 
social movements are bearers of new ideas, values, principles of organisation and issues finds 
its way, implicitly, into Sabel's arguments. Other researchers such as Offe (1988) and 
Melluci (1989) highlight the growth of less hierarchical organisations based on networks and 
networking which establish links between people on the basis of a lateral and horizontal 
rather than vertical set of principles - whether it be neighbourhood groups, feminist, lesbian, 
gay groups, ecological, anti-racist and civil rights groups - all are said to practise a very 
different form of "cognitive praxis" (Eyerman, 1991) than the old social movements, and it is 
from these that the trade union movement must leam if it is to survive into the twenty-first 
century.
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However, there do seem to be some significant differences between the respective proposals 
of the social movement theorists on the one hand, and Sabel on the other, which deserve to 
be investigated. Despite their differences all the social movement theorists would hold to the 
idea, originally expressed by Touraine, that in the postindustrial or programmed society 
conflicts continue to exist:
"Industrial conflict has not, however, disappeared. The new social categories 
still fall under the domination of work organization and inhuman work norms.
New regions are becoming industrialized; women and immigrant workers are 
being subject to new assembly-lines; office workers' jobs are becoming more 
mechanical; and the working conditions of many workers re deteriorating, 
particularly due to the rapid incursions of shift work: proletarianization is 
forging ahead. Industrial class relations do not disappear with the emergence 
of the class relations of programmed society."
(1988, p. 11).
The main change, for Touraine, lies in the fact that these have become institutionalised and 
that forms of domination and resistance have shifted to a higher level. In short, the conflict 
envisaged by Touraine is still a struggle between opposing adversaries involving a principle 
of'identity', 'opposition' and 'totality' (see Touraine, 1988, 1989). This is qualitatively 
different from Sabel's definition of conflict which involves bi-lateral exchanges and disputes, 
but no struggle over the dominant 'cultural model' of historicity. By comparison with the 
radical theorists of the new social movements, it seems that Sabel's vision of the trade union 
is fundamentally incorporatist or corporativist in the sense that he envisages the union as 
accepting the dominant relationships of production. In fact, Sabel seems to be saying that 
the chief role of the union would be to act as a sort of labour exchange, advising workers on 
job-slots and on retraining, rather than other more fundamental forms of contestation, let 
alone wage-bargaining. It is interesting that this 'pluralist' or even 'unitarist' argument has 
been taken up by some of the 'New Times' writers in Britain. For example, Martin Jacques 
has argued that:
"Anyone familiar with management theory will know that the state of the art 
company less and less resembles a pyramid. Hierarchies are getting flatter, the
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space above the base contracting. The old pyramid is looking more like a 
deflating balloon. The company career promises, consequently, to become an 
increasingly rare phenomenon: there won't be enough vertical lines."
(1993, p.23).
As with much of the 'New Times' writing it is easy to criticise for its generalities. Moreover, 
where trade unions or workers are in such a picture is not explained. Perhaps they have 
been all made unemployed because of the 'third wave' of automation and new technologies! 
Sabel is slippery enough to avoid this conclusion, but it is still uncertain what he means 
when he concludes his article by hypothesising a number of 'possible worlds':
"The world of the inclusive meta-corporation might be a world of cabals and 
cliques in which the struggle for an honourable place within the community of 
production constantly threatens the forms of corporation on which productive 
flexibility depends. Or to avoid this danger, it might be a world in which 
workplace autonomy was combined with, even dependent on, forms of social 
conformity persons of my generation once associated with post-war U.S. 
suburbs and those in the United States now associate with Japan. What would 
be the role of women in either of these societies? Of men? Or the meaning of 
citizenship?"
(1992, p.46).
On the one hand it could be the 'really existing' meta-corporation of Silicon Valley as in 
Florida and Kenney's (1992) picture of rampant market competition, mistrust and conflict.
Or on the other hand, their picture of the 'structured flexibility' of Japan and the fear of 
Japanisation'. Sabel would hope for a different outcome, but as these last remarks suggest it 
is nowhere to be found in the present. What seems to be happening, to transcode Sabel, is 
the transition to, and emergence of, the possibilities for a society based on moebius surface 
forms and Groucho Marx identities. It is emergent in Raymond Williams sense of the term 
in that it is beginning to displace the dominant (mass-production) forms of production and 
society That this lies in the future and depends on political will is made more obvious in 
Sabel's concluding remark where he criticises pluralist readings of his work:
1 6 1
"Notice, however, that this inclusive world does not correspond to the idea of a 
pluralist society, at least in its U S. variant. Pluralists believe the identity of 
each individual is the composite of the vector of his or her attachments to 
groups of different kinds. But the identities of these groups are fixed by 
ethnicity, religion, or place in the division of labour. In the metacorporate 
world I am describing, individuals form and reform identities by reference to 
groups whose identities are constantly in flux. Individuals are thus not the 
'natural' result of the accidental combination of 'natural' collective 
self-understandings. Surely, a second pressing task for a new sociology of 
work is, therefore, to better characterize the substance of solidarity within the 
meta- corporation."
(1992, p.46).
The critique of U S. pluralist self-understanding does not extend to what Sabel calls the 
British variant where, as he writes with relation to Paul Hirst's recent work in political 
philosophy, there is a reciprocal constitution of individuals and groups within a form of what 
Hirst, following Cole and Laski, calls an 'associational socialism'. Sabel's comments also find 
resonance with Unger's political theory of self-invention, but a self-invention within 
quasi-communitarian forms. Moreover, the appeal to the blurring of boundaries and identities, 
as we have already seen, moves in the direction of a post-structuralist understanding of the 
social and of the politics of 'subjectivity', 'identity' and 'solidarity'. Not, however, in the 
facile sense of theorising a complete unfixity of meaning, or dissolution of the subject into 
the lability of language, or, as Anderson (1985) claims, an 'absolutisation of language', 
'attenuation of truth' and 'randomisation of history'. In line with defenders of certain forms of 
post- structuralist discourses (see Laclau, 1985, 1992) Sabel recognises that:
"A world in which boundaries within and among firms and between the public 
and the private are blurring is not a world without boundaries [my emphasis]. 
New boundaries, indeed new kinds of boundaries, are being drawn as the old 
fade. To detect them, we need not only a new language of analysis but new 
concepts of equality and fairness. And by the oldest paradox in the book, once 
we have such a language and such concepts, we will begin to change the very 
boundaries we discuss."
(1992, p.46).
1 6 2
Tonclusion
The next chapter will discuss the political implications of Piore and Sahel's theory of FS. As 
has been argued, there has been a continuing development of the themes which have been 
the focus of the FS hypothesis. First, as Sayer and Walker (1992) write it is true that the 
debate has moved on from Piore and Sabel's The Second Industrial Divide (1984). But this 
should not be interpreted to mean, as they seem to, that there is no need to read, interpret 
and criticise it any more as in an act of intellectual amnesia. Moreover, it is to recognise, 
as Sayer and Walker do not that Piore and Sabel have modified and revised their positions 
quite considerably over the years.
Second, while there are many problems with the formulations proposed by Piore and Sabel 
their analysis is, as Hirst and Zeitlin argue, more complex than the 'New Times' analysis. 
Therefore, Sayer and Walker are wrong in relation to FS at least when they write "The 
trouble with concepts like Fordism, post-Fordism, and FS is that they are overly flexible and 
insufficiently specialized" (1992, p.193). The argument that there is a dualistic and binary 
framework in Piore and Sabel's work has a certain truth to it, but only at the highest level of 
abstraction and Hirst and Zeitlin seem nearer the mark than Sayer and Walker, although Hirst 
and Zeitlin take their logic of nominalism too far in the other direction. Related to this is the 
claim of Best in his The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring (1990), 
that Piore and Sabel's argument for the diversity of industrial trajectories is belied by their 
positing of either mass production or flexible specialization as possible futures is accurate 
up to a point, but increasingly less valid for the later work of, in particular, Sabel.
Third, the criticism that Piore and Sabel are too romantic in their appeal to the historical 
figure of the craft-worker or artisan, made by many critics, most notably Christel Lane 
("Kern and Schumann also make it much clearer than do Piore and Sabel that the type of 
worker at the centre of the new production concepts is not identical to the craft worker of 
old" (1992)) cannot be sustained with reference to their later writings as they have moved 
closer to the Kem and Schumann position on this matter as I have argued above.
Fourth, the argument that they overestimate the importance of small-scale industry and 
underestimate that of 'structured flexibility' on the Japanese model has some truth, but again 
increasingly less as their argument has been refined and extended, especially with relation to 
Germany and as Sayer and Walker argue:
"The academic attention given to the Third Italy in the post-Fordist literature 
seems bizarre when one compares the number of firms which feel threatened 
by the Third Italy, or the number of books for managers on 'learning from 
Japan' with those sent to the Third Italy."
(1992, p.192).
Fifth, the strongest critics of Piore and Sabel and the FS hypothesis are more radical in their 
challenge. Included in this category are first and foremost, Andre Gorz and Jurgen 
Habermas, who challenge the produ ctiv ism  and econom ism  of the model put forward by 
Piore and Sabel. Thus the challenge to the model put forward by Piore and Sabel et al, 
which should be challenged at the empirical level of attempting to falsify their empirical 
propositions, should also be supplemented by a political analysis of their writings, as 
prescription. This, in turn, should lead to a non-reductionist sociology of knowledge which 
situates their thinking with the contemporary Z eitg e is t which is, of course, the 
disillusionment with the idea of a socialism beyond the rule and hegemony of capitalism and 
liberal democracy.
Again, it is necessary to note that the FS school is a response to the collapse of orthodox 
Marxist forms of radical thinking, which unrealistically postulated the 'end of the market' on 
the one hand and, on the other hand, a radical response to neo-liberal celebrations of the 
free-market' and 'individualism'. The FS thesis postulates a third way beyond Marxism and 
beyond individualism' (Piore) and, therefore, in this sense, the FS thesis represents a variant 
of neo-m odem isation  theory where, as Alexander argues, contemporary radical intellectuals 
have "reinflated the emancipatory narrative of the market., a new and positive social theory of 
markets has reappeared" (1995: p.86). Moreover, as Alexander also recognises this new 
narrative of n eo-m odern isa tion  has led to a shift in the intellectual theorizing about the
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political and politics. Alexander writes: "In fact, in a manner that parallels the rise of the 
market1, there has been the powerful re-emergence of theorizing about democracy" (ibid, 
p 89). It is to these features of the FS thesis which I shall now turn in Chapter Four.
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REFERENCES: CHAPTER THREE
1 Unger's concept of 'false necessity1 echoes much recent social theory. The theme of 
plasticity and contingency is widespread in the social sciences. False necessity is harder to avoid 
that is sometimes thought. Unger argues that deep structure' social theory is unavoidably 
necessitarian However, as Perry Anderson (1992) has pointed out in his critique, Unger also 
falls back into a version of false necessity' in his analysis of the contradictions of Social 
Democracy.
2 Product-cycle theory argues that there is an evolutionary, necessitarian logic to economic 
development. In its strong form it cannot explain how some economies are overtaken by others. 
Sabel rejects this theory, although it could be argued that it creeps back into his argument about 
flexible specialization.
3 Sabel writes little about human relations, neo-human relations and strategic human 
resource management. However, much of his argument makes implicit references to these ideas
4 Although consumption and consumerism has become a major object of research it has yet 
to be integrated into a more general theory of production and consumption. One of the strengths 
of Regulation theory is that it attempts to integrate a theory of production with that of 
consumption While Piore and Sabel also attempt the same they offer little evidence for their 
thesis that mass markets are breaking-up (see the critique by Williams, et al).
5. Institutionalism is a theory of economic activity which criticises neo-classical economies 
for neglecting the social and institutional features of economic activity and practice. 
Romanticism refers to a tendency for the FS theorists to idealise or paint with a rosy hue 
particular regional economies and economic models.
6 In our post-historical' and postmodern' times it is necessary to imagine a utopia which 
rejects a politics of redemption' to use Agnes Heller's expression.
7 The postmodern (1993) movement in anthropology takes self-reflexiveness to extremes 
All the researcher can do is examine his/her own social positioning and context. However, this 
leads in the case of Marcus and Fischer to uncritically accept the research findings of Sabel. 
Sabel is not postmodern in the poststructuralist reflexive manner. A point which is not 
mentioned by Marcus and Fischer (1986).
8 This quote exemplifies the romanticism of Sahel's account. The reader is invited into a 
rhetoric of romanticism where phrases such as the unity of the abstract and the concrete avoid 
actual evidence.
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9 . The term 'industrial districts' was, of course, coined by the economist and social thinker 
Alfred Marshall The new interest in spaciality and the regions is one of the external reasons 
(from the point of view of a sociology of knowledge) for the interest in these ideas and theories).
10 The argument of neo-classicism is the opposite of the new institutional economics.
1 1 The argument about the decline of trade union density in the United States obviously has 
parallels with trends in Britain and Europe The ideology of human resource management is 
clearly in its overall logic, anti-trade-union.
12 While Foucault, Derrida and Rorty cannot be collapsed into a singular category (see 
Habermas (1988) ), they do, however, share a number of common themes and motifs. They 
oppose necessitarian and deterministic arguments. They champion contingency and to use 
Unger's expression 'negative capability'.
13 These terms point to a more complex understanding of the relationship between rigidity, 
structure and flexibility.
14 The themes of dualism', social polarisation' and social marginalisation are important 
concepts for any sociology of economic life. See Goldthorpe (1992), Streeck (1993), Kern and 
Schumann (1987), Gorz (1989).
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4. POLITICAL t h e o r y  a n d  f l e x ib l e  sp e c ia l iz a t io n
The debates over FS (and cognate terms) within the social sciences are often presented in a 
dry, neutral and objective manner befitting academia and the political dimension while not 
absent is not very often theorised as such. However, as I have argued above, the FS thesis is 
fundamentally about politics, political transformation, and political institution-building As 
Sabel suggests in the concluding remarks of Work and Politics:
"The more you look at Italian developments the more you are driven to 
conclude again that, within the broad limits imposed by competition in world 
markets, economic structure is fixed by political choices.”
(1982, p.231).
He writes this in the context of his understanding of much radical thinking being 
deterministic, essentialistic, and reductionist in its theoretical understanding of politics:
"Scientific thinkers on the Left will say that each group's inevitable pursuit of 
its interest, determined by its place in the division of labour, is the real 
explanation Both [and neo-liberalism] will agree that ideas of dignity and 
honor, the political programs they inform and the conflicts to which they give 
rise were only the foam on the wave of history. If you have been persuaded by 
the book you have just read, you will not believe them."
(ibid, 232).
Thus Sabel and the FS school reiterate their principle thesis that social and economic 
organisation is about political choice and decisions, rather than the inexorable working out of 
an infrastructural logic. However, the defeat of Communism' in Eastem/Central Europe (and 
its transformation into a form of authoritarian market-capitalism in China) has, paradoxically, 
lad to the foreclosing of alternatives to capitalism. In this sense the FS school represent, as 
argued previously, a neo-modemisation approach which attempts to avoid the functionalist
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objectivism of orthodox first stage modernisation theory and deterministic Marxism. As 
Tiryakian (1991) has argued modernisation theory II or neo-modernisation theory avoids the 
errors of orthodox modernisation theory by foregrounding the importance of the actor and 
action To quote: "Neo-modemisation theory would , renovate the voluntaristic basis of action 
theory" (1991, p 172). Alexander's (1995) argument that neo-modemisation theory offers up 
the possibility of more socialised definition of the market can easily be interfaced with the 
commUnitarian politics implicit in the FS thesis. In the neo-modemisation paradigm the 
embeddedness of the market has "...transformed the image of the market into a social and 
interactional relationship that has little resemblance to the deracinated, capitalist exploiter of 
the past." (Alexander, 1995, p.88).
This point is emphasised with directly political implications in Piore's Bevond Individualism 
(1995) where he argues that the rational-choice, market-based individualism of classical 
liberalism has to be replaced by a political, social and economic theory which makes possible 
an individualism which flourishes in the context of community:
The influence of civic republicanism is most evident in the writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, but it is most prominent in the work of James Madison, Benjamin 
Franklin, indeed most of the founding fathers. In that tradition, as in Greek 
thought, the political community does not constrain the individual; it provides 
the context through which the individual realizes himself or herself as a 
person."
(Piore, 1995, p. 141).
In this context, it is important to return to the FS critique of Marxism, for despite the 
accusations of determinism and objectivism, Marx would have agreed with the civic 
republican tradition that individuals can only realize themselves in a wider community.
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Marxism and determinism
It is not quite clear how Sabel understands the term ‘the Left’ At one level, he is writing against 
not the left per se, but rather deterministic doctrines of the left (and right). Although he does not 
develop these points it is obvious that he is referring to forms of Marxist determinism and 
objectivism That is, Marxism is interpreted as a theory which interprets history as the outcome 
of strictly deterministic, scientific laws of history modelled on the natural-sciences in the 
nineteenth century meaning of the term
However, interpretations of Marx have moved on since For example, the authors who are 
usually cited as examples of Western Marxist vary, but there is agreement that George Lukács, 
Antonio Gramsci, Karl Korsch, Herbert Marcuse and the later Jean-Paul Sartre are paradigmatic 
instances It will be remembered that Lukács’ famous 1923 book History and Class 
Consciousness, criticised Bukharin’s popular Manual on the ground of its objectivism, 
determinism and technologists And that Gramsci’s first writings were directed against the 
positivist interpretations of Marx and called instead for a “Revolution Against ‘Capital” And 
even towards the end of his life and now in the Fascist prison he could write in the Ouaderni del 
Carcere a critique of Bukharin which reads very much like Lukács’ and, moreover, the whole 
interpretation of the Prison Notebooks has been to establish a non-objectivist and more 
sophisticated form of Marxism which believes, like Sabel, that politics is everything, all the way 
down as Rorty would say Later Marcuse (and the Frankfurt School, particularly Walter 
Benjamin in his “Theses of the Philosophy of History”) and Sartre would take up these themes in 
various ways and insist on the importance of human praxis, willing, imagining and poiesis 
Interpretations of Marx which found their textual support not in the 1859 Preface but, rather, in 
the early works such as the famous 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
Despite their differences, these writers had taken on board the fact that the old mechanical and 
objectivist Marxism of Kautsky and Bukharin is not defensible All agreed, essentially, that 
everything is politics Writers left out by Anderson (1976) from the canon of Western
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Marxism include paradoxically, some of the most important such as the Socialisme ou Barbarie 
group, the Arguments group and the Italian operaista * tendency Again all politico-theoretical 
tendencies which interpreted Marx in a deeply political sense Thus, despite their differences, all 
would agree that the 1859 Preface is too crude and needs supplementing with a more 
sophisticated reading
The Arguments philosopher, Kostas Axelos, wrote something most of the Western Marxists 
would probably have agreed with:
“The principal fault of all historico-dialectic materialism is that the object, reality, the materials 
are taken only under the form of produced objects, material realities, materials for work, they 
are thus effectively grasped, but they lack a ground and a horizon This is why the other side 
was developed, in a metaphysical way - in opposition to naive or sophisticated realism - by 
idealist philosophy which, naturally, neither knew nor recognised the world we call real: the 
totality of forms, forces, and weaknesses of the constituted, concretized and fixed world - the 
mode of being of the constituting and open World, the other side of the same and unique 
World Marx wanted sensible objects to be superior to ideal objects, but he did not grasp 
human activity itself as problematic activity Thus he considered - in the Contribution to a 
Critique of Political Economy as much as in the Poverty of Philosophy - material life as the 
only truly human one, while thought and poetry were grasped only in their conditional and 
ideological forms.”
(Cited in Poster, 1976, p 225).
No doubt Sabel would be concerned that this criticism, despite its now somewhat arcane 
language, is close to his own Countless other works of interpretation would back up this 
interpretation of Marxism as a critique of productivist political economy, rather than a search for
laws of history.2
However much one can argue for a anti-deterministic (anti-essentialistic, anti-reductionist) Marx 
there is, of course, always the possibility of interpreting Marx in the other direction, but in a 
sophisticated way Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History ( 1980) is one such example which, 
using all the resources of analytical philosophy, attempts to present a Marx
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who gives primacy to the productive forces and, essentially, rewrites the 1859 Preface. Whatever 
one makes of this (see Callinicos, 1989, 1990; Hirst, 1985;Elster, 1989) it offers a salutary 
warning to the kind of Marxism theorised above in that it criticizes the idea that anything is 
possible, given human will and ambition to achieve it The hubristic belief that human societies 
are just blank pieces of paper upon which the party-vanguard or the political redeemer can write 
new characters has nothing emancipatory about it, but is, on the contrary, a recipe for terror and 
totalitarianism
Marxism and democracy
Certainly, it is correct to point out that a foraging society or mode of production could not, 
through mere effort of will, transform itself overnight into an advanced capitalist society, or for 
that matter, agrarian empire, but the fundamental point is, rather, that given the material 
conditions and the social forces and interests engendered by those conditions, the process of 
social transformation must be one that respects the gains of modernity - rights, rule of law, civil 
society, representative democracy, and so forth. Respect for these cross-cuts the 
voluntarist/determinist divide as Robin Blackburn recognises in his essay “Socialism After the 
Crash”:
“Thus while Marxism cannot escape the implication in the fate of the Russian Revolution, 
neither should it be ignored that many of the most notable Marxists of the day - not only 
Kautsky, of course, but also Rosa Luxemburg - repudiated the practice of party dictatorship 
right from the beginning The subsequent history of the Soviet Union has been marked by 
successive critiques This criticism and rejection has related in different ways both to the 
basic strategic line of march and to particular crimes and errors perpetuated along the way. 
Most of these critics have situated themselves squarely within the Marxist tradition They have 
appealed to a Marx who bitterly attacked press censorship and the arbitrary exercise of state 
power, who insisted that the battle to win democracy must have priority, and who supported 
the accountability of political representatives ”
(1991, p 179).
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While Blackburn is essentially correct he is, however, too ecumenical in his list of those within 
the Marxist tradition who have abided by these principles (e g Trotsky was no democrat) and, 
moreover, he is too ready to believe that Marxism has a developed political theory For as many 
critics of Marxism have noted it is the failure to develop a proper political theory of democracy 
that has disabled Marxism This is not a new idea, of course, Bernstein anticipated it in his critique 
of the Bolsheviks in a statement which, as Beilharz recognizes, anticipated the recent events in 
Eastern/Central Europe
“The socialistic theory of the bolshevists is, as it does not offhandishly recede behind Karl 
Marx, a Marxism made coarse, its political doctrine is an overvaluation of the creative power 
of brute violence and its political ethics are not a criticism but a coarse misunderstanding of the 
liberal ideas of the great French revolution of the eighteenth century have found their classical 
expression But just as by the unbending language of facts they have already seen themselves 
compelled to subject their economic policy to a thorough revision, the time will not stay away 
when in the face of the rebellion/revolt of the ineradicable striving o f the peoples to freedom 
and right they will also have to fundamentally revise their policy and their ethics ”
(cited in Beilharz, 1990, p.82)
Post-Marxism and flexible specialization
What is new, however, is the recent explosion of political theory which is attempting to construct 
a radical theory within the context of a fundamental concern with democracy - or rather radical 
democracy This means that Sabel is right to foreground politics as being at the heart of social 
organization and social transformation, but he is wrong to suggest that Marxism even in its 
so-called determinist form is a negation of the principle that different routes of industrialisation 
are possible, for even the most determinist Marxism allows variations in the political forms of 
capitalism as shall be argued in the context of a critique of Unger’s political theory Moreover, 
what is regressive in Sabel’s writings is his neglect of the most important question that post- 
Marxists are now grappling with namely, the forms of politics and of democracy that are possible 
to articulate new industrial identities That is, Sabel never explicates what he means by politics 
and what the normative ground for his
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appeal to politics are On the one hand, it is a rather Hobbesian/Weberian notion of politics as 
struggle and conflict between groups On the other hand, is the implicit suggestion that FS is 
potentially, the ‘good society’ in operation, but Sabel never sketches out in any detail the precise 
form such a politics would take For a theory of socio-economic organization that gives primacy 
to the political and politics this is disabling and disturbing. Admittedly in his recent writings he 
has started to tackle these issues in more detail, but the main criticism still hold that a theory or 
research programme which claims the importance or centrality of politics must develop a theory 
of the political and politics as a central concern.
Piore and the Vita Activa of Arendt
Piore, for example has attempted to recruit the political philosopher Hannah Arendt as an 
inspiration for his own political and social philosophy. His article, “Work, Labour, and Action: 
Work Experience in a System of Flexible Production” (1992) draws upon Arendt’s distinctions, 
based on classical Greek philosophy, between labour, work and action.** Arendt’s The Human 
Condition argues that there are three realms of human experience, each characterised by their 
temporal durability Labour is mere biological reproduction and consumption which does not 
endure Work has durability and can be characterised as the manifestation of homo faher or the 
craft-worker and artisan Action is true praxis embodied in discourse, dialogue and 
communication This is the sphere of activity of the citizen in the polis Arendt’s political 
philosophy was, of course, taken from her understanding of the conditions of life in Ancient 
Greece. Labour was the work of slaves (and women engaged in biological reproduction), work 
was the activity of the free artisan and action was the prerogative of the citizen unburdened of the 
necessity to engage in these two activities
For Arendt, with the emergence of modernity, the social and mass production, the activities of 
work and action in the true sense had been destroyed. Piore writes: “In the notion that work has 
been reduced to labour through mass production, Arendt follows Marx, this assertion and its 
analytical implications are essentially coincident with the theory of mass
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production as developed by Marx and later by Taylor and Ford" (1992, p.312). At first sight 
one would think that Piore would focus on Arendt's second category of work. The FS thesis 
would be taken as arguing for the necessity to return to craft or artisanal production 
However, Piore turns to the importance of the third category, of action to develop his ideas 
on the politics of FS.
However, this theorization is problematic, because Piore misinterprets Arendt's argument by 
collapsing action into work, a move which Arendt would not have supported. Piore argues
the following:
"What might it mean to think of production as a form of action? It means that 
the production process becomes for the people who participate within it a 
public space like the political forum of ancient Greece, that they see that space 
as a realm in which they reveal themselves to each other as individuals."
(1992, p.314).
The production space of industrial districts will form this new public sphere of action and 
community. Under Fordism and mass production, the production process is merely a means 
for that attainment of an end, income. But under FS, the realm of action and production 
becomes an end in itself. Nonetheless, the means still has to be considered of importance in 
that the wealth produced can provide a decent living for everyone in the community. The 
central paradox that Piore puts forward is the following: "... How is it possible to ensure that 
production serves as an effective means for the community's survival without having the 
members of the community become so preoccupied with income that action, which makes 
the community dynamic in the first place, loses its centrality in the community's value 
system?" (1992, p.316).
It is doubtful whether Piore's transcoding of Arendt will provide an adequate political 
philosophy for a flexibly specialized economy and society for the following reasons. First, 
Arendt's trichotomy of spheres of action are too rigid and artificially separated from one 
another (see Heller, 1976). Many feminist researchers, for example, point out the sexist
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nature of Arendt's diminution of the role and status of biological reproduction. Second, Piore 
is unable to escape from the aporias of Marxism. As Agnes Heller (1982) has shown there is 
in Marx two paradigms, a paradigm of work and a paradigm of production. The paradigm of 
work can be found in the early Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844 Here Marx, like Piore, attempts to show that work is an anthropological category. In 
line with a tradition of romantic thinking, Marx argues that human beings fulfil themselves 
in creative work and activity, shaping the world according to their aesthetic needs and 
desires In the Grundisse and Capital. Marx moves to a paradigm of production, where 
liberation of humanity lies beyond work and necessary labour time. As Oskar Negt argue, 
the paradigm of production understands labour as a fundamental historic category and not an 
anthropological one. Piore is still too stuck in the first paradigm (see Habermas, 1987,
Heller, 1993, Murphy, 1990).
Unger and Hirst: political foundations
Other theorists who have taken up the FS thesis have, however, been more explicit in their 
attempt to give a political dimension to Piore and Sahel's ideas, namely Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger and Paul Hirst. I have argued they have a distinct understanding of the type of politics 
that needs to be developed and its relation to FS.
Unger and Hirst, however, do have differences, but despite these differences there are many 
similarities. These are, as has been argued above, a common concern to criticise traditional 
and post-traditional Marxist understandings of the concept of capitalism. Both reject the 
totalizing assumptions of Marxism. That is to say, the concept of capitalism and the 
capitalist mode of production is taken as a too all encompassing term which cannot account 
for specifities and differences. In short, it is not a precise enough term to have any use at an 
analytic and political level. It is, they both argue, a deep structure theory which gathers all 
institutions, practices and relations around a single centre or organizing principle. Both also 
agree that the reductionist and essentialist assumption that the working class has an
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objective interest in overthrowing capitalism is false. In short, they both reject the classical 
theory of political representation. They also are sceptical of the political forms that Marxism 
offers as alternatives to capitalism and attempt to develop a politics o f 'radical democracy'.
This is not, of course, to deny the disagreements between them. The first thing to realize 
when reading them is the distinct traditions of theorizing they draw upon In Unger it is a 
florid, ornate and baroque prose While Hirst's prose is increasingly bare, functional and 
terse. Their distinct language based practices spills over into the type of social theory and 
political philosophy they are constructing. In Unger's case it is a passionate, romantic and 
overweening desire to crack the 'practico-inert' (Sartre) shell of the present OECD order To 
disentrench the social order and to increase, in his peculiar use of Keats' phrase, 'negative 
capability'. All part of Unger's intense and visionary modernist politics (see Anderson, 1992, 
Belliotti, 1989, Hawthorn, 1987).
On the other hand, Hirst's language is a reflection of his increasing disillusion with any 
residue of romanticism and modernist renewal. It is not exactly that he has accommodated 
himself to the dominant order of capital as some critics suggest (Elliot, 1986; Benton, 1984), 
but rather his view of the possibilities of transformation has moved towards a form of 
associational democracy that was propagated by Cole and Laski, and has been taken up 
under modem conditions by scholars like Robert Dahl (1982) and more recently Streeck 
(1993). And it is probably the case that Hirst would reject the Ungerian proposals put 
forward in his False Necessity as adequate or realistic solutions for providing a political and 
institutional support for FS. Unger is a Brazilian who was opposed to the Dictatorship and is 
now attempting to find a radical politics which can be usefully applied in Brazil in its 
fragile formally democratic phase in a situation which is in danger o f  being polarized 
between conservative reaction, populism and extremist revolutionary currents. On the other 
hand, Hirst is writing in a completely different political environment where Conservatism 
rules, within the context of a liberal representative democratic representative system.
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Unger: a passionate romantic theory of flexible specialization
Roberto Unger’s political theory has been the subject of a great deal of debate in the United 
States, but rather less in Britain despite the fact that his three volume book Politics, a Work in 
C onstructive Social Theory was published in paperback by Cambridge University Press in 1987 
His work polarises opinion although many respected political philosophers and sociologists have 
commented on his work critically but sympathetically such as Perry Anderson, John Dunn, 
Geoffrey Hawthorn and Richard Rorty It is not necessary to go into a thorough review of 
Unger’s political theory but only how far it relates to his institutional theory of the politics of FS 
As 1 have argued, Unger shares with Sabel an opposition to forms of determinism:
“The most serious dangers that deep structure analysis poses to the endeavour of the modernist 
visionary are precisely the dangers that arise from its truncation of our insight into structural 
diversity: the closure imposed on the sense of historical possibility, the reliance on an 
explanatory script and the inability to grasp how and why the relation between the formative 
and formed, between social structure and human agency, may change Deep structure social 
theory disorients political strategy and impoverishes programmatic thought by making both of 
them subsidiary to a ready-made list or sequence of social orders.”
(1987, p 93).
As I have shown, then, this is a valid move if we ignore some of the caricatural comments he 
makes about Marxism as inevitably deterministic and evolutionist. However, Unger’s 
understanding of Marxism is shared by others such as Hirst but also heterodox figures who have 
also gone through Marxism in various ways such as Lefort, Castoriadis and Lyotard "*
Castoriadis does not go as far as to reject the concept of capitalism because it is too abstract, but 
he casts in doubt the dominant forms of Marxist critique on the same grounds as Unger - its 
objectives and determinism
There are other similarities that Unger shares with Castoriadis which might be mentioned as 
relevant in this context. Both share the belief that social theory should not be a negative
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critique of a bad reality, but should also see as its task the need to sketch out possibilities 
for the future in the form of alternative institutional arrangements, or formative contexts and 
imaginary significations That is to say, they both see the imperative to go beyond Marx's 
reluctance to depict what the future emancipated might look like. As is well known, Marx 
was scornful of all those utopian schemes and philosophies of the nineteenth century such as 
Fourier's, Cabet's or Proudhon's He thought it was enough to outline the supposed real 
movement of history as it was unfolding in the development of the modern labour movement. 
On the one hand, this was laudable in the sense that he refused to be the legislator who 
anticipated the future in advance of its invention and creation by the protagonists of history 
themselves This tradition of refusing to provide blueprints for the future organization of 
society was handed on to later inheritors of the Marxist tradition and, in the most accentuated 
form, by the Frankfurt School
When Marxists have sketched out the future it has often been to tragic effect. For example, 
Lenin's The State and Revolution must count as such a case as argued by A.J. Polan who 
writes in his Lenin and the End of Politics:
"... it has proven difficult to explain precisely why Lenin chose the moment of 
temporary lull in the storms of 1917 to write the book in his enforced Finland 
exile And it is even more difficult to discover why he chose to propound the 
argument it contained What possible connection these thoughts bore with 
what subsequently occurred under his leadership is the most obscure question 
of all."
(1986, p 10).
Other Marxists, such as Trotsky, also stand indicted; his puerile and sub-Nietzschean ideas 
that under communism everybody would attain the giddy heights of genius is not a very 
edifying speculation and further evidence of the vacuity of his political theory.
However, the past century's experience of revolutionary experiments and actually existing 
socialism has called into question the idea that the appeal to the praxis of the working class 
and their self-organization will be enough. Any real politics has a duty to explain how it
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envisages the future organization of society, its institutional structure, systems of jurisprudence, 
economic, political and social organization and so forth It is to Castoriadis’ and Unger’s credit 
then that they have taken these issues seriously, although this is not to say that there are not many 
problems with how they conceptualize and envisage their autonomous society or empowered 
democracy 6
Castoriadis early on realised that in the context of the failure of the Russian Revolution and the 
discrediting of socialism by Stalinism it was necessary to be more specific about how socialism 
might be organized. For Castoriadis it is not a case of drawing up blue-prints or cook-books of 
the future - in this he agrees with Marx - but it is necessary to have some idea of where you are 
going and not just how you are going to get there, so in various writings of which the most 
important are his two articles which appeared in Socialisme ou Barbarie. “On the Content of 
Socialism”, he attempted to give more flesh than is usual in the Marxist tradition to the future 
society In this 1957 article Castoriadis writes:
“The experience of bureaucratic capitalism allows us to clearly perceive what socialism is not 
and cannot be A close look both at past proletarian uprisings and at everyday life and 
struggles of the proletariat enables us to say what socialism could and should be Basing 
ourselves on a century of experience we can and must now define the positive content of 
socialism in a much fuller and more accurate way than was possible for previous 
revolutionaries. In today’s vast ideological morass, people who call themselves socialists may 
be heard to say that they ‘are no longer quite sure what the word means.’ We hope to show 
that the very opposite is the case Today, for the first time, one can begin to spell out in 
concrete and specific terms what socialism really could be like.”
(1988, p 91).
Castoriadis then goes on to spell out in some detail his particular version of the positive content 
of a libertarian socialism Although Castoriadis was later to voice some reservations about his 
proposals the point is that he saw it as his duty to unite a critique of capitalist society with a 
positive outline of the content that would replace it.
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Unger too believes that central to social theory that sets itself the task to help the 
emancipation of humanity must have an alternative institutional framework. In chapter 5 of 
False Necessity. "The Program of Empowered Democracy: The Remaking of Institutional 
Arrangements", Unger expounds his point of view on these matters which is worth quoting at 
length:
"This chapter sets out a program for reconstructing the large-scale institutional 
structure of society: the constitution of government, the organization of the 
economy, and the system of legal rights. The institutional program is extended 
by a program for remaking the fine texture of social life: the style of direct, 
person-to-person relations. The immediate subject of the programmatic 
argument is the institutional structure of contemporary societies and in 
particular the formative institutional context of the Western industrial 
democracies ... The program is not meant as a timeless blueprint, to be applied 
with appropriate variations to any historical circumstances. It responds to a 
particular situation with particular measures and beliefs, drawn in large part 
from a particular institutional and imaginative tradition ... How does the 
programmatic vision connect with the account of context change developed in 
the preceding parts of the book? After all, the dominant tradition of modern 
philosophy since Hume and Kant has emphasized the differences between the is 
and the ought. Modem social thought affirmed its identity in part by the 
resoluteness with which it tried to overcome the loose confusion of normative 
and explanatory ideas."
(1987, p.341).
Unger argues that the classical division between the is and the ought has no place in social 
theory. Although he is not the first to recognize this. The direction in the last twenty-five 
years in political philosophy (but not sociology) has been to draw the is and the ought 
closer together. This general criticism of positivism or behavioural social science can be 
seen in many better known philosophical projects in social thought such as John Rawls and 
Jurgen Habermas (and, of course, Castoriadis). As Geoffrey Hawthorn writes in his critique 
of Unger "Practical Reason and Social Democracy: Reflections on Unger's Passion and 
Politics":
"Both start with a conception of what people are, and of the most general
circumstances in which they find themselves, and argue to a view of what
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societies that included such persons could be. Both assume that people are 
committed to live together and to arrive at an agreed form of, or framework 
for, collective life through a 'reflective equilibrium' (Rawls' phrase) or through 
'self- reflection' (Habermas). Both further assume - Rawls more clearly than 
Habermas - that having agreed to a form of collective life, people will agree to 
explicit principles to maintain it and will decide these principles in an equally 
explicit procedure. This can be done, they both believe, with the greatest 
practicable degree of social transparency, as Rawls calls it, with the greatest 
'publicity' ... But neither Habermas nor Rawls makes clear how a mere 
understanding of a common interest - either in justice or in what Habermas 
calls Mundiekeit - might hold a society together. Nor is it clear in either 
thinker for whom such a society is an option. Unlike Habermas, Rawls does 
see that there are innumerably many and particular loves and attachments and 
thick conceptions of the good. But having consigned them to the private realm, 
as liberal moral philosophers tend usually to do, he, like Habermas, leads us 
out all too easily to the politically opaque and uninteresting constituency of all 
the rational agents there are "
(1987, p.93).
linger and coinmunitaiianism
In short, Habermas and Rawls' theories go part of the way to reuniting the Kantian 
dissociation of description and prescription, but unfortunately their conception of society and 
individual is remarkably thin. They offer procedural theories rather than, to use Geertz's 
term, 'thick' substantive theories of human actors and societies. Unger in contrast, according to 
Hawthorn, criticizes them for dispensing with a "view of the self or of society as a basis for 
normative vision". Unger in contrast attempts a richer and more socially embedded vision of 
human beings and their doings, a vision which has some connection, at a distance, with the 
communitarian critics of Rawls and Habermas.17' The communitarians are a diverse group 
of writers who share at least one thing in common, that is, an opposition to the abstract 
individualism of classical liberalism. Writers such as Alasdair MacIntyre in his After Virtue:
A Study in Moral Theory (1991), Michael Sandel in his Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
(1982), Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equity (1983). 
Charles Taylor in his Sources of the Self (1989) and Philip Selznick in The Moral 
Commonwealth Social Theory and the Promise of Community. (1992) are some of the leading
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term, 'thick' substantive theories of human actors and societies. Unger in contrast, according to 
Hawthorn, criticizes them for dispensing with a "view of the self or of society as a basis for 
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influences on the communitarian position. With Unger the communitarians would say that 
the classical liberalism of Rawls is too individualistic and atomistic and presume an actor 
outside of the society's communal traditions. However, communitarianism is politically 
janus-faced in that it could be used to legitimate a politics of conservatism or to legitimize a 
socialist or radical democratic politics.181
It all depends on what kind of community is being theorised. For example, Robert Reich has 
argued that in the 1980s a certain kind of community of neo-liberalism was established in the 
USA A "community" based on the concern for money and social status: "There is one thing 
Americans do have in common with our neighbours .. It is our income ... [A] passionate 
interest in maintaining or upgrading property values ... is responsible for much of what has 
brought neighbours together in recent years" (p.22) This is the community of what Galbraith 
calls the culture of contentment191 and which is today so dominant, if not hegemonic. On 
the other hand, most of the communitarians would place themselves on the left (although 
some might not accept this bi-polar coding of politics). For example, Sandel (1982) has said 
that communities should have a say in plant-closings, capital mobility and sudden industrial 
change. Indeed, this kind of message would find resonance with the argument of Piore and 
Sabel and a strong case can be made for the suggestion that the politics implicit in The 
Second Industrial Divide are a communitarian politics. Others on the left who have a 
sympathetic albeit critical relation with communitarianism include the American journal 
Telos and the post-structuralist theorist, Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe, for example, has written 
on communitarianism and argues that communitarianism has a radical potential so long as it 
is read 'symptomatically' through the grid of a post-structuralist, radical pluralistic, 
democratic theory. Her position steers a course between the classical liberals and the 
republican communitarian position. First, she argues that the argument is a rehearsal of the 
debate between what Benjamin Constant called the liberties of the Ancients and the liberties 
of the Modems. That is, between what Berlin famously called positive liberty or rights and 
negative liberty or rights. The communitarians have a preference for the former (although 
they would not reject the latter either). However, they do argue that there are no natural 
rights outside a particular tradition or community of people which can lead to accusations of
relativism More to the point it should also be recognized that all communities define 
themselves in acts of exclusion (see below).
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As Mouffe argues:
"[the communitarians argue] ... that such an absolute priority of the right cannot 
exist and that it is only through our participation in a community which defines 
the good in a certain way that we can acquire a sense of the right and a 
conception of justice ... Where the communitarians lost their way is when some 
of them, such as Sandel, conclude that there can never be a priority of the right 
over the good, and that we should therefore reject liberal pluralism and return 
to a type of community organized around shared moral values and a substantive 
idea of the common good. We can fully agree with Rawls about the priority of 
justice as the principal virtue of social and political institutions and in 
defending pluralism and rights, while admitting that those principles are 
specific to a certain type of political association."
(1992, p.230).
Further, Mouffe argues that the communitarian position that classical liberalism has divorced 
the sphere of morality from that of politics is valid, but needs reformulating:
"We do need to re-establish the lost connection between ethics and politics, but 
this cannot be done by sacrificing the gains of the democratic revolution. We 
should not accept a false dichotomy between individual liberty and rights on 
one side and civic activity and political community on the other."
(1992, p.231).
Mouffe argues for a radical pluralistic democracy which unites these two positions by 
transcoding them into the language of democratic articulation. However, the problem with 
the work of Mouffe (and Laclau) is that their enterprise is highly formalistic. There is not 
much in the way of content, beyond attractive sounding declarations. Perhaps as their work 
develops this criticism will become less accurate? However, a more devastating criticism 
can be addressed to the communitarians and Mouffe. This is the standard critique that once 
you have jettisoned universalistic values or groundings is not the result relativism?
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Indeed, Axel Honneth (1991) argues that as the debate has evolved and Rawls has modified 
his position to a more contextualist position both he and the communitarians
"currently find themselves in very much the same dilemma. They no longer 
have any supra-contextual criterion with which to distinguish with justifications 
between morally acceptable and morally objectionable concepts of the 
collective good The reason for this is that they wish, in their employment of 
contextualistic arguments, to abstain from providing a universalistic foundation 
for the principles of morality anchored in the constitutional principles of 
western democracy. Yet, both sides are at the same time all the more 
dependent on such a criterion because in the meantime they widely agree that 
without any link to value convictions there is an inability to clarify the 
conditions under which individual freedom is realized."
(1991, p 31)
Nevertheless it is important to summarise the main principle of communitarianism which have 
influenced the FS thesis which can be summarised, by referring to Selznick's (1992) argument 
that communitarianism comprises a complex set of seven basic values. These are (1) 
historicity which refers to the strands of history, culture and tradition which inform social 
forms; (2) identity which refers to the sense of loyalty, community and distinctive identity 
which particular historical forms impart to social groups; (3) mutuality which refers to the 
experience of solidarity, reciprocity and interdependence in particular communities; (4) 
plurality which refers to the necessity o f intermediate groups' which provide the possibility of 
meaningful participation in society; (S) autonomy which refers to the necessity for individuals 
to be protected from coercion in communities; (6) participation which refers to the necessity 
of communities to encourage participation and involvement in them and, finally; (7) 
integration which refers to norms, beliefs, values and practices which hold everything 
together.
Unger's position is close to the communitarian critique in some ways, but in others it is 
distinct and unique, (Kymilicka, 1994; Holmes, 1993) or rather sui generis. On the one hand 
Unger argues for a social constructed and embedded theory of society and politics, but also 
makes some raprochement with the Rawls/Habermas position insofar as he attempts to
formulate a more universalistic schema than communitarianism allows. This revolves 
around his ontology of negative capability'101 which suggests that human beings are creative, 
passionate, inventive, desiring and imaginative being striving, to borrow a well-used term, to 
achieve recognition from others. In Anderson's concise definition, negative capability can be 
defined thus:
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"The meaning that he attaches to this term is virtually the opposite of that 
intended by Keats What it denotes is active will and restless imagination 
pitted against all circumstance or convention, a constitutive human capacity to 
transcend every given context by negating it in thought and deed. As such, 
Unger argues, its exercise has gradually expanded since the dawn of 
civilization, giving history what cumulative (though not irreversible) direction it 
appears to have Today the goal of politics must be to increase the space of 
that negative capability, by creating institutional contexts permanently open to 
their own revision - so diminishing the gap between structures and routines."
(1992, p.l 13).
Unfortunately, this move opens up Unger to a number of criticisms. From the communitarian 
position its universalism is suspect. And as John Dunn puts it:
"Many of Unger's critics will probably concentrate their fire upon the character 
of this telos - Unger's idiosyncratic reading of the form of the human good 
Even those who see a human society as fundamentally a relation between the 
imaginations of its members will probably find the ferocity of Unger's 
insistence on individual imaginative autonomy too extreme to be sane. Still 
others are likely to see his human society of endless participatory deliberation 
and choice as more of a forum for endlessly futile bickering and the 
squandering of time and energy than they are to see it as a promise of linking 
individuals to their social milieu in a vital flow of interest and enjoyment."
(1987, p. 19).
This view of human beings as endlessly active evokes a picture of a high and febrile 
romanticism. Unger's appeal to endless imagination and inventiveness, of course, is shared 
by many on the left and goes back, it could be argued, to Marx's Promethean and Faustian 
musings. Of the modems, Castoriadis shares some of the same assumptions with Unger as 
argued by Rorty.
This metaphysics of creativity as the expression of a normative imperative can be found in 
Marx himself, with a difference. For Marx it is capitalism which is creative and dynamic, 
putting into shame all the achievements of past civilisations. Agnes Heller has reinforced 
this point in her essay "On Being Satisfied in a Dissatisfied Society". Following her general 
discussion of contingency, Heller argues that:
"The term dissatisfied society has been coined in order to illuminate one 
conspicuous feature of western modernity. Dissatisfied society is not an 
essentialist term. That is to say, it is not meant to designate the essence of 
modernity. Modernity can be described in accordance with many categories, 
each of which elicit one particular feature or other of the world epoch which 
differs from all those who have preceded it. The notion of a 'dissatisfied 
society' seeks to grasp the specificity of our world epoch from the perspective 
of needs, or, more particularly, from that of need- creation, need-perception, 
need-distribution and need- satisfaction ... it suggests that a strong 
dissatisfaction operates as a strong motivational force in the reproduction of 
modern societies."
(1989, p. 14)
Drawing on a wide range of philosophers and social thinkers - Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, 
Sartre, Fromm, Unger - Heller makes a strong case for her understanding of modernity as 
driven by dissatisfaction. Indeed, it is a theme which runs through modem anthropology and 
sociology in general.
Unger shares the classical assumptions of what Stephen Crook (1992) has termed 'modernist 
radicalism' and that his ontology and metaphysics of activity or 'negative capability' is not so 
original. What is more original is Unger's attempt to adapt the classical method of political 
philosophy, whereby the philosopher logically derives normative conclusions from a 
particular concept of human nature, to his view that you can draw normative conclusions 
from a unfixed or plastic view of human nature. For if human nature is so plastic and 
contingent then surely, so the critic would suggest, human beings can create any number of 
forms of society. However, Unger would reply that a contingent and unfixed human nature 
cannot logically be corralled into a necessary structure which places restrictions on human
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freedom. It demands therefore a disentrenching of social life and a discovery that there are, to 
use Touraine’s term, no meta-social foundations of social life. *'
As Unger explains his project:
“The argument moves through three steps First, it considers the narrowest link between the 
programmatic and the explanatory ideas The institutional program includes a feasible version 
of petty commodity production, the most stubborn rival of the style of economic organization 
_ that became dominant in the course of modem Western history The second step goes on to 
consider the relation between the larger theory of transformation that informs my polemical 
genealogy of dominant and deviant styles of industrial society and the conception of the ideal 
that inspires this entire institutional program. Both the program and the explanatory theory 
take as their point of departure the same fundamental account of our relation to the contexts of 
our activity. In particular, they discover both a practical and an epistemological interest in the 
paradox of contextuality: our need to settle down to a particular context and our inability to 
accept any context in particular as fully satisfactory. The programmatic argument sees the 
change of our relation to the contexts of our activity as the basis for a broad range of forms of 
empowerment The third step in the effort to establish a link between the explanatory and the 
programmatic argument is the sense in which a vision of human empowerment can possess 
prescriptive authority Views that define both the meaning of empowerment or self-assertion 
and the causal conditions for its promotion should be seen as the most common form of 
historically located practice of normative argument. Such a fundamental practice cannot be in 
any simple sense true or false, right or wrong, though we may have reasons to change it or 
even to abandon it Our ways of assessing the normative weight of conceptions or self- 
assertion ultimately reflect views about our relation to our fundamental practice.”
(1982, p.342).
Unaer and the mythical history of modernity
Unger’s first step, then, is to argue that there are many deviant forms of industrial organization 
that do not fit the classical English pattern of industrial development and organization. In other 
words, that the standard economic history of industrial trajectories and its sociological cognate 
the industrial society theorem are misleading At this point
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Unger's argument is dependent on the ideas of Sabel and Zeitlin in their "Historical 
Alternatives to Mass Production" (1983) article, but it also depends on Unger's prior 
argument about the historical evolution of work organization in the OECD democracies.
Although Unger describes what he calls a continuum of work organization it has the bleak 
ring of a Braverman:
"At one pole of this spectrum lies a rigid form of rationalized labour. A clear 
distinction is made between the work of defining the more or less abstract 
projects that are to be carried out by the group and the actual work of 
execution. The definition of the tasks include decisions about the structure of 
jobs, hierarchies, and perhaps even material rewards within the organization as 
well as decisions about how to reassess both the layout of work and the 
understanding of the collective tasks in the light of the group's concrete 
experiences. ... This rigid classification of operational acts, tied in with a 
independently defined plan, is the core meaning of routinization of work."
(1987, pp. 154-5).
However close it is to Braverman's description Unger does qualify his statement, as he must 
to be consistent with his methodological prescription of non-necessity, by arguing that this 
rigid style of work organization can be realized in any number of alternative institutional 
arrangements and he further emphasizes that the general schema should not be mistaken for 
any of its concrete instances. Nevertheless, this is not convincing as it depends on he 
ideal-type of the rigid style of work organization which we can read as a combination of the 
Chandlerian multi-divisional corporation (the visible hand), Taylorist patterns of labour 
process organization and, Fordist mass-production.
Counterpoised to this, for Unger, is the ideal-type of flexible organization:
"Take now the flexible form of labour. It relativizes the differences 
formulating tasks and executing them. The project becomes simply the 
provisional and sketchy anticipation of a collective effort. Each operational act 
represents the project on the march: an adaptation of the plan to circumstances 
that is also both a step towards greater detail in the understanding of what the
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project is and a proposal for its redefinition. Because the moments of 
formulation and execution tends towards merger and simultaneity rather than 
separation and sequence, the boundaries among operations are themselves more 
elastic. Each operative step gains meaning and guidance from its direct 
relation to other steps as well as from its link with the provisional and 
progressively enriched plan. The foremost difficulty or organization becomes 
the need to maintain direction and unity without abandoning the impetus 
towards flexibility."
(1987, p 154).
Thus Unger lays out for the reader the same ideal-type dichotomy of mass production and FS 
that Piore and Sabel (Zeitlin) put forward in their writings And like them, he rejects the 
post-Fordist formulation that these stand to each other as in a necessitarian evolutionary
sequence:
"I argue that this view of industrial development drastically underestimates the 
degree of deviation from the mainstream that occurred even in the prize 
exhibits of the mythical history as the economic and social transformation of 
England. In fact the deviant forms reveal more of what was distinctive to the 
West and what made it incomparably revolutionary than do the dominant ones. 
I also claim that the traditional view gives a mistaken sense of the degree of 
prevalence that the more rigid type of work organization in fact achieved 
According to the mythical history the deviations appeared for special reasons - 
the idiosyncrasies of the regions where they arose - but failed for general ones 
- the inherent imperatives of industrial development."
(1987, pp.181-1).
To recapitulate then, for Unger, as for Piore and Sabel, the conditions which lead to specific 
and particular socio-economic forms of organization are essentially political:
"One approach is to study the dependence of the dominant industrial style upon 
a variety of extra economic institutional arrangements that were themselves 
subject to constant struggle. The study of this dependence could then be 
complemented by an attempt to imagine the institutional conditions under 
which the alternative industrialism could have flourished more widely. This is 
the theme pursued throughout this interpretative history of contemporary 
formative contexts as well as in later parts of False Necessity."
(ibid, p. 187).
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To further prove his thesis Unger argues that any constraints which might exist at the natural 
or the economic level significantly under-determine the 'styles of work organization' and that, 
moreover, technological constraints that exist are as much a product or a result of the cause 
of social settlements as a cause. And that therefore we cannot "comprehend either in 
advance or in retrospect the range of feasible organizational responses to technological or 
resource constraints" (p. 195). In this context it is necessary to point out that Unger's 
methodological precepts regarding the heterogeneity and diversity of possible forms of 
economic organization undermine Best's criticism, directed at Piore and Sabel, that:
"... instead of extending their critique of a single organizational imperative to 
allow for a variety of possible organizational forms they [Piore and Sabel] stop 
short by distinguishing between only two possible types of production systems: 
mass production or flexible specialization ... [they] risk replacing one immanent 
logic with another and losing the contingent dimension to economics and 
economic policy-making institutions."
(1990, p.9).
In other words, although Unger, Piore and Sabel operate with an ideal- type dichotomy 
between mass production and flexible specialization they do envisage a continuum between 
these two forms. The continuum is the product of the political/institutional forms which 
modify, extend and transform bare economic ideal-types into substantive politico-socio­
economic realities.
Unger and pettv-commoditv production
Nonetheless, Unger does tend to retreat, despite these disclaimers, into the rhetoric of what 
he calls petty commodity production as a normative ideal at least. The petty commodity 
form of production for Unger means the following, an economy of small-scale, relatively 
equal producers, operating through a variable mix of cooperative organizations and 
independent activity. Unger does recognize though, contra Best, that the petty commodity
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form of production coexists with other forms such as the multi-divisional enterprise and mass 
production form. That is to say, they can exist in the same synchronic space rather than in 
an evolutionary diachronic process of succession. In other words, it avoids the kind of 
chrono-political argument that Johannes Fabian in his book, Time and the Other: How 
Anthropology Makes its Object (1983), has warned against in the context of anthropological 
studies, that is, the denial of coevality to any form of life (petty commodity production) 
different from its own (mass production). Just as the primitive tribe or band in the periphery 
of the modern world-system is presented as existing in a different, past time from the core 
or centre, so the petty commodity form of production is often theorised, especially by the 
industrial society theorists, as residual and existing in the past, ready to be displaced by 
modernity and its advanced technologies. Bauman's comments on Fabian are very relevant 
in this context:
"The allochronic distancing device (Fabian's felicitous term) seems to be a 
variant of a more general expedient: construing the Other (defining the Other) 
in a way that apriori decides its inferior and indeed, transient and (until 
disappearance) illegitimate status. In the age of the forward march of 
reason-guided progress, describing the Other as outdated, backward, obsolete, 
primitive, and altogether 'pre-', was equivalent to such a decision."
(1992, p.xxxvi).
This argument can be carried over into Bauman's own work on modernity and postmodemity. 
In Modernity and Ambivalence (1993) Bauman argues that what characterizes modernity in 
the post-Enlightenment period is its increasing inability to tolerate ambivalence, difference 
and ambiguity. The cultivating and gardening mentality of modernity (and this means, first 
and foremost the legislating 'intellectuals and ruling-elites) demand order and clear 
boundary-maintenance, which is reflected and reproduced in its rationalizing, normalizing and 
instrumentalizing tendencies. All Otherness has to be obliterated and, to use Lyotard's term, 
the incommensurate cannot be tolerated. In these terms, Unger, although a 'visionary' and 
'radical modernist' in some ways, is at the same time, through his championing of the petty 
commodity form of production, a contester of this dominant modernist form of 
understanding. It would go too far to call him a postmodernist, whatever this term might
mean, but he is certainly ambiguously situated within the modernist camp as defined by 
Bauman at least.
Nevertheless, Unger's use of the term the petty commodity form of production can be 
criticized. For as Anderson has written:
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"What Marx spoke of einfache Waren-produktion - 'simple' commodity 
production - he defined it not by the scale of its output but by the nature of its 
key input: it was that form in which the producer marketed goods without 
resort to wage-labour (or servile dependents). For Unger, on the other hand, 
petty commodity production includes every kind of market enterprise short of 
the centralized factory and multi-divisional firm - from the manufacture of 
cutlery in Solingen to computers in Silicon Valley. The connexion of this 
gamut of economic forms with even the widest notion of petty bourgeoisie is 
tenuous indeed."
(1987, p. 139).
Moreover, Unger has no real concept of the structural forces which will be the carriers or the 
addresses of his political programme and vision. As Anderson writes there is no
"overall class map of these social formations ... The petty bourgeoisie itself, the 
hero of Unger's parable, is in this respect virtually plucked out of thin air. For 
there is no surrounding class relationships into which it is inserted, in structural 
antagonism or dependence, affinity or ambivalence. Nobility or bourgeoisie, 
middle classes or working classes, are little more than smudges on the 
horizon."
(1987, p. 139).
Anderson further notes that Unger fails to mention the fact that in the twentieth century, the 
petty-bourgeoisie have often been mobilised behind right-wing populist and fascist political 
movements.
Although Anderson's critique has some force, it should be added that in other places, Unger 
is more concrete in his political analysis and the role of class and class structure is given 
more emphasis. Unger's understanding of the petty bourgeoisie should perhaps be viewed in
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the context of the political situation in his native Brazil. For example, in a series of 
newspaper articles in the largest Brazilian newspaper, A Folha de Sao Paola. Unger fully 
considers the role of class, class structure and class alliances in the transition from 
dictatorship to democracy and beyond. What is significant in Unger's account is that 
contrary to Anderson's rather orthodox Marxist transcoding of Unger's argument, where if the 
working class is not always referred to as the potentially hegemonic class located at the 
centre of the mode of production, then it doesn't measure up to a coherent argument. Unger 
develops in his articles on Brazil a fine grained class analysis which leads logically to his 
argument for a labour-intensive, small-scale production system. An argument which has 
some similarity with Sabel's reflections on FS in the 'Third World'.
In William Simon's article "Social Theory and Political Practice: Unger's Brazilian 
Journalism" (1987) succinctly summarized Unger's argument:
"Some aspects of the Brazilian social structure seem enigmatic, especially from 
the perspective of the wealthy Western countries. In order to come to terms 
with them, one must abandon the premise that in every historical situation, 
classes have well-defined boundaries and that they speak with a single voice."
(in symposium on Ungar, p.303).
Unger rejects the idea that has already been criticized, that classes are homogeneous 
collective actors acting on the stage of history like protagonists in a drama with a 
recognizable class identity (Poulantzas, 1980; Laclau, 1985; Hirst, 1979). As always the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness or reification must be avoided and Unger is successful at 
this without abandoning completely the problematic of representation. Unger notes that the 
class map of Brazil is characterized by: (1) a weak middle-class of professionals and 
functionaries; (2) relative absence of hostility between the organized working class and the 
unorganized, under-employed, and disadvantaged urban masses; (3) another conflict which is 
significantly absent, according to Unger, is between the middle and lower classes in the 
countryside and those in urban areas.
Unger argues that the tasks of the Brazilian democratic movement is to show, in Simon's 
words, to [the middle classes] that its interests are not in conflict with such a movement. In 
programmatic terms, this means the protection of small property, both rural and urban [my 
emphasis]..." (p.304). For the working class and the disadvantaged the policies which would 
foster solidarity among
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"the various elements of the working classes [in the short run would be] ... a 
full employment policy would moderate tensions arising from competition for 
scarce jobs. In the long run, the reorientation of industry toward popular 
consumption and more labour intensive technology would avoid the dantrer of 
an implicit alliance between industrial workers and rich consumers [my 
emphasis], an alliance likely to strengthen divisions within the working class." 
(ibid, p.306).
The other potential conflict between the urban and rural masses could be avoided by 
implementing a development strategy which would
"strengthen small and medium-scale family operations through technical 
assistance, credit, and marketing facilities [my emphasis] than it would be for 
the strategies of consolidating agricultural production in large-scale 
capital-intensive enterprises."
(ibid, p.307).
This is not the place to assess the accuracy and adequacy o f Unger's account of the role of 
class and class alliances in Brazil, but it is to indicate that Anderson's reading is not fair to 
the complexity and detail of Unger's full argument, and that there is a close symbiosis 
between Unger's socio-economic policy proposals and his view of social classes, their 
interests, their representation and their identity.
Furthermore, where Unger does propose some sort of leading role for the petty bourgeoisie it 
is not understood, as Anderson reads it, some sort of indeterminate stratum based on 
small-property per se, but rather on the white-collar stratum which, Anderson says, Unger 
ignores
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"... Unger virtually ignores white-collar employees - the archetypal petty 
bourgeois of the big cities from the late nineteenth century onwards, epitomized 
in the calicot public of T.J. Clark's unforgettable portrait of Parisian popular 
culture of the period."
(1992, p. 139).
This is a rather incredible interpretation for as Richard Rorty has pointed out:
"Unger does not assume that the agents of transformation in the Third World 
will be workers and peasants. He thinks they will be petty bourgeois 
functionaries: 'In countries with a strong statist tradition the lower rungs of the 
governmental bureaucracy constitutes the most likely agents for the 
development of such floating resources. For example, in many Latin American 
nations whole sectors of the economy (e g. agriculture) are closely supervised 
and coordinated by business bureaucrats: public-credit officers and agronomists 
... But the bureaucracies are typically mined by a multitude of more or less 
well-intentioned, confused, unheroic crypto-leftists - middle class, 
university-trained youth, filled with the vague, leftist ideas afloat in the world. 
The ambiguities of established rules and policies and the failures of 
bureaucratic control can supply these people with excuses to deny a fragment 
of governmental protection to its usual beneficiaries and make it available to 
other people, in a new proportion or in new ways ... The result is to create a 
floating resource - one the transformers can appropriate or fight about.' ..."
(1991, p.182).
Of course whether this is an adequate theory of strategy and agency is open to question and 
how it fits into Unger's Brazilian articles is not clear. For instance, it could be argued that it 
is to vanguardist, replicating some of the worst faults of both social democratic elitism and 
Jacobin/Leninist elitism. But then again, the anarchist dread of the people representing 
themselves, unmediated by any sort of leadership or guidance is perhaps too optimistic and 
politically unlikely.
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Radical democracy and flexible specialization
From the ontology of the actor as a passionate, acting, shaping, imagining and desiring being, 
through to the mediation of class and class conflict, Unger arrives at his concrete proposals 
for political, social and economic organization. It is at this point that we can see more 
clearly the connections that Unger draws between his ontology and his programmatic 
orientation, between his view of 'contingency' and his version of 'radical democracy' 
mediated by the economic form of 'flexible specialization'.1121
Unger writes of two 'possible worlds' within the alternative, which suggests as he says a 
range of possible forms within a continuum:
"The changing international division of labour threatens the stability of 
mass-production industries in the richer countries and underlines the importance 
of a greater emphasis on the vanguardist industries, with their characteristically 
more flexible interplay of task- defining and task-executing activities. The 
change of emphasis can be accomplished by either more conservative or more 
subversive means. Its more restrained form would resort merely to economic 
incentives and manpower training. Its more radical variant would begin by 
depriving mass-production industries of the legal- institutional devices by which 
they protect themselves against potentially fatal instabilities in the product, 
capital and labour markets. This more transformative sequel would culminate 
in a capital-allocation system more supportive of the teams of technical workers 
and manager-technicians that typically do the main work of vanguardist 
industry. The reconstructed mode of petty commodity production represents 
just such a system."
(1987, p.346).
The first alternative, the conservative one, would suggest the post- Fordist or regulationist 
scenario of 'flexible accumulation'. That is a regime based, say, on human resource 
management, the giant corporation, just-in-time inventory systems, multi-skilled core 
workers, and so forth. The second, more radical alternative would involve a whole new 
political settlement and 'regulatory regime'. Unger is quite clear that his programme for a
flexibly specialized 'radical democracy' is nowhere in place in the radical form which he 
envisages. It is a prescription for the future, rather than a description.
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This is something which there is endless confusion about and the worst offender is the 
academic Marxist critique which more often than not when it is writing about the transition 
from Fordism to post-Fordism argues in a manner which is, paradoxically, mechanical and 
automatic. Things are happening so the argument goes, but we do not know yet where things 
are going. Capital is an omnipotent Leviathan which evolves in a certain direction, propelled 
by mechanical forces. Rarely do these academic radicals suggest ways in which the 
productive system could be reorganized into other 'possible worlds'. They then make the 
automatic supposition that what Piore, Sabel et al are describing is some reality, rather than 
an emergent possibility. (A good example of this form of argument is Harvey's The 
Condition of Postmodernitv (1988). In this literature there is always a totally capital-centric 
form of theorizing which says little about alternative plans/policies for organizing 
production.
This can be demonstrated in more detail by examining Unger's political theory of 'flexible 
specialization' as a political theory of alternative social (and personal) and economic 
organization. Unger situates himself within the coordinates or the matrix of the classical 
tradition of political philosophising, triangulated by liberalism, socialism and communism:
"Nothing in the program worked out here represents a sharp break with the 
shared ground of the modem secular ideologies of emancipation ... All these 
doctrines emphasize the link between individual or collective empowerment and 
the dissolution of social division and hierarchy. All hold that such dissolution 
depends upon the remaking of practical institutions. They differ, of course, in 
their understanding of institutional reconstruction (a voluntary act? a reflection 
of underlying forces?), in their specific institutional proposals and their 
resulting evaluation of present society, and therefore also in their way of 
characterising the content of empowerment."
(1987, p.348).
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It differs in its enlargement of the sense of social possibility and the possibility in turn of 
'context revising' practices which make possible an escape from passive imprisonment with a 
particular framework of 'context-preserving' practices. Unger's argument recapitulates the 
one already made above about post-Fordist Marxism, that is his theory's intimate and 
fundamental connection between "explanatory and programmatic arguments", differs from 
deep-structure social theory in that here we are presented with a type of theory which makes 
"programmatic thought superfluous. There is no point in asking ourselves what society 
should become if history will tell us in the end what it becomes" (p.349).
In these circumstances Anderson's ability to provide compressed summaries of complex ideas 
is welcome:
"The programmatic proposals which ensue ... Unger criticizes what he sees as 
the modal type of Western liberal state for effectively paralysing significant 
change from above, and precluding it from below, by constitutional checks and 
balances originally and deliberately designed for the restrictive purposes of 
eighteenth-century notables. But he does not endorse any call for more direct 
democracy which he regards as little more than an imaginary inversion of the 
prevailing model. Instead he argues for 'dualist' constitutions conferring rival 
power and initiative on two centres of authority, president and parliament, 
favouring creative conflict between them, with rapid resolution of deadlocks by 
popular consultation. The principle of this conception is an 'overlapping' rather 
than separating of powers - extended to the creation of a special instance for 
ensuring the democratization of information inside and outside the state itself. 
So constructed, Unger's republic is designed to mobilize the democratic 
energies of its citizens rather than to neuter them. Yet its charter can be 
realized only if the economy is transformed. For 'such a democracy cannot 
flourish if the everyday world of work and exchange is organized in ways that 
not only differ from the principles of democratic government but limit their 
scope, undermine their influence, and disrupt their workings.' The target of 
Unger's critique here is the assimilation of markets as decentralized arenas of 
exchange, with property rights as absolute claims to divisible portions of social 
capital. The former are indispensable, for freedom and for efficiency; the latter 
are unacceptable mechanisms of inequality and privilege ... Unger's remedy is 
to transfer control over major productive assets to a 'rotating capital fund' 
which would desegregate property rights down through a tier of capital-givers 
and capital-takers - an ultimate social fund controlled by the government, 
leasing capital to autonomous investment funds operating in given sectors, who
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then auction or ration resources to competitive teams of producers, for 
stipulated periods. Breaking up consolidated property rights in this way would 
then encourage more flexible forms of work organization, characteristic of 
small or medium vanguard enterprises today [my emphasis]. The working of 
the market, in which capital-takers acts as 'unrestricted gamblers', would be 
buffered by welfare rights guaranteeing a minimum income for all."
(1992, p. 142.)
These proposals which Anderson summarizes are, however, significantly more complex than 
indicated For example, Unger argues that the State itself should be subject to fragmentation 
and division, even beyond the classical republican insistence (Montesquieu, Harrington, 
Toqueville, etc.) on the division of powers into legislative, executive and judiciary. For 
Unger this means the institution of three new branches of the state. These are: (1) an 
informational power. This branch of government would be charged with enlarging access to 
the means of communication, information and expertise; (2) a transformative power. This 
branch would be responsible for systematic intervention in all other state and social 
institutions. This power would have responsibility for the practical re-organization of major 
institutions, for changing their procedures, and their ways of handling technical, financial 
and human resources; (3) a sovereign programmatic power. This branch of government would 
be committed to implementing the transformative programme of the elected party in power.
It would be responsible for monitoring and steering the process of political and social 
transformation.
Unger's radical insistence on experimentation rejects all the classical conservative obstacles 
to reform which are best captured in Hirschman's rhetorical tropes in his book The Rhetoric 
of Reaction (1989). namely, perversity, futility and jeopardy. Mobilising the themes of 
Hirschman's earlier book, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments before the Rise 
of Capitalism (1987), it is further possible to argue that Unger is reintroducing passion into 
economic life and displacing the interests. At this point we can see more clearly the 
relationship between the explanatory and the programmatic dimension of Unger's argument in 
that the ontology of the self which is argued for in False Necessity, finds its concretization 
in the programme. As Anderson writes about this dimension:
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"Unger completes his programme by arguing that a transformation of personal 
relations is the necessary counterpart of institutional change. He calls this 
prospect 'cultural revolution' - significantly, the only time the latter acquires 
salience in his vocabulary. Its contours are much more elusive, in part because 
detailed treatment of them is deferred to a further volume on the 
'micro-structure of social life'. But two elements are already sketched. 
Interpersonal relations can be rewrought in the spirit of modernism by 
deliberate role- jumbling and confusion of expressive conventions, while the 
idea of a community should move from the seamless sharing of customary 
values to a heightening of mutual vulnerability, which accepts conflict as itself 
a positive value. Although these notions occur only as a tentative coda to 
False Necessity, they are of central importance to Unger, who insists that 
'qualities of our direct practical and passionate dealings always represent the 
ultimate object of our conflicts over the organization of society'."
(1992, p. 143)
However one interprets this concept of the personality theorised by Unger it is easy to see 
that the programmatic conclusions of his work illustrates that the FS thesis is fully embedded 
with the institutional, political, social and personal relationships of society and cannot be 
understood outside them. In this sense the term embedded flexible specialization can be used 
to highlight the fact that for Unger and for Piore and Sabel, whatever exists today is at best 
a transitional or interstitial form of FS arid not the hypothetically real, embedded sort. To 
use the term coined by Clifford Geertz, and increasingly used by radical geographers to 
describe industrial districts, localities and regions, embeddedness is a thick institutional 
relationship mobilizing local-knowledge.
A political and economic institutionalism
Unger (and Piore, Sabel, Zeitlin, Hirst) are firmly, then, in the institutionalist camp which is 
becoming increasingly a dominant progressive research programme within the social 
sciences. Institutionalism is a critique of the individualist assumptions of rational-choice 
theory and neo-classical economics on the one hand, and the economistic assumptions of 
various forms of Marxist analysis on the other. As Swedberg and Granovetter put it:
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"Economic action is socially situated and cannot be explained by reference to 
individual motives alone It is embedded in ongoing networks of personal 
relationships rather than being carried out by atomized actors. By network we 
mean a regular set of contacts or similar social connections among individuals 
or groups. An action by a member of a network is embedded because it is 
expressed in interaction with other people. The network approach helps avoid 
not only the conceptual trap of atomized actors but also theories that point to 
technology, the structure of ownership, or culture as the exclusive explanation 
of economic events."
(1992, p.9).
As I have shown, Hirst's trajectory from the rationalistic assumptions of Althusserian 
Marxism to the implicit Webenanism of the FS thesis is comparable in many ways with 
Unger's critique of 'false necessity' and 'deep-structure' social theorizing However, Hirst 
dispenses with the more metaphysical and speculative assumptions and jargon that Unger 
mobilises in his theorizing. The Romantic element which is so evident in Unger's writings is 
notably absent in Hirst's writing, although certain romantic motifs do appear in Hirst's appeal 
to 'possible worlds' and the importance of trust in economic and social relationships.
On the other hand though, both Unger and Hirst in their critique of Marxism have attempted 
to rescue forms of radical, anarchist and socialist traditions which have been marginalised by 
the dominance and hegemony in the twentieth century of Marxist forms of political, 
economic and social theorizing. It is well known that Marxism as a synthesis of theoretical 
knowledge has brooked no compromise with alternative forms of radical thinking which it 
has seen as competitors. From Marx's criticisms of Proudhon through to the theoretical and 
organisational struggle against the anarchism of Bakunin in the First International, Marxism 
has attempted to proclaim itself the sole radical agenda and source of theoretical truth. This 
refusal of pluralism and implacable hostility to other traditions of thought and action is 
something that has led to the collapse of Marxism as a political tradition at the end of the 
twentieth century. Its sins are being returned to it in the form of the dogmatic rejection of 
Marxism in its entirety by many intellectuals, especially in the former Soviet Union and in 
Eastem/Central Europe.
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Unger and Hirst (Giddens and Habermas could be included as well in their reconstructive 
endeavours) in their different ways, however, refuse this dogmatic response and do not reject 
Marxism, but utilize it while recognizing the importance of alternative traditions of thought. 
In Unger's case, the traditions to be redeemed and transcoded include utopian socialism, 
anarchism and social democracy. Unger collectively names this tradition petty-bourgeois 
radicalism and writes "I have found inspiration for the development of the economic 
proposals in the writings of nineteenth century publicists, especially Proudhon, Louis Blanc, 
and Lassalle" (p 628)
Unger's full explanation of how he plays one thinker off against another is worth quoting in 
full:
"I have also found inspiration for the development of the economic proposals in 
the writings of nineteenth century publicists, especially Proudhon, Louis Blanc, 
and Lassalle. A study of Lassalle's debate with Rodbertus and Marx proved 
especially helpful. Lassalle, an early leader of German social democracy, 
criticized as impractical and demobilizing Schulze-Delitzch's cooperativist 
ideas. Emphasizing the importance of access to capital, Lassalle advocated the 
establishment of state-supported cooperatives. Central government would 
supply the necessary capital and supervise the sector of producers' cooperatives, 
which would eventually out compete the private firms sector ... Lassalle's 
program gave new life to Louis Blanc's plan for industrial social workplaces, 
which in turn codified ideas current among radical circles and politically 
engaged skilled workers in the 1830s and 1840s ... Rodbertus criticized 
Lassalle's proposals as both impractical (because the producers' associations 
would not be able to compete successfully with private firms within an 
economy based on current principles) and unjust (because if the proposals did 
succeed, they would produce a new system of group privileges). In his parallel 
debate with Lassalle, Marx argued for the inefficacy of reform that failed to 
change and to replace, on a society wide basis, the laws of the capitalist 
economy ... Rodbertus drew gradualistic conclusions and Marx revolutionary 
conclusions from what was essentially the same argument."
(1987, p.629).
Unger replays the debate and no doubt Marx and contemporary Marxists would criticize 
Unger's ideas as petty bourgeois on the following grounds. The domination of the economy
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by producers' associations is simply a repetition of, to use Kolakowski's expression,
Proudhon's Utopia The cooperatives, even if they belonged to the workers, could only exist 
in a state of competition and the laws of the market would continue to operate with the 
inevitable crises, bankruptcies, and the concentration of capital. Furthermore, Unger's view 
of the State is contrary to the orthodox Marxist view that it is an instrument or structure 
which has to be broken and which, moreover, serves the dominant ruling class. However, as 
1 have argued, Unger attempts to overcome these criticisms by drawing upon Marxist 
criticisms mediated in the more reformist form of Rodbertus.
Whatever the criticisms that can be made of Unger's proposals, the Marxist criticism stands 
condemned, from a contemporary perspective, as being unrealistic in its hope for a perfect 
and rationalised economy without contradiction and conflict. As Robin Blackburn has shown 
in his essay "Fin de Siecle: Socialism after the Crash", the forms that socialism will take are 
varied and that the best we can hope for is a form of socialized market:
"An important socialist tradition, stretching in Britain from William Morris to 
Raymond Williams, has opposed the corrupting and destructive logic of 
pervasive commercialization and passive consumerism. Yet the market itself, 
in and through the reactions to it, also broadens the potential scope of human 
solidarity. Thus the market should be socialized not only 'from above', through 
the action of the state, but also 'from below', through the pressures of working 
collectives and communities."
(1991, p.227).
This is a message which finds resonance throughout the contemporary left as the idea of a 
totally rationalised and planned economy, a legacy of modernist enlightenment, is rejected in 
favour of a postmodern eclecticism regarding alternative economic forms. That is to say, a 
rejection of both the hegemony of the transnational multi- divisional corporation as the 
singular form of propulsive growth and its mirror image, the socialized and nationalized state 
owned economic form of organization.
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Hirst's ideas follow on from this form of political theorizing. That is, the recognition that 
socialist ideas have to be reconstructed on the basis of a rejection of the Marxist 
understanding of a simplified and rationalized for of economic calculation based on the 
dissolution of the commodity form. And further, like Unger the basis for this renewal can 
partially come from the revaluation of other radical thinkers and traditions outside Marxism 
While Unger looks to continental traditions of thought for the basis of this reconstruction, 
Hirst looks at the British tradition of 'associational' and guild socialism of G.D.H. Cole, 
Tawney and Laski (as well as North American pluralists such as Dahl) This tradition is not 
ignored by Unger, but his judgement about its inadequacy is more negative than Hirst's: 
"British guild socialism extended and failed adequately to reconstruct, the tradition of Louis 
Blanc and Lassalle" (p.629). Unger does not explain fully why this is, but it can be 
interpreted to mean that the British tradition is still caught in the aporias of the continental 
tradition and that the same criticisms that have been directed at Proudhon, Blanc and Lassalle 
can be directed at G.D.H. Cole et al Hirst, on the other hand, has nothing to say about the 
continental tradition (except Marx) and his reconstruction via British socialism is concerned 
solely with attempting to provide an alternative to Marxist forms of theorizing and policy 
proposals.
Hiist and practical theorizing
While Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today (two volumes) was concerned, as I have argued, 
with criticizing the epistemological foundations of Marxist discourse at a very high level of 
conceptual abstraction, Hirst's later writings are much more engaged with political and legal 
theory and policy formation/proposals. In a sense the earlier writings were a clearing 
operation which made the later work possible, and inaugurated at the same time, a break 
between the earlier theoretical abstractions and the later, more modest, practical 
philosophising. That is to say, a break between the search for episteme of the earlier 
writings and the acknowledgement that politics has more to do with the Greek concept of 
phronesis or political judgement. This move was announced in Hirst's first writings on law
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and ideology and in his essays in Marxism and Historical Writing (1985), especially 
"Labour's Crisis - Principles and Priorities for Social Reconstruction" and "Obstacles in the 
Parliamentary Road". But surprisingly these writings are purely pragmatic in the alternatives 
to orthodox Marxist and Trotskyist understandings of the 'British Crisis' that they offer, and it 
is only with his book Law. Socialism and Democracy (1988) that a coherent attempt to 
provide a practical political philosophy is made (engaging with the social democratic politics 
of the kind typified by Cole, Laski, Tawney, Crosland, Bernard Crick, David Marquand and 
John Dunn). And a later book edited by Hirst, The Pluralist Theory of the State (1992) has 
extended this argument considerably, culminating in 1993 with his book Associational 
Democracy (1993).
Hiist, secondary associations and democracy
Hirst argues for what he calls 'associationalist' forms of democracy which avoids the 
traditions of collectivism and statism, which Stephen Yeo has identified as the two other 
forms of socialist thinking and practice in Britain and by extension Europe. While Yeo 
argues that these terms are ideal type constructs rather than substantive realities, it is still 
useful to outline their main distinguishing features as developed political ideologies. In the 
1970s socialist discourse was dominated by 'collectivism'. The term was used to refer to a 
societal project where
"the factory relations of large-scale industry have been extended to giant, 
society-wide, transnational systems; where scientific knowledge has become a 
precondition and supervisor of production, subordinating hands to heads ... As a 
project or tendency 'collectivism' is deeply rooted in large-scale industry and in 
the divisions of labour which accompany it, regardless of the label used to 
describe the surrounding system as a whole. Doubtful about whether to 
welcome it as a 'stage' in history or whether to fight it directly, associationists 
have only just begun to identify collectivism clearly for what - and whose - it 
is."
(1993, p.240).
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Collectivism is not the solution to the problem and injustices of capitalism because it is part 
of the system itself - complicit with its logic and rationality, rather than in discontinuity with 
it - whether in the capitalist or socialist form. Unger makes much the same criticism of 
large-scale industry and collectivist attempts to cling on to the rationalized and 
bureaucratized social forms of societal decision-making.
The second form identified by Yeo is that of 'Statism' which refers to a "project or to a 
society in which the political and economic claws of private capital have been clipped but 
where ... the conditions for collectivism listed above do not obtain ... To cut a long story 
short, in statism a group ... without a direct base in material production, seeks to exercise 
control. It concentrates, perforce, on the circulation/distribution, rather than production"
(p.241). Statism is perhaps the most criticised form of socialism which has been identified 
by contemporary political philosophers. The whole revitalization of the concept of civil 
society and the argument that there is an absence of a Marxist theory of politics and the 
representative democratic state is fundamental, as is the whole discourse of 'anti- politics' that 
can be found in the discourse of Central/Eastem European opposition movements in the 
1970s and 1980s. In the context of the generalized critique of Marxist theorizing and 
political theory we can situate Hirst's own developing political theory.
Associationalism has links with the idea of non-statist form of socialism which develops a 
thriving and autonomous civil society or public sphere. Moreover, it has links with the form 
of radical pluralism associated with Robert Dahl. In Grahame Thompson's words:
"It is perhaps with the idea of 'associational socialism' as developed by Paul 
Hirst that the notion of FS has the closest contemporary affinities. But Sabel 
and Zeitlin link to the early Proudhonist notion of worker cooperatives, and 
discuss it with respect to other early socialist projects ... In its more 
contemporary guise, Paul Hirst has argued for the extension of the notion, to 
rid it of its solely productionist connotations, and promote associations as 
occupying the central spaces of social, political and economic life. The 
impetus for this reconceptualization of the idea has come from a number of
208
quarters. One of the most important of these involves what might be termed a 
'rediscovery' of the virtues of pluralism."
(1989, p.536).
Thompson contrasts the notion of pluralism and associationism with the neo-Marxist concept 
and strategy of heeemonv and in the process identifies hegemony as being a statist notion 
and political strategy. In Britain the strategy of hegemony (more idea than reality) has been 
most closely associated with the now defunct journal of the former Communist Party of 
Great Britain, Marxism Today Together with Stuart Hall's writings, Marxist Today 
introduced the Gramscian idea of the necessity for a fight for ideological and political 
struggles outside the state in civil society. At first sight this might seem like a paradigmatic 
anti-state strategy insofar as it rejects simplistic Leninist and social-democratic ideas of the 
state as instrument or subject to be captured by a 'war of movement' or frontal assault. It 
foregrounds the importance of culture and consciousness, of ideas and their practices, and so 
forth. In Hall's famous formulations from the dismal decade of the 1980s it made the left 
aware and cognisant with the emergence of 'authoritarian populism' or Thatcherism as a 
dominant ideological ensemble which had entered into social, cultural and political 
circulation Taking various modalities of materiality, sociologists influenced by this 
approach could identify its ramifications in, for example, the law and order sphere and 
economics, employment and work in the form of the 'enterprise culture' or the rise of the 
'yuppie'. However, it was still a statist strategy in the sense that the inheritance of Gramsci 
is still fatally complicit with the orthodox Marxist and Leninist theory of the party as 
vanguard or in Gramsci's phrase, 'Modern Prince'. Whatever attempts that have been made 
to recruit Gramsci into the democratic socialist camp it is unable to come to terms with the 
fact that Gramsci's Marxism still holds the totalising assumption that it is the role of the 
party's organic intellectuals to weld together an organic bloc, uniting infrastructure with 
superstructure and to tie together or 'suture' the webs of the social into a harmonious whole 
or, to use Gramsci's own aesopian expression, to create a regulated society.<l}>
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While this is not the place to give an exegesis of Gramsci's writings and their contemporary 
meaning it is easy to see that there is nothing in Gramsci's writings which provide a political 
theory for the present or even a sociology (which is not, of course, to devalue Gramsci's 
local insights and attempt to reconstruct Marxism). As Piccone has noted in his book Italian 
Marxism (1986) and in his review of the publication of the English language 
edition/translation of Ouaderni del Carcere:
"Consider Gramsci's theory of hegemony. Outlined before the advent of the 
culture industry - and Adomo- Horkeimer's devastating analysis of its impact 
on the development of revolutionary consciousness - Gramsci's speculation 
about the 'war of position' allegedly leading to the achievement of cultural 
hegemony and thus the creation of the necessary cultural preconditions for a 
revolutionary social transformation appear today as relevant as DC current for 
the development of modem electronics. Party intellectuals ... were to 
universalize workers' needs and aspirations in terms of a theoretical framework 
- Marxism - conducive to a qualitative alteration of predominant social 
relations. This process, however, was to take place through a mode of 
communication - direct contact, public forums, newspapers, pamphlets, etc. - 
which had already become secondary by the early 1930s with the advent of 
radio. The very form of the new modes o f communication, independent of any 
content, implied isolation, passivity and a kind of permanent sub- individuality 
conducive to mass manipulation by powerful centralized bureaucracies."
(1992, p.182).
Moreover, as Giddens has noted in his book The Nation State and Violence (1988) the 
historical opposition or dichotomy between the State and civil society cannot be sustained in 
the modem age where state agencies and bureaucracies have thoroughly colonized and 
restructured the 'private' and 'civil' sphere of society. Nevertheless, while it is necessary to 
insist on the fact that the state is implicated in all areas of the life-world or civil society and 
that the barriers between them are permeable it is still important to maintain the distinction 
as a normative idea and, to a certain extent, de facto reality if we are to avoid the error that 
Althusser introduced in his "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” essay, where the 
state in its ideological apparatuses modality was extended to all areas of society and the 
division between the public and private abolished. The mistakes that follow from this sort of 
neo-Gramscian analysis can be found in the writings of Laclau and Mouffe where their
understanding of the conditions of existence of 'radical democracy' conceal a traditional 
Leninist problematic.
As Thompson argues, then, in contrast to 'hegemonic' socialist strategies, associational 
socialism has a very different understanding of socialist strategy and calculation. "We can 
now contrast the idea of a 'socialist pluralism' to this notion of hegemony" (1989, p.536) 
argues Thompson and he explains that the origins of the notion of pluralism is not the 
simplistic liberal pluralism of American political science, but rather has its roots in the 
indigenous British tradition of pluralism which includes not only radical thinkers like Cole 
and Laski, but also conservative thinkers such as Figgis.
That pluralism is usually associated with conservative and liberal theory as mediated by 
North American political science is obvious and, moreover, is associated with anti-radical 
ideas needs to be corrected by the more recent interpretations of it as a radical theory that 
can correct some of the errors of Marxism. David Held in hupathbreaking Models of 
Democracy (1989) makes this turn as does Greggor McClennan in his Marxism and 
Pluralism (1990). Robert A. Dahl (1982) has also insisted that the traditional left has 
misinterpreted pluralism. In an appendix to his book The Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: 
Autonomy vs Control (1982) he argues that:
"I have been puzzled by the assertion sometimes made by critics of 'pluralist 
theory' that such a theory contends, or assumes, that all groups, interests, 
interest groups, and so on are equal or substantially equal in organisational 
capacities and access, or resources or power, or influence, or the like."
(p.207).
Dahl defends pluralism against what he considers unjust charges. He quotes Truman's The 
Governmental Process to the effect that "Several bodies of data, however, indicate: (1) that 
the frequency of membership in formal organizations of the association type increases from 
the lower to the upper reaches of the class structure, and (2) that the members of many if 
not most, such groups are drawn from the same or closely similar status levels”.
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In Hirst's interpretation of 'pluralist associationalism' the division between the state and civil 
society is dissolved, but not in the neo- Gramscian sense. Rather a more radical 
deconstructive enterprise is pursued whereby the substantial unity of the state itself is 
fractured into a number (a plurality) of institutional spheres of decision- making. As 
Thompson puts it:
"In this pluralist tradition the idea is to allow, and even encourage, the 
formation of as many different organisational voices and institutional entities as 
wish to form. A radically decentralised administrative and governing structure 
is envisaged. The usual liberal (and Marxist) conception of the separation of 
the state from civil society is dissolved within this conception as the state 
apparatuses eventually become just another set of associations."
(1989, p.536).
Thompson further argues that this is quite antithetical to ideas of hegemony. Hegemony, it 
could be argued, is too tied up with traditional notions of sovereignty whereby there is a 
hierarchically ordered tier of decision-making reaching to an apex or summit of power. 
However, if one "promotes a radical concept of associations ... allegiances are dispersed and 
sovereignty non-hierarchically ordered. A different, genuinely 'plural' system of 
govemmentality and regulation is needed. This can be fostered as 'associational socialism ..." 
(1989, p.537).
2 1 1
Associational democracy and flexible specialization
The connection between this form of associational democracy and FS is not sketched out in 
Hirst's political writings in any explicit manner. However, Thompson asks:
"Where does this connect to FS and its allied concepts? Clearly FS provides 
one of the preconditions for associationalism. The break up of the large-scale 
mass production firm - with its vertical, horizontal or multi- product 
integrations - presents an attractive proposition for those interested in 
associational socialism. If FS became the norm, the industrial districts and
212
regional economies it engendered - with their myriad of interconnected support 
mechanisms and interdependent associations - would represent an economic 
basis for the wider network of associations in which people could invest their 
other social and political activity."
(Ibid, p.537).
Thompson asks whether all this smacks of 'corporatism' and he acknowledges that it does in 
the sense that it attempts to build a consensus of trust and normative regulation (plural 
regulation) and integration., that is to say, to rebuild society on the basis of norms of 
reciprocity and solidarity. This can be interpreted as a form of Maussian or Durkheimian 
socialism in its foregrounding of solidarism and the importance of work and occupational 
communities (secondary associations) as the basis for the constitution of society.
Associations, regions and flexible specialization
It is necessary to read Durkheim through the lens of Marcel Mauss so as to highlight the 
aspect of Durkheim's writings which emphasize the democratic regulation and organization of 
the world of work and the public sphere itself. Thompson's gloss on Hirst's political ideas 
raises doubts that the nation-state (Durkheim's object of analysis par excellence) is an 
adequate social space for the development of such a system of solidaristic democracy or 
associational socialism. Thompson foregrounds, yet again, the importance and vitality of 
regional and local economies, strongly embedded in Polyani's (1957) sense, in the social 
structure:
"The enthusiastic reception of FS and allied concepts by those instrumental in 
developing the idea is based upon detailed analyses of the economic structure 
of various regional economies in Europe in particular, and to a lesser extent in 
the USA and Japan. Perhaps the premier of this regional economy emphasis 
concerns the case of Italy. Here it is the Emilia-Romagna region in the centre 
of the country that has attracted most attention. But this regional-based 
emphasis has been extended to the area around Lyon in France, to Southern 
Germany, to Jutland in Denmark and other places in Europe, and to Hollywood 
and Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in Massachusetts, and to the
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example of Sakaki in Japan". (Ibid, p.539). This argument ties in directly with 
Sabel's article on the emerging regional economies which has been examined 
above. Indeed, Hirst's (and Zeitlin's) writings on associational socialism 
presuppose a more locally based socio-economic structure and forms of 
political representation. However, while regional economies have been 
identified in continental Europe and in the United States of America there has 
not been much success in identifying similar localities, districts or regions in 
Britain. While Cambridge is often cited it is not a particularly good or 
successful example and has none of the romantic appeal of Emilia-Romagna.
Britain and industrial decline
Before I come back to the issue of regionalism and industrial districts it is necessary to 
observe that for Hirst in his book After Thatcher (1989) the key problem of the British 
economy and society is that of industrial, social and political backwardness. This 
observation is shared by many strands of political and intellectual opinion. The most cogent 
analysis from the left has been Anderson's analysis first in his "Origins of the Present Crisis" 
(1992) and reformulated in "Figures of Descent" (1992) and more recently in his closing 
chapter of his collected essays English Questions (1992). In his closing essay "The Light of 
Europe", Anderson writes on these debates and controversies with his usual synoptic verve:
"There is a standing answer to questions such as these within the repertory of 
the Left. Ever since the modernity of the British economy and the British State 
was first seriously called in question in the early sixties, socialists have been 
tempted to deny that the issue has reality or relevance ... Beyond a wealth of 
different local contentions, however, three tropes dominate it. In the style of 
Albert Hirschman's taxonomy of the rhetoric of reaction, but in a discourse of 
progress defining capitalism in England rather than condemning revolution in 
France, these might be called: priority - generality - purity. In one variant, the 
specificity of British capitalist society lies essentially in the fact that it came 
first in historical order - virtually everything distinguishing it followed from 
this early lead alone. In another, there is nothing special about British 
capitalism at all: it is rather a formation which exemplifies the international 
laws of the development of capital as a whole. In a third, what is peculiar to 
the United Kingdom is the purity of its native capitalism, as opposed to 
mongrel versions with more pre-capitalist strains elsewhere. The three lines of 
argument are logically distinct, but can coexist or overlap in particular polemics 
... What is common to the trio, of course, is minimization of all those social,
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political and cultural features of the British record which appears at variance 
with the rational dictates of capital."
(P 331).
Anderson restates the case for the specificity of the English state. He rejects Pollard's view 
put forward in Britain's Prime and Britain's Decline (1989), that the decline should not be 
dated back to late Victorian or Edwardian times and has rather more time for Alfred 
Chandler's view, expressed in Scale and Scope: the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism 
(1990), that the failure of British firms to develop the organizational capabilities necessary 
for competition in capital-intensive industries contrasted with the new organizational 
structures emerging in the United States and Germany with the rise of the 'visible hand' of 
the giant multi-divisional corporation.
This analysis can be theorized in many forms and although Anderson's analysis would at first 
sight dovetail in with Hirst's there are significant theoretical and political differences in the 
manner by which each writer theorizes the nature of Britain's origin and decline as an 
economic and political power. As Hirst has explained in his essays collected in Marxism 
and Historical Writing (1985), his initial sympathy with the New Left Review type of 
analysis exemplified in Anderson's "Origins of the Present Crisis" (1965) gradually 
dissipated as the Review turned to Trotskyist politics and eclectic importation of various 
Western Marxist writings. In his "hard hitting" review essay of Anderson's two books on 
state formation in Europe, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism and Lineages of the 
Absolutist State (1977), titled "The Uniqueness of the West", Hirst pinpointed a number of 
problems in Anderson's writing of history. First, the 'speculative empiricism' of Anderson's 
method whereby the destiny of the West is inscribed from its beginning in, to use the 
Parsonian term, the 'seed-bed' societies of Ancient Greece and Rome, mediated with the 
feudal era by the conduit of the Christian Church, is teleological:
"Anderson's method and his original conception of the strategy of the New Left 
Review form a unity. There is no real change in method between 'The Origins' 
and Passages-Lineages In both texts certain objects of analysis are ascribed to
215
a 'trajectory', to development from an origin. 'Trajectory' is inscribed within a 
narrative and the singularity of this narrative is defended and demonstrated by 
speculative empiricism."
(1985, p. 122).
Moreover, Hirst is opposed to what he views as the 'abstraction' and 'culturalisin' of the NLR 
strategy:
"Analysis provides no strategic guidance for action in the current situation 
That situation is ascribed its essential characteristics by a history. Given 
Anderson's method and commitment to socialism the paralysing effects of the 
past must be effective at the cultural level. Culture determines politics. If it 
did not then political practice would be necessarily impossible. The weakness 
of the left would be a necessary feature of the social structure British 
Capitalism bequeathed to us by the history of its formation. Culture, however, 
formed by the past, is capable of change - ideas can be imported whereas 
social structures cannot. The political backwardness of the British Left is 
ascribed to the cultural effects of a history, the effects of the absence of a class 
conscious bourgeoisie."
(ibid, p. 123).
Whether this is an accurate portrayal of Anderson's position today is debatable. On the one 
hand, his recent essay "Figures of Decline" (1992) gives a more materialist account of the 
nature of British society than his earlier "Origins of the Present Crisis" which did have 
markedly idealist and culturalist motifs to it.
Britain and the lack of flexible specialization
Nevertheless, in Anderson's understanding of the longue duree of the British crisis the 
solution involves some form of modernization of the whole structure of British society. 
Anderson refers to "three major types of regulative intelligence" in advanced capitalism since 
the Second World War, with a fourth sub-variant. First, the French technocratic form of 
regulation; second, the West German or Modell Deutschland corporatist form of regulation; 
the Japanese model forms a combination of the above two; third, the Swedish and Austrian
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form of social democracy. The uniqueness and singularity of Britain as a polity lies in the 
fact that there has been a "lack of any of these three possible correctors, once the process of 
decline became manifest" (1992, p. 191). However, this singularity is itself overdetermined 
by the larger forces of international capital movements and flows which place in crisis all 
forms of national regulatory regimes:
"Britain, then, not only witnesses the probable early beginnings in America of 
something like a vast repetition of the same historical process it has undergone, 
in the absence of the same gyroscopes it has lacked, but also perhaps the signs 
of its ultimate generalization throughout the advanced capitalist world. For the 
radical internationalization of the forces of production - not to speak of 
circulation - that defines the spearhead forms of capital in the final years of the 
twentieth century promises to render all national correctors, whatever their 
efficacy to date, increasingly tenuous in the future. In that sense, no bourgeois 
society - not even the last great classically national economy, Japan - will be 
immune from the unpredictable tides and tempests of an uneven development 
whose elements are acquiring a well-nigh meteorological velocity around the 
world, across all frontiers. The British crisis has no solution in sight; and 
perhaps the time in which one is possible, as a national recovery, has passed.
At the zenith of English capitalism, Marx declared that his portrait of it in 
Capital held a mirror of the future to the rest of the world. Now, towards its 
nadir, the superscription may read once again: De te fabula narratur."
(1992, p.192).
Hirst's understanding of the British crisis has points of similarity, but also, importantly, 
contrast and dissent from this viewpoint. On the one hand, he agrees that the British crisis is 
a structural one to do with the organization of the whole economy, society and polity. 
Furthermore, he agrees that some form of modernization is needed, of the 
political/constitutional framework and the social and economic framework of British society. 
And that this is a long-term rather than short-term conjunctural problem stretching back into 
the past. However, in line with his earlier criticisms of Anderson's work he would reject the 
teleological reasoning of Anderson's account and would foreground the importance of nodal 
points in the history of British society where change and transformation were possible and 
were for various reasons missed and not taken advantage of for various reasons. For 
example, Hirst places great emphasis on the last two decades as being crucial for the
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accelerated decline of the British economy. Decades when other countries introduced new 
flexible manufacturing systems and corresponding systems of regulatory institutions, but 
Britain stuck with its obsolete structure of mass production manufacturing and archaic system 
of management and training. In other words, not even a true Fordism, but to use Jessop's 
term a flawed Fordism or blocked Fordism. This argument should not be misinterpreted to 
mean, as Peter Nolan and Kathy O'Donnel (1991) believe, that Hirst ignores the longer view 
of Britain's decline, for in other writings, such as Hirst's After Thatcher (1988), this long 
history is recognised as being of vital significance at all levels of the British social structure 
(a point which is reinforced by Zeitlin's historical writing). The second point made by Nolan 
and O'Donnel, that Hirst ignores the wider international and political economy within which 
Britain is situated as a conduit for transnational capital is more to the mark. The continuing 
emphasis, which Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today inaugurated, on national economies 
seriously weakens Hirst's overall argument and separated him from Anderson's final remarks 
in "Figures of Descent".
The substance of Hirst and Zeitlin’s arguments in their Political Quarterly article "Flexible 
Specialization and the Competitive Failure of UK Manufacturing" (1989) can be summarized 
in the following seven points: (1) British firms catering for the mass market were absorbed 
in meeting UK domestic demand and are therefore still highly inefficient in delivering to 
foreign markets; (2) since the merger boom of the 1960s, British firms have been dominated 
by the belief that there are inevitable competitive advantages to large-scale firms (economies 
of scale); (3) British management is badly trained and bases its ideas on old-style low-trust 
Taylorist systems of management control; (4) British firms and governments have failed to 
develop an adequate framework of industrial training and skill shortages are therefore 
widespread, especially when there is an upturn in the economy; (S) where British firms have 
adopted new technologies and flexible manufacturing systems the results have been less than 
successful. As Bryn Jones has shown in his article "Flexible Automation and Factory 
Politics: The United Kingdom in a Comparative Perspective" (1989) British firms have not 
exploited the potential of the equipment and have tended to run it as if it were dedicated 
mass production machinery. For the majority of British firms, investment in such equipment
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is seen in terms of short-term cost savings and the reinforcement of labour control; (6 )
British policy-makers have believed in the virtues of 'competition' to the exclusion of 
'cooperation'. Hirst appeals to the concept of the public sphere, a concept popularised by 
Jurgen Habermas in his book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989).
For Hirst the 'public sphere' seems to mean a form of micro/macro corporation whereby 
relationships of trust and cooperation within the division of labour are established; (7) the 
final point Hirst makes is the absence in Britain of the industrial district and regional 
economy:
"Britain is thus an economy that has overconcentrated on mass production for 
given markets and has suffered differentially in international competition as a 
result. The causes of industrial decline are recent, but they also mean that 
traditional remedies for reversing industrial decline are ineffective and obsolete 
Traditional Keynesian policies to stimulate effective demand are ineffective as 
specific strategies to cope with de-industrialization and foreign import 
penetration."
(1989, pp 169-70).
A few words can be said about Hirst and Zeitlin's argument. First, the argument that flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS) have not been fully implemented in Britain seems to be a 
reasonable conjecture They cite a number of studies such as C. New and A Myers This 
can be further backed up by the research of Christel Lane (see her various articles and her 
book Management and Labour in Europe. 1987) which shows, from a comparative 
perspective, the differential success in implementing flexible specialization into Germany, 
France and Britain
Second, their espousal of FS is not adequately argued for and, in particular, it is not clear 
that mass production has been superseded as they suggest. Forms of flexible mass 
production are probably the evolutionary successor to old style mass production. Like Sabel, 
Piore and Unger, Hirst and Zeitlin have, again, the unfortunate tendency to confuse the 
imperative with the indicative A consideration of the arguments of Streeck's concept of
diversified quality production, Kern and Schumann's new production concepts, or the lean 
production concept would face Hirst with alternative ways of formulating the problem.
Their suggestion that some regions of Europe and North America are already operating 
flexible manufacturing systems and social systems, with the web of corresponding regulatory 
institutions of consensus and trust, is at odds with their more radical purpose of going 
beyond orthodox social democracy to a more 'radical democracy'. However, there is the 
implicit recognition in Hirst's writing that these new forms of regional economy are the 
beginnings of a process of transition to a more realized democracy, rather than the end-point. 
That is to say, an 'associational democracy'.
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Conclusion
Unlike Unger, Hirst does not go into full detail about the form and content of his alternative 
institutional arrangements, but, although there is plenty of room for disagreement with Unger, 
there are definite convergences, although Hirst's formulations suggest a more cautious set of 
formulations of what Unger calls the modest eclectic. The major point of agreement between 
them, however, is the recognition that a more fully realized radical democracy needs to be 
developed, linked with the invention of a flexibly specialized economic system. Both agree 
that false necessity has to be countered by the thesis of artifactualitv:
"Associations are not socially given but are in large measure the products of 
public policy. Associations' conditions of operation and the culture of 
associational relations with one another and with the state can be shaped by 
deliberate reform interventions by the democratic state."
(1992, p.474).
Both Unger and Hirst sketch out in more detail that Piore and Sabel the possible institutional 
contours and framework of a politics of FS, but there does not seem to be any reason to
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believe that Piore and Sabel would necessarily object to the main thrust of Hirst or Unger's 
political ideas, although local disagreements of emphasis are likely.
The major conclusion that has to be made then is the following. The FS school are 
attempting to develop a political, social and economic theory which goes beyond orthodox 
liberal individualism and reconnects with older, communitarian based, liberal republican and 
utopian socialist political traditions. Piore’s argument in Bevond Individualism (1995) is the 
contrast between "two individualist norms, a norm of individual autonomy in classic 
liberalism and a norm of individuality realized in a community of equals that is associated 
with the civic republican tradition" (p.193). However, despite Piore's attempt to connect up 
this tradition with the new identity politics in the United States, his paradigm of community 
is still very much dependent upon the idea of work-based collectivities and communities of 
which the Third Italy provides the ideal-type. Piore writes,
". .. The economic prowess of central Italy in particular is dependent upon 
communities of differentiated small firms...The firms in the community network 
share a common culture and language, a kind of dialect of production. They 
also share a variety of common institutional supports ranging from canteens 
and medical facilities to marketing mechanisms and to schools, training 
facilities, hiring halls, and of course, a common labour force. The worker 
loyalty that the large corporation tries to attach to itself is in central Italy 
attached to the local community and the collectivity of enterprises embedded in 
it."
(1995, p.190).
However, as shall be argued in Chapter Five, this dependence on worker collectivities has 
some problematic aspects of which the most important one is its over-dependence on the 
centrality of an obsolete, masculinely gendered, theory of labour, work and production as the 
foundation for a progressive politics. Neo-modemisaiion theory or theory of reflexive 
modernisation must be cognisant of the reductionism of this perspective, based, as it is, on a 
one-sided and out of date economic reason.
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REFERENCES; CHAPTER FOUR
1 Anderson's (1971) history excludes many important schools of Western Marxism. His 
thesis that Western Marxism retreated from politics into philosophy and aesthetics can only be 
maintained by suppressing the political tradition of Western Marxism. The Italian workerist' or 
operarist current, the French Situationists and the political group Socialisme ou Barbarie.
2 Aristotolians or neo-Aristotolians are too dependent on Hannah Arrendt's politics of 
separate spheres of poeisis. techne. and praxis (1958).
3 That the political theory of Lenin and the Bolshevists has nothing to offer, albeit in only 
negative terms, is one of the political lessons that has yet to be learned by some political 
organisations on the Left.
4 These distinctions are totally inadequate for understanding the social complexity of 
advanced industrial capitalist societies.
5 Richard Rorty (1991) has noted the homologous themes that can be found in Unger and 
Castoriadia. That is, the importance of the imagination creativity. The fundamentally contingent 
nature of the social world, and so forth.
6. Unger's term for his vision of society beyond social democracy.
7. Communitarianism is a complex political philosophy which finds its antipodes in John 
Rawl's Theory of Justice (1971) and Jurgen Habermas's Discourse Ethic. It is important to 
recognise that the label ’ communitarism' is not one accepted by some labelled as such.
8 Radical Democracy refers to the indeterminacy of politics as theorised by Claude Lefort 
( 1986), Chantal Mouffe (1992) and Ernesto Laclau (1992).
9 John Kenneth Galbraith's book The Culture of Contentment (1994) explores the theme of
exclusion'.
10. Unger's concept of 'negative capability' is taken from the poet Keats. But it means more 
or less the opposite from Keats's expression. Unger it means the capacity for the human being 
to change, transform and restructure social relationships.
11 These are Alain Touraine's terms for Unger's 'negative capability*. In contrast to 
functionalism and other necessitarian ideas (false necessity), Touraine argues that modern 
societies are characterised by an increased 'historicity'. That is to say, an increased capacity to 
act upon themselves. In other words, the increased space of contingency'.
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12 Unger creates an ideology that human nature' is best expressed in a formative context' 
that is constantly open to revision and change. Role-jumbling and flexibility are the key-words
here.
13 The critique of Gramsci's Marxism is long overdue. That Gramsci is a profound and 
innovative thinker is beyond dispute. However, his political philosophy fails to break adequately 
with Leninism Thus Hirst's rejection of hegemonic socialism for associationalist socialism
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5 . POLITICS. WORK. AND FLEXIBLE SPECIALISATION 
The paradigm of work
The FS thesis, as already argued, is part and parcel of what Alexander (1995) calls, a 
"fourth version of mythopoeic social thought" (p.87) (orthodox modernisation theory; 
dependency or world-system theory; postmodernism, namely, neo-modemisation theory). 
With its revalorisation of the market (albeit, socialised) the FS school are too dependent 
on a form of analysis which privileges the primacy of labour as a constitutive principle of 
society The FS thesis can only see a progressive politics which places an emphasis on 
transforming the work society. As Sabel represents the future of the United States, for 
example, depends upon reform of the economy: "The US economy seems stuck at a 
crossroads. For a decade, debate has insisted on a choice between two paths of economic 
adjustment The high road leads to a permanent innovation economy in which highly 
skilled workers use flexible machines to make products for more and more differentiated 
markets" (1995, p.5).
The FS hypothesis represents the place, position and role of work and employment in a 
way that has to be problematized and questioned. In common with Marxism and the 
sociological tradition of Durkheim and Weber, the FS hypothesis starts from the 
assumption that labour and work are the ontological and anthropological foundations for 
the constitution of society. For these traditions of thought, work and labour are the 
constitutive organizing and structure-forming principles of society. Society is literally 
built up, at the phenomenological level, by the metabolism that humanity enters into with 
nature. For Marx, from his earliest works such as the Philosophical and Economic 
Manuscripts of 1844 (1982), and Capital (1982) of 1867 we can find the common thread 
of praxis interpreted as labour being the anthropological principle which is the determining 
principle of societalization (Habermas, 1992; Heller, 1982; Honneth, 1991; Gorz, 1981, 
1989; Oflfe, 1988).'"
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For Durkheim cognate themes can very easily be traced, particularly in The Division of 
l ahour in Society (1893, 1933) and Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (1898, 1991).
For Weber, work and labour is fundamental in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1905, 1958), Economy and Society (1922, 1978) and The General Economic 
History (1923, 1992). The arguments of Piore and Sabel, Unger and Hirst and Zeitlin 
follow this tradition of conceptualizing the character of society through its work process 
And, moreover, o f  identifying work and labour as being at the centre or core of identity 
formation and self-realization. This can be shown by referring to Sabel's romantic 
expressionist reflections on high-technology cottage industry1:
"If you had thought so long about Rousseau's artisan clockmakers at Neuchâtel or 
Marx's idea of labour as joyful, self-creative association that you had begun to 
doubt their possibility, then you might, watching these craftsmen at work, forgive 
yourself the sudden conviction that something more utopian than the present 
factory system is practical after all."
(1982, p.220).
Or alternatively, Unger's reflections on the types of orientation to work and labour in 
modem society which he identifies in False Necessity (1987). And Piore's reflections and 
borrowing from Arendt reinforce this argument. Indeed, the central theme that runs 
through all the FS literature is the importance of organizing work in such a manner as will 
lead to a more satisfying relationship with labour within the employment relation.
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However, a number of objections can be directed at this labour or work society approach. 
First, as such sociologists as Habermas (1982), Offe (1988), Touraine (1988) and Gorz 
(1989) have pointed out it is not clear any more whether work and labour as the 
constitutive organizing principles of society are as important as they once were. The most 
forthright and controversial expression of this viewpoint is OfFe's who in an important 
article "The End of the Work-Based Society" (1988) has argued that this principle is 
declining as a force of social cohesion:
"If we consider the answers given between the late eighteenth century and the end 
of the First World War to questions relating to the organising principles of the 
dynamics of social structures, we can safely conclude that labour has been ascribed 
a key position in sociological theorizing ... Can we still pursue this materialist 
preoccupation of the sociological classics? ... It is precisely this comprehensive 
determining power of the social fact of (wage) labour and its contradictions which 
today has become sociologically questionable ... Labour and the position of the 
workers in the production process is not treated as the chief organising principle of 
social structures; the dynamic of social development is not conceived as arising 
from conflicts over who controls the industrial enterprise; and ... the optimization 
of the relations of technical-organisational or economic means and ends through 
industrial capitalist rationality is not understood in the form of rationality which 
heralds further social developments."
(pp. 129-132).
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In Offe's post-Frankfurt School theorizing, labour no longer has its radiating force in 
determining the fundamental relationships o f society. This is not to say that work, 
employment and labour are no longer of significance as we enter the leisure society', the 
'consumer society' or the 'postindustrial society, for all these things depend on the presence 
of employment as the principle of allocations of resources and their distribution. Indeed, it 
is easy to argue that work, labour and employment in their different modalities are still 
vital for the maintenance of society and its expanded reproduction as, for example, R E. 
Pahl has shown in his pioneering, albeit somewhat romantic book, Divisions of Labour 
(1984).|J| The question is not however about whether work is disappearing, although this 
is an important aspect of the question as Andre Gorz has forcefully emphasised in his 
successive books, Farewell to the Working Class (1981), Pathways to Paradise (1983) and 
The Critique of Economic Reason (1989). But more importantly, and a question which 
Gorz takes up as well, whether work is still the most important societal steering- 
mechanism and structuring factor for social consciousness and political action. Offe's 
stimulating essay is, of course, influenced by Habermas's reflections on the relationship 
between labour and interaction and 'system' and lifeworld'. The whole drift of whose 
writings are towards problematizing the traditional Marxist assumption that labour as 
Praxis is the anthropological, epistemological and ontological foundation. Against the 
reductionism of orthodox Marxism, Habermas has insisted on the importance of 
understanding society as structured both at the level of material production and symbolic, 
interactive and communicative action.
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By following this course Habermas is able to avoid the subject-centred reason of the 
earlier Frankfurt School who ended up viewing modernity as a totalized system of 
oppressions based on identitarian' logic. For Adorno modernity was like a Weberian 'iron 
cage, or in his own expression a giant work-house. Indeed, for Adorno Marx was 
ultimately complicit with this tradition of the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, in that 
communism, in Adorno's understanding, was the logical end-point of this vision 
Habermas in arguing for a model of society which examines other principles of social 
organisation apart from labour to question the sociology of the work society and it is from 
this theoretical tradition that Offe starts from in his article. Habermas has elucidated on 
these themes in his later work such as an excursus on the 'paradigm of production' in his 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1988) and, most importantly, in his 
essay/lecture "The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies".
In this talk which he gave to the Spanish Cortes in 1984, Habermas reflects on the decline 
of political and social utopias of the sort that emerged with the coming into being of 
modernity (first, the early utopias of the Renaissance: More's Utopia: Campanella's City of 
the Sun: Bacon's New Atlantis: second, the historical and prospective utopias of Mercier, 
Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Proudhon, Bloch). Today, however, Habermas observes we 
are witnessing the exhaustion of these utopian energies as society seems to be entering a 
state of crystalline rigidity' characterised by what Gehlen and other have called 
posthistoire.141
Beyond the utopia of wort* and production
Habermas writes:
"Today it seems as though utopian energies have been used up, as if they have 
retreated from historical thought. The horizon of the future has contracted and has 
changed both the and politics in fundamental ways. The future is negatively 
cathected; we see outlined on the threshold of the twenty-first century the 
horrifying panorama of a worldwide threat to universal life interests: the spiral of 
the arms race, the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons, the structural 
impoverishment of developing countries, problems of environmental overload, and 
the nearly catastrophic operations of high technology are the catchwords that have
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penetrated public consciousness by way of the mass media ... What is at stake is 
Western culture's confidence in itself."
(1992, p.51).
Although this was written at the height of the 'Second Cold War' of the mid-1980s and the 
political scene has changed dramatically, it has not led to the resurgence of confidence in 
the future or to a renewed optimism on the part of the intellectuals. Indeed new problems 
and hitherto hidden pathologies have emerged to take place of the old one. However, it 
should be noted that in his recent essay, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some 
Reflections on the Future of Europe" (1992), Habermas is more optimistic and writes:
"Until the middle of the eighties, history seemed to be gradually entering that 
crystalline state known as posthistoire ... In the iron grip of systemic constraints, all 
possibilities seemed to have been exhausted, all alternatives frozen dead, and all 
avenues still open to have become meaningless. This mood has changed in the 
meantime. History has become mobilized; it is accelerating, even overheating.
The new problems are shifting old perspectives and, what is more important, 
opening up new perspectives for the future, points of view that restore our ability 
to perceive alternative courses of action."
(1992, p .ll).
Habermas argues that the classical utopias with their depiction of a life of dignity and for 
socially organised happiness no longer have force because of the end of a particular form 
and representation of utopia which based itself on the potential for a society based on 
socially organised labour:
"The classical social theorists from Marx to Max Weber agreed that the 
structure of bourgeois society was stamped by abstract labour, by the type 
of labour for payment that is regulated by market forces, valorized in 
capitalistic form, and organized in the form of the business enterprise. 
Because the form of this abstract labour displayed such power to colonise 
all spheres and put its stamp on them, utopian expectations too could be 
directed towards the sphere of production, in short, to the emancipation of 
labour from alien control. The utopias of the early socialists took concrete 
form in the image of the phalanstery, a labour-based social organization of 
free and equal producers. The communal form of life of workers in free 
association was supposed to arise from the proper organization of 
production itself."
(1992, p.53).
For Habermas this utopian idea of a society based on social labour has lost its persuasive 
power because, as Offe has argued, labour no longer has the same structure-forming
effects.
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Gore: a utopian post-Fordism
Another reference point in contemporary social and political theory for Habermas is, as I 
have already mentioned, Andre Gorz. Habermas argues that in the rare instance that a 
writer appeals to utopian theme and horizons as in the case of Gorz(S| it is no longer 
labour which is at the centre: "Andre Gorz's Paths to Paradise (1983) will find this 
diagnosis confirmed. Gorz bases his proposal to disengage labour and income through a 
guaranteed minimum income on the ending of the Marxian expectation that self-directed 
activity and material life could still be one and the same" (P-53) Gorz takes up these 
themes in his various writings which have produced some controversy. A brief review of 
Gorz's intellectual trajectory shows that he once had a vision of a society or utopia of self 
directed and self-organised labour. His book Strategy for Labour (1963) which was 
published in the 1960s looked forward to a situation where the working class or as he put 
it, the new working class of technicians and cadres theorized by Serge Mallet and others 
would through a process of revolutionary reforms and take over the o rganisation of 
society. The move beyond this vision and perspective was gradual and faltering. His 
writings on the division of labour and later on the ecology movement introduced themes 
that placed the utopia of autonomous labour in question, but it was only with his great 
iconoclastic book, Farewell to the Working Class (1981) that a full break with this 
tradition was accomplished and which would find its summation in The Critique of 
Economic Reason (1989).
With such theorists as Habermas and Touraine, Gorz believes that the actor or agency of 
potential societal transformation, which the working class was once thought to represent, 
has disappeared. To use Habermas's phrase ' revolutionary self-confidence and theoretical 
self-certainty’ that the proletariat would be the exclusive agent of change has been replaced 
by the suspicion that other agents and social forces are beginning to occupy the social
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landscape as the paradigm of production and praxis becomes part of our political and 
theoretical history. Gorz's argument can be summed up in the following manner: 
Traditional Marxist theory assumed that capitalist production would generate the 
conditions for revolutionary change, i.e., a large working class. This class was also to be 
sufficiently united and qualified to carry out the revolutionary task. It was forced to seek 
social changes, and it knew its goal: socialist society. It is not a question of the proletariat 
no longer existing, but of surrendering a conviction: that the proletariat is the exclusive 
agency of historical change. The changed role of the working class is related to changes 
in the political and social structure: (a) the working class has been increasingly integrated 
into bourgeois society; (b) society is beginning to run out of work; and (c) new attitudes 
towards work lead to a declining importance of trades in the formation of personal 
identity.
Touraine and post-industrialism
Touraine in his various writings comes to a similar conclusion and he observes in his own 
elegy and farewell to the proletariat, The Workers' Movement (1988) that:
"The workers' movement, throughout the history of industrial society, has never in 
fact seen itself as involved simply in a struggle internal to the industrial system 
within which it enveloped, but appealing to Reason, Progress, History, and the 
objective laws and contradictions of capitalism, it has always had a profound belief 
in the direction of history, seen as successive stages among which capitalism is to 
be followed by a classless society when humanity would at last emerge from pre­
history into history. But who still believes in those ideas? Revolutions all over 
the world have created regimes which call themselves socialist, but there is no way 
in which they can still be identified with the workers, movement even in those 
instances where the workers' movement in fact contributed to the regime's 
establishment."
(p.291)'61
In fact, many other theorists on the radical left share these views apart from the ones 
mentioned here. In some instances, as with Negri and Guattari, the potential revolutionary 
subject is extended far beyond the classical social figure of the factory proletariat to the 
socialised worker, a vague, amorphous and unsatisfactory theoretical and political solution.
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While for Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1992) the agency is never a given, but is rather the 
effect or the result of the articulation of subject-positions which can never be given in 
advance.
ITie deconstruction of the utopia of Labour
All these reflections, then, share Habermas's insistence on the end of the utopia of labour 
which, in a paradoxical form, has been revived by the FS thesis. Although Piore, Sabel, 
Unger, Hirst and Zeitlin have criticized and problematized many features of classical 
Marxism they still share the assumption that work and labour can be meaningful and that 
heteronomv and alienation can be transcended by reappropriating lost capacities in 
controlling work and gaining autonomy in one's labour. However, these assumptions are 
the most problematic aspect of the FS argument which Gorz in The Critique of Economic 
Reason. Oskar Negt in his article "Utopia and Labour" and, more problematically and 
hyperbolically, Baudrillard in The Mirror of Production (1976) has questioned with such 
force
Gorz's The Critique of Economic Reason (1989) is a full frontal attack on a number of 
targets. First, it criticizes the arguments of postmodernism that reason and rationality must 
be deconstructed, arguing the contrary position that has also been put forward by Ulrich 
Beck (1992) that:
"What we are experiencing is not the crisis of modernity. We are 
experiencing the need to modernize the presuppositions upon which 
modernity is based. The current crisis is not the crisis of Reason but that of 
the (increasingly apparent) irrational motives of rationalization as it has 
been pursued thus far ... The current crisis is an indication of the need for 
modernity itself to be modernized, to be included reflexively in its own 
sphere of action: for rationality itself to be rationalized What 'post­
modernists' take to be the • . - the crisis of Reason is in reality the 
crisis of the quasi-religious irrational contents upon which the selective and 
partial rationalization we call industrialism - bearer of a conception of the 
universe and a vision of the future which are now untenable - is based."
(1989, p.l)
232
Gorz explicitly refers to Beck's thesis on reflexive modernization. Ulrich Beck himself in 
The Risk Society - On the Wav to Another Modernity (1992) has reinforced these 
observations by arguing that the postmodern discourse is the expression of sociological 
helplessness: "'Post' is also the expression of mental laziness in sociology" (p.8 6 ). From 
these observations Gorz builds up his own theory of the conditions necessary for the 
'reflexive modernization, of modernity which focus on the critique of economic reason and 
of the classical labour-based utopias:
"The utopia which has informed industrial societies for the last two hundred 
years is collapsing. And I use the term utopia in its contemporary 
philosophical sense here, as the vision of the future on which civilization 
bases its projects, establishes its ideal goals and builds its hopes. When a 
utopia collapses in this way it indicates that the entire circulation of values 
which regulates the social dynamic and the meaning of our activities is in 
crisis. This is the crisis we are faced with today. The industrialist utopia 
promised us that the development of the forces of production and the 
expansion of the economic sphere would liberate humanity from scarcity, 
injustice and misery: that these developments would bestow on humanity 
the sovereign power to dominate Nature, and with this the sovereign power 
of self-determination; and that they would turn work into a demiurgic and 
auto-poietic activity17' in which the incomparably individual fulfilment of 
each was recognized as both right and duty - as serving the emancipation of 
all. Nothing remains of this utopia ..."
(1989, p 8).
Pualization. polarization, marginalisation
In chapter 6 , "The Ultimate ideology of Work", Gorz confronts what he believes is the 
current ideology of work in the present era - human resource management - which is the 
latest embodiment and manifestation in capitalist form of the labour utopia. Starting from 
the history of this ideology in the work of the human relations theorists and its practical 
embodiment in the co-management plans of the 1940s such as the Scanlon Plan, through 
to the contemporary discourse of 'Japanisation', Gorz shows the ideological nature of these 
policies and discourses. Far from liberating the worker from heteronomy and alienation, 
the ideology of human resource management (HRM) is a capillary and molecular form of 
power, the 'ultimate ideology of work/employment'.
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Commentating on the case of Japan, Gorz reveals the preconditions for the reproduction of 
such a system as the Japanese economy and society. Namely, that it depends on the 
policy of dualization whereby Japanese firms are only to guarantee their employees jobs 
for life by subcontracting out the manufacturing and services which they, as parent 
companies, have no vital interest in undertaking themselves, to a vast network of satellite 
companies. These subcontracting enterprises cushion the parent company from 
fluctuations in economic conditions: they employ and dismiss their workers according to 
changes in demand, and the fact that their employees often have no union of social 
protection whatsoever means this can be accomplished with great speed. Job security in 
the parent companies is matched bv unstable employment and social insecurity throughout 
the rest of the economy. Employment for life and social integration are privileges 
reserved for a male elite (about 25 per cent of Japanese employees in 1987, a figure which 
is decreasing markedly as older workers are encouraged to retire early and are not 
replaced). They are only compatible with economic rationality within the framework of a 
dual society. The social division (or dualization') has been the dominant characteristic of 
all industrialized societies since the mid-seventies.
Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize that the existing form of work organization and the 
labour process in Japan is not, as is sometimes thought, a flexibly specialized alternative 
to Fordism, as argued for example by Friedmann in his book The Misunderstood Miracle 
(1990), but rather an internal modification of Fordist principles creating even greater 
instrumental rationality in the form of lean production'. As Dohse, Jurgens et al have 
written:
"Like in the West, work is organized according to the assembly-line 
principle, is repetitious, consists of shortcycles, and is subordinated to 
centrally planned time standards. The - frequently exaggerated - allocation 
of indirect production tasks to production workers do not fundamentally 
change the character of work and can be regarded as an advanced 
rationalization of indirect production activities".
(1994, p.141).
More to the point, Gorz's observations on the Japanese system can be said to be out of 
date as the system is coming under some pressure as the global economic crisis deepens.
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For example, the system of manpower management developed in the sixties and seventies 
that has served Japan so well is currently undergoing a gradual transformation. Even 
before economic and demographic conditions made it obvious, perceptive Japanese 
observers pointed out the inherent weaknesses of 'Japanese management'.
However, despite these local criticisms, Gorz's conclusions that a process of dualization is 
deepening is supported by much current social scientific theorizing and empirical research. 
For example, the work of post-Fordist researchers such as Soja, Harvey, Lash and Urry 
and Davis have evidence and argument to support this thesis, as do researchers like 
Therbom who uses the term Brazilianization18* (Gorz uses the term South Africanisation). 
In Britain, sociologists such as Ray Pahl and Claire Wallace (1984) have insisted on the 
fact that polarization is taking place between those who monopolize work and employment 
and those who are increasingly excluded from the work/employment society.
On the theoretical level, Goldthorpe has put forward the view that dualization is 
increasing , albeit differentially, in all advanced industrial societies:
"If the foregoing analysis is accepted, then corporatist tendencies may be 
thought of as a response to the current problems of western economies of an 
'inclusionary' kind: the increased power of major economic interest groups - 
and of organized labour in particular - is offset by institutional 
developments designed to involve these interests in both the formation and 
the implementation of economic policy ... However, to view corporatist 
arrangements in this way is at the same time to become aware of the 
possibility of a response on quite contrasting 'exclusionary' lines: that is one 
which would entail offsetting the increased power of organized interests by 
the creation expansion of collectivities of economic actors, within the sphere 
of production, who lack effective organization and indeed the basic 
resources and perhaps motivations from which such organization might be 
developed. Tendencies indicative of a response of this kind maybe 
described as ones in the direction of dualism".
(1992, p.329).
Goldthorpe's observations are made in the spirit of an attack on the classical liberal 
industrial society thesis of Kerr which is, of course, a target of Sabel's criticism in Work 
and Politics (1982). The major criticisms of the industrial society thesis are reviewed
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above but Giddens has given a fairly accurate synopsis of them relating to the critique of 
the 'orthodox consensus' in post-classical sociology:
"These views, which were developed in a political context of progressive 
liberalism, during a phase of relatively stable economic growth in Western 
capitalism, now appear almost archaic, following a period of heightened 
political and economic conflict. Indeed, they may now be interpreted as a 
cautionary tale of the perils of overgeneralisation in social analysis "
(1982, p.235).
The alternative viewpoint that there are significant diversities, between and within societies 
put forward by Goldthorpe and others can not dissimulate the fact that some sort of 
generalisation always has to be made and it is hard not to come to the conclusion that 
although the process is proceeding at different rates and in significantly different ways in 
advanced industrial capitalist societies, the dualization hypothesis has a certain universality 
to it.
To summarize these new lines of division and of cleavage in the following five points: (1) 
division between workers in weak and strong sectors; (2 ) division between workers in 
weak and strong firms, (3) the division between workers in large and small firms; (4) the 
division between workers in competing production units, (S) the division between the ins 
and outs'. Most importantly it is necessary to recognise the specifically gendered and 
racialized character of these processes, something which is often scandalously neglected by 
the FS school of research.
Thus Gorz's 'dualization' thesis finds much support in a wide range of social scientific 
writings The relevance of this thesis for understanding work and employment today is 
emphasised by Gorz when he discusses the meaning of human resource management and 
the hypothesis of Piore and Sabel. For although Sabel's critique of the industrial society 
thesis allowed for the possibility for increased dualist tendencies the logic of the FS 
argument is to suggest that once industrial capitalist societies jump on to the learning 
curve of flexible technologies they will enter a new phase of prosperity and, given the 
right kind of institution-building, will be more egalitarian (the artifactual argument). But 
there is no escaping the logic of the argument which suggests that FS is a form of
2 3 6
adaptive upgrading towards a post-industrial society (despite the epistemological comments 
of Hirst and Zeitlin). Thus there is a constant slippage to be found in the writings of the 
FS thesis between artifactual and necessitarian form of argumentation and, moreover, a 
constant conviction that the politics of FS gives primacy to the conditions of labour as the 
centre for human liberation.
Flexible specialisation and human resource management191
The contrary suggestion well summarized by Slavoj Zizek that the "world today is more 
and more marked by the frontier separating its insiders from its outsiders, between the 
developed, - those to whom human rights, social security and the like apply - and the 
others, the excluded" (1992, p 21). Gorz takes up this theme when he observes that the 
arguments of human resource management serve an ideological purpose and function: "the 
ideology of 'human resources', typified - almost caricatured - by the 'integrated, multi­
dimensional, human enterprise', conceived as a site for the blossoming of individual and 
collective initiatives and thus an engine of social and economic progress ... 11  (p.6 6 )" 
conceals the fact that it is only a minority of workers who 'benefit', from it. Using Kern 
and Schumann's studies on the 'reprofessionalization', of labour, Gorz notes that the 
factory with the highest degree of robotized production in Europe (Volkswagen) has, at the 
most, only one thousand workers of this new kind in a workforce of a hundred thousand 
Gorz concludes by arguing that the
"image of the enterprise as a place where employees can achieve personal 
fulfilment is therefore an essentially ideological invention. It conceals the 
real transformations that have taken place, namely that enterprises are 
replacing labour by machines, producing more and better with a decreasing 
percentage of the workforce previously employed, and offering privileges to 
a chosen elite of workers, which are accompanied by unemployment, 
precarious employment, deskilling and lack of job security for the majority.
The advance of technology has thus resulted in the segmentation and 
disintegration of the working class. An elite has been won over to 
collaboration with capital in the name of the work ethic; the great mass of 
workers have become marginalized or lost their job security".
(ibid 14, p.6 6 ).
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Drawing upon the work of a German trade-union researcher, Wolfgang Lencher, Gorz 
concludes that enterprises are adapting a flexible strategy which divides the workforce into 
three sectors or groupings: (1) The stable core must accept occupational mobility and 
which is functionally flexible and which are the target of human resource management 
strategies; (2) The peripheral workforce which are numerically flexible; (3) The external 
workforce, which includes extremely highly skilled professionals, as well as workers with 
no particular skills and the large, fluctuating workforce occasionally employed by 
subcontractors. Gorz argues that these growing divisions and process of social 
polarization means that solidarity between workers can only be forged if it breaks 
completely with the ideology of 'human resources:
"Now this creation of solidarity is only possible if we break with the work 
ethic and with what I have termed the utopia of work. This utopia - and, 
equally, its philosophy o f productivity, hard work and professionalism - is 
devoid of all humanistic content in which work is no longer the major 
productive force and in which, therefore there are not enough permanent 
jobs to go round. In such a situation, the glorification of hard work and the 
assertion that working and living can be one and the same thing, is an 
ideology which can only be held by a privileged elite which monopolizes 
the best-paid, most highly skilled and most stable jobs and justifies doing so 
on the grounds of its superior abilities. The ideology or work and the ethics 
of effort therefore become a cover for ultra-competitive egoism and 
careerism: the best succeed, the others have only themselves to blame ... If 
we are to prevent the 'South Africanisation' of society, we find another 
utopia".
(ibid 1989, pp.70-71).
Return of the work ethic?
For Gorz, then, and for other researchers such as Oskar Negt (see Rabinbach, 1990), the 
new ideology of work and the revalorization of the work-ethic which can be found in the 
writings of Kern and Schumann and Piore and Sabel et al, has to be countered by another 
utopia which will transcend the utopia of labour and the 'work-society,. For despite the 
arguments of Ingelhart and others on the emergence of 'post-materialist values' in 
'postindustrial societies', it does seem to be the case that, paradoxically, given Offe's, 
Habermas's, Negt's and Gorz's arguments about the end of the work-society and the 
structuring efficacy of the work ethic, the eighties and the early nineties have seen the
themes of'enterprise', entrepreneurialism' and the morality of work and effort firmly 
established within the 'social imaginary' (see Pahl 1995).
The evidence is not conclusive but I can agree with Michael Rose when he argues in his 
much neglected book, Re-workine the Work Ethic (1985) that there is no evidence for, 
first, the general disenculturation thesis: that is, the argument that the work-ethic is being 
abandoned, the most highly developed form of the hypothesis being the argument that as:
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"one of the virtually inevitable consequences of a move towards a 
postindustrial society in which a previously ‘sacred1 link between work and 
social activity is dissolved because individuals will take for granted their 
own high standard of living, whilst production of goods is automated, and 
employment shifts towards work environments where much effort has to be 
devoted to games between people in which each player attempts to nurture 
and develop his or her own ego. Work values, along with culture as a 
whole, are, in this perspective, modified because the immediate material 
threat is removed".
(1989, p.15).
New Age capitalism" 01
This line of inquiry is associated with the postindustrial' and 'post-materialist' argument 
which we find in Beil (1972) where the argument is that what characterizes the new work 
environments based on information technologies is not a 'game against nature' or 'against 
fabricated nature', but rather a 'game between persons'. It is a Goffmanesque world of 
'role-players', 'role-takers' and varied strategies of 'presenting the self in the dramaturgical 
postindustrial service economy. However, more recent research has shown that these 
developments do not necessarily mean the end of the work-ethic, but rather the 
colonization of social life by therapies and management theories which articulate or suture 
apparently incompatible discourses with the process of capital accumulation and 
valorization. Rose's critique of the cultural disenculturation thesis (and the constrained 
recommitment thesis) and his own more empirically sensitive alternative, the differential 
reconstruction thesis backs this argument up.
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However, although Rose's thesis that the work ethic has been held by groups of workers in 
differential and varied ways in different historical periods is a more sensitive sociological 
sensitising concept, it doesn't adequately capture the characteristic uniqueness of the 
postmodern present where narcissism and 'New Age' philosophies can quite easily be 
united with a revalorized work ethic. As Heelas has argued:
"Expressivism ... has evolved some way since the counter-culturalists 
rejected the mainstream. During the 1970s it appeared to Bell, as to others, 
that the quest within was gravely undermining commitment to capitalist 
endeavour. Yet New Agers' cum radical expressivists are now employed by 
mainstream companies to unleash human potential in order to create better 
managers and workers. In measure, New Age capitalism serves to solve the 
'cultural contradiction', which so worried Bell. The idea that work is 
liberating and fulfilling enables some to believe that there is no need to 
disengage or 'drop out' in order to pursue the quest for what lies within."
(1992, p. 161).
In his book America (1986), Baudrillard argues in much the same manner showing that in 
what he calls the 'post-orgy' societies of the advanced industrial societies, the liberationist 
ideas of the 1960s have been articulated in the new work environments of Silicon valley: 
"Reduced pace of work, decentralization, air conditioning, soft technologies. Paradise.
But a very slight modification, a change of just a few degrees, would suffice to make it 
seem like hell".(p.46).
New economic sociology and woiR
While Baudrillard's analysis is perceptive it has little explanatory value and therefore 
needs to be taken further by examining the conclusions of theorists working within the 
paradigm of the new economic sociology. In their introductory article to the new 
economic sociology, "The paradigm of economic sociology", Swedberg, Himelstrand and 
Brulin (1992) argue the following:
"During the 1960s and the early 1970s an increasing amount of attention was 
focused on the need to democratize the workplace. Today, however, the climate of 
opinion has changed and one example of this is the popularity of a new type of
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managerial philosophy which has found expression in such works as William G. 
Ouchi, Theory Z. Deal and Kennedy, Corporate Cultures and Peters and Waterman, 
In Search of Excellence. The main message of these works is that a company, in 
order to be successful, must develop a strong sense of self-motivation among its 
employees. The managers are no longer supposed to just take care of the business 
side; the key to real success (.excellence,) is to instil a sense of purpose in the 
employees and thereby to get them to put in that extra bit o f effort."
(1987, p.194).
Swedberg et al argue that the orthodox neoclassical theory of the firm cannot provide an 
adequate analysis, for in neoclassical theory the enterprise is treated as a black-box, where 
little can be said about managerial philosophies. More specifically, the neoclassical 
emphasis on the individual actor fails to acknowledge the fact that all economic 
interactions take place in complex social situations, where the social actors are related to 
one another in intricate social networks of varying complexity. In short, economic 
interaction is embedded in a wider series of social relationships. Drawing upon 
Granovetter's analysis, Swedberg argues that:
"Granovetter's analysis can thus help explain what some employees find 
valuable in the new managerial philosophies': the pleasure of being part of 
an active social network, the joy of collective purpose, and so on ... 
According to Bowles analysis, which is explicitly launched as an alternative 
to neo-Hobbessian' theories of authors like Williamson, there exists a 
conflict in capitalist firms over the intensity of labour; the employer can do 
better than to simply hire workers and let them work as they please. The 
reason for this conflict is that the employer pays for the time of work as 
opposed to the amount of work. That the new managerial philosophies with 
their emphasis on highly motivated employees would be a perfect solution 
to this conflict is obvious. With no additional supervision, the employees 
can be made not only to work hard but extra hard - a nice bonus for 
management.”
(p. 194, 1992).
Thus, Human Resource Management can be read and interpreted as a way of integrating 
the insiders into the corporation. In short, it is part of the whole contemporary process of 
irrational reenchantment. Thus to conclude,
"Precisely at the moment when the workplace is becoming more 
rationalised, more technologically intensive, more automated and more
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controlled, managers are turning their attention to the irrational side of 
working life and making the ineffable realm of human values and 
motivations the conspicuous object of their concern. They are attempting to 
define yet another utopian language of management whose key words are 
not so much rationalisation' and 'control' but 'trust' and 'commitment', 
'participation' and 'humanization'."
(1987, p. 194).
(ioiz. liberation, and the critique of flexible specialization
The new managerial ideology of human resource management is attempting to define a 
new 'utopian' language of labour dovetails in with Gorz's criticisms of the project and his 
critique of the latest forms of work':
"Does the general rise in levels of qualification and the increase in 
autonomy at work also signify that the unity of working and living, 
occupational culture and culture in general will be created? Is it true, as the 
proponents of the utopia of work and number of left-wing authors - such as 
Kern and Schumann in West Germany, Sabel and Piore in the United States 
and Mike Cooley in Britain - maintain, that the reskilling of industrial 
labour will eliminate its heteronomy, restore humanity's mastery over 
machines, promote the full development of our human faculties within our 
work and give workers back their sovereignty? The answers one gives to 
these questions will vary according to the dimensions one takes into 
accounts.
(1989, p.78).
The dimensions which Gorz identifies are the following: (a) the organization of the labour 
process; (b) the relation with the product to be produced; (c) the content of work, that is, 
the nature of the activities and the human faculties it requires. These dimensions map 
onto the classical idea of alienation that we find in Marx's The Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts (1982) and the modem critique of the labour process and the 
degradation of labour. For Gorz, work only becomes autonomous activity if the following 
conditions are met: (a) it is organized by those performing it; (b) it consists of the free 
pursuit of a self-appointed aim; (c) it is fulfilling for the individual performing it.
Contrary to the orthodox Marxist view that these dimensions of autonomous activity can 
be reappropriated in forms of workers' control, or the view of HRM and Kem, Schumann,
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Piore and Sabel et al that forms of reprofessionalised labour can regain autonomy, Gorz 
argues that: (a) working in autonomous groups which overcomes Taylorism does not, 
however, eliminate heteronomy, but merely displaces it; (b) the alienation from what they 
produce, is in certain respects, "even more complete here than in the Taylorised factory. 
The specialised skilled workers in these multi-skilled groups no longer hand the producers, 
know-how which, in spite of everything else, unskilled workers still possessed: they never 
come into direct contact with the product or semi-finished product, that is, with the actual 
materials" (p.79); that the reprofessionalised workers of Kern and Schumann and Sabel 
and Piore are not fulfilled in their labour
For Gorz, work is not just the creation of economic wealth or value, but also, or should 
be, a means of self-creation and expression. Drawing upon the phenomenological writings 
of Husserl, Enzo Paci and Adorno and Horkheimer and Sartre, Gorz argues that:
"The tangible substance of the world has been abolished. Work as a 
physical activity has been abolished. All that is left is a purely intellectual, 
or rather, mental activity. This is the ultimate, the absolute triumph of what 
Husserl defined as ' mathematized nature1: reality as we perceive it has been 
stripped of all its tangible qualities ... Hence the pertinence of the question 
posed by Husserl, which will also be the starting point for the proponents of 
Critical Theory: what relation to oneself as a sensory, corporeal existence, 
inherent in the world through the body, governs the methodical application 
of technique?"
(1992, p.85).
Hie end of a utopia and the beginnings of another?
Ultimately the political conclusion that Gorz draws is the opposite of the HRM, Kem and 
Schumann, Piore and Sabel romanticisation of labour:
"The price we have to pay for technicization is only acceptable if the latter 
saves work and time. This is its declared aim and it can have no other. It 
is to allow us to produce more and better in less time with less effort. ... I 
cannot emphasize this too strongly; a job whose effect and aim are to save 
work cannot, at the same time, glorify work as the essential source of 
personal identity and fulfilment. The meaning of the current technological 
revolution cannot be to rehabilitate the work ethic and identification with
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one's work. It only has meaning if it broadens the field of non-work 
activities in which we can all, the new type of worker included, develop 
that dimension of our humanity which finds no outlet in technized work". 
(1992, p.88).
Conclusion
The conclusion to draw is that it is, as Gorz argues (but also Negt, Negri), the division of 
labour (or a world beyond labour) that can be found in Marx's the Grundrisse (1857) that 
we must turn, rather than the exhausted utopias of labour of Kern, Schumann, Piore, Sabel, 
Unger and Hirst. In large-scale industry, Marx writes,
"the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the 
amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion 
during labour time... Real wealth manifests itself rather - and large industry 
reveals this in the monstrous disproportion between the labour time applied, 
and its product ... Labour no longer appears so much to be included in the 
production process itself ... He steps to the side of the production process 
instead of being its chief actor."111'
Thus, the promise of liberation through work and labour must be challenged. Although, 
Marx's son-in-law, Paul Lafargue's pamphlet The Right to be Lazy (1895) might have 
posed the question in somewhat of a facile manner it still has its moment of truth which 
finds its contemporary resonance in Gorz's writings, but also in the contemporary critique 
of one-dimensional emancipatory politics that we find in the writings of new social 
movement theorists (Eyerman, 1991) and in Therbom (1991) and Giddens (1991) call for a 
Life Politics or a politics of universal human life-realization1'2' (Therbom) to accompany 
emancipatory politics. Emancipatory politics is about the following: (1) the freeing of 
social life from the fixities of tradition and custom; (2) the reduction or elimination of 
exploitation, inequality or oppression. Concerned with the diverse distribution of 
power/resources; (3) obeys the imperatives suggested by the ethics of justice, equality and 
participation. On the other hand, 'life politics, is about the following more qualitative 
factors: (1) political decisions flowing from freedom of choice and generative power; (2) 
the creation of morally justifiable forms of life that will promote self-actualization in the
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context of global interdependence; (3) develops ethics concerning the issue 'how should 
we live?' in a post-traditional order and against the backdrop of existential questions.
Thus the arguments of Gorz, Habermas and offe must be taken as problematizing the core 
ideas of Piore, Sabel, Hirst and Unger.
As Anson Rabinbach has written in his fundamental study of the origins of modernity, The 
Human Motor (1990):
"The goal of emancipating labour from the constraints of tradition or 
unscientific practices no longer resonates with utopian anticipation as it 
once did for nineteenth century reformers, scientists, and social thinkers.
The displacement of work from the centre to the periphery of the late 
twentieth century thought can thus be understood by the disappearance of 
the system of representations that placed the working body at the juncture 
of nature and society - by the disappearance of the 'human motor'."
(1990, p.300).
This is not, however, to completely reject the line of thought put forward by the FS 
theorists because it is still the case that the advanced industrial capitalist societies need to 
develop competitive capacities and advantages where work will still occupy a vital but 
decentred position. Ulrich Beck (1992) has argued this point with some eloquence in his 
thesis on risk society,. He argues that we are witnesses to the destandardization of labour 
where we are moving from a system of standardized full employment to a system of 
flexible and pluralized underemployment':
"In the current and coming waves of automation this system of standardized 
full employment is beginning to soften and fray at the margins into 
flexibilizations o f its three supporting pillars: labour law, work site and 
working hours. Thus the boundaries between work and non-work are 
becoming more fluid."
(1992, p.l42),li*
Nevertheless, it has been the contention of this chapter that the FS thesis is over-dependent 
on the Utopia of labour' and that a more radical version of neo-modemiscUion theory 
needs to be developed which can think in more creative ways about the alternatives facing 
societies in the context of a question addressed to him by Keane in an interview (Gorz,
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1994) about the viability of FS answers in the following manner: "...all that has completely 
changed Identification with work and the glorification of work can no longer have the 
sense of an identification with the working class and a glorification of its might. This is a 
fact that certain sociologists - particularly sociologists of industrial relations - will not see. 
Whether consciously or not, they want to preserve within their analyses the idea of a 
working class that derives from its technical power an aspiration to exercise political 
power and take control of the means of production" (1994, p.86). Indeed, if one wanted to 
go further in this critique it would be possible to say that the FS thesis represents a further 
extension of the modern work ethic and the rebirth of what Godignon and Thireit call the 
rebirth of voluntary servitude' (1994) where modern "society now accords a wholly 
positive value to work, transforming it from a means to an end in itself' (1994, p.226).
Not surprisingly, the FS thesis says little about the gendered division of labour and, again, 
Gorz is entirely correct to criticize Piore and Sabel for attempting to revive the sort of 
masculinist work society of the 19th century labour utopia. Again, a more progressive 
neo-modemisation thesis would learn from the sort of gender conscious analysis found in 
the likes of Beck's theory of reflexive modernisation, where the revolution in gender 
relationships is seen and acknowledged to have revolutionary implications for society as a 
whole.
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6. POLITICS. REGIONALISM AND FLEXIBLE SPECIALISATION
The final theme that needs to be taken up regarding the FS thesis is the politico-spatial 
dimension. The role of localities and regions in the FS argument is well-known and 
subject to much research and criticism, but there are also important political implications 
which need to be analyzed within the context of debates around what Stuart Hall has 
called the 'global and local' (1993) and, moreover, around debates on the changing nature 
of the State and political social movements, rather than on the debate around the concept 
of Marshallian industrial districts or the 'new industrial spaces' which is at the heart of the 
FS thesis and has been subject to numerous critical commentaries both supportive (Scott, 
1986; Storper, 1992; Brusco, 1989; Cooke, 1987) and highly critical (Amin, Thrift,
1992).111
The question of regionalism, localities and industrial districts has to be situated within the 
emerging neo-modemisation thesis. As Tiryakian (1994) has argued, the fall of 
Communism' and the end of the Cold-War has not meant the end of history' as 
postulated by Fukuyama (1989) but, rather the emergence of new worlds' of turbulence, 
chaos and anomie. The economic and political restructurings in all parts of the globe has 
destructured the old national economies causing widespread feelings of insecurity and 
heightened feelings of risk. Tiryakian argues for a renovated modernisation perspective on 
these changes - a neo-modemisation - which would treat the Parsonian dimensions of 
personality, society and culture as interactive dimensions of change. Reacting to the 
determinism of orthodox modernisation theory, Tiryakian's ideas mesh with those of the 
FS school (the foregrounding of the arii/actual thesis) insofar as he calls for a more 
voluntarist theory of social action and creativity. However, he is more consistent in his 
voluntarism in recognizing that there are many dangerous social forces and trends 
emerging in the world of the late twentieth century than is ever recognised in the writings 
of the FS theorists. "The period of transition and flux we are in, alternating between order 
and disorder, between features of globalisation and local reactions to globalisation,
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between differentiation and de-differentiation, is witness to a set of dialectical relationships 
that do not culminate in any linear direction; global or universal characterisations" (1994, 
p 143). Against this background it is necessary then to consider the dangers of an analysis 
or theory which puts great faith in the idea of regional economies as a new model of 
social and economic regulation. The danger that needs to be faced is the possibility that 
the strongly communitarian and work society centred model postulates by the FS school 
could help legitimise new forms of inequality and exclusion not just in the sense argued in 
chapter 5, but also in terms of the Balkanization of societies and ethno-national 
mobilisations, where the world is divided into productive FS sectors of the information 
rich on the one hand, and on the other, the non-productive, information poor regions (Lash 
& Urry 1994).
Industrial districts and politics
As an opening introduction I can define the term 'industrial district' in the following 
manner. Nineteenth-century industrial districts, as described by Alfred Marshall, were 
systems of small, craft-based companies specialized in the production of a particular set of 
products, interlinked by tight networks of subcontractors, often organized around family 
relationships dependent on starting finance raised within the community and capable of 
producing customized products, often for a luxury market. Such districts would be 
localized in particular regions or even within towns or specialized areas of cities. The best 
examples of industrial districts were Sheffield cutlery, tools and special steel districts, the 
Birmingham armaments and jewellery quarters, the Lyons silk manufacturing district, the 
New York garment district and the Roubaix and Kortrijk textile towns of France and 
Belgium. In recent years it has become apparent that such localities not only survive in 
the contemporary period but that they are amongst the most dynamic, fast-growing centres 
of production in the 'postmodern' space economy. The next step in the argument made by 
researchers such as Sabel (1989) and Cooke (1987) is to suggest that these industrial 
localities, or districts are forming spatial agglomerations of regionally based economies.
The 'Third Italy' is the most famous and perhaps well researched example but it is also 
necessary to add the 'Second Denmark', Baden-Wurttemburg, Silicon Valley and Route
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128 in the United States of America, Sakaki in Japan and so forth. At the empirical level 
it might be the case, as Sayer (1992) has argued, that just as researchers once upon a time 
spent their time discovering, branch-plant economies, so now they spend their time 
'discovering' industrial districts, localities and regions.
However, the most important question is the political implications of the question As 
Sabel argues in his essay "Flexible Specialisation and the Re-emergence of Regional
Economies":
"Independent of the emergence of the new industrial districts and the shift 
in large firms' strategy, there has been a striking reorientation in the 
thinking of regional planners, local development officials, and the 
geographers, urbanists and regional economists who are their exponents and 
advisers. In the heyday of mass production poorer regions were conceived 
as blank spaces on the national map of industry, to be filled by the same 
development strategies as such voids were filled in the 'Third World'. In 
more prosperous areas the region or municipality was seen as an 
administrative unit suited to dispensing welfare services."
(1989, p 40).
Sabel argues that this is changing as political movements rediscover the region as an 
apposite politico-economic entity. Set against a background of successive development 
strategy failures such as the Labour Party's 'Alternative Regional Strategy' or the municipal 
Keynesianism of the late 1970s in cities like Marseilles, London, Dortmund, Bremen, 
Hamburg and Detroit. And finally, the false hope of a forward flight into the sun-rise 
world of high-technology industrial parks.
For Sabel these changes created a new social, political and economic orthodoxy that 
valorizes endogenous local development:
"Like the firms, the localities know that they must survive in a turbulent 
economic environment; like the firms, they must accommodate volatility 
through flexibility, though for localities this naturally means facilitating the 
recombination of resources among companies, so that the latter may better 
redeploy them internally."
(Ibid, p.43).
Sabel, like most other researchers, expresses caution as to whether the new regional 
economic strategies will succeed, but is at the end of the day optimistic, given the political 
will that flexibly specialised regional economies are harbingers of the future. The 
fundamental obstacles are not apparently economic per se, but rather political and 
ideological:
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"There are signs of regional reconsolidation, but significant obstacles to it as 
well. Even in countries such as Germany and Denmark with strong 
federalist traditions, prior efforts at administrative rationalisation of local 
governments, as instruments of the welfare state efforts to impose national 
fiscal discipline, obstruct efforts to increase regional autonomy. And these 
are the most favourable cases. But in these countries, and others as well, 
the new localists are pressing for an extension of their legal powers and no 
one is to say which forces will prevail. But it is possible, I think, to 
indicate some ways political intervention can and has already encouraged 
the formation of successful regional entities."
(ibid, p.45).
Under the somewhat obscure title of "The Politics of Memory: Creating Regional 
Economies", Sabel devotes a section of his paper on how industrial districts and regions 
should be created, entrenched and multiplied.
Regionalism, industrial districts and ethno-nadonalism
The 'politics of memory' is perhaps an unfortunate title,121 for it evokes some rather 
disturbing tendencies in modem politics, namely, the reactionary politics of ethno or neo­
nationalism which is sweeping large parts of the world, not the least Europe. Sabel's 
paper and politics, let it be made clear, do not have any direct or immediate relationship to 
these developments and one can only mention the fact that his politics are progressive in 
the best social democratic sense. Furthermore, the argument that will be developed is only 
pointing out to certain ambiguities and possibilities that are latent in the regional 
economies position rather than some fully established political reality.
253
The 'politics of memory', then, connotes the emergence of local memories or local 
knowledge that articulates and sutures a politics of ethnic revivalism, with the boundary 
maintaining structures of a social and economic fabric of relationships, which puts into 
play a dialectic of the Same and the Other. With the globalisation131 of economic, social 
and political relationships we are experiencing a fundamental transformation in the way 
social systems are organised which, as of yet, has not crystallized into a coherent shape. 
One line of analysis followed by Held and Hall (1993) is that the modem state, as it 
evolved from the 16th to the mid-20th century is no longer adequate for managing the 
hyper-complexity of post-modern social organisation. The state so it seems is too big for 
the local problems and too small for the global problems'. That is to say, it is a meso- 
structure which is unable to adapt, or cope with, the myriad of problems that a rapidly 
changing world is constantly throwing up. In Held's (1989) more ambitious formulations 
the nation-states system is in long term decline as a series of disjunctures open-up along 
four critical dimensions: (1) the disjuncture between the international, transnational and 
global nature of multi-national capitalism (production, labour, finance, commodities, etc.) 
and the increasing diminution of state power, autonomy and efficacity; (2) the disjuncture 
between the autonomous sovereign nation-state and the rise of power-blocs of hegemonic 
states; (3) the disjuncture between the expansion of international organisations and the idea 
of autonomous sovereignty of the nation-state as the central 'steering-mechanism, of 
internal relations and international relations; (4) the disjuncture between the nation-state as 
the legislator and implementor of legal/juridical relations and the rise of international law 
and legal bodies.
ih e  global and the local
This line of analysis does not lead, however, to the simplistic idea that what is needed is a 
world government, popular in the earlier years of the twentieth century by the likes of 
H.G. Wells, but rather that new structures of governance and decision-making have to be 
invented that link the local with the global by a system of federal institutions and 
relationships. The growth, expansion and deepening of capitalist economic relationships 
(in labour, product and capital markets) is part and parcel of what Giddens calls
disembedding mechanisms', or abstract systems', but this is a process which is 
dialectically entwined with a counter-tendency for the re-embedding' or reweaving of 
these disembedded relationships into new institutional and relational patterns.
254
The return of the local
Quite possibly the emergence of flexibly specialised regional economies (FSRE) could be 
the outcome of the contradictory tendencies identified above. For example, Kevin Robins 
(1989) argues that in these 'global new times, we are seeing the "renaissance of localities 
and o f  localism. There has been a great surge of interest recently in local economies and 
localised production complexes - the 'Third Italy', the 'Second Denmark', the industrial 
districts of Baden-Württemberg in West Germany, Sakaki in Japan, or Oyonnax in France" 
(p.20). In broader terms Robins speculates that the global-local nexus is about the erosion 
o f national cultures by local and regional cultures and that "Modem times are 
characterised ... by a process of cultural decentralisation and by the sudden resurgence of 
place-bound traditions, languages and ways of life" (p.27). Robins argument also leads in 
other, more complex directions, pointing to alternative trajectories and more complex 
inter-linkages between the local and the global or, as Stuart Hall (1993) argues in his 
commentary on Robins argument that,
"alongside the tendency towards global homogenization, there is also a 
fascination with difference and the marketing of ethnicity and 'otherness', 
here is a new interest in the 'local' together with the impact of the 'global', 
globalisation (in the form of flexible specialization and 'niche' marketing) actually 
exploits local differentiation. Thus, instead of thinking of the global replacing the 
local, it would be more accurate to think of a new articulation between the global, 
and the 'local'. This 'local' is not to be confused with older identities, firmly rooted 
in well-bounded localities. Rather, it operates within the logic of globalisation. 
However, it seems unlikely that globalisation will simply destroy national 
identities. It is more likely to produce, simultaneously, new 'global' and new 'local' 
identifications."
(P 304).
However, within the FS literature per sc there is a tendency to underplay the globalisation 
processes which post-Fordist writers such as Harvey (1989), Lash and Urry (1987, 1994),
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Amin and Thrift (1992) and Castells (1989) have identified and to foreground, instead, the 
local and the regional dimensions of the equation which leads, so I would argue, to a 
romanticisation of the local and regional. For example, many of the left argue for a 
'Europe of the Regions' which would be a federated European Economic Community 
(ECC), based on a decentralized structure where power would be unshackled from the 
centralized nation-state and Brussels bureaucracy and would be devolved to various 
regional bodies and administrations Furthermore, it could be argued, for example, on the 
basis of reading of the anarchist and libertarian tradition of political and social thought 
Bakunin, Proudhon, Kropotkin (and others outside this traditions such as the geographers 
Elisee Reclus and Paul Vidal de la Blache) - that a Europe based on regional federation 
holds out the best hope for a radical democratic society.
For the anarchist tradition generally, the productive structure of such a regionally 
decentralized Europe would be based on small-scale production as argued for by Proudhon 
and by Kropotkin, which in its modern reincarnation is, of course, called FS by Piore and 
Sabel, Unger and Hirst and Zeitlin. As Peter Hall argues in Cities of Tomorrow (1989):
" many though by no means all, of the early visions of the planning 
movement stemmed from the anarchist movement ... The vision of these 
anarchist pioneers was not merely of an alternative built form, but of an 
alternative society, neither capitalist nor bureaucratic-socialist: a society 
based on voluntary cooperation among men and women, working and living 
in small and self-governing communities'."‘4|
A Europe of the legions?
To emphasize that this vision is not just the fantasy of marginal libertarian groups it is 
worth mentioning that political journals such as The London Review of Books and The 
New Statesman15* have also mooted the idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' and, moreover, 
that the Assembly of the European Regions, established in 1985, now has 171 members in 
both eastern and western Europe. Writers such as Neal Ascherson, Ralf Dahrendorf and 
Hans Magnus Enzenberger have also written in support of a 'Europe of the Regions', based 
on a productive structure of FS.
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Enzenberger's book Europe. Europe (1992) can be read as precisely such a deconstructions 
of the conventional image of Europe made up of nation-states slowly coming together into 
a homogenized European super-state. Bearing similarities with Derrida's (1992) reflections 
on Europe as based on difference, but within the universality of a defence of human-rights 
and the gains of modernity, Enzenberger bears witness to the essential plurality and 
diversity of Europe, which has found its specificity and uniqueness in the fact that it has 
resisted homogenization and uniformity. As historians and sociologists such as Braudel 
and Wallerstein have argued, Western Europe has been able to expand and grow on the 
basis of its unique synthesis of the classical and the feudal and the resistance to 
bureaucratic and absolutist state structures which could have choked off any economic, 
social and political dynamism by forming a bureaucratic empire.
Enzenberger (1990) lists his own problems which are facing traditional nation-states and 
capitalist economies which bear many similarities to the one listed by Hall and Held 
(1993) on the global and the local. Not surprisingly these are developed most thoroughly 
in his chapter on Italy, 'Italian Extravagances'. They are:
"(1) The Crisis of Sovereignty. The nations of Europe now occupy only a 
subordinate role in world politics. Sandwiched between the superpowers 
and pressured by the allies as well as adversaries, they can no longer 
conduct an independent foreign policy ... In the long term even their 
economic power will probably be insufficient to allow them to keep up with 
the major technologies. They will have to earn their living in the interstices 
of the world economy and look to softer, smaller, more flexible forms of 
production. This situation is nothing new for Italians;
"(2) The Crisis of Govemability. Central political apparatuses have 
increasingly isolated themselves from society, bureaucracies are preoccupied 
with their own tumours, and political parties have degenerated into corrupt 
self service stores. Society ceases to believe in its ability to solve its own 
problem. It tries to live by its wits and get around centralized systems. A 
crazy quilt of quarrelling special-interest groups of disparate cultures and 
sub-cultures is forming; underground and shadow economies are beginning 
to flourish ... The economic outcome of this strategy is dear. While state 
activity has left behind nothing but the grand ruins o f obsolescent heavy 
industry, efficient small and medium-sized industrial companies have sprung 
up spontaneously in furniture making and tourism, fashion and precision 
engineering [my emphasis]. The country's present affluence depends on this 
swarm of heterogeneous initiatives.
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"(3) The Crisis of Planning. The more complex social and economic 
processes become, the more difficult it is to predict their outcome ... 
Changes can no longer be thoroughly planned and imposed, but can be 
achieved only through trial and error, in a kind of stochastic process ... [the 
Italians] historical experience demonstrates that the larger the apparatus, the 
less effectively it actually works. They've always preferred to rely on 
detours, improvisations, and specific experimental solutions [my emphasis].
"(4) The Crisis of Work. The shrinking employment is a traumatic 
experience for all industrialized societies Unemployment is not just an 
economic problem, which could be solved by redistributing profits.
Millions of people have internalized the ethic of work, achievement, and 
discipline to such an extent that they can't cope with the loss of the 
'workplace'. For them unemployment is a psychological and cultural 
catastrophe as well as an economic one. Such an attitude has never 
managed to establish itself in Italy, not because the Italians were lazier than 
anyone else but because the history of the country has not known long 
periods of full employment. As a result, the Italians possess an extremely 
rich culture of parasitism. Unproductive spongers', beggars and prelates, 
magicians and gangsters, buffoons and barons, swindlers and tourists, 
whores and bosses, have never really been despised, ostracized, and 
condemned here."
(1990, pp.82-3).161
All of the themes that can be found in both FS literature and the post-Fordist literature are 
present here and Enzenberger gives his ideas a more explicitly theoretical formulation in 
the postscript to his book, a rather obscure semi-fictional piece called "The Seacoast of 
Bohemia, 20061, where he argues, using metaphors from 'chaos theory', that Europe is a 
"fractal object"171 As far as European societies are concerned
"it really is irregular, right down to its microstructures. Any attempt to 
create order here in the traditional sense is bound to fail. That's also true of 
the constitutional framework of the Community. It's possible, however, to 
lay down certain limits. This hodgepodge is our final shape. That's true 
even of our economy. The result is P.O.D., that is, the abandonment of 
mass production. Production on demand - we do it better than everyone 
else, and that's the reason we're still important in the world market. The 
Italians were the first to understand this - despite, or because of, their shaky 
infrastructure, their incompetent administration, and their jumble of 
institutions. But, as you can see, Italian improvisation also works here in 
the North'. 'It seems rather chaotic to me., 'What you call chaos is our most 
important resource. We need our differences...' ...."
(1990, p.310).
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Hip regions and politics
Enzenberger's Europe. Europe exemplifies the relationship between the concept of a 
'Europe of the Regions', meaning a Europe of plurality, difference and diversity in terms of 
cultural identity, economic structure and political constitution and the general theory of 
FS Like so much of the FS literature, Enzenberger's voice expresses a certain 
disillusionment with the great 'grand narrative', left-wing and Marxist project for the 
transformation of society through the action of an avant-garde political party whose 
radiating, totalising and hegemonic influence will re-make and transform society.
Like the more explicit postmodernist philosophers such as Lyotard (1979), Enzenberger's 
history of left-wing activism has turned into a more modest and pragmatic fin-de-siecle 
pessimism about the 'grand narratives' of modernity. A defence of civil society and of 
autonomous initiatives at the local/regional level dovetails in with the more modest but 
romantic ambitions of the FS theorists such as Piore and Sabel, Unger (although Unger's 
vision is significantly distinct as to be non-assimilable to this on a number of dimensions), 
Hirst and Zeitlin. For Enzenberger, Marxism although still an influence on his thought, is 
too implicated in the great Enlightenment and modernist dream of a "transparent society” 
which can order its relationships with itself through a collective decision-making process 
of direct-democracy. In line with the likes of Luhmann (1982), Habermas (1987), Lyotard 
(1983) and Vattimo (1992), Enzenberger believes that societies are too hyper-complex to 
be able to realize this vision without catastrophic results, involving the over-reduction of 
the complexity of society. Put simply, the dream of a radical break in social relationships 
through a revolutionary rupture with the past is rejected.
Similar ideas have been put forward by others such as Derrida whose collection of essays 
on Europe, The Other Heading (1992)1' 1 closely echo Enzenberger's ideas on cultural 
identity as always non-identical to itself, open to a 'constitutive outside' (Laclau and 
Mouffe, Hall (1985) ). More pointedly, the North American Journal of radical social 
theory, Telos. has argued for a communitarian European Federal Populism which would 
invent new democratic forms of decision-making, dovetailed with regional based forms of 
economic FS. The editor of the journal, Paul Piccone, is the most insistent voice arguing
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for a communitarian, regional/federal system of FS, based on his political and social 
theory, of late Frankfurt School providence, called the "artificial negativity" thesis.
Although the work of the Frankfurt school form the bedrock of Piccone's theory, other 
influences include the writings of the late Husserl and the Marxist phenomenology of Enzo 
Pact (1972) However, Piccone criticizes their theories for not taking into account modern 
developments which has made much of the, one dimensional society' thesis outmoded 
Piccone writes:
"One dimensionality came about as a result of a massive drive to annihilate 
all specificity and otherness typical of the entrepreneurial phase, in order to 
create the conditions necessary for this further rationalization of capital 
Both work and leisure had to be homogenized by turning people into the 
abstract labor power needed in the new Taylorized productive process, and 
into the alienated consumers needed to buy the well-packaged and carefully 
marketed junk that such a system could profitably produce. Taylorization, 
capital-intensive technology, the culture industry and consumerism 
combined within a productive system based on the automobile and military 
expenditures to facilitate the penetration of capital relations into every 
domain of life. The homogenization and depersonalization associated with 
this period - i.e., the domination of the concept and of the abstract 
instrumental reason of capital - constitute the historical limit of this 
transitory rationalizing phase. The fu ll triumph o f one dimensionality 
corresponded to the exhaustion of the model that had generated it. [my 
emphasis]."
(1983, p.46).
Drawing upon post-Weberian studies of the sociology of organizations and bureaucracies, 
Piccone argues that the Weberian vision of a totalizing, rationalizing, bureaucratization of 
capitalist relationships of production, ignores the fact that these processes become 
"counter-productive precisely when it successfully penetrates what it seeks to rationalize" 
(p 46) In somewhat of a functionalist turn of argument, the artificial negativity, thesis 
argues that the 1960s social movements were rapidly assimilated or coopted into a new 
logic of social organization and management. As Tim Luke (1984) puts it:
"[through artificial negativity] ... the administrative regime has fostered a 
variety of ... internal reforms to correct the totalizing excesses of the 
transition. Bureaucratic insurgency tactics, ranging from whistle-blowing to 
public employee unionization to information leaks as well as new anti- 
bureaucratic legislation, such as sunshine laws, sunset provisions, and zero-
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based budgeting policies, are making bureaucratic decision-making more 
accountable as the aura of total power and absolute knowledge are stripped 
away from the bureaucratic practices. Similarly, the system accommodates 
artificial negativity by organizing increased citizen participation as part of 
its standard operating procedures."
(p70).
Piccone argues similarly in his later writings on Italian populism that:
"Contrary to the dark forebodings about various 1984s' and 'Brave New 
Worlds', the homogenization projected by this dialectic of enlightenment 
turned out to be considerably less pervasive than originally suspected ... The 
commodity form never succeeded in exhaustively colonizing that pre­
modem reality whose residual traditional content seems to resurface 
spontaneously among the institutional ruins created by the domination of the 
concept."
(1992, p.5).
The outcome of this form of thinking is remarkably similar to Enzenberger's and Derrida's, 
albeit in a distinct idiom and genre of thought, in that we have the same refusal of 
traditional left responses, and the reassertion of diverse cultural identities, within a plural 
and federal Europe. Specificity, particularity and difference being the watchwords and, 
moreover, a suspicion of the totalitarian designs of the state:
"By subsuming all local particularities, community specificity and regional 
differences under a fictitious 'national' unity, the state tended to reduce 
various concrete peoples to abstract citizens who, stripped of their 
autonomous pre-political identity readily deteriorated into an 
undifferentiated mass unable and unwilling to sustain their social institutions 
increasingly entrusted to a separate bureaucratic apparatus."
(ibid, pp.5-6).
In this context Piccone and Ulmen argue in their essay "Schmitt's Testament' and the 
Future of Europe,, (1989) that there is much to leam from the thought of Carl Schmitt, the 
infamous jurist and philosopher of the Weimar Republic who was complicit with the Nazi 
regime, but much like Heidegger has also many important things to say about democracy, 
the rule of law and, most crucially Europe and the system of nation-states. This is not the
place to investigate the contribution that Schmitt made to legal and political philosophy, 
but suffice it to say the major insight that Schmitt contributed which is of relevance here 
is the recognition that the sovereign state that has been the foundation of the Eurocentric 
order of international law is declining as the result o f globalisation and the rise of non- 
Westem powers. Consequently, the iust publicum Europium no longer obtains.
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Regionalism and flexible specialisation
For Piccone and Ulmen, Europe today is faced with the task of forging a new form of 
unification based on federal principles and, most crucially, based on turning away from the 
traditional centralizing and social democratic configuration to an administratively 
decentralized federalism that create the conditions for a new
"post-industrial system variously described as 'post-Fordism' by regulation 
theory, flexible specialization, etc., which for the past two decades has 
already been gradually displacing the so-called 'Fordist, model - a model 
inextricably rooted in central planning and the totally administered society 
... The gargantuan concentration of labor, capital and resources into mass- 
production factories, sharply separating an increasingly deskilled labor force 
and management seeking to control all features of the labor process, was 
not a neutral technological imperative but a key requirement of the central 
planning system of both over-bureaucratized state socialism and its 
counterpart, oligolopistic capitalism."
(1989, p.8).
This alternative to this iron-cage of mass-production would be the vision of FS as 
articulated by Piore and Sabel et al.
Within a decentralized federal system, this industrial model, historically associated with 
environmental irresponsibility, homogenization of producers and consumers alike, would 
according to Piccone and Ulmen be displaced by a new system "characterized by a myriad 
of much smaller autonomous units, where the separation of labour and management is no 
longer very sharp, quality becomes crucial, and the possibility of greater product diversity 
allows for better responsiveness to an increasingly fragmented market” (p.8).
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However, Piccone and Ulmen argue that this 'possible world' will not come about because 
capital has discovered social responsibility, but rather because of the need to remain 
profitable in a world of cutthroat competition. What Streeck (1993) calls diversified 
quality production', is a necessary response from the west to the competitive advantages 
coming from the newly industrialising countries of the East. Piccone and Ulmen are 
critical of Clarke's (1990) powerful, but orthodox Marxist, critique of the FS thesis on the 
following grounds:
"Clarke's argument against the possibility of this sort of organizational 
development contradicts his earlier convincing claim that industrial 
rationalization is never brought about merely by technical innovations but 
by social and political imperatives. If the industrial decentralization 
postulated by flexible specialisation' is, in fact, not only already 
technologically feasible ... but politically desirable from the viewpoint of 
relaunching capitalist profitability while at the same time guaranteeing 
social harmony, then it does not make sense to dismiss it, as Clarke does, 
purely on technical grounds that it may not be able to deal with mass 
production - something which can always be worked around. What is 
crucial is the presence of a strong capitalist political will and foresight."
(1989, p .9).
Nonetheless, for Piccone and Ulmen there is, at least in their essay on "The Future of 
Europe" a recognition that a regionally based, federated FS regime would not be the 
romantic vision put forward by the FS theorists. FS would entail new and unanticipated 
social conflicts. It might involve the inclusion of some sections of the 'community' and 
the exclusion of others. Women might be excluded, but more specifically it might be the 
women and men of groups identified as outside the 'community'. In short, the culturally 
defined Other:
"The marginalization of previously disruptive labour conflicts does not ipso 
facto usher in a conflict-free system. Residual labour and class conflicts 
typical of the Fordist phase of capitalist development turn into cultural ones 
[my emphasis] as a result of declining birthrates in Western societies and 
the growing importation of labour-power from the Third World or from 
remnants of the Soviet Empire. Such a fortuitous predicament provides 
diminishing native populations considerable opportunity for upward social 
mobility ... In the interim, however, since the only means of effectively 
resisting hardship associated with this social integration are the resurrection
2 6 3
of fading but still strong cultural particularisms, cultural fragmentation is 
likely to remain a significant feature of a federated Europe."
(pp.9-10).
The Leea Nord and flexible specialization191
It is significant that Piccone develops his analysis further in later articles where, 
significantly, he espouses the radical potential of the new populism in Europe and, in 
particular, the Lombardy League (and Northern Leagues) of Italy. Piccone recognizes that 
the dominant leftist analysis and interpretation of this new populism is that it is racist, 
xenophobic and reactionary.
Nevertheless, Piccone argues that to the extent that one of the League's main goals is
"the constitution of a new nomoi, which as this point exist only as what 
Ernst Bloch would have called 'the not yet', i.e., in vague communitarian 
longings, rough territorial contours and negatively, in opposition to the 
central bureaucratic apparatus, the League's identity is likely to remain 
associated with its visibly exclusionary criteria and therefore vulnerable to 
charges of racism and ethnocentrism especially from the traditional left."
(ibid, pp.42-43).
An observation which is supported by the writings and speeches that come out of the 
League such as those by Gianfranco Miglio: "Britain has deteriorated since the war. This 
is due to new elements which are alien to the British world".
Piccone strongly resists this interpretation of the Northern League by arguing that it has 
changed in recent years and that populism is not an essence, but rather contains a 
multiplicity of possible directions. Much like Laclau's (1983) classic discussion of 
populism whose character is defined as the effect of the articulation of a chain of 
equivalences, between its elements, Piccone argues, albeit from a very different theoretical 
tradition, that the populism of the League is potentially progressive. Nevertheless, 
Piccone's defence of the Northern League is not convincing and goes against the grain of 
most progressive thinking on the matter:
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"While in its early days the Lombard League entertained vague notions of 
ethnicity as sine qua non conditio for community belonging, that was 
dropped with the shift to the Northern League. There is certainly a concent 
with illegal immigration, the generally perceived unwillingness o f many 
new immigrants - especially North Africans - to integrate into local 
communities [my emphasis], and with the inadequacy of existing facilities 
(jobs, housing, social services, etc.) to accommodate those new immigrants 
legally accepted."
(1991, p 14).
Piccone's defence of the Northern League (and by extension other regional movements) 
backfires by its explicit rationalisation of racist politics revealed in this passage which, 
moreover, shows the aporia of the whole regionalist discourse: on the one hand, its 
romantic vision of a communitarian society of regionalised 'high-technology cottage 
industry, of industrious male artisans and, on the other hand, the series of social, 
economic, political, ethnic, racial and gender exclusions on which the whole idea at 
present seems to rest, at least when the idea is mobilised by regional political/social 
movements such as the Northern League. Thus, the defence of regional movements as 
new forms of cultural identity do nothing but to displace downwards, into a Balkanized 
pluralism, all the reactionary themes that can be found in traditional forms of nationalism 
and national identity.
Regionalism, as a new, invented and 'imagined' form of cultural identity, as presently 
articulated, while seeming attractive to some on the left is fraught with dangerous forms of 
exclusions which we are all too aware of at the end of the twentieth century to be 
optimistic. Apart from Piccone and Enzenberger we find in Britain Neil Ascherson and 
John Keane taking up these themes of a 'Europe of the Regions' as constituting a new 
project for the left. However, it is not difficult to agree with Bob Fine that:
“...a Europe des regions combining European citizenship with myriad local 
national identities - offers the scenario of a Europe based on a mosaic of 
small nations (except, doubtless, for one or two big nations at the centre) 
entrenched in their own parochialism, kept from each others' throats by the 
constitution of 'Europe,, and inevitably identified by their apartness from the 
'non-European'. The turn to national identity represents as aestheticization
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of politics; the triumph of form over substance, of ceremony over the resources 
needed to give real meaning and quality to our lives."
(1992, p. 15).
However, although Fine's warning is salutary, his overall critique of Keane's position 
seems to be based on the fallacy of abstract universalism. That is to say, he appeals to an 
identity based on work, an anachronistic idea that can be, of course, traced back to Marx's 
as argued in Chapter 5. National self-determination and national identity is not an 
unchanging essence and Keane's appeal to new forms of national and regional identity in a 
poly-diverse world, while problematic, offers up a vision which would position 
national/regional identity as just one dimension or aspect of a more complex, flexible and 
polyphonic form of cultural identity in a globalised world. To avoid Fine's scenario it is 
necessary to take heed of Habermas's warning (and no doubt Keane would agree here) that 
this postmodern mood, which is
"making its mark, all the way into the detective novel and onto the back- 
cover blurb. The publisher extols Enzenberger's new book [Europe. Europe] 
with the notice that he enlists what is irregular against the project of 
homogenization, the margins against the centre of power, living from 
difference against unity - Derrida's jargon migrates into commodity 
aesthetics."
(1992, p. 140)
has to be countered by the recognition there is a dialectical relationship between the 
particular and the universal:
"Repulsion towards the One and veneration of difference and the Other 
obscures the dialectical connection between them. For the transitory unity 
that is generated in the porous and refracted inter-subjectivity of a 
linguistically mediated consensus not only supports but furthers and 
accelerates the pluralization of forms of life and the individualization of 
life-styles".
(ibid 14, p. 1-40).
In short, greater universalism should be seen as what makes possible greater plurality and 
difference rather than being seen as in contradiction with each other. But although this 
Habermasian point is eminently sensible it solves the problem only in abstract terms,
leaving untouched the complex problem of its realization in concrete institutional forms 
which, ultimately, must be the touchstone of any political and social theory of radical
democracy,.
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Therefore, it is against this background and series of debates, that the FS argument is 
being mobilized as an infrastructural support or foundation for Regionalism. However, 
this linking must be viewed as one of the more problematic dimensions of the FS debate 
in terms of its political instrumentalisation. Piccone writes, for example, the following in 
support of his more general thesis:
"...the Northern League proposes an integral federalist model which is 
potentially generalizable at least to all of 'Europe' and may provide an 
alternative to an increasingly discredited central state as the basic unit of the 
forthcoming European federation. Caught between a vibrant regional 
revival predicated on post-Fordism and what Gianfranco Miglio calls the 
fifth productive revolution' [my emphasis], on the one hand, and a broader 
nascent European federal framework, on the other, the traditional nation­
state is rapidly losing even its last raisons d'etre "
(1991, p.8)
Elsewhere he writes that:
"Although the League consciously locates itself beyond any Left/Right 
division, its animating spirit is rooted both in a much older but largely 
forgotten Left anarchist tradition, as well as in the most advanced 'post- 
Fordist, industrial practices which, not by accident, are very congenial to 
older anarchist forms of economic organization dating back to Proudhon.
To a greater extent, the unprecedented prosperity of Northern Italian regions 
today is largely a function of the gradual post-Fordization of production that 
has been underway over the past two decades."
(1992, p.43).
While it might be the case that, as Piccone argues, the Northern League and Regionalism 
is not a racist and ethnocentric movement but rather a progressive movement beyond both 
social democratic welfare capitalism and free-market capitalism, it remains the case that 
there is enough room to doubt this proposition and therefore to oppose at the theoretical 
and political level this new form of what, paradoxically in the light of Piccone's 
enthusiasm for Carl Schmitt, Schmitt (before Benjamin) called aestheticised 'political
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romanticism' The idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' is more likely to give rise to what 
Umberto Eco (1986) has called a revived, new or postmodern "Middle Ages" of feudal 
states, or what Michel Maffesoli ( 1988) has called neo-tribalism’ ("Utopian 
postmodernism is thus a neo-tribal paradise in which a set of spatially set forms of life 
carry on experiments, each in their own culture. In this vision, however, communication 
is impossible between tribes”, based on a productive structure of exclusions, of insiders 
and outsiders, as argued by Oskar Negt and Andre Gorz and in Chapter 5.
Conclusion
While the previous comments do not disprove the viability of FS as an economic, social 
and political strategy they do, however, place in doubt the claimed political 
progressiveness of the strategy as formulated and concretized in an actually existing 
political and social movement. It might be that the elements of the FS strategy could be 
articulated and sutured in different ways, producing new combinations which have greater 
radical democratic political potential, but this remains to be seen and has to be placed in 
question if we accept the propositions of Jonathan Friedman (1994) who has argued, from 
a Wallersteinian world-system perspective, that the disintegration, or break-up, of the 
current parameters and shape of the hierarchy of economies is giving rise to distinctive 
new cultural identities. In the capitalist "core" the reaction to 'globalization', post- 
industrialization' and 'postmodemization' is, as discussed above, a political and cultural 
reaction formation which takes the form of a search for "roots", in diverse movements 
such as communitarianism, ethnicity and nationalism. However, as Friedman recognizes 
this return to "roots" is mediated by the world-system itself and he would be the first to 
agree with Giddens's observation that with the increasing "time-space distanciation" of 
modernity, "place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric:1'01 that is to say, locales are 
thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influence quite distant from them. 
What structures the locale is not simply that which is present on the scene; the visible 
form, of the locale conceals the distanciated relations which determine its nature, (1988,
P 19). In short, what may lay behind the visible form' of FS is the whole, totalizing world- 
system of late capitalism.
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The above points discussed in this conclusion do not add up to an empirical falsification 
of the FS thesis, nor do they show the impossibility of the realization of such a project. 
They do, nonetheless, sketch out in a preliminary form why the FS thesis should be treated 
with some caution, from the perspective of a radical perspective in social and political 
theory which approaches the debate from a practical interest in the constitution and 
invention of a more emancipated and democratic society. Contrary to Hirst's argument in 
his Associative Democracy (1994) there is no reason why FS might not lead to the further 
Balkanization, of societies or what he calls the ’ Ottomanization of society where separate 
and antagonistic communities live adjacently with each other in mutual suspicion: "This 
has been carried farthest in parts of the USA, where the radical divergence of ethnic, 
religious and lifestyle groups have produced a virtual re-creation of the Millets system of 
the Ottoman Empire in which plural and semi-self-regulating communities coexisted side 
by side, with very different rules and standard" (1994; p.66). Interestingly, Piore has 
attempted to tackle the question of the fragmentation of the United States into distinct 
communities of meaning and action, based primarily upon race', ethnicity and gender in 
his book, Bevond Individualism (1995), and his appeal to ideas of hybridity', borderlands' 
and anti-essentialism link his ideas up with contemporary radical thinking on this question, 
although his claim that a revived trade unionism is one of the ways in which different 
communities could be connected up with one another is not perhaps a theme or a solution 
which would gain wide acceptance. For Piore, the concept of borderlands' (Rosaldo 
1993) "yields new insight into how a society composed of communities of action might be 
integrated socially, into how networked organizations might emerge in the economy, and 
into processes that might reconcile the conflicts among the claims of such communities 
and between those claims and the constraints imposed by the economy" (1995, p.167). 
However, this prescription, however appealing, leaves out of consideration the possibility 
that the FS solution could just as easily by a justification and legitimation for the further 
fragmentation and segmentation of the United States into Balkanized regional economies 
of winners and losers as the modernist nation-state system implodes into the neo-medieval 
world of the local in the global.
Furthermore, at an intellectual level it is problematic that Telos (Piccone, 1994) has 
recently deepened its interest in federalism, regionalism and communitarianism by
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publishing some of the writings of the French New Right, a move which would seem to 
confirm some of the anxieties expressed in this chapter.1" 1
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REFERENCES: CHAPTER 6
1 Industrial districts, localities, and regions are all terms used for the renewed interest 
in spatiality in the social sciences. Debate over their characteristics, development or even 
their existence is the site of an important intellectual and political debate and is at the heart 
of the FS debate.
2. "Politics of Memory" is a term used by Sabel (1989). The meaning is never directly 
explained, but it connotes a politics that returns to the local and the region. It points to a 
certain populist and romanticist nostalgia in Sahel's writings. It has certain affinities with 
Kenneth Frampton's concept of 'Critical
Regionalism' That is, the postmodern return to a smaller scale more local politics.
3 The debates around trans-nationalisation, globalisation and the global/ local nexus is 
at the heart of the FS theory. See, in particular, Stuart Hall (1992).
4 The Anarchist tradition of political thought can be seen as a utopian precursor of Piore 
and Sabel's politics of FS. Unger's political genealogy draws upon this tradition, but also 
Lassalle, Rodbertus and others. Hirst, the pragmatist of these researchers, says nothing on this 
tradition, preferring the tradition of English Christian associationalist socialism.
5 See, in particular, The New Statesman. 19th June 1992. This issue deals with Nations 
and nationalism in the new Europe. It develops and debates the theme of a democratic federal 
Europe
6 Enzenberger's reflections can find support is political economy. See, for example, 
Enzo Mingione's work on informalisation and marginalisation in Italy collected in Fragmented
Societies (1992).
7 This term should be taken in a metaphoric sense to refer to the new politics of 
federalism and difference.
8 Derrida's reflections on the new Europe suggest that there is a politics in Derrida close 
to Sabel's ideas about a 'politics of memory'.
9 The Italian Northern League's support in Northern Italy dovetails with the valorisation 
of the 'Third Italy' in academic and political debate. However, although there is an elective 
affinity between the Northern Leagues's economic and political policies and FS there are other 
possibilities of articulation.
10 Anthony Giddens in his The Consequences of Modernity (1990) points out that in 
high modernity' what appears as the 'local' is often colonized and penetrated by the "abstract 
systems" and "symbolic tokens" of a globalized modernity. Illusions of locality are invented
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and imagined. This produces a sort of reification and fetishization which occludes and 
dissimulates the de facto reality of the global.
11. A disturbing feature of Piccone's defence of the Italian Northern League is his 
sympathy for some of the arguments of the French and European New Right. See in 
particular Piccone's article Old Prejudices or a New Political Paradigm?' in the Special 
Double Issue on The French New Right in Telos. No. 98-99 Winter 1993-Fall 1994. Piccone 
finds the French New Right interest in organic communitarianism, federalism and populism 
confluent with his own interest in these themes. Piccone down plays the racist aspect of the 
ideas of such New Right thinkers as Alain de Benoist, thus refusing to consider the real 
dangers that a federal, communitarian populist politics presents in a world where differential 
racism (Tanguieff 1994) is on the rise. For a critique of Piccone read, John Michel article, 
Critical Intellectuals and Identity Logic: Politics, Representation and Community' in Telos. 
No 101, Fall 1994 See Piccone's reply in same issue, From the New Left to the New 
Populism'.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation has argued that the FS 'research programme', around which a diverse group 
of scholars have organised their intellectual labour, is a developing one insofar as it has not yet 
exhausted its potential for further development and enrichment. However, it has not been the 
intention of this dissertation to suggest that the FS thesis is a tightly delimited 'paradigm' or 
'research programme' in the sense defined by the philosophy of science. Rather, it is a 'research 
programme' in a more pragmatic sense defined in terms of a series of'family resemblances' 
between a configuration of ideas, concepts and intellectual 'networks'. In this sense I would 
concur with Frank Webster's comment (1995), that the FS thesis concerns a "quite 
extraordinary diversity of opinion which endorses the notion" (p. 157). Nonetheless, I have 
sought to show that within a significantly diverse set of researchers, principally - Piore, Sabel, 
Hirst, Zeitlin and Unger - there are enough commonly defined and embraced themes, motifs 
and concepts to define a common set of concerns and a matrix of interpretation, which in 
broad terms are the following.
A critique of orthodox deterministic and necessitarian theories of social change and 
development; a critique of'neo-liberal' accounts of the industrial and political organisation of 
advanced, industrial capitalist societies. A critique which is shared by numerous contemporary 
scholars and researchers, epitomised by the success, in 1995 and 1996, of Will Hutton's The 
State We're In ( 19961 ( which should be read with the Labour Party influenced Report of the 
Commision on Social Justice [1994] and Ralf Dahrendorfs Liberal Democrat influenced 
Report of the Commision on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion [1994]), Francis 
Fukuyama's reflections on the reasons for the success of the Asian 'Tiger Economies' (1995) 
and Benjamin R Barber's reflections on McWorld (1995). The upshot of all these arguments 
is, of course, that any purely 'economic' argument about the state of modem industrial 
capitalism is reductionist and that any reform of economic relationships depends upon a whole 
'reengineering' of political, social and-economic 'formative contexts' or the institutional 
architecture of society; an attempt to reconstitute or reconstruct theories of advanced, 
industrial capitalist societies, which takes into account the need to respond politically to a 
world where both 'neo-liberal' and the 'state-socialist' solutions to the problems of modem 
political economy have been rendered implausible and unfeasible. And, moreover, to develop 
'counterfactual' 'plausible worlds' (Hawthorn, 1991) to the present in a spirit of'utopian
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realism' (Giddens, 1994) beyond the world of'simple modernisation' (Beck, 1991) and into a 
world of'reflexive modernisation' (Beck, 1992) in the 'Enlightenment's Wake' (Gray, 1995), to 
show, moreover, that this group of FS thesis scholars are responding to the profound political, 
social, cultural and economic transformations that are taking place in an increasingly 
interdependent, globalised world defined in terms of nothing less than a 'second industrial 
divide' of corporate transformations, technological transformations, restructurings and neo­
industrial 'reflexive modernization', to show, as a corollary o f these four points, that it is an 
error to see the FS School's work and research as simply concerned with a description, of the 
present state of affairs, but rather to show that their work is transgressive and deconstructive 
insofar as it is equally about prediction and prescription in a world 'beyond individualism'
(Piore, 1995) and into a 'stake-holder' society of'inclusion' and high 'trust'. And finally to show 
that it is necessary to problematise the FS thesis by identifying weak points or aporias in its 
basic assumptions and modes of argumentation. Only by identifying these problematic aporias 
can there be any advance towards, to use an archaic expression, a 'united front' or 'popular 
front' of'non-neo-liberal', 'non-state-socialist' forms of contemporary radicalism It has been 
my argument that the FS thesis provides one possible and fruitful framework for moving 
beyond the antinomy of either 'market regulated' social relationships or 'state regulated' social 
relationships' Moreover, because of its relative openness, the FS thesis can be deepened and 
extended in an ecumenical spirit of radical enquiry and research as long as it remains open to 
other currents of radical theorising which hope for a future beyond the 'ffee-market' paradigm.
The FS thesis is still a developing one, it is being deepened and broadened by the scholars 
associated with it as exemplified by the publication in 1995 and 1996 of Piore's Beyond 
Individualism and Hirst and Thompson’s Globalization in Question It is certainly one of the 
most creative and innovative approaches to offering a radical alternative to the nostrums of 
orthodox, neo-liberal market theorising and politics As argued in Chapter 1 it has 
successively criticized conventional modernisation theory and in its place has opened up a 
space for the development of a second stage of modernisation theory - neo-modernisation 
theory (Alexander 1995, Tiryakian 1991, 1994) - which theorises a more voluntaristic, less 
deterministic and necessitarian, form of industrial society theory. Although, as argued , there is 
far too much ambiguity surrounding the degree of openness and contingency (artifactuality) 
which it allows for in (Giddens 1994, Beck 1995)1 the development of paths to late modernity 
or reflexive modernity it opens up avenues for thinking about change and transformation 
which orthodox modernization theory and orthodox forms of Marxist theorising refuse 
Nevertheless, hidden through the back door is the relative closure of alternative possibilities as 
it argues for the inevitability of the market and the inevitability of the decline of Fordist mass-
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production, and the reconvergence of industrial economies and societies upon a common 
model in a globalised world Nonetheless, this neo-modernist 'realism' can be harnessed to a 
'utopianism' which looks beyond the one-dimensional juggernaut of neo-liberal globalisation 
(see Hirst and Thompson, 1996).
Following on from this point, and as argued in Chapter 2, the FS thesis has been too ready to 
reject some of the key concepts of Marxist theory such as capitalism' and the necessity for a 
totalising theory of the modem globalised world-system On the other hand, as argued in 
Chapter 3, their foregrounding of the 'political constructionist1 (Locke & Thelen, 1995) or 
arlifactual thesis allows considerably more contingency and the possibility of institutional 
invention within social forms such as capitalism, than the Marxist paradigm allows However, 
the FS thesis neglects to consider realistic ways of dealing with the profound tendencies which 
modem capitalism generates towards the generation and reproduction of new inequalities 
between and within various groups in the population. Chapter 4 argues that the FS thesis is 
closely allied with the contemporary revival of political theorising within the social sciences 
and shows that it is close to the communitarian perspective which offers up a political 
analogue to the critique of orthodox individualistic neo-liberal market-based thinking and 
theorising In this sense, it offers up a theory which attempts to go beyond individualism' and 
towards a theory of community, association 'stake-holding' and trust Nevertheless, as argued 
in Chapter 5, this theory of communitarian flexibly specialised production systems is too 
dependent upon a productivist, work-society' form of theorising and politics, which 
downplays the possibility of other forms of social organisation that might be possible beyond 
the old labour utopias Moreover, taking up themes from Chapter 3, it does not take 
significantly seriously the manner in which significant sections of late modem industrial 
societies are being excluded from participation in the work-society Finally, Chapter 6 has 
shown how the FS thesis with its valorisation of regions, localities and districts opens up the 
possibility of a virulent form of neo-medieval, Balkanised polarisations of the rationaliser 
winners' and the rationaliser losers'. But, as should be emphasised, this is only a possibility in 
an artifactual world and the general conclusion should be that the FS thesis is still a creative 
and progressively advancing research programme which could incorporate these criticisms into 
its own research agenda It is certainly the case, moreover, that the FS thesis represents a 
radical neo-modemisation perspective which goes beyond' the orthodoxies of neo-liberalism 
and is desperately seeking a vision of a new world order
As a final set of comments to the conclusion of this thesis I would just like to remark on the 
manner in which the FS 'research programme' could develop and progress, rather than
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'degenerate' and stagnate As mentioned above the FS thesis shares a number of commonalities 
with a wide-range of anti-'neo-liberal' political and socio-economic programmes and ideas 
circulating in the contemporary world o f the late twentieth century. Moreover, it has been 
suggested that the FS thesis can be viewed as convergent with the theory of'reflexive 
modernisation' insofar as it shares a similar interest in a 'neo-modemisation' perspective on 
contemporary political and socio-economic transformations and restructurings. Thus it is my 
contention that the next stage of theorising should be to make this convergence more explicit 
and to help draw out where the two programmes of'flexible specialisation' and ’reflexive 
modernisation' could mutually enrich each other. This is not to say, of course, that these two 
programmes or theories are internally homogeneous within themselves as it is the case that the 
FS thesis, as shown in this dissertation, is by no means a single unified and uncontested set of 
propositions Likewise, the theory of'reflexive modernisation' is a broad perspective rather 
than a single, logically clarified theory undivided by debate and controversy (see, Beck,
Giddens and Lash, 1994, Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne, 1996)
Nevertheless, the two programmes feed on the same Zeitgeist and 'networks' of social scientific 
research which can be broadly summarised as a 'progressive' intelligentsia which while 
disillusioned with Marxism has not capitulated to the ideology of the globalised 'ffee-markef 
Both programmes identify the late twentieth century as a period of transformation and 
transition For the FS thesis it is a time o f another 'great divide' or 'second industrial divide' 
based on fundamental socio-economic transformations which are transforming the productive 
structure of society on a global basis and which, moreover, are leading to great institutional 
readjustments on the level of corporate organization and governance, political organisation 
and cultural production and consumption. Likewise for the 'reflexive modernisation' 
perspective we are witnessing a fundamental 'divide' in late twentieth century societies 
between an era of 'simple-modernisation' on the one hand and, on the other, and the coming 
era of'reflexive modernisation' based on a need to master our own 'mastery' of the social 
and'natural' world In these terms then the reflexive modernisation perspective can provide a 
broader framework for situating the institutional changes identified by the FS thesis One that 
is able to draw upon the idea that a revamped neo-modemisation perspective is a useful way 
to go forward in a situation where there are marked tendencies towards a convergence of 
industrial structures upon some form o f 'market' based relationships on the one hand, but also 
on the other hand, a growing acceptance that the 'market' is always socially and institutionally 
embedded in a pre-contractual web of relationships and networks which leads, logically, to the 
conclusion that 'market' based societies exhibit marked divergences between each other in 
terms of how the market is organized and regulated In this sense, then, this dissertation leads
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to the conclusion that a new hybrid theory is coining into existence which could be called for 
want of a better term 'reflexive flexible specialisation' While 'reflexive modernisation' is a sort 
of meta-theory which highlights the broad sociological transformations contemporary societies 
are undergoing, 'flexible specialisation' is a more specific research agenda which is attempting 
to suggest counter-factual, 'plausible' possibilities which are tendentially present in the 
contemporary world at the level of the socio-economy Moreover, such a recoding avoids the 
reductionism implicit in the FS thesis where a narrowly defined concept of industrial division 
and change is interpreted as representing the whole complex social totality.
In line with the latest developments in 'reflexive modernisation' theory it is necessary to argue 
that 'reflexive modernisation' is a form of neo-modernisation theory which attempts to steer a 
course through the idea of modernisation as being 'necessitarian' on the one hand, and on the 
other, being a 'artifactual' social construction. As Beck has argued the theory of'reflexive 
modernisation' is as much about self-confrontation as 'reflexivity'. Beck argues that the 
transition from 'simple modernisation' to the new 'reflexive' stage occurs unintentionally, "Risk 
society is not an option which could be chosen or rejected in the course of political debate, It 
arises through the automatic operation of autonomous modernisation processes which are 
blind and deaf to consequences and dangers (p. 26, 1996) However, the blindness of the 
modernisation process increasingly calls forth a response in terms of a political and 'sub- 
political' (Beck) logic of criticism which opens up a societal space for renewed social critique 
which Beck calls "reflexive modernisation as a theory of the self-criticism of society" (p.33, 
1996) The reference to Beck's concept of'sub-politics' is particularly pertinent in relationship 
to the his comments on Piore and Sabel's ideas in the section in Risk Society (19921 called 
'The Sub-Politics of Industrial Automation' (p215). Commenting on the changes happening in 
many industrial sectors Beck refers to the "new forms of'flexible specialization' [which] 
compete effectively with the old 'hulks' of mass production." (p.215). Moreover, Beck 
elaborates by suggesting that it is important to to evaluate these restructurings correctly and 
he writes "The model of primary rationalization, which is marked out by changes in the 
categories of job, skill and technical system, is being displaced by reflexive rationalizations "
(P 217) These changes involve transformations in the plant paradigm, the arrangement o f  
production sectors, and mass production
And yet while the theories of reflexive modernisation and FS can leam from one another and 
feed off each other’s insights, it is nevertheless the case that their commitment to local, partial 
and sectional critiques can give rise to confusion and lack o f clarity about the general 
principles and values which govern and organise society. In criticising Marxism and Critical
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Theory for having a transcendent concept of critique, Beck thus avoids an explicit self- 
thematisation of values, norms and principles which is necessary for any genuine social 
critique So while Beck writes that the theory of risk society avoids the "difficulties of a 
critical theory of society in which theorists apply more or less well justified standards to 
society and then judge and condemn them accordingly"(p.33,1996) it comes into collision with 
the problem of confusing and eliding the levels of description, prediction and prescription 
which is one of the problems with the FS thesis as argued above in many places in this 
dissertation Therefore a more analytically precise differentiation and specification of these 
levels of analysis must be the aim of any future research into reflexive modernisation and FS. 
That is to say any empirical research into the new production, corporate and governance 
structures that are emerging in the new space economy must specify and analytically 
differentiate between what is happening empirically (description), the broad trends shaping the 
future (prediction) on the one hand ( for an exemplary analysis along these lines see Lash and 
Urry, 1994) and, on the other hand, the question of normativity and prescription which is a 
question of political philosophy defined in the broadest sense.
Thus while the FS thesis draws upon normative political philosophy - ideas of justice, equality, 
community, liberty, democracy, etc - it rarely makes explicit the way in which it defines and 
evaluates these concepts Where it does make distinctions it either collapses the distinction 
between description and prescription as in the case of Sabel in particular Or, on the other 
hand, it builds up an unbridgeable gulf between what is (description) and what should or could 
be (prescription) as is the case in different ways with Unger and Hirst Consequently the 
actual agents or actors of social change are entirely left out of the picture and thus the 
intermediate level of prediction is elided and undertheorised Perhaps Piore's Bevond 
Individualism (1995), with its democratic pragmatist Deweyian overtones, goes some way to 
avoid these errors and to successfully integrate all three levels in a satisfactory, but analytically 
differentiated fashion Whatever the case may be the future of the reflexive modernisation 
theory,of which the flexible specialisation thesis is a sub-component, depends upon the 
successful identification and differentiation of these analytically defined levels of research and 
advocacy An engagement with some of the arguments of radical political philosophy is on the 
agenda as represented by, say, John Roemer (1995), Elmar AJtvater (1993) and G.A Cohen 
(1988)
While it is true that the political terms 'left' and 'right' have been subject to something of a 
deconstruction in recent years and there is much talk of the 'End of Left-Right Dichotomy' (de 
Benoist, 1995) or 'Beyond Left and Right' (Giddens, 1994) there is still the need to recognise
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that history has far from ended in the utopia of an egalitarian liberal democracy, rather there is 
the threat of a 'turbo-charged capitalism' (Luttwak, 1994,1995) where we will see the revival 
of various forms of fascism and fundamentalist jihad In this context it is necessary to 'reinvent 
the Left' (Miliband, 1994) in a spirit of ecumenical dialogue with all those traditions of social 
thought which hold out hopes of the realisation of a more just and solidaristic society. Thus, 
despite these deconstructions, Stephen Lukes is correct to say that "Left-Right maps still make 
sense of our politics and the Left is right "(p. 10, 1992). The FS research programme if open to 
these other radical social theories can contribute to this reinvention. Thus it is important to 
view-the FS research programme as an attempt to create and invent a set of ideas and 
programmes which are concerned with the institutional reinvention of the political, social and 
economic architecture of society, inspired in particular by a theory of 'radical democracy' 
(Unger) It is a theory and programmatic ideal which hopes to avoid the error of rationalistic 
social engineering on the one hand and also on the other hand, the error of 'free-market' 
'reengineering' and 'downsizing' of the 'new' 'ruthless' economy (see, Sennett, 1995, Head,
1996) Furthermore, its artifactual or political constructionist approach takes into account 
important contextual factors to do with national, regional and local specificities and 
differences, thus avoiding false universalistic schemas (see Locke & Thelen 1995) which have 
harmed previous attempts at proposing forms of institutional and political reinvention
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REFERENCES: CONCLUSION
1 Giddens, for example, in Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics 
(1994), seems to suggest a relatively unproblematic theory of what he calls reflexive 
modernisation' which conceals the contingent openness of modernity: "The development of 
social reflexivity is the key influence on a diversity of changes that otherwise seem to have 
little in common. Thus the emergence of post-Fordism' in industrial enterprises is usually 
analyzed in terms of technological change . But the underlying reason for the growth of 
flexible production' and bottom-up decision-making is that a universe of high reflexivity leads 
to greater autonomy of action, which the enterprise must recognize and draw on" (p 7) 
Giddens draws upon the work of Ulrich Beck, but Beck seems to open up a greater space for 
contingency than Giddens Beck's distinction between simple modernization is a phase of 
social transformation in which...modernization changes shape. Class, stratum, occupation, sex 
roles, businesses, sectoral structures . are all affected...Unconsciously, and counter to planned 
activity, modernization is undercutting modernization". (1985, p.36). Giddens use of the term 
'reflexivity' seems to suggest a linear, evolutionary theory of development which repeats some 
of the errors of classical, orthodox modernization theory. Indeed, Alexander (1995, p 42-47) 
has criticized the "hubris of linearity and the dangers of theoretical amnesia' (p.42) in Giddens' 
theory of'reflexive modernity'. Beck's theory of 'reflexive modernity', on the other hand, 
seems much more in tune with the theory o f ' neo-modemization' put forward by Alexander 
and Tiryakian.
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